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TERENTIUS O'DONNELL, S.T.D.,

CENSOR DEP.

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
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SOME QUESTIONABLE TENDENCIES IN THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD

THE present age has been made familiar with the contention that the dogmas of the Catholic Church are incompatible with the established truths of science. It has even been claimed that these latter are steadily demolishing the grounds of all belief in the supernatural: in revealed religion, miracles, creation, immortality; and that science pronounces the great, ultimate problems concerning the origin, nature and destiny of man and the universe to be simply insoluble. Such confident assertions of Agnosticism are, indeed, much rarer now than they were a generation back. In the heyday of Huxley and Tyndall and Spencer, natural scientists were disposed to accept the Darwinian hypothesis as the best attainable philosophy of life and mind, and physical scientists fondly imagined that the equations of abstract mechanics offered the most satisfactory account we could hope for of the universality of things. The first fascination of such vast and novel conceptions betrayed not a few of the leading scientists of the time into an attitude of over-hasty and unscientific approval. The present-day leaders of science are more cautious and guarded. Thinking men have got time to reflect calmly and dispassionately on many at least of the newer facts, to examine more carefully the assumptions involved in the methods by which scientific theories are propounded, and to see the limitations of these methods and theories. As a result of this, I think we can detect a

more becoming modesty in the speculations of those living scientists who theorize upon ultimate or philosophical problems concerning matter and life and mind—for the greatest scientists *do* theorize on these problems: they ever have been, and ever will be, philosophers as well as scientists.

But it is the lot of all leaders of thought to have their themes and theories misunderstood, mis-stated and distorted from their rightful sense, in the interests not of truth, but of party, by second- or third-rate popularizers, whose assurance is in excess of their insight. And so it comes that our current newspaper and periodical literature is still liberally supplied with unproven assumptions and speculations, posing as 'scientific truths.' Some of these, indeed, run so directly counter to common sense that it is scarcely credible they could mislead anyone: as, for instance, the assertion that our belief in free-will is an illusion; or that our whole mental life is a mere mechanical dance of material or electrical particles; or that, on the contrary, all material phenomena, including our own bodies and brains, are really mental or spiritual entities—thoughts or ideas formed by some mind or minds. But still, many of the current *pseudo*-'scientific truths' though sufficiently startling, and calculated to disturb common Christian beliefs, are not manifestly false; and when they are presented to the unsuspecting inquirer with all the credentials and all the authority attaching to the 'rigorous and exact methods of modern scientific research,' it is no wonder if they sometimes unsettle sound philosophical and religious convictions. These convictions, however, it is the obvious duty of every Christian who possesses them to protect and defend; while it belongs in a special way to the office of the Christian *teacher* to expose the fallacies of those specious catch-cries of free-thought and pseudo-science which are a constant menace to the Christian's philosophy of life. And whoever undertakes the task of analysing any of these modern naturalistic deliverances which parade as 'science,' will find that the fallacies lurk not so much in the explicit application of the methods of inference by which the erro-

neous or unproven positions are supposed to be established, as in the more or less tacit assumptions which underlie both the methods themselves and the initial interpretation of the materials to which these methods are applied. Starting-points are assumed as axioms which are not axioms at all, but only postulates,—at best hypothetical, and often very questionable even as hypotheses. It is forgotten that each of the special sciences deals with only one or a few *abstract aspects* of a *limited portion* of the whole domain of human experience ; and that any attempt to erect a special science or group of cognate sciences into a *philosophy*, by extending its methods and findings to *all* experience, involves the very grave danger of mistaking part for the whole. In any attempt of the kind, deep and abiding differences between the various fields of phenomena are inevitably ignored or unduly minimized ; resemblances often remote and far-fetched are overrated ; unwarranted liberties are taken with the argument from analogy ; and the natural craving of the human mind to simplify and unify its rich variety of experience, tempts us to take rest and refuge in over-hasty generalizations, in theories which ought not to satisfy us, since they will not and cannot stand the test of a more candid and sustained analysis.

The work of forming a *philosophy*, of thinking out for oneself a reasonable *world-view* which will embrace *the whole* of experience, is a more arduous task than that of the specialist in any department of science ; and the scientific specialist is here peculiarly exposed to the danger of arriving at a one-sided philosophy by a too exclusive attachment to his own methods and materials. An intimate acquaintance with the methodology of his own special science will not enable him to dispense with that training in General Logic to which all must submit who would learn the proper method of approaching those ultimate, philosophical problems presented by universal experience to the reflecting mind. But if this General Logic become itself one-sided, if it be not applicable to *all* experience, it will be an unsafe guide to philosophy. *Modern Inductive Logic* is hardly above reproach in this respect.

These general considerations I purpose to illustrate in due course by examining certain assumptions that underlie the usual treatment of the *Logic of Induction*. For, needless to say, the scope and significance of the general truths or laws which we discover and establish about the matters of our experience will depend altogether upon the value we attach to the special methods and entire mental procedure by which we arrive at such truths or laws ; and this whole procedure is commonly dealt with nowadays under the general title of *Induction*. The logical *Theory of Induction* ought, therefore, to rest on *universal* experience and furnish us with a *method of philosophy*. It is no part of the duty of the exponent of General Inductive Logic to explore the provinces of the special sciences in order to expound the various modes of procedure peculiar to each. This is the function of the special sciences themselves : each has its own special methodology. Philosophy synthesizes the results of the special sciences ; and to set forth *its* methodology is the function of General Logic. But just because philosophy does take up and interpret, collate and harmonize, as far as may be, the assumptions and conclusions of the special sciences—mathematical, physical, natural, anthropological, social, economic, ethical, etc., it is not so easy in practice to decide where the work of each special science ceases and that of philosophy begins. And so it is, too, with regard to the scope of General Logic. This may easily deviate into the investigation of methodological details proper to special sciences ; or—what is a more serious mistake—it may, by losing sight of some departments of human experience and falling unduly under the influence of others, set forth as general canons of philosophical investigation, methods that may be valid only within the narrower presuppositions of some special science or group of sciences. These are mistakes which writers on Inductive Logic since the time of Mill have not, I fear, successfully avoided. Nor is it difficult to one looking back, to see why such mistakes were, humanly speaking, almost unavoidable. I would account for them in this wise.

At different epochs men engaged in the investigation

of those higher and deeper problems which lie along the confines of philosophy and the special sciences, have been very differently impressed as to the relative values of these latter in advancing human knowledge. At one time the attention of scholars is drawn more exclusively to one group of sciences, and at another time to another group: and the Logic of each period will be found to reflect faithfully the then prevailing attitude, by its fuller consideration of the methods and data of the dominating group.

Thus we see that, broadly speaking, the Middle Ages witnessed an exhaustive development of the Logic of *Deductive Reasoning*. This was because men were then more satisfied with their principles of knowledge and perhaps more religiously-minded; because they set greater store on a knowledge of man's nature and destiny than on a knowledge of the external universe; because for progress in the former they relied on (deductive) reasoning from great, broad, general principles and truths that were universally accepted at the time—some on the authority of God as being revealed by Him, others as self-evident, others again as sufficiently established partly by their intrinsic evidence and partly by the common assent and authority of the learned of past ages.

Then came the period of the Renaissance, a period of doubt about hitherto received principles, of revolt against authority and rejection of traditional views and methods. On the one hand the hitherto accepted teachings of philosophy and religion were critically re-examined; and this new analysis had finally the effect of adding to the *traditional* Logic an extensive discussion on the possibility and grounds of human certitude and on the ultimate criteria or tests of truth. On the other hand, a closer attention to the study of external nature led to a wonderful progress in the domain of the physical sciences. The cultivation of this fertile field of research has been rewarded by rich and useful discoveries; the physical universe is being eagerly explored and made to yield up its secrets; and the general laws and conditions according to which its phenomena unroll themselves are the keys by which its most hidden

agencies are brought to light and utilized by human enterprise. Hence the high degree of importance that has been attached to *general truths of the physical order*—in contrast with these other general truths that have to do with man's religion, natural or supernatural, with his moral conduct in life, with the inner nature of his own mind and soul, with the ultimate purpose of his existence, and with his final destiny.¹ Hence, too, the very large and prominent place devoted in modern treatises on Logic to an analysis of the method and processes by which *general truths about the physical universe* can be securely and certainly established: as if these were the only general truths of importance, or anyhow of most importance, to man; as if *Physical Induction* were the only or the chief method of reaching a certain knowledge of the weightiest truths to which the human mind can hope to attain.

The modern logician of Induction invites us into chemical, physical and physiological laboratories; he familiarizes us with test-tubes and balances, with boilers and engines and dynamos, with microscopes and telescopes; he teaches us how to observe and experiment, how to detect analogies between physical phenomena, how to construct hypotheses foreshadowing the laws according to which these phenomena take place; he lays down canons which will help us to simplify our data by elimination of the unessential, and so to test or establish—or, it may be, to reject or to modify—our hypotheses, until we thus finally discover and generalize some abstract law about the conditions requisite for the occurrence and the recurrence of some physical event.

But the general truths we reach about the external universe as distinct from man himself, by the application of such methods, constitutes *only one* department of human knowledge—an important one, no doubt, yet by no means the most important. There is, for instance, the wide and fertile, if more difficult, department of human research which has for its object the phenomena of *human* activity

¹ Cf. Joseph, *An Introduction to Logic*, pp. 344 sqq.

in the individual, in the family, and in the State: the domains of anthropology and psychology, of the social, economic and political sciences. The methods of discovering and establishing general truths in these sciences should have no smaller degree of interest for the logician than the methods of reaching, say, the Law of Universal Gravitation. Yet the modern logician tells us comparatively little about the former: about *statistics* and *averages* and the *canons of probability*: the various means of reaching another class of general truths or laws which may have immense practical interest for us, even though we can have only moral, and not physical or metaphysical, certitude concerning them.

And what about the innumerable truths, or supposed truths, some of which inform us of *particular* facts in human history, such as the conquest of Gaul by Cæsar, or the crucifixion of Christ; others of which embody *generalizations* such as that 'Moral excellence in men and nations results from their possession of deep and true religious beliefs'; and all of which are accepted and believed, by nine-tenths of those who do accept and believe them, *on the authority of their fellow-men*, on the strength of *historical evidence*? If the logician thinks it a part of his duty to teach us how to measure *masses* and *motions of matter* by the 'method of means,' the 'method of least squares,'¹ etc., may we not reasonably expect from him an equally detailed code of directions in the task, let us say, of estimating the value of the historical evidence in favour of the alleged fact—so momentous in human history—that Christ rose from the dead after His crucifixion?

The logician is no more debarred from dealing with the methodology of 'metaphysical,' or 'ethical,' or 'historical' truth than he is from investigating the methods of discovering and establishing 'physical' truths. Truths and theories, facts and phenomena, whether real or alleged, whether 'religious' or 'scientific,' forming, as they all do, the common data of philosophy, fall equally within the

¹ Cf. Welton, *Logic*, ii., § 158; Joyce, *Logic*, p. 368.

sphere of Logic. They are all subjects of human investigation : and it ought to be, therefore, the function of General Logic, not to teach us how to explore the hidden recesses of any particular department, but rather to give us a general training in the method of discovering and proving truth : a training which will help us equally well all round, which will aid us in determining whether God exists and has spoken to us through Christ, no less than in determining whether radium cures cancer or whether alleged ' telepathic ' phenomena are mere coincidences.

The logician must, of course, ultimately use his own discretion in determining whether he ought in a general way to indicate the main methods in use in this or that special department of science ; and it is just here, in judging which departments are worthy of a more detailed attention, that he will be influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by the general trend of intellectual activity in his own time and country. In this way he is exposed to the danger of unduly emphasizing the scope and import of certain special methods of scientific research, or even of setting them up as the *only* methods of attaining to truth.

Now, Modern Inductive Logic gives pretty clear evidence of suffering from an undue bias of the sort just outlined : it has concerned itself somewhat too exclusively with the mathematically exact quantitative methods of the physical sciences, and it has thus fostered an unwholesome tendency to conceive and treat *all* human experience as amenable to the laws and methods of mechanics. It has been more or less obsessed by the rigid determinism of the ' Mechanical Theory of the Universe,' which was so much in vogue about half a century ago. The accounts it gives us of *Causality* and *Law*, of *Science* and *Demonstration* and *Explanation*, contain a great deal that is ambiguous and not a little that is positively misleading. A remark or two about each of these points will suffice to reveal the resulting tendencies.

Efficient Causality, or rather the *efficiency* involved in causality, is ignored on the intelligible plea that *Physical Science* is concerned only with discovering the essential

conditions requisite for the uniform co-existence or sequence of the phenomena with which it deals. But if Physical Science thus *abstracts* from the efficiency of Nature's agencies and is then surreptitiously set up as a *Philosophy*, as the only science of Nature to which the mind can attain, the step is a short one to the *denial* of efficiency in Nature, or at least to the denial of any possible 'knowledge' of efficiency—and this in spite of the most palpable and fundamental fact in all man's conscious experience: his consciousness of his own *efficient* causality!

Again, the terms 'Causality,' 'Causation,' are transferred from their traditional meaning to designate the *regularity* or *uniformity* with which the processes of the physical universe are assumed to take place. And because the reliability of the generalizations of physical science is based upon this postulate of 'Uniformity,' it is insinuated that 'scientific' knowledge would be impossible if this uniformity were not absolutely rigid, inviolable and all-embracing; that a 'free' or 'self-determining' cause would render the whole universe 'unintelligible'; and that, therefore, belief in free-will must be an illusion!

Mathematical reasoning is exact and cogent; the application of number to weighing and measuring physical phenomena familiarizes us with mental *calculation* of the quantitative side of the latter; we symbolize the mechanical aspects of physical processes by arithmetical or algebraic formulas and equations; we can *explain* a result when we can *calculate* numerically the value of each of the factors that lead up to it. If we become exclusively absorbed in this quantitative study of physical processes, in applying to these the equations of abstract mechanics, we are very naturally and very gravely exposed to the danger of forgetting the *qualitative* diversity of physical phenomena, of considering no knowledge as 'certain' or 'scientific' which is not in the nature of a *calculation*, no proof as 'scientific' which is not *mathematically cogent*, no explanation as 'scientific' which does not explain in terms of such quantitative conceptions as 'number,' 'space,' 'time,' and 'velocity.'

It can scarcely be denied that such narrow and one-sided conceptions of knowledge, science, certitude and the knowable are fostered by current methods of treating the Logic of Induction ; that misleading views are propagated, or at least not discountenanced, regarding so-called 'scientific' laws and theories and methods ; and that sound convictions are often shaken or ruined by the groundless dogmatism of false teachers who endeavour—and too often successfully—to palm off their pet theories as 'established truths of science.' Some of these misleading tendencies I hope to illustrate in another article.

P. COFFEY.

ST. GREGORY THE GREAT, POPE AND CONFESSOR ¹

THE PREFECT OF ROME

ON a bright Spring morning, fourteen centuries ago, a young man in the prime of life, about thirty years of age, stood before his palace on the Cœlian Hill, in Rome. He was Prefect or Governor of the city, and wore the gorgeous robes appertaining to his office. In the absence of the Emperor, he was the lay ruler of the Eternal City.

Although the glories of pagan Rome were then declining, yet a splendid panorama lay before the young Prefect Gregory. The Cœlian Hill extended from St. John Lateran to the Vigna of the Porta Capena, and from the Grotto of Egeria to the present Convent of San Gregorio. In the time of St. Gregory on either side rose the splendid monuments of pagan Rome's wealth, luxury, and pleasure. Amongst the latter stood out in massive relief the remains of Rome's greatness in the past and emblem of her perpetuity in the future—the Coliseum. Of this mighty amphitheatre, which remains to-day to overawe the twentieth-century tourist, the Venerable Bede wrote :—

While stands the Coliseum Rome shall stand.

When falls the Coliseum Rome shall fall ;

And when Rome falls—the world.²

Before Gregory lay the ruins of the luxurious baths of Caracalla—stately columns still remaining upright and many prostrate over the ground. Directly opposite his palace rose the Palatine Hill, even then covered with the remains of clustering palaces which were haunted by the memory of many an emperor. Beneath his eyes was the mighty palace of the Cæsars, also falling to decay.

¹ *Gregory the Great, His place in History and Thought.* By F. Holmes Dudden, B.D., Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford.

² Owing to the fact that Byron quotes these lines in *Childe Harold* some persons have ascribed them to the poet instead of to the priest.

But even then amid the crumbling ruins a new Rome was growing up. Stately Christian edifices were competing in magnificence and beauty with the pagan structures. Amongst those in reach of his gaze stood St. Paul's on the Ostian Way :—

By Tiber's current where the turf on the left bank is grazed
And Ostia's Road guardeth the hallowed ground,
Our Prince's favour there to Paul a stately fane upraised,
And pranked with golden plates the circuit round,
The aisles are ruddy as the morning ray.

But greater changes were occurring in the mind of the young Prefect than even those of the physical order which met his view.

Gregory was born in A.D. 540.¹ His father, Gordianus, had been a Senator, and Regenarius or Deacon of the city. He was descended from the old patrician family of the Anicia. His mother, St. Silvia, had, after the death of her husband, consecrated herself to God. It was, says the Saint's biographer, Dr. Dudden,² from her 'that he derived his almost feminine tenderness, power of sympathy, religious mysticism, self-sacrificing, self-effacing disposition.' While from his father 'he had handed down to him administrative capacity, legal acumen, and an inexorable justice.' Thus all circumstances combined to make a deep impression on the mind of the thoughtful child who, growing up amid the relics of a greatness that had passed away, was daily reminded of the vanity of things, and began to look on the world with sorrowful eyes. This feeling grew deeper every day, even the glitter of his jewelled robes could not dispel it.

¹ Some enthusiasts, jealous of the honour of Ireland, have endeavoured to trace the origin of Gregory's family to Irish descent. But after many enquiries I cannot find any solid reason for this assumption. No doubt in the text of the *Annals of the Four Masters*, an entry occurs of the election of Gregory to the Pontifical throne. The tradition must have arisen from the fact that one of the three Canons connected with the Island of Arran was named 'Grigoir.' The name of Gregory became popular, and we find St. Gregory's Well and St. Gregory's Cave at Arranmore, and some places in Kerry. However, it is remarkable that in the *Annals of the Four Masters*, as far as I could trace them, the election of any Pope is not recorded, except Gregory, and probably the Annalists must have had some reason for including his election in their records.

² From whom I chiefly quote in this paper.

The transition was determined on the very day we see him standing before his palace gate. His training had much to do with the step he was about to take. As a boy he was grave beyond his years, 'a dreamer full of fervent aspirations and religious enthusiasm, a student, glad to sit humbly at the feet of older men, a university scholar without a touch of pedantry, and withal a youth whose character was shaping in noble lines.' His education, sacred and secular, well qualified him for the post of Prefect.

In the absence of the Emperor in far-away Byzantium, and of the Exarch at Ravenna, the position of Governor of Rome was one of great dignity and responsibility. On the death of Pope John, Gregory had to deal with the Lombards—his life-long terror—ever thundering at the gates of Rome, within which poverty and disease were rife. It was at this time he felt that the world, its honours, and its cares pressed upon his mind, and warned him that its influence was growing upon him, and then he came to the resolution to resign his position, to dispose of his wealth amongst the poor, and to turn his palace into a monastery. And so, having abandoned and laid aside every sign of his former rank and wealth, the young man changed the silken and glittering garments which dazzled all eyes, and donned the coarse dress of the monk. He began to learn the lesson of humility as a simple brother in the monastery into which he had turned his palace.

His biographer remarks how the young Prefect thought that in entering the door of the monastery he was locking himself in for ever from the outside world, whereas he was really entering a door which was destined to lead him into the midst of affairs spiritual and temporal, and ultimately to raise him to the highest dignity to which man could attain, and to exercise an influence which reformed the Christian world in his own time, and which has not ceased after the lapse of fourteen centuries to affect the spiritual and temporal affairs of Christianity to the present day.

THE MONK

Before we follow the late Prefect of Rome into his monastery let us say a word of the great Order of the Church on whose lines, if not exact rule, Gregory's community was conducted. Certainly his model was the glorious Order of the Benedictines and their two famous monasteries of Subiaco and Monte Casino. They were at once the centres of piety, learning, and labour. In those days, whilst kings and nobles were feasting and carousing, it was the religious Orders who preserved all the classic literature and all the elements of the physical sciences, the development of which we now possess. On this point the great Protestant historian of English literature, Hallam, says :—

— For five centuries every sort of knowledge was confined to the Church, it kept flowing in the worst of seasons a slender but living stream, and Benedict, whose Order became most widespread, enjoined upon his brethren to copy and collect books. This, in course of time, became the means of multiplying classical manuscripts.

And in centuries after, when the printing press had been discovered, it was from Subiaco went forth some of its first productions—the Bible, and following it the *De Civitate Dei* of St. Augustine, and the *De Oratore* of Cicero. The following reference to the discovery of the printing press is made by Hallam :—

There was a practice in the Church of taking impressions from blocks of wood for rude cuts of saints, frequently accompanied by a few lines of letters cut in the blocks. Gradually entire pages were impressed, and then began what were called block books, printed in fixed characters.

Thus from this pious Catholic custom came the invention of that printing press which revolutionized the world of letters.

Reading such testimonies to the great part which the Catholic Church played in the diffusion even of secular learning, it is surprising how silent non-Catholic seats of learning have been upon this point. However, some short

time ago a graceful, if a tardy, tribute was paid to the literary work of the great Order of St. Benedict by Trinity College, Dublin. At a recent conferring of degrees, one, *honoris causâ*, was granted to the Benedictine Abbot of Downside. On that occasion the public orator said :—

Benedict allowed man's heavenly craving for enriching the mind with learning, and thus it came to pass that through all the ages, from the houses who have followed his rule, established for men by intrinsic wisdom, have issued most important books distinguished by acuteness, erudition, and culture. So that the Benedictines have with the most perfect right been always regarded as the most learned amongst the Orders of the Church of Rome.

But the rule of Benedict provided for more than pious exercises or literary labours. Amongst the steps of the 'ladder of perfect life' he laid great stress on the exercise of manual labour. He said 'the good monk must be a worker; anchorites might enjoy a life of contemplation after long privation and having learned to fight against the devil,' but for those unable to read or meditate, *even on Festivals* he prescribed 'some work that one can do and so avoid being idle,' and yet we hear even to-day from those uncatholically educated of the 'lazy monks'; far better would be the alliterative and truer phrase the 'lazy laity.'

Benedict's knowledge of human nature was profound, and his sympathy with human weakness immense; he wound up his rule in these words :—

We, therefore, are now about to institute a school of divine servitude in which we hope nothing will be ordained rigorous or burdensome, but leading to a life never departing from His teaching, but preserving in our monastery His doctrine unto death.

Since I wrote the above description, I have read the beautiful words of Mr. Birrell, Chief Secretary for Ireland, when referring the other day to the noble history, and brutal destruction of the great Benedictine Abbey at

Reading in Berkshire. It was on the occasion of the unveiling of a memorial cross to Henry I.; he said :—

But here in Reading they thought of Henry as the founder of the great Abbey on the 18th June, 1121, just 788 years ago—now the ruin of a ruin—and it was impossible to help asking how this came about. That great Abbey and its once glorious church was hallowed on a particular date by Thomas à Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury, attended by ten bishops and all the great nobles of the land. Parliaments were held within its walls, and no single monarch or queen, or any distinguished inhabitant of the land ever failed to visit Reading and to worship within the walls of the Abbey. And, yet, suddenly as it appears to us, one black day in 1539 the inhabitants of Reading, men and women, stood apparently guiltily by, and allowed the Abbot of Reading, the Mitred Abbot, a man of blameless life, to be brutally executed in front of the gateway of his own home, and his companions scattered penniless upon the world. They had been owners of great properties, and dispensers of great charities—the main features of the authors and builders of Reading—and, yet, in the hour of their displacement and their shame, apparently nobody lifted a hand on their behalf.

So in a monastery founded on these lines the future Pope and Saint spent, according to himself, the happiest three years of his life, for in after years when overwhelmed with the cares of all the churches and monasteries, aye, and of all the kingdoms of Christendom, he burst out into lamentations over the monastic peace and quiet which he had lost, for he cried out :—

I am shaken by the waves of a great sea, and the ship of the soul is dashed by the storms of a mighty tempest, and when I recall the condition of my former life, I sigh, as one who looks back on the shore he has left behind.

But already in this haven of rest his reputation for piety and prudence was commencing to oil the works of that lock which shut him out of the outer world. He was called out by Pope Benedict I., who made him a Deacon of the city. Later on, he was to fill the difficult post of Nuncio at Constantinople, the new capital of the Empire. There his duties were extremely irksome. From Rome he

was bombarded with appeals to accomplish the impossible, and get troops to protect the city from the barbarians. The Byzantine Emperor seemed to forget the ancient capital and the threatening Lombard hordes ; the Patriarch of Constantinople and the clerical party were jealous of him ; the brilliant and luxurious courtiers disliked him for his aloofness ; and amidst the senseless pageants no one stopped to listen to the sorrowful monk pleading vainly for his fatherland. However, this mission was not entirely devoid of good. Here Gregory acquired the important accomplishment of diplomacy, he studied the characters of leading men, he became acquainted with the workings of the Imperial Government, and learned the important lesson that the Emperor was a broken reed to lean on. He found that Rome and Italy must be saved, if at all, by the vigorous and independent action of those at home. At last he was recalled to Rome—a summons which he received with great joy.

On his departure the Emperor, not very sorry to be relieved of so serious an observer of the proceedings in the the gay capital on the Bosphorus, loaded him with honours, and presented him with two precious relics for his monastery on the Coelian, the head of St. Luke and the arm of St. Andrew.

THE ABBOT

On his return to his convent he was chosen for this office. The monastery became a school of saints and scribes ; the Abbot himself became the exponent of the Old Testament. During his lectures the students took shorthand notes which were afterwards transcribed in full. In his preface to his lectures on the Book of Job, St. Gregory makes the following apology for its lack of style owing to ill-health. He says : ‘ I have been afflicted with frequent pains and so broken down that I am always in bad health.’ These broken powers were caused by the great austerities which he had practised in former years. But he further qualified this apology with an appeal to his readers, saying :

I beg that in going through this work you will not look for

the foliage of eloquence, for by the Sacred Oracles commentators are expressly debarred from the vanity of empty wordiness in that it is forbidden to plant a grove in the Temple of God, and all know that when a rank crop shows stalks that abound in leaves, the grains of the ears are least filled.

Of this book, which was called *Magna Moralia*, Dean Milman says :—

The Book of Job, according to Gregory, comprehended in itself all natural, all Christian theology, and all morals. It was at once a true and wonderful history, an allegory containing in its secret sense the whole theory of the Christian Church and Christian Sacraments, and a moral philosophy applicable to all mankind.

And we might say to all times, for to this day in the divine Office of the Church, the homilies of St. Gregory are continually quoted.

It was during the interlude between the great change that the incident occurred of Gregory's interview with the young English slaves in the market-place at Rome. 'What,' he said, as he looked at the fair flaxen-haired boys, 'is the name of their nation?' 'Angles.' 'Good,' quoth the Abbot, 'they have the faces of angels. From what country do they come?' 'Diera.' 'Yes, verily they shall be saved from God's ire. How call you their king?' 'Ælla.' 'There must be alleluia in their land.'

The punning Abbot [says Dr. Dudden] returned to his monastery, but the affair did not end in mere words : the bright faces of the English lads haunted him, and at length he proposed leading a mission himself into their distant and unknown country. The Pope gave his consent. Gregory, accompanied by a few monks, stole out of Rome on his long journey. On the way he took out a roll of Scripture and began to read—a grasshopper alighted on the open page. 'Ecce locuta,' he exclaimed, 'that means we shall not be allowed to proceed on the journey.'

Almost as he spoke messengers arrived in hot haste from Pope Pelagius with imperative orders for Gregory to return to Rome without delay. The people of Rome had

got to love the Abbot. When they heard of his departure they flocked in great numbers to the Lateran, and began to upbraid the Pope with terrible cries : ' Ah, Apostolic, what hast thou done ! Thou hast offended Peter, thou hast destroyed Rome.'

So the terrified Pontiff told the messengers if necessary to use force to bring him back. He had therefore for the present to abandon his design, but we shall see that when it was in his power he did not forget it.

Indeed Pelagius could ill spare him ; he was his right-hand man. Just as this time a terrible plague which had spread throughout the length and breadth of the Empire reached Rome. The Tiber overflowed its banks, sea monsters were thrown on the shore, their pestiferous bodies polluted the air. Gibbon paints a fearful picture of this calamity. To add to the consternation, Pope Pelagius sickened and died of it. The choice of his successor lay with the clergy, senate, and people of Rome, and without hesitation they elected the Abbot of St. Andrew. Gregory shrunk from the honour and besought the Emperor not to confirm his election. During the interval the plague continued to rage. Gregory worked indefatigably to check its progress. In the Basilica of the Lateran he preached a great sermon, in which he said :—

My brethren, with contrite hearts, with devout minds, with tears and amended lives, let us assemble at early dawn on the fourth day of the week, and with seven-fold Litany, so that when the strict Judge sees that we punish our faults ourselves He may refrain from passing the sentence of condemnation now ready to be pronounced against us.

And in the bright sun of the Spring morning he led a great procession to St. Peter's. With it is connected the following tradition. According to it, Gregory, at the head of the great train of penitents, was crossing the Bridge of Hadrian. Before his eyes beyond the Aurelian Gate, dazzling in the sunshine, stood the Mausoleum of Hadrian with a conical copula. As Gregory and his penitents passed before it they beheld on the summit the

Archangel Michael in the act of returning to its sheath a flaming sword, in token that the plague was about to cease. And ever after, for many centuries, the Mausoleum continued to be called, as it is to this day, the Castle of St. Angelo.

The account of this blessed procession over the Bridge of St. Angelo in the end of the sixth century reminds us of a tragedy which occurred on the same spot nine hundred years after during the Pontificate of the learned Pope Nicholas V. In the year 1450 he had congregated in Rome vast crowds of scholars from all parts of the world, much in the manner of our modern congresses. Such a throng passed over the bridge of St. Angelo that it broke down, and 200 people perished.

Although Gregory had appealed to the Emperor not to ratify his election, the letter was intercepted, and the ratification came.

Again he took refuge in flight and concealment, but he was pursued and almost dragged to St. Peter's. From being a simple monk he had to be consecrated to the Episcopal office, and he was then 'given as Pope to the city and the world, *urbi et orbi*,' on September 3, 590.

There is a pious tradition that he had concealed himself in a forest cave, but that on the third night, in answer to the prayers and fasting of the people, the place where he had hidden was revealed by a miraculous column of light from heaven.

THE POPE

In the monastic life Gregory had found complete satisfaction for all the aspirations of his soul, and he felt that to work obscurely 'in the Peace of God' was better than an outward exaltation for which one had to pay so great a price.

Writing to the sister of the Empress, he said :—

Under the pretence of being made a bishop, I am brought back to the world, for I am now more in bondage to earthly cares than even when I was a layman. I longed to sit with Mary at the Lord's feet, but I am compelled like Martha to be troubled

with many things : but as it is impossible to resist the ordinance of God, I have obediently followed what the merciful hand of the Lord has been pleased to work out for me.

The new Pope had a lofty idea of the responsibility of the pastoral office. He had laid down beforehand what manner of man should come to the supreme rule of a bishop, to which position he had to be raised before his coronation as Pope, in what spirit he should act, how he should order his own life, how, above all things, a bishop should teach, how he should be a pattern of life.

As for himself [says Paul the Deacon], he never rested ; the habits of monastic discipline he did not abandon, after his removal to the Palace of the Lateran, he surrounded himself with the most learned clerks and pious monks and lived with them in common. His diet was of the simplest. He cut off all luxuries and continued to wear his coarse monk's dress.

His management of the city and his regard for the temporal as well as the spiritual needs of the people was manifest in all his acts. The rich patrician families, whose properties had been plundered by the Lombards, left the Pope as the only wealthy man in Rome, and to him, and to the Church, the people could only look for the means of existence.

So thoroughly did he consider himself responsible for the welfare of the people that on one occasion, when a poor person died of starvation in a lodging-house, the Pope abstained from saying Mass for some days, sorrowing as if he had been the man's murderer.

But his solicitude for the spiritual needs of the people exceeded his interest in their temporal welfare. He believed with St. Paul that it was an indispensable qualification for a bishop to teach. His mastery of the matter and phraseology of the Bible was complete ; it became as it were his own natural language. His thoughts so flowed in Scriptural channels that they ran in no other. He it was who first introduced stories, like the parables of our Lord, into his sermon, and he advocated their use for conveying great truths to the people.

On the point of unquestioning belief of doctrines not easily understood by human intelligence, he wisely said : ' If the word of God could be comprehended by reason it would be no longer wonderful, and *faith would have no merit if reason provided proof.*'

By many writers to St. Gregory is ascribed the reform in Church music called the Plain Song or Gregorian Chant. Other biographers, amongst them Dr. Dudden, question this connexion. He contends that there is no reference to it in St. Gregory's own writings, which were prolific ; nor is it mentioned in his epitaph recounting his chief works. Paul the Deacon does not refer to it, nor does the Venerable Bede, nor Isidore, his contemporary, both great musicians ; again, ' the notation,' says Dr. Dudden, ' belongs rather to the eighth than the sixth century.' Doubtless this statement originated in the fact that the Pope took a great interest in the choir boys of the Basilica, frequently leading them himself.

But this is a matter better left to those more acquainted with it than I am. It is hard to upset a long tradition, particularly when it is held by so learned an authority on all things connected with the saints as their great historian, H. Griser.

Passing from his solicitude for the spiritual and temporal needs of the citizens of Rome, we must note the management of the vast estates of the Church in Italy and other countries known as the patrimony of St. Peter. These possessions were derived from Imperial grants ; legacies from pious donors, property accumulated by bishops and left to the Church at various times. Soon the domains of the Fisherman were swelled to great dimensions, the income in St. Gregory's time amounted to some hundreds of thousands of our pounds sterling. Their supervision in many lands—Campania, Sicily, Africa, etc.—devolved entirely upon the Pope, who thus, long before the time of Pepin or Charlemagne, had been invested with large territories by pious donors.

An examination of St. Gregory's administration will show how great was the responsibility of the papal land-

lord, and how heavy was the task laid upon him. He invested the overseers or agents with their office in the most solemn manner. Before the sacred remains of St. Peter they were made to take an oath 'to maintain the rights of the Church—but at the same time to protect the poor and the oppressed.' Under his own hand he exhorted them: 'Whatever commands you receive from us for the benefit of the poor you must carry out justly and vigorously.' The agents were obliged to keep strict accounts. When these were not considered satisfactory they were summoned to appear in person to explain. In cases of doubt he considered it better '*to incline to kindness than to press the letter of the law.*'


Although conservative of the rights and revenues of the Church, he laid down the following instruction as to administration: 'We will not permit that the exchequer of the Church shall be soiled by sordid profits.' What a lesson to so many owners of property in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries! Fourteen centuries ago this great ruler and landlord anticipated Shakespeare, for he said, 'Let justice season your humility, and let humility temper your justice.'

In the midst of all the Pope still continued his literary labours and pious teaching. At the urgent request of friends he published, under the title of *Dialogues*, a collection of stories. They became so popular that he was known for many centuries as 'Gregory of the Dialogues.' They were simple, but each contained a moral lesson. Let us take one for example:

It was a story from a convent of his great model, the Benedictines, and the scene was in the monastery of Isaac the Syrian. It was broken into by thieves, but they found themselves compelled by a supernatural impulse to work hard at digging the garden the whole night. In the morning the Abbot came with a merry twinkle in his eye, and said to the perspiring burglars, 'Rejoice, my brothers, you have worked well, and now you may take a rest.' He then gave them a good breakfast and a present of vegetables.

This exemplified the advantage of labour over larceny.

Referring to the monasteries scattered then over Christendom, Dr. Dudden says, 'they afforded great opportunities, they were havens of refuge for the destitute,' real houses for the poor, not the sham workhouses and degrading prisons of our day. 'The monks themselves,' he says, 'led a peaceful and happy life, they were generally employed in some manual labour, tilling the ground or building.'

 In his discourses and dialogues St. Gregory displays, with all his sympathy for the weakness of human nature, the vigorous justice which was instilled into him by his illustrious father, the Senator Gordianus. For instance, in his decree on the privilege of asylum in the churches for those flying there for protection, he decreed that this protection was only to be used 'to further the interests of equity and not to screen the wicked from punishment.' If the refugees were slaves, he directed that in case they had any just complaint against their masters, a proper arrangement was to be come to before they left the sanctuary.' If they were free men they left under a pledge of a fair trial, and it was then the duty of the bishop to see that those who so left suffered no unfair treatment. In fact, fair play was St. Gregory's motto. Would it were the creed of many rulers and employers of men both in past and present times, and even of individuals towards each other, and how much less oppression there would have been in the past and how much less of what is called Socialism in the present.

In addition to the austere conduct of his pious life, and his solicitude for the welfare, spiritual and temporal, of his immediate flock in and about Rome, questions of interest to the Church in general had his close attention.

In one particular case, known as the 'three chapters,' a sharp controversy arose. Gregory condemned the 'three chapters,' and although the dispute continued for a long time, in the end his views prevailed.

The most interesting of the many delicate points which St. Gregory had to decide were questions of precedence of the Holy See of Rome. The most important case was that

of John, Patriarch of Constantinople, who claimed the title of Ecumenical, or Universal Bishop. The Pope refused to acknowledge this ambitious title, although the Patriarch had the support of the Emperor ; the attitude of St. Gregory in this contest was one of humility rather than of arrogance.

Whilst laying down the doctrine of the supremacy of the See of Peter as the centre of authority, he dwelt on the personal humility of every bishop, rather than any claim to universal jurisdiction. 'They were all,' he said, 'servants of God,' and he as the successor of St. Peter, considered himself the humblest of all, and selected for his title that which the Popes ever since have borne, *Servus servorum Dei*—'the servant of the servants of God.' The death of John did not end the controversy, for his successor continued to use it. But Gregory never ceased to condemn the assumption of the title. But, as in most instances, what the Pope did not see accomplished in his own day, followed after. During the pontificate of Boniface III., the claim and title were relinquished, and it was solemnly and publicly declared by the Emperor that the Bishop of Rome was the head of the entire Church, 'at the seat of the Apostle beloved Peter and the head of all Churches.'

But one of the great consolations of his life was that he lived to see the return of Spain to the bosom of the Church after its long profession of the Arian heresy. The Donatists also, soon after his death, ceased to trouble the Churches of the East, so that all his efforts to restore peace and unity to the Church were eventually crowned with success.

In lesser controversies the Pope showed himself firm in essentials, but loving and forgiving in occasions of affliction. For instance, in the case of the Bishop of Ravenna, Maricannus, as to the wearing of the pallium. The Exarch took the side of the Bishop. Complaints also reached Rome of oppression of the monasteries by the clergy, and the Pope wrote, saying, 'Do not defer the correction of this evil now that you have been warned a second time.' The Bishop's slackness was incurable, but just at this time

he fell ill and, forgetting all the controversy, Gregory wrote :—

On the arrival of a person from Ravenna I was greatly shocked to hear that your fraternity had been spitting up blood. I am very ill myself, and feel it very desirable that you should in God's grace return in good health to your church, and if He should see fit to call me before you—and I am not far from death—I should like to pass away in your arms. If you feel the disease continuing and you make up your mind to come here, you need but bring few persons with you, because you will live with me in my palace and will be waited on daily.

It happened, however, that the Bishop did not come ; his health improved, and he outlived the Pope two years.

But amidst all these labours of the intellect, the government of the Church, the care of the people under his immediate protection, and the supervision of the vast territories of the Church, the great Pope had to protect Rome and Italy from the incursions and ravages of the Lombards.

The history of this formidable clan is most interesting. They were the scourge of Italy and the constant terror of St. Gregory. The tribe was called the unutterable, even as the Turks in later times were called the unspeakable. Their name, Lombards, had its origin in the following circumstances : Called the ' Winnili,' they marched to subdue another tribe from the north who had prayed to Odin. His answer was : ' Whichever tribe I look first upon, to that I shall give the victory.' The Winnili prayed to Odin's wife who recommended that at dawn the warriors and their wives should stand before Odin's eastern window, and that the women should arrange their hair around their faces to look like beards. This advice was followed, and when Odin looked out from his window he beheld the Winnili warriors and the women with the hair round their faces, then he said to his wife, Freia, ' Who are the long beards ? ' (*longi barbi*) ; and she answered, ' Thou hast given them a name, so now give them the victory.' Then, by Odin's help, the Winnili vanquished the Vandals, and the Lombards and their Dukes became the scourge of Italy.

‘This nation,’ says Pope Gregory, ‘issued from their native desert as the sword is drawn from the scabbard to mow down the human race.’ They destroyed the cities, changed the towns into heaps of ruins, depopulated the plains, and made whole provinces one vast solitude.

And it was Pope Gregory alone who defended Rome, repeating the action of his great predecessor, Leo I., who by his personal influence saved the Eternal City from the wrath of Attila. St. Gregory met the Lombard king face to face before the doors of St. Peter’s, who being overwhelmed by the very appearance of the Pope, retired from the city. Historians add that the Lombard king had perhaps in his mind the miserable tale of those who had desecrated and pillaged the city of Rome : Alaric had taken Rome, and died in the flower of his age ; Attila menaced it, and died a mysterious death on his wedding night ; Genseric had plundered it, and in less than a century his nation had perished ; Totila had twice captured it, but at the height of his power was slain in the battlefield on which the Gothic race and monarchy received its death-blow.

However, whether these gloomy consequences of Roman conquest influenced Agilulf or not, the Lombards marched away in 593. And they left behind them a power which they little imagined would bring about the overthrow of their nation. Referring to this defence and preservation of Rome by Pope Gregory, Dr. Dudden says :—

It rested with him to declare whether the city of the Cæsars should yet be the home of classical tradition, the abiding light of Europe through centuries of intellectual darkness, or whether, as the seat of some ignorant Lombard duke, it should gradually pass into decay and insignificance ; had Gregory chosen the latter alternative it is impossible to conjecture what would have been the after history of Italy and the Empire.

It was thus by the defeat of the Lombards in their attacks on Rome that the temporal power of the Papacy commenced. Now it was that the Pope was no less a ruler than any other potentate. The successor of St. Peter was not only a power in heaven but on earth. Such was

the spectacle which Gregory presented to an astonished world, and, says Dr. Dudden, in this twentieth century 'the lesson learned then has not been forgotten.'

Not certainly by fair-minded scholars like him, but it is a lesson frequently forgotten by prejudiced writers, and utterly unknown to most modern tourists who visit the great citadel of the Catholic Church. The educated bigots shut out the fact and the uneducated multitude are unaware of it, that it was the action of St. Gregory, his predecessors and successors, which saved the city of Rome with its august traditions of government and civilization, and the Papal city continued in an age of outer darkness to be the enlightened capital of the Christian world.

On this point, Dean Milman—a non-Catholic authority—says: 'It is impossible to conceive what had been the confusion, the lawlessness, the chaotic state of the medieval ages without the medieval Papacy—and of the medieval Papacy, the real father is Gregory the Great.' The combination in one man of the various qualities of Gregory astonished the historian. 'We see in him a simple-hearted priest, an accomplished courtier, a military expert, an eloquent preacher, and a lawyer of singular acumen.'

Notwithstanding the tribute of fair-minded men like Dr. Dudden and Dean Milman, there have not been wanting critics to find blots upon this sun of the spiritual and temporal firmament. One of the most formidable charges brought against the Pope was his eulogy of the new Emperor, Phocas, the successor of his weak predecessor, Maurice. The latter never gave any help to Gregory to save Rome from the ravages of the Lombards, and the Pope was constrained to enlist the help of the new Emperor. When writing to him in flattering terms Gregory was quite unaware of his antecedents. Nor could he have any knowledge of the events which preceded his accession. The delay of communication between Rome and Constantinople was very great, owing to the distance, and during the Winter. In fact, the Pope may not have known the events of November, 602, when he wrote in February, 603. And

even if he were aware of them, or of the doings and history of Phocas, he had to face the fact that he was the elected Emperor, and in the interests of the threatened city of Rome, he had to placate him and solicit aid. It can scarcely be held that these charges in any way dim the lustre of Gregory's career.

Amongst lesser charges brought against St. Gregory by his critics was the discouragement of the ancient classics and monuments, and his hostility to libraries. These are unfounded libels. No doubt in those early ages of the Church, when the influence of pagan literature was still apparent, the Pope, like his namesake, Gregory of Tours, Alcuin, and Lanfranc (who led the revival of letters in the eleventh century), held it was unbecoming to be too much occupied with such studies. It was not possible, in the days when paganism was hardly dead, to study them without being affected by the sentiments which they expressed.

As to the libraries and public monuments, they were not under the control of the Pope; he had no jurisdiction over them. They were the property and under the care of the Emperor, and their neglect is not to be ascribed to the Pope.

St. Gregory's love and support of the Benedictines, the preservers and publishers of the ancient classics, show that in their proper place he was not opposed to their preservation and circulation.

When we remember that St. Gregory was barely fifty years when he was made Pope, almost the universal Ruler of Christendom, and all that he accomplished in thirteen brief years, we can form some idea of the power of his intellect and the magnitude of his work.

Having thus traced the history of the great man, the great ruler, the great law-giver, and the great pontiff, we come to speak of his noblest title,

THE GREAT SAINT

In the days of Gregory, and before them, the enrolment amongst the blest was made in accordance with the vote of the clergy and the laity in each district who were witnesses of the deeds which entitled anyone to that honour. It

was not until the twelfth century that the inquiry, owing to the changed circumstances of the extended Church, led to the existing system of canonization.

In the time of Gregory the area of Christendom was comparatively restricted, many countries were unconverted, and some continents unknown. Depending, therefore, on the votes of those who had observed the life of Gregory, we cannot be surprised that by general acclaim he was included in the roll of Saints.

He lacked not one of the qualifications—personal sanctity, deeds of charity, fasting and austerity; the gift of prophecy, and by his life-long physical sufferings, the result of extreme austerities, he well had earned the martyr's crown.

A great tribute is paid to him in the epitaph on his tomb. He was a great preacher and a great teacher, but he practised what he preached and taught, *Implebatque actu, quid quid sermone docebat*, a great note of a saintly life.

Therefore [says Dr. Dudden] together with the entire Church of his own day, and that of succeeding centuries, we may gratefully reverence the name of Gregory as that, not only of a great man, but also of a great saint. The memory of Gregory will always be honoured throughout the Christian world. He is one of the grandest figures in ecclesiastical history, before whose eminent qualities ordinary men are compelled to bow in homage.

Except him, little is remembered of those who lived in his day, the Emperor Maurice is forgotten; the name of Phocas is only associated with the column in the Forum; the courtiers, bishops, patriarchs, and imperial governors have long since passed into oblivion with the majority of mankind. Out of this general dimness one majestic figure stands clear, the man who gave a new character to the Papacy, who confirmed and fortified the system of monasticism, who popularized the doctrines of Augustine, who fixed the form which religious thought retained for centuries—that man must surely be classed amid the ranks of the immortals. So long as human history is studied and the memory of mighty men continues to be cherished, *the fame of Gregory the Great will not become obscure.*

CHARLES DAWSON.

EVOLUTION OF MIND—MONISM

MATERIALISM is not nearly so popular a doctrine at the present day as many seem to suppose. And it was only to be expected that it would soon lose in favour. Novelties have, indeed, a wonderful attraction for the human mind ; but the novelty is soon dissipated and falsity, where it exists, exposed. The mind of man could not long remain satisfied with a philosophy of life in which the plainest and commonest facts in human experience were flatly denied ; so that reason, reverting on itself after the first excitement caused by the theory of materialism, was compelled to rebel against its degradation to the level of common matter, the reduction of its self-consciousness to cerebral reactions, and the analysis of the soul into ether waves. It is not to be expected that men will long continue to have faith in a theory which applies the same laws of attraction and repulsion to the Planets and the Pleiades, to intellection and volition, and chocolate and gingerbread.

But though materialism was forced to give way, it was not yet prepared to abandon the field, and soon returned to the attack ; now, however, under a form which, curiously enough, has given to it the name of Monism.

Those of our readers who may not be conversant with the magic of modern thought, the romance which has grown up with the progress of science, and the crazy speculations of modern philosophy, will be surprised to learn the nature of this new doctrine which is represented by the term Monism.

We used to smile, even in our boyhood days, at the credulity of our classical authors who seriously discoursed about Janus and Scylla and Proteus and the rest. But now we find the advanced thought of the twentieth century assuring us that the Metamorphoses of Ovid are only commonplaces compared with the discoveries science has made in what used to be called the world of lifeless matter. We

are now being taught that matter and spirit are not two distinct substances, as we were wont to regard them, with nothing in common. Haeckel, in his own wise way, informs us that 'the two fundamental forms of substance, ponderable matter and ether, are not dead, and only moved by extrinsic force, but they are endowed with sensation and will.' There is now but one substance in *rerum natura*. You may call it matter if you like, but you must remember that it has two sides, or faces, or phases; one material, the other spiritual. Every atom of matter has a spiritual side: manure-heaps and coal-cinders and brickbats and snow-balls, hobby-horses and icecream, and everything else, are all made up of one substance, which is two—which is material and at the same time spiritual.

The difficulties which beset all previous attempts at Psychology are now put to rest. Idealism tried to reason the external world out of existence, but the solid earth refused to give way. Materialism next undertook to remove the spiritual from the universe, but gave up the attempt in despair. Now Monism strides triumphant over the ruins of both, and at the same time sweeps away the psychology of ages with a fearless flourish of this brand-new weapon of spirit-matter. We were all terribly mistaken, it tells us, in thinking that matter was one thing, spirit a different thing: all matter is spiritual, on one side at least. What more natural, therefore, than to find these phenomena we call mental in this curious conglomeration we call a man.

Monism, with an unconscious lack of saving humour, styles itself a new doctrine, a real up-to-date affair. It may, we grant, be up-to-date; but certainly it is not new. For Monism in some shape or other is older than Parmenides, older than Pythagoras, as old as the Earlier Ionian School. And in recent times we find many brands of the same attempt at representing all the complexities of existence as modes or manifestations of one fundamental reality. What is Spinoza's doctrine of the Absolute, but Monism? 'Instead of Descartes' doctrine of the antithesis of the substance of mind to the substance of matter, we have the

doctrine of one substance conceived under the antithetical attributes, thought and extension.'¹ Modern Monism has but very slightly varied this doctrine. In the Idealism of Berkeley we have the same theory under a different form : 'There is no material substratum of things ; mind and mind-dependent phenomena alone exist ; to be is to be perceived—*esse est percipi*.'² Again, Materialism at the opposite pole from Idealism, is essentially monistic, and is indeed fundamentally the same as this new doctrine of Monism, if the latter is to be made at all intelligible. In fact, all the various philosophical systems which have arisen from the time of Descartes to the time of Mrs. Eddie are but different brands of Monism.

The ancient alchemists, simple confiding men, wasted their time in a fruitless search after the philosopher's stone ; and modern chemistry, though waiting in eager expectation, is afraid to do more than venture an opinion as to the likelihood of the ancient philosophers' hope being realized after the lapse of so many ages : but W. K. Clifford has beaten all records and anticipated the science of the distant future by the wonderful discovery of the *stuff* that *minds* are made of. The new gospel teaches that to every particle of matter there is attached a tiny morsel of mind, and that as the particles of matter coalesce to form molecules and the molecules larger bodies, the little bits of mind combine to form bigger pieces, and these big pieces ultimately result in human consciousness and human rationality. And yet, according to Monism, there is only one substance—but with two aspects, one material and the other spiritual : which can only mean that matter viewed from one side is matter, but turn it round and it appears a spirit. Is this physics, or philosophy, or conjuring ? I lift this book, turn it round, and viewing it on all sides find that each portion of it seems as much matter as any other. Will any sensible man, except a hypnotist practising on me, ask me to believe that the one side of this book is material, the other spiritual—that every atom of it carries

¹ Turner, *History of Philosophy*, p. 469.

² *Ibid.*, p. 515.

a spiritual electron ! Is it all a joke, or magic, or madness ? Matter, we are informed, is under one aspect material, under another spiritual : but *in se*, in its own substance, aspects apart, what is it ? Is it one thing or two ? If it is a single substance, we are back again to Materialism if we admit the reality of matter at all. If two, why not admit the duality at once and have done with it ? And the whole doctrine of Monism points to a duality : but, then, where does the monism come in ? There is always a danger of throwing away the baby with the water of the bath.

Being assured of the existence of this dual unity, this material substance which is spiritual, we are next informed that there is a parallelism between the activities of its two sides without any interference of one with the other. This is the process according to Clifford's teaching : ' The physical facts go along by themselves and the mental facts go along by themselves. There is a parallelism between them, but no interference of one with the other.'

In a moment of illumination this doctrine may have appeared very plain to its author ; but to us it is certainly anything but plain. It is not intelligible : it is absolutely meaningless. Here are some of our difficulties. We want to know, first of all, where these mental facts come from. Then we want to know how you establish the truth of the non-interference. And when you have established the truth of this modest assertion, we would like to know how you arrive at a knowledge of these physical facts which you say never interfere with the mental facts. If Monism insists on the non-interference of the material with the mental, in what conceivable way can we know anything about the material ? And we find a further difficulty which takes the form of a dilemma : Either all our knowledge consists in modifications of material energy, and this is Materialism ; or, all our cognitions are only subjective states, caused by we know not what except that they cannot in any way be originated by matter ; and thus we are back to the Idealism of the Berkeley school. We do not know how you are going to rebut this dilemma. Lastly, in the event of your failing to satisfy us on these points, you might

help us to some understanding of what you are trying to expound, if you would tell us whether it is the Occasionalism of Geulincx and Malebranche, or the Pre-established Harmony of Leibnitz that modern Monism is clumsily trying to plagiarise. Occasionalism is at least an intelligible theory; but these mental facts which come from nowhere and go nowhere help but little to elucidate matters. They cannot be caused by the physical facts, that is made evident; and since Haeckel's 'absurd hypothesis of a God' is out of the question, what at all are we to make of them? No wonder Herbert Spencer sought shelter from the attacks to which this philosophy exposed him in that safest of all asylums which a modern infidel has branded as cowardly Agnosticism.

How, you may ask, was the astounding discovery made that matter is material on the one side and spiritual on the other? But it is all very simple, and the wonder is that the discovery was not made long before the days of Clifford. This is the method of procedure: You first procure a primitive nebula; then you get fragments of mind smashed up exceedingly small, and you scatter them about in your nebulous mist. Then you simply go and find them there. No deception whatever. It is useless and worse than useless, it is impertinence, to be asking advanced science how you are going to procure the nebula and how you are to find the mind fragments. Cannot you do as science does: make a supposition, and the trick is done.

You see something like this must be done. Materialism would not wash; in fact it went to pieces as soon as we began to handle it. But as the continuity of evolution must be sustained at all costs, and as there are still some hard-headed people who cannot be got to overlook the facts of consciousness and reason, the only thing to be done is to start a theory at such a distance back that it will be safe from the attacks of all but the Metaphysicians. You know that

Distance lends enchantment to the view;

and, besides, you are of course aware that science has already laughed metaphysics out of the world.

Metaphysics was good enough pastime in those old days of happy far-off things when men slept and dreamt, and deducted ; but in these days of advanced thought, the onward march of science and the application of the Inductive Method have swept clean away all those hoary myths which passed for philosophy in the Middle Ages. What an archaic tone there is about the writings of that poor, deluded scholar, Father Maher, for instance ! Here is a typical passage. The advocate of mind-stuff, he tells us,

has to make an absolutely incredible assumption without a scrap of evidence in its favour. In order to do away with the souls of a few living beings who do not form the one hundred-millioneth part of the mass of the physical world he has to assign a mental life to every grain of sand and every drop of water on the earth. He has to ascribe to every molecule of matter in the universe something the nature of which cannot be imagined, and the existence of which neither the experiments of science nor the observation of mankind has ever discovered the slightest trace. Such is the modest demand on our powers of faith made by scientists—who, when it suits them, can be so exacting in their demands for proof.¹

All monists, however, are not of the thorough-going type of Clifford. Some, like Dr. Bain, are not courageous enough to assert that all things, from the contents of a dust-bin to the genius of a Dante, are alike endowed with mentality. The monistic doctrine is accordingly restricted by these and made applicable only to human beings. But within this restricted sphere Dr. Bain and those of his way of thinking are just as vigorous as Clifford or Haeckel in maintaining that all mental life is but an 'aspect' or 'phase' or 'face' or 'side' of neural changes, though it never in any way affects these changes and is never itself affected by them.

Now what meaning are we to attach to these 'aspects,' 'sides,' etc., unless we suppose that there is something which apprehends them ? For what is an aspect but a certain form or appearance under which a thing is viewed.

¹ *Psychology*, by Rev. M. Maher, S.J., pp. 509-510.

And when you speak of neural changes, meaningless though the language be, do you not obviously imply that there is something which can look at both sides of this succession of events in which neural antecedents determining material consequents carry with them on the other side mental sequences? Must we not apprehend the two sides of a succession of events before we can inform the rest of mankind, in no dubious manner, about the mode of its procedure? Or are we just speaking at random, regardless of all meaning? Plain common sense tells us that if we speak deliberately about two aspects of a thing we must be thinking of them. What, then, is this thing which stands apart, as it were, and viewing both sides of the succession of changes is able to say that they never influence each other? How do you know that they never influence each other?

‘The only tenable supposition,’ says Dr. Bain, ‘is that mental and physical proceed together as undivided twins.’ Now who or what makes this supposition? Who or what is it that constitutes itself judge and jury for the passing of sentence on these undefended twins? Is it one of the twins himself? But the twins are indivisible. Is it both then? If so, then both pronounce the same individual judgment! Both pass judgment on each other’s conduct though neither can know anything about the other; for by no possibility can there be any interference between them notwithstanding their twinship and their indivisibility! Indivisible twins!

‘When, therefore, we speak of mental cause and mental agency, we have always a two-sided cause.’ But, surely, Dr. Bain, if we are to continue to communicate with each other we must believe that speech is the expression of thought; and thought can be no more two-sided than it can be triangular or polygonal. We wonder what the sides of a cause must be like. In the present state of our knowledge we can as easily conceive a judgment of a light-blue colour or a musical note of dark-grey pitch. One side of this cause consists in motion: what can the other side be like? Can motion be the side of anything, or itself have sides?

Just try to picture to yourself a triangular-shaped acceleration down an inclined plane, and you will have some notion of monistic dynamics. Motion can have no sides any more than it can have feet or hands ; and thought can no more consist in motion than it can stand on its head.

And this two-sided cause is material and mental, that is, material and not material. It could as easily be straight and crooked at the same time. ' When we speak of mental cause and mental agency ' we should think of what we are saying. What is this mental cause ? What is it the cause of ? Are there any mental causes in Monism or are all the activities effects ? Effects of what ? And what is a cause at all ? We are all aware of the difficulty of finding a satisfactory definition, but we are equally aware that we should avoid all reference to the sides, the top, or the bottom of a cause, unless we are determined to dispense with rational speech and be satisfied with the jargon of idiots. A two-sided cause is like a wooden-bottomed colour.

' A line of mental sequence,' continues Dr. Bain, ' is thus not mind causing body, and body causing mind, but mind-body giving birth to mind-body : a much more intelligible position.' That is all. But in the name of all that is wonderful who ever taught or thought that mind causes body or that body causes mind ? There were some that held a doctrine of corporeal Traducianism, but they were consistent enough not to double the aspect of the soul or of the body. What kind of protean phenomenon is this mind-body ? You could speak as intelligibly about motion at absolute rest. Between mind and body there is no mean ; and between mind and body, between what is material and what is spiritual, there is an impassable gap : matter does not shade off gradually into mind, nor in its most attenuated forms can it be anything even remotely resembling mind. Either the one or the other, material or spiritual ; a substance must be all matter or all spirit : it cannot be both any more than it can stand on its shoulders or walk without legs. The more intelligible position of mind-body is just unthinkable.

In the chapter on Mental Evolution in his *Animal Life and Intelligence*, Professor Lloyd Morgan treats us to a piece of typical monistic psychology. After referring to the terms 'neurosis' and 'psychosis' invented by Huxley to express respectively molecular changes in the brain and the concomitant states of consciousness, he continues :—

According to Materialism, psychosis is the product of neurosis: but according to Monism neither is psychosis a product of neurosis, nor is neurosis a product of psychosis, but neurosis is psychosis. They are identical. What an external observer might perceive as a neurosis of my brain, I should at the same moment be feeling as a psychosis. The neurosis is the outer or objective aspect; the psychosis the inner or subjective aspect.

Now what kind of identity is claimed for the neurosis and psychosis? Is it generic, or specific, or numerical? Is it real or formal? From the nature of the problem it is manifest that we should be very definite in our terminology. However, we have no hesitation in denying that neurosis is psychosis. It is nothing of the kind. Molecular changes in the brain are not, and cannot be, states of consciousness. What reason is there for thinking that they are? Those molecular changes are material motion: states of consciousness are anything but motion. Motion cannot occur without displacement of material particles; and what rearrangement of particles is going to give us the notion of justice, for instance?

'What an external observer might perceive as a neurosis of my brain, I should at the same moment be feeling as a psychosis.' Let us try to realize what this means, keeping in mind that Monism only recognizes the existence of neurosis and psychosis, which two, it says, are identical. Now, what feels? The psychosis, of course. But the psychosis is identical with the neurosis; so that the neurosis, that is, molecular motion, feels itself. This is Monism with a vengeance. The conclusion is inevitable, that molecular changes in the brain are states of consciousness: and this is Materialism, pure and simple.

'The neurosis is the outer or objective aspect; the

psychosis the inner or subjective aspect.' The outer and inner aspects of what? Neurosis and psychosis are identical; therefore the outer and inner aspects are identical: the convex is concave! I imagine Professor Morgan touched the true psychology when he wrote that what the external observer perceives in the brain he should then be feeling as a psychosis, but he had not the courage to be candid with himself. This *I* that feels both the neurosis and the psychosis is a large factor which finds no place in this last extravagance of Materialism.

Now comes the eternal question of the evolution of all these neuroses and psychoses. Of course they must have been evolved: that much may be taken for granted at the outset.

Complex neuroses have been evolved from less complex neuroses: these from simple neuroses; these, again, from organic modes of motion which cannot be called neuroses at all; and these, once more, from modes of motion which cannot be called organic. And from what have psychoses, or states of consciousness, been evolved? Complex psychoses have been evolved from less complex psychoses; these from simple psychoses; and these, again, from what? We are stopped for want of words to express our meaning.

No doubt. The author evidently considers an act of faith necessary to prevent him turning evolutionary infidel, for immediately he emphatically adds: 'We believe that psychoses have been evolved.' Thus fortified he again faces the question, 'evolved from what?' And at length the mystery unfolds itself. 'From other and simpler modes of——' Here a dash gives us time to pause and brace ourselves for the reception of the final revelation. Here it is: 'something which answers on the subjective side to motion.' The Professor works himself up to such a pitch of excitement that we begin to fear for his sanity; and then with the bliss of triumph on his countenance delivers himself of a plain simple truth old as Aristotle.

The molecular changes in the brain may, if you will, have come from inorganic matter, though indeed we do

not see much meaning in the process as here presented by Lloyd Morgan ; but why should the subjective aspect have been evolved at all ? Where is the necessity for any such evolution ? It corresponds, very likely, with the molecular changes in the brain, and only arises when they arise ; but why should it come from anywhere ? Is it motion at all ? ‘Something,’ you say, ‘which answers on the subjective side to motion.’ Precisely : that is true psychology. But you will observe that this psychological triumph in which Lloyd Morgan’s evolution has culminated is just a repetition of the common scholastic doctrine, that the activity of the soul is something which answers on the subjective side to motion. We are compelled to think of it as motion, for we cannot think without the imagination which knows no activity that is not a mode of motion. But we know it cannot be motion as we understand it : hence we call the act of the mind immanent.

If our author had stopped here, he might have saved his psychology, and perhaps his common sense. But the ‘something which answers to motion’ must get a name. Accordingly, he finds it necessary to have recourse to the word factory. ‘I shall, therefore, coin a word to meet my present need.’ He excuses the coinage on the ground that otherwise he cannot make his meaning clear. We are not sure that it makes for clearness to ignore the word ‘thought,’ which we have all been so accustomed to for such a long time, and which we are still likely to find just as satisfactory as any new manufacture, even fresh from Morgan’s mill. Coining words, we must admit, suggests suspicions about the new treatment of old problems ; for we cannot help thinking that Aristotle and St. Thomas were as good psychologists as any of the modern monists. However, for the sake of clearness, Professor Morgan introduces us to the magic word, ‘metakinetic.’

We are now in a position to grasp the relation in which mental activity stands to Evolution generally. ‘Every kinesis has an associated metakinesis ; and *parallel to the evolution of organic and neural kinesis, there has been an evolution of metakinetic manifestations culminating in con-*

scious thought.' This, by the way, for the sake of clearness. It reminds us of an experience of the late Mark Twain's somewhere in the East, where he happened to be one of an audience which witnessed a play performed by the natives. Nobody understood what the play was about, and so it became necessary for some one to explain it when it was over. This was accordingly done; but not with the best results. For, up to that point, Twain remarks, it was obscure; then it became opaque.

Professor Morgan has explained to us that complex psychoses have been evolved from less complex psychoses; which, of course, means nothing at all. These simple psychoses have been evolved from something. This something is stamped 'metakinetic,' which, even to those whose Greek may not have become more or less rusty, conveys no very definite meaning if it is intended to express anything different from what we have always regarded as 'thought.' And we are still curious to know where the thing called 'metakinensis' comes from. Perhaps it is the old story of the elephant and the tortoise.

But hear what follows. The author freely admits that his whole theory is pure assumption; just as any other theory, he says, is pure assumption. In answer to the question: 'How does the objective neurosis become conscious as a subjective psychosis?' he says: 'While admitting freely that I do not know, I enter the protest that it is philosophically an illegitimate question; for an answer is impossible without transcending consciousness.' The question is *scientifically* illegitimate in the sense that science should mind its own business, and not go poking its nose into matters which in no way concern it, and about which it is wholly unable to form the remotest shadow of an opinion. It is with questions of this kind philosophy has always to deal; and therefore persons who feel unable or unwilling to attack such problems should refrain from setting themselves up as the judges of what belongs to philosophy and what does not.

We have no difficulty, however, in admitting that an answer to the question, how neurosis becomes conscious, is

impossible—impossible with or without transcending consciousness. The impossibility of the answer arises from the impossibility of neurosis ever becoming psychosis. With regard to that time-honoured objection that consciousness cannot study its own acts unless it is able to transcend itself—that position is carried by the simple method known as *solvitur ambulando*.

It is just this reflex consciousness, this mental activity, which can and often does, study and examine itself, that will forever remain a standing and unanswerable refutation of all attempts at Monism or Materialism. It is certainly not scientific to overlook these great facts which play such an all-important part in the life and destiny of every human being using reason ; and it is just as unscientific to attempt any reduction of them to the laws of motion or of chemical action. The attempt has brought science, no less than metaphysics, into disrepute ; for the scientific passion for reducing all the knowable universe to some form of unity, has converted the scientific arena into a philosophic Babel.

If science is the highest and most certain knowledge attainable by us, is it not matter for lasting regret that we should so far forget its dignity as to identify it with grotesque speculation and open falsehood ? Unscientific champions of science, entrenching themselves behind a fortification of antitheological absurdities, have degraded science to such an extent that at the very mention of a scientific opinion we are immediately on the alert lest by some sleight of hand falsehood should be slipped to us in the garb of truth.

Had physical science only confined itself to what is professedly its own province and adhered to the rules of that Inductive Method for which Francis Bacon has received so much unmerited praise, it would have commanded the respect of all thinking men. But, then, so many books could not have been written ; Haeckel would have missed an opportunity of lamenting the pitiable state of the world which is so incurably vitiated by Romanism or Ultramon-tanism, ' that pitiful caricature of pure Christianity that still plays so important a part in the world ' ; his ' absurd

hypothesis of a God ' could not have been exposed in all its audacious effrontery, nor his ' great charlatan of the Vatican ' been made the butt of so much abuse : though what all this has to do with Biology or with the Last Words on Evolution or with Haeckel himself is not easy to see. Think of the Jena infidel shedding his crocodile tears over the degeneration of pure Christianity, and you get a fairly satisfactory mind-picture of the scientific spirit in which Biology can philosophise God out of existence.

Though with every fresh victory of science new worlds were continually challenging conquest, scientific men, not content to prosecute their labours in their own ever-widening fields, would insist on going outside their proper sphere, only to lose themselves in a maze of absurdities which rose round sentiency, soul, and God. Because the balance and the measuring-tape could not be applied with scientific accuracy to life, sentiency, consciousness, conscience, soul, God, science tucked her gown around her, mounted her pedagogic pedestal, and with a wave of her wand swept the whole spiritual world out of existence.

The scene was changed : and we beheld Fechner and Weber chasing abstract ideas up their legs and arms, and hunting for universals and syllogistic arguments in the grey cortex of the brain.

Again the scene was changed ; and other jugglers came on the stage with little bits of mind stuck on to the sides of molecules and atoms : these the performers began to roll up together, as boys make snow-men ; and the result was a Homer or a Virgil, a Dante, a Goethe, or a Shakespeare, according to the positions which the atoms took up. Such is the scientific nonsense which ' advanced science ' asks us to accept in lieu of the ' worn-out ' doctrines and dogmas of the past.

R. FULLERTON.

A GREAT REFORMER—FRA GIROLAMO SAVONAROLA

WE do not think that we exaggerate his position when we place Fra Girolamo Savonarola in the front rank of the world's best reformers, or that we exaggerate his character when we call him a saintly man, whose sanctity was of the heroic type.

Few men have been so gravely maligned, few have been so greatly misunderstood as the Friar of San Marco. Many people still regard him as a disobedient and fanatical friar who came into violent collision with the reigning Pope, and who was excommunicated for his stubbornness—a censure which had its final effect in the Friar's shameful death. Those who accept Dr. Ludwig Pastor as their guide will, of course, continue to look upon Savonarola as a misguided and rebellious priest who forgot his position and was unmindful of his obligations. But Dr. Pastor is not infallible. His criticism of Savonarola is a curious piece of inconsistency and contradiction, which betrays an unexpected amount of prejudice on the part of the learned historian of the Papacy. This conclusion will be forced upon anyone who studies the late Professor Luotto's vindication of Savonarola. The Professor of Faenza takes up the accusations of the Professor of Innsbruck one by one, examines them and answers them. He accuses Dr. Pastor of 'illogical deductions' and 'gratuitous assertions,' of having given 'false interpretations,' and of writing at times in an un-Catholic spirit.¹

These are grave charges, but Luotto makes a still more serious accusation. 'It is evident,' he tells us, 'that the learned historian of Innsbruck . . . wrote without having read or studied the works [of Savonarola] and without

¹ *Il Vero Savonarola e Il Savonarola di L. Pastor*, p. 5. IIa edizione, Firenze, 1900.

sufficient preparation for the task he had undertaken.' In consequence of this he has presented us with 'an imaginary Savonarola,' not with a portrait of the real man; and when he condemns Fra Girolamo, as he does in no gentle terms, 'it is the creature of his imagination he condemns, not the Friar.'¹

Dr. Pastor replied to the criticisms of Professor Luotto in a pamphlet² which, on the authority of Professor Gherardi, 'is a piece of inconclusive reasoning. The charge *proved* against him by his opponent, of not having examined or studied what he ought to have examined and studied, *remains intact*. *New arguments to sustain his opinions there are none.*'³

We are of opinion that the verdict of Professor Gherardi will be endorsed by anyone who has read Dr. Pastor's reply to Luotto. It contains nothing new, nothing which has not been answered by Luotto, whose vindication of Savonarola is a monument of critical acumen and patient research. Dr. Pastor grows sarcastic at what he is pleased to call 'Dominican legends,' and finds fault with Villari because he was far too much influenced by them. Most assuredly the Order of Preachers has venerated and still reveres the memory of the Friar of San Marco, but such veneration is not legend, it is reality, and Father Ferretti had good reason to ask:—

Does Dr. Pastor remember that it is not some archæological work which he examines? or that he has not to pass judgment on a man dead and buried for centuries? Does he bear in mind the fact that Savonarola still lives in his writings, and yet more fully in the hearts of his brethren in the Order which holds him in esteem as one of its brightest glories, and whom it does not ever intend to repudiate?⁴

Sarcasm is not criticism; and while Dr. Pastor speaks slightly of those authorities who are favourable to

¹ *Il Vero Savonarola, etc.*, pp. 2, 6.

² *Zur Beurtheilung Savonarolas: Kritische Streifzüge*. Freiburg: Herder.

³ Letter to Padre Lodovico Ferretti, O.P., quoted in *Irish Rosary*, vol. ii., p. 312. Italics ours.

⁴ *Rosario. Memorie Domenicane*. Anno xiii., 23.

Savonarola, his own chief sources of information are the French rationalist Perrens, and the Protestant historians Ranke and Cosci.

Those who rely on Dr. Pastor for a true knowledge of Savonarola will never obtain it; neither will the 'Biographical Study' of the Friar by the Rev. Herbert Lucas, S.J., help to make the Friar known as his Order knows him. Admirable as it is in many respects, and very different to the pages of Dr. Pastor, it is not quite so impartial as the learned author intended it to be. Father Lucas appears to take away with one hand what he has given with the other, and imputes motives and draws conclusions for which we venture to state he has not only no authority, but which are contradicted by Savonarola's own words. When he insists that pride was the motive of the Friar's conduct, and when he states that he was 'deluded, as so many men, before and since, have been deluded, in the matter of visions and revelations,' we are of opinion that the learned Jesuit goes a little too far. If Savonarola had been infected with pride, and if pride had been the motive of his resistance to Alexander VI.—if he had been only a deluded visionary and nothing more—we cannot understand how saints should have shown him any veneration, or how some Popes should have held him in the highest esteem. Savonarola is a complex character in some ways, in others he is very simple; but we certainly have not yet seen any traces of pride in his conduct, as we have failed to discover that personal or unworthy motives were the reason for the stand which he took in relation to Alexander VI.

It very frequently if indeed it does not always occur that a sentence which has been wrenched from its context takes on a meaning different to that which it possesses when read with what precedes and with what follows it. The context is the setting of the sentence, and is necessary to its real meaning; and it is scarcely fair to judge any man, particularly a preacher of Savonarola's stamp, by isolated phrases taken from some of his discourses. To understand the preacher's mind we must read the discourse in its

entirety, not merely a few sentences taken from it. Professor Luotto gives large extracts from the sermons and writings of Savonarola, and this is one of the features of his volume. He makes Savonarola speak for himself, explain himself, and defend himself; and we venture to suggest that a more intimate knowledge of Luotto's volume would have prevented many of the conclusions which Father Lucas has drawn, as it would have changed the tenor of some of his statements.

We cannot here discuss the questions of Savonarola's alleged disobedience to Alexander VI., his prophetic gifts, or his excommunication by the Pope. To do so would carry us far beyond the limits of this paper. We may state, however, without presuming to settle a question upon which the Church has given no definite pronouncement, that we are convinced that Fra Girolamo Savonarola was no deluded visionary, or that his mission was only an 'imaginary' one; that he was not at any time of his life disobedient to the Holy See; and that excommunication there was none. His three-fold prophecy was fulfilled; and though Father Lucas says 'the face of the Church has been renewed, though not so "soon and speedily" as he had imagined,'¹ we venture to disagree with him. Savonarola was put to death in 1498. Luther broke away from the Church in 1517. The Council of Trent held its first session in 1545. The interval of half a century between a prophecy and its fulfilment may well merit the terms '*cito et velociter*.'

As regards the alleged disobedience of the Friar, the documents which were discovered in the Florentine archives are such as to compel so careful a writer as Cardinal Capecehatro to withdraw, in the third Italian edition of his *Life of St. Philip Neri*, the charge of disobedience made against Savonarola in the preceding editions.²

The sentence of excommunication was declaratory, not infictive. By the Brief of May 13, 1497, Savonarola was

¹ *Fra Girolamo Savonarola: A Biographical Study*. By the Rev. Herbert Lucas, S.J., page 439. Second edition, revised. London: Sands & Co.

² 'Per questi è per altri documenti fattimi conoscere è forza conchiudere che la disubbedienza non ci fu' (vol. i., lib. ii., c. v., p. 308).

declared to have incurred *ipso facto* a sentence of excommunication pronounced against him in a previous Brief, dated November 7, 1496, because he had not obeyed a Papal command which was conveyed by that Brief (November) to unite San Marco with the Tuscan-Roman Congregation. The Brief of 1497 presupposes a command given to Savonarola himself by the Brief of 1496, and that the Friar had refused to obey this command. As a matter of fact, no such command was ever given to Savonarola, and his name is not even mentioned in the Brief of November 7. Consequently, there was not, nor could there be, disobedience to a command which was non-existent, and since the censure was declared to have been incurred by reason of this non-existent disobedience, it follows that the censure itself was invalid and without any force. It must never be forgotten that the union was accomplished by the promulgation of the Papal Brief, and required no action on Savonarola's part. Action on his part would have been altogether superfluous.¹

We cannot enter more fully into these questions at present, but we do emphatically state that the Church had never a more faithful child, or the Holy See a more loyal subject, than Girolamo Savonarola. He combated Alexander VI., but not the Papacy. He found fault with the man, but not with the office he held; rather was it his reverence for the dignity of the successor of St. Peter which forced him to denounce the vices of him who sat in Peter's Chair. This fact must be borne in mind by those who would claim Savonarola as a forerunner of Luther, as well as by

¹ Cf. *Fu Veramente Scommunicato Il Savonarola*. Lottini, O.P. Milano, 1898. *Come si è formata la Coscienza del Savonarola, rispetto ad Alessandro VI.* Firenze, 1900.

The granting of a Plenary Indulgence to Savonarola and his two companions by Alexander VI., without mention being made of any *absolutio ab excommunicatione*, supports the opinion that the Pope himself did not look upon Savonarola as having really incurred the censure. While we fully agree with Father Lucas in regarding this proceeding as 'strange,' we do not agree in stating that the Indulgence was given 'as if in recognition of at least the possibility that they had acted in good faith' (op. cit., p. 438). Even Alexander VI. would scarcely grant a Plenary Indulgence to three men who had been condemned as *heretici, scismatici, et contemptori della Sede Apostolica* on the chance 'that they had acted in good faith.'

those who see in him only a violent antagonist of the Borgia.

Both Dr. Pastor and Father Lucas regard Savonarola's work of reform as drastic, and find fault with the methods he used in his attempt to change the moral tone of Florentine society. Dr. Pastor says the reform was shallow and the effect of the Friar's preaching ephemeral; and since he cannot deny the Friar's zeal, he calls it excessive. Father Lucas sees 'a certain tendency to exaggeration' in Savonarola's methods, giving as an instance of such exaggeration the Friar's injunction that, 'if anyone should wish to bring back any people to the true faith, *first of all the children must be withdrawn from all ecclesiastical ceremonies.*'¹

The quotation, Father Lucas informs us in a footnote, is taken from the 'rough draft' of one of the Friar's sermons, which is scarcely the best source from which to take any quotation. We have an example here of that method of isolated quotation to which we alluded. As the sentence stands by itself, it certainly does sound strange to Catholic ears; but can any explanation of it be given? In one of his sermons Fra Girolamo speaks pretty plainly of the abuses which had crept into the sanctuary on festival days. He tells priests and religious that they are more anxious for the splendour of the ceremonies than for God's glory, and reprehends the women of Florence for their indecency in dress. The churches have become a kind of promenade where people chatter and talk, the women seated on cushioned chairs, and the 'young men, who surround them like a hedge, speaking a thousand profanities. Are such feasts,' he asks, 'ordained to God's glory?'²

In another sermon he warns the people of the danger there is in attending 'certain festivities which are held on the Sundays in Lent at Fiesole.' Now, Guido Biagi informs us that the paganism of the Renaissance had infected even ecclesiastical ceremonies,³ and we know what kind of fes-

¹ Op. cit., p. 32. Author's italics.

² Sermon xviii., on Amos and Zacharias; ap. Luotto.

³ *La Vita privata dei Fiorentini*; quoted by Luotto, p. 149.

tivities were held when Pius II. passed through Ferrara in 1459-1460.¹

It was from 'ecclesiastical ceremonies' of this kind that Savonarola urged the fathers and mothers of Florence to keep their children; but his insistence that they should 'attend Vespers on Feast-days' is proof that he did not desire to have them withdrawn 'from *all* ecclesiastical ceremonies,' while his minute instructions on the Sacrifice of the Mass, on Holy Communion and Confession, and the Rule of Life which he drew up for the people are in direct contradiction to the statement which is taken from the 'rough draft' of a sermon.

These remarks bring us to the subject of the present paper—Savonarola as a Reformer, and one of the greatest that the world has seen. The good which he accomplished has been only too frequently obscured and hidden by the shadows in which some writers have enveloped his figure. These writers insist upon Savonarola's faults while they minimize his virtues; and in their eagerness to show up the Friar's disobedience they keep his ardent charity and zeal for souls quite in the background.

We may consider the reforms which Savonarola introduced from a religious, ethical, and social view-point, and in every reform we see a master mind and a heroic soul working bravely and steadfastly in the face of all opposition. He has been blamed for having called upon the civil authorities to enforce his reforms; but we ask: Was Savonarola's action a peremptory summons, or was it not rather a counsel as to the course which the civil authorities ought to follow? Was not such action to be expected from any zealous priest at the time, particularly when the dividing-line between ecclesiastical and civil authority was not so sharply drawn then as it is in our day? When we remember the unique position which Savonarola occupied, a position which was certainly not sought by him, but which, as Dr. Pastor acknowledges, was forced upon him by circumstances; when we bear

¹ Aquarone: *Antichità Estensi del Muratori*. Cf. Villari: *Life and Times of Savonarola*, pp. 9-12. English translation. Second Popular Edition.

in mind the fact that the people of Florence looked to him, and to him alone, for advice and guidance in all things, we confess that we do not see how he can be blamed. Did not St. Alphonsus give his warm support to Father Sarnelli when the latter summoned the civil power to help him in his crusade against the vice and immorality of Naples? And in what way does the action of Savonarola differ from that of St. Alphonsus since both men had the same objective and the same interests at heart—the salvation of souls? We cannot judge the customs of other times by those of our own day, but our judgments must be impartial. We must not condemn the action of one zealous man if we find no fault with a similar action on the part of another who has been raised to the Altars of the Church. Savonarola's preaching and example changed the social life of Florence. Usury, gambling, licentiousness, and blasphemy grew less by degrees, and then died away; surely the success which the Friar obtained in the sphere of social reform is a forcible proof of his apostolic zeal as well as of his power over the people. Dr. Pastor sees, what Savonarola did not see, 'the absurdity' of those processions which were directed by him; while Father Lucas is of opinion that, 'Friars wearing garlands on their heads must surely have trodden dangerously near to that proverbial precipice, over which it is so easy to fall from the sublime to the laughable.'¹

Once again must we remember that times are changed, and that we cannot judge the customs of other times, or of other countries, by those of our own. Processions were of frequent occurrence in the fifteenth century. The processions which took place in Florence before Savonarola transformed them were of so reprehensible a nature generally that they deserved the name which Gambi gives to those that were revived after the Friar's death—*Festa diabolica*.²

Fra Girolamo knew that it was impossible to put a stop to the processions. He did the only thing that was

¹ Pastor: *History of the Popes*, vol. vi., p. 208. Eng. trans. Lucas, op. cit., p. 43.

² Quoted by Luotto, op. cit., p. 135, note.

possible: he changed them completely, and he had the example of other preachers as a precedent for what he did, though they did not meet with the success that he did.

As to the 'Friars wearing garlands on their heads,' Burlamacchi, as Luotto points out, is the only writer who mentions this: neither Landucci, Nardi, nor Somenzi ever allude to the incident.¹ Yet, supposing that Burlamacchi is right, how is the incident laughable? Manifestations of devotion amongst the people of Italy are very different from the restrained devotion of either the Teuton or the Saxon; yet even in England a Bishop of London went to St. Paul's on June 30, 1405, with his canons 'wearing garlands of crimson roses on their heads'; and 'the canons and vicars of some of our cathedrals, and the clergy in not a few of our parishes, walked in solemn array at the great processions of the year . . . crowned with roses, and honeysuckle, and other sweet-smelling flowers.'²

The charge which Dr. Pastor makes, that the children were urged and instructed by Savonarola to enter private houses in order to stop gambling more effectually, and that they confiscated the money on the gaming-tables, is not only a gratuitous assertion but one which is contradicted by the Friar's own words. He forbade the children to enter private houses, and forbade them even to touch the money on the tables.³ But he instituted collections at the processions in order that the poor might be assisted; while it was owing to him alone that the *Monti di Pietà* were established in Florence. Others had attempted to introduce them but without success.⁴

When the authorities thought to shut the gates of the city against the starving peasantry who flocked into Florence during the famine years of 1494-95, Savonarola protested with all the might of his charity and eloquence against the proposal. In this also he was successful, and

¹ Op. cit., pp. 141, 142.

² Rock: *Church of Our Fathers*, vol. ii., pp. 59 sqq., 340, 341. New Edition.

³ Sermon xvii., on Amos; ap. Luotto. Sermon ii., on Ruth.

⁴ Pastor, op. cit., vol. v., p. 111.

by his exhortations brought the magistrates to a sense of their obligations towards the poor of Jesus Christ. As Luotto points out, the principles which the immortal Leo XIII. laid down in his Encyclical on *The Condition of Labour* were inculcated and preached by the Friar of San Marco. Capitalists fared badly at his hands, and he lashed without mercy those merchants of Florence, the forerunners of our modern multi-millionaires, when they sought to take advantage of a people's hunger to increase their profits by making what we should call 'a corner in wheat.'¹

Society was transformed by the preaching of Savonarola. Even Dr. Pastor grudgingly acknowledges this, though he tries to minimize the greatness of the work by calling it ephemeral, inasmuch as, on Savonarola's withdrawal from the pulpit, the people fell back into their old vicious ways. We confess that we regard this fact quite differently. It proves to us, not the ephemeral nature of the Friar's reform, but the strength of the Friar's personality. The re-opening of the flood-gates of vice after Savonarola's retirement from public life, and the licence which followed hard upon his death, show clearly, we think, the power which he exercised over the fickle minds and corrupted hearts of the Florentines, while it is proof of the energy of the man to whom the people looked for guidance and whom they hailed as their uncrowned king.

But Fra Girolamo was not unmindful that social reform must be the outcome of the reformation of the family and of the individual, since the individual is the basis of the family as the family is the nucleus of society. Hence we find him labouring zealously for the proper education of the children and the young. Savonarola was pre-eminently an apostle of the children; and he who sees in the Friar's dealings with them only a subtle manœuvre by which he worked out his scheme of reform, or who regards the youths of Florence as the Friar's 'inquisitors,' altogether misunderstands the Friar's mission. Savonarola was no civic

¹ Sermon xii., on Ruth and Micheas; ap. Luotto, pp. 32 sqq.

functionary, as some would make him appear to have been. He was a priest—a priest of apostolic heart, who yearned for the souls of men and desired to be anathema for his brethren. This, we take it, will go far to explain those expressions which some writers regard as springing from a proud or an insufficiently humble heart, and which Dr. Pastor considers as blasphemous! Conti has said that ‘saints understand saints,’ and we venture to state that apostolic men understand each other much better than a critic of Dr. Pastor’s type has understood Savonarola. What authority has the Professor of Innsbruck for the statements that Savonarola ‘publicly preached disobedience,’ and that ‘parental authority had no sanctity in his eyes when exerted in opposition to his wishes’?¹

Nothing could be less true or more unjust. Fra Girolamo insisted upon obedience to parents, and insisted too that parents should enforce obedience to their commands when those commands were not contrary to the commands of God. It were well, indeed, if the children of to-day showed as much real reverence for their parents as Savonarola taught the children of Florence to show.²

From instructing the children the Friar turned to instructing their parents. He reminds them of their solemn duties and grave responsibilities in language which is as homely as it is restrained.³ Parents who allowed their children to run about the streets in the evening, when they can learn evil only, are severely reprovèd; and he strongly insists that mothers should nurse their own children instead of shirking that duty by leaving their little ones to the mercies of hired nurses.⁴

Dr. Pastor speaks of the disunion which was caused amongst the families of Florence by the preaching of Savonarola, and quotes from Perrens and Vaglianti in support of his statement. If he had quoted the latter in

¹ Op. cit., vol. v., p. 206.

² Cf. *Compendio della Filosofia*, lib. vi., 4°. Sermon xxii., on Amos; quoted by Luotto.

³ Cf. Sermons xii., on the Psalm ‘Quam Bonus’; ix., on St. John; xxxiv., on Zacharias.

⁴ Sermon xlii., on Amos.

full, and had not given a garbled quotation only, his readers would have learned that, apart from the opposition of the Arrabiati, the Palleschi, and the Compagnacci, who hated the work of reform, the so-called 'disunion' was nothing more than a diversity of opinion as to whether Fra Girolamo was a prophet or not. The real disunion was the inevitable antagonism which his preaching caused between the good and the *tiepidi*. Savonarola was no disturber of family peace, no fomenter of domestic strife. The peace which he did destroy was that which is born of sin and of compliance with evil: and to suggest that he set himself to create family disturbance is to suggest what is contradicted by his own teaching:—

Let all be united in charity [he tells his hearers], and if those who were evil-doers in the past should now desire to amend, let you all receive them. Leave your hatreds; follow not in the footsteps of your fathers, who were obstinate in them. You ask me: What must we do? You must do what I have told these children—Love one another.¹

Those who heard the Friar's words, who were moulded by his preaching and brought to a sense of better things by his instruction and example, became that 'ingenuous and faithful people . . . which, bearing the strange name of *Piagnoni*, proved to be courageous in warfare and of unshaken faith.'²

And the means which Savonarola employed to bring about this reformation, what were they? No novelties certainly, nothing which the Church had not sanctioned; just the means she has always used—Prayer, the Sacraments, devotion to God's Mother. Savonarola's teaching on Confession and Holy Communion is the teaching of a saintly priest who knew the soul-disease of his time and knew its remedy also. He inculcated the practice of 'spiritual' as distinguished from sacramental Confession, and, at a period when the practice of Confession and Holy Com-

¹ Sermons iii. and xxxiii., on Amos; quoted by Luotto. Cf. Sermon xlvii., on Amos.

² Capponi: *Storia della Rep. Fiorentina*, lib. iv., c. 6; ap. Luotto, p. 137, note.

munion was not as regular as it is now, Savonarola stands out as an earnest preacher of the frequent reception of the Sacraments.

When Father Lucas tells us that 'second only to his devotion to the Blessed Sacrament and to the Passion of our Lord was his filial veneration of the Virgin Mother of God,' he only states what is abundantly confirmed by the Friar's writings. 'Recommend yourselves to the Blessed Virgin,' he exclaims; 'address her as *Mamma mia*, for she is indeed your mother.' Did the phrase still linger in the cloisters of San Marco long after Savonarola's death, and was it there that *Pippo buono* learned to address Our Lady in the very words of Fra Girolamo?

We cannot judge Savonarola by the criteria which are applied to other men who have striven for the welfare of peoples and nations. He was a reformer of quite a different stamp from others, and was as far removed from the demagogue as it was possible to be. The supernatural was the motive power which urged him to dare and to do, and those who overlook this fact will never understand or appreciate the Friar of San Marco.

Prophecy and inspiration [says Père Bayonne], these are the salient characteristics of this great personality. They are shown forth in all his acts, writings, and preaching. The supernatural wells up on every side in his public and in his private life; and for the historian who refuses to recognize this, Savonarola remains an unintelligible riddle, an enigma which cannot be explained, like Joan of Arc with her voices and visions of angels and saints.¹

We have often thought that there is a wonderful similarity between the Maid and the Friar, in the misunderstanding which befell them, the opposition they met with, in the deliberate and malicious falsification of their processes, and above all in the tragic deaths they died.

Joan's enemies flung her ashes into the Seine. Ungrateful Florence cast the charred remains of Fra Girolamo into the Arno—but, as a writer puts it: 'Joan's enemies

¹ *Étude sur Jérôme Savonarole*, p. 385. Paris, 1879.

have given her a tomb of which the greatest hero may be proud, for the sea beats on every shore, and Joan's grave is the world ! ' May not the same be said of Savonarola ? His name is not dead. His memory is not forgotten. He lives not only in the hearts of his brethren, but in the hearts of all ' who love justice and hate iniquity,' and he will live as long as truth, justice, and religion have any power over the souls of men. His name has been obscured and his heroic figure has been veiled, but the shadows are growing faint with the passing of time, and the mystery which has enveloped him so long is becoming less day by day. It took well nigh five hundred years before the crown of justice and of sanctity was placed upon the gentle brow of Joan the Maid. Shall we be blamed if still we hope and pray that the day is not far distant when the successor of Peter will proclaim the sanctity of Girolamo Savonarola, and that justice shall at last be done to him who died for justice' sake ?

STANISLAUS M. HOGAN, O.P.

AN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CONVERT

THE first decades of the nineteenth century will live in history as the age of notable conversions to the Church. The Catholic revival at home and abroad, and the illustrious names connected with it—Newman, Manning, Stolberg, Schlegel, Haller—to mention but a few, easily occur to one's mind in connexion with this happy epoch in the annals of historic Christianity. Still it must not be forgotten that even during the depressing period of the preceding century, with its prevailing scepticism, materialism, and penal laws, the Church in these realms was constantly receiving into her fold those who, recognizing her paramount claims on the spiritual allegiance of mankind, gladly made every sacrifice in witness of their belief. Some, like Gother and Challoner, were destined to render pre-eminent services to the faith; to others was assigned the task of edifying their generation by the holiness of their lives—of silently preaching, as it were, resignation and contentment amidst a state of things which supernatural motives alone could make endurable. Among those who glorified God in the hidden, and therefore more difficult, way, the Rev. George Chamberlayne deservedly holds a conspicuous place, and it is concerning this devoted priest that we propose giving some details which may not be considered either wholly uninteresting or out of place.

The Rev. George Chamberlayne appears to have been born in 1738 at Great Cressingham, in Norfolk, of which parish his brother was rector. After a preliminary classical education at Eton, he proceeded to King's College, Cambridge, where, in 1757, he was elected a scholar on Dr. Beattie's foundation. Two years later, when already in Orders of the Established Church, he was appointed to the important office of bursar of his college, and it was about this time that he was chosen by the Duke of Newcastle as

companion to his son, the Earl of Lincoln, on the grand tour of Europe which the latter young nobleman was about to make in accordance with an excellent custom of the day. Mr. Chamberlayne's sojourn abroad seems to have whetted his appetite for travel, for shortly after his return, he again left for France accompanied by some University friends, and the party having spent some weeks in sight-seeing in the provinces, settled down for a prolonged stay in Paris.

The English tourists of the eighteenth century were, needless to say, a race apart from the more or less badly dressed mob which to-day 'does' the Continent from Trouville to Trieste. None but the wealthy could then afford to cross the Channel, and the bulk of those who travelled did so with the intention of storing the mind with that elegant knowledge of the arts which a prolonged residence in Rome, Florence, or Paris alone could give. Mr. Chamberlayne's visit to the French capital was destined, however, to have a more serious result. It chanced that the owner of the house where he lodged had a brother a Dominican monk, and with this good Father the subject of this notice often conversed, especially on topics relating to the doctrine and discipline of the Church. The Dominican was one of those wise individuals who regard controversy as being too often not the beginning but the end of conversion, and when matters of debate arose, he almost invariably referred his English friend to the pages of Bossuet and Arnauld for the Catholic interpretation of the various points at issue between Rome and Canterbury. The result of this sensible advice is best given in the words of a friend of the subject of this memoir :—

He [Mr. Chamberlayne] told me that the first book which began to make an impression on him was Bossuet's *Universal History*, which so clearly shows the superintending providence of God over His people the Jews ; and it seemed strange to him that the same Providence should suddenly cease, after His formal promises to watch over His Church with paternal care, by leaving it to the caprice of private judgment.

This reflection soon^{ly} brought with it other considerations,

and the perusal of the before-mentioned works of Bossuet and Arnauld displayed to the earnest enquirer the faith of the ages in all its splendid harmony as compared with the multifarious contradiction of Protestantism. Mr. Chamberlayne was also very much impressed, according to the same informant, 'with the orderly and religious behaviour of Catholics, especially at Vespers'—a welcome piece of intelligence, truly, in view of what we have been told of contemporary religious life in Paris and its Voltarian indifference. Further converse with the Abbé Ferris, Superior of the Lazarists at Amiens, strengthened his intellectual conviction, but some nine years had still to elapse before the end came in submission to the one fold and the one shepherd. Mr. Chamberlayne was received into the Church by the Rev. Peter Browne, at the Sardinian Chapel, Lincoln's Inn Fields, in 1778, and was shortly afterwards confirmed by Bishop Challoner, Vicar-Apostolic of the London District.

When this event occurred the whole body of British Catholicism still lay under the full unrepealed burden of the Penal Laws, though, thanks to Edmund Burke, Sir George Saville, and other friends, Parliament was about to initiate the first movement towards Catholic Emancipation by abolishing some of the worst of the persecuting statutes. In taking the step he did, Mr. Chamberlayne performed a truly heroic act, braving at once the legal penalties of Recusancy, and what was in practice far worse, the social ostracism which then fell to the lot of those who gave up every worldly advantage to embrace the Catholic faith. One noble mind, indeed, there was to applaud the courageous conduct of the young clergyman. When Mrs. Kennicot spoke to Dr. Johnson of the great prospects in the Church of England which her brother, the Rev. Mr. Chamberlayne, had sacrificed on his conversion to the Roman Catholic faith, the Fleet-street sage, who always warmly admired conscientious adherence to principle, fervently exclaimed: 'God bless him!'

On the advice of Bishop Challoner, and upon his own inclination, Mr. Chamberlayne resolved to study for the priesthood. He arrived at Douai on May 16, 1780, where,

in consideration of his circumstances, he was permitted to study theology privately instead of in the public schools. After his ordination, in 1783, he returned to England with the reputation of 'a sound scholar, a very pious man, and of remarkable gentleness and suavity of manners.'

He served only one mission, that of Cossey in his native county of Norfolk—the seat of Sir William Jerningham, Bart. During his pastorate at Cossey, from 1784 to 1798, he endeared himself to all his flock, so much so, indeed, that fifty years later one of his successors in the mission—Dr. Husenbeth, we believe—often heard the older members of the Congregation 'dwell on the goodness of his heart and the beneficence of his actions.' According to the same authority, 'those who had the happiness of living under the same roof with him found a constant source of edification in the piety, the love of prayer and holy meditation, as well as in the general spirit of mortification which they observed in him.'

Though out of sight, in a remote country mission, Mr. Chamberlayne—to give him the title by which he was always known—was not out of mind as far as his ecclesiastical superiors were concerned. When the Hon. and Right Rev. Bishop Talbot applied to the Holy See for a coadjutor, his name was one of the three sent to Rome, and two years before this—in 1787, to be precise—he was nominated as successor to the Rev. Dr. Wilkinson in the presidency of St. Omer's College—an honour which Mr. Chamberlayne, however, respectfully declined.

Having early mingled with the worldly great, and therefore being able to contrast the unsatisfactory nature of mere temporal preferment with the peaceful enjoyment of the holy Catholic faith, the missionary pastor of Cossey had no inclination for advancement or publicity of any sort. It is perhaps on this account that there are so few events to chronicle in connexion with his career. After fourteen years of strenuous, if unobtrusive missionary labours at Cossey, he came to London, and till his edifying death in February, 1815, resided with Bishop Douglass, the Vicar-Apostolic, in Castle Street, Holborn.

As a scholar, Mr. Chamberlayne excelled in the Greek and Latin classics, Virgil and Horace being perfectly familiar to him, as indeed they were to most gentlemen in those days, before smatterings of 'ologies and 'ographies had all but ruined what used to be called a 'liberal education.' Only a day or two before his death, he quoted with much feeling Homer's sublime lines describing Ajax involved in dark clouds, and praying to be at least allowed to die in the light.

Having been a Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, before his conversion, Mr. Chamberlayne after that event felt some scruple with regard to a matter which may appear trivial, but which shows how thoroughly the spirit of Catholicism had taken possession of his heart. One of the conditions of the Fellowship was—as we believe it still is—that the holder should pray for the soul of the pious founder, King Henry VI. This Mr. Chamberlayne had of course, as a Protestant, neglected to do, and so strongly did the sense of restitution weigh upon him, that he purposely asked advice on the matter of Monsignor Stonor, Agent of the English clergy in Rome, who, it is said, counselled him to make almsgiving the medium of compensation—which recommendation was duly carried out. This not only relieved the scruples of the reverend gentleman, but enabled him to say with perfect truth that 'he was the only statutable Fellow of the College, as the Fellows of King's College and of Eton, both founded by Henry VI., are obliged to *swear* that they will accept of no dispensation from the statutes of their founder'—an obligation which the casuistry of the Reformation has for some three centuries and a half rendered obsolete.

BERNARD W. KELLY.

Notes and Queries

CANON LAW

CELEBRATING MASS AND HEARING CONFESSIONS ON BOARD SHIP

REV. DEAR SIR,—During the Summer I expect to go for a sea voyage. Do I require a special permission to say Mass on board the ship? If so, might I get it from my own Bishop? There would not, I presume, be much difficulty about hearing the confessions of the passengers? There will be, I have reason to know, a good number of Catholics among them.

ANXIUS.

There have been several communications regarding these matters. The above covers all the cases.

We fear that, 'Anxius' will have more difficulty than he anticipates. No one is allowed to say Mass on board a ship unless he has a special Apostolic Indult granting him permission. So strict is the regulation that it binds even Apostolic Missionaries and priests who enjoy a special privilege of celebrating Mass anywhere they please.¹

The regulations regarding confessions are much more lenient. There used to be considerable discussion as to the source from which a priest should receive jurisdiction in the circumstances.² The matter is now settled. By a Decree of the Holy Office, dated April 4, 1900, and approved by Pope Leo XIII., it was decided that a priest could hear the confessions of his fellow-passengers on board the ship all through the voyage, provided he had jurisdiction from his own Ordinary. The same Congregation subsequently issued two supplementary Decrees on the subject, both approved by the present Pope. By the former (August 23, 1905) it was enacted that a priest might hear confessions

¹ Bened. XIV., *De Sacrif. Missae*, l. 3, c. 6. *Resp. S. C. Rituum*, March 4, 1901. Cf. a Decree of the Propaganda, March 1, 1902: 'Missionariis . . . speciali indulto fruentibus celebrandi,' etc.

² Cf. Lehmkühl, *Theol. Mor.* (ed. 1879, p. 279).

as above if he had faculties either from his own Ordinary or from the Ordinary of the place from which the ship sailed, or, finally, from the Ordinary of any of the ports at which it called. By the latter (December 12, 1906) it was arranged that the priest's jurisdiction should extend to the faithful who, for any reason, visited the ship, as well as to those who, when the priest happened to land for a short time (*in terram obiter descendentibus*) desired to confess their sins to him, provided always—in regard to the second class mentioned—there were not more than one approved priest in the place and that the Ordinary could not easily be approached.

These latter Decrees may be found in *The Appendix to the Maynooth Statutes* (pp. 109, 398, 399).

MAYNOOTH DECREES AND DANCING

REV. DEAR SIR,—In the Maynooth Statutes of 1875 one of the laws regarding dances runs as follows: 'Saltationes quasdam (*fast-dances*) recenter in hanc regionem inductas et modestiae Christianae plane repugnantes pro viribus impediunt (sacerdotes)' (page 114). The corresponding canon of the Synod of 1900 is: 'Saltationes modestiae Christianae repugnantes pro viribus impediunt' (page 109). Is there any conclusion to be drawn from the change? It would seem to indicate a more lenient view of the foreign dances that have been introduced.

In regard to clerics the Fathers declared: 'Choreas et saltationes tam publicas quam privatas clerici omnino fugiant, nec eas instituant, nec ullo modo promoveant' (page 83). Now, 'promovere' is a strong word. Would it apply to the case of a Parish Priest who merely grants the use of a school or hall? Should he not be described as 'permittens' rather than 'promovens'? Is the granting of such permission prohibited by the law? If so, priests will often be placed in a very difficult position. At the close of a bazaar, for example, the young people who have worked hard in connexion with it approach the Parish Priest, now so much their debtor, and ask his permission to hold a dance. Is he bound to refuse?

I should feel very much obliged for an expression of opinion.
PAROCHUS.

I. We have summarized our correspondent's letter: it

ran into several pages. The summary includes, however, all the essential points.

Of the intention of the Fathers in modifying the canon of their predecessors, only those who were engaged in the framing of the laws can speak with authority. We can merely attempt an interpretation of the words as they lie before us. And certainly the most obvious interpretation is the one our correspondent has himself suggested.

The purpose of the legislators of 1875 was, of course, to put an end to dances opposed to morality and Christian decency.¹ Instead of prohibiting such dances in general terms they made special mention of dances recently introduced from abroad.² This special mention amounted, one might say, to an authentic declaration that, whatever might be thought of other dances, these at all events were gravely opposed to Christian decency and should be regarded by everyone as such. In the Statutes of 1900 the prohibition is given in general terms and the special declaration is omitted. To the outsider, the most obvious conclusion to be drawn is that, in the opinion of the Fathers of 1900, these foreign dances should no longer be considered a class completely apart but should be treated on the same principles as apply to others ; or, in other words, that, however bad generally, they have been so modified in this country in course of time as not to be now necessarily in all cases gravely opposed to Christian modesty.

Another consideration tends to support this conclusion. In the Pastoral Letter issued by the assembled Bishops in 1875, the faithful were specially warned against the dances introduced from Continental countries.³ Now it can hardly be said that these dances had completely disappeared in 1900. If the stringent views of 1875 still remained it would be difficult to explain why there is no corresponding paragraph in the Pastoral Letter of 1900.

II. 'Promotion,' strictly speaking, suggests a stronger approval and a more active co-operation than is implied in a mere 'permission.' And the action of the Parish Priest

¹ See Pastoral Address, pp. 165-6.

² See above.

³ Pp. 165-6.

in question is, in another part of the Decrees, described as 'permission.'¹ It should be noticed, however, that, in speaking of 'promotion,' the terms employed by the Fathers are of a very wide and indefinite description ('*nec ullo modo promoveant*'): wide enough certainly to include a permission to use for dancing purposes a hall or school over which the Parish Priest has sole control. In any case, the connexion of priests with dances, in Gaelic League circles for instance, is often much closer than that outlined by our correspondent.

In interpreting canons of particular Councils it is well to keep in mind the general doctrine of the Church on the matter involved, and, especially, the interpretation of the general law adopted by the majority of writers. Now, the attitude of the Church towards dancing is, it may be admitted, one of disapproval. To quote a few typical statements: 'All the Doctors, both Greek and Latin, condemn dances as a crime gravely offensive to the Deity,' says one authority.² 'The holy Fathers,' says another, 'vehemently disapprove of dances for they lead the faithful to the lowest depths of destruction.'³ A third states: 'If adultery and fornication be evil things, I cannot see how it is not an evil thing that men should dance with women, seeing that the one is a strong inducement to the other.'⁴ A fourth, St. Charles Borromeo, describes dances as 'the source of sins and offences';⁵ while a fifth puts the whole case in a mathematical nutshell: 'A worldly dance is a circle of which the devil himself is the centre, and the circumference his ministering angels.'⁶ Countless other quotations might be given.⁷ Yet, when all this comes to be analysed and scientifically interpreted, we find that the disapproval is not so strong as not to admit of possible exceptions. We may take St. Thomas of Aquin and Father Lehmkuhl as

¹ P. 109. See below, p. 71.

² Balthasar Francolinus, *Cler. Rom.*, disp. 7.

³ Segneri, *Chris. Instr.*, par. 3, serm. 29.

⁴ Bellarmine, Belgian sermon.

⁵ *Acta Eccl. Mediol.*

⁶ Corrad Clingius, *Catech. Cath.*, l. 4, c. 14.

⁷ See, e.g., Bened. XIV., *Institut.* 37 and 76.

fair interpreters of the Catholic position. In the former we read :—

Since it is impossible to be always engaged in the active and contemplative life, we must occasionally mingle enjoyment with our cares lest the spirit be shattered by undue severity. And that a man may the more promptly attend to works of virtue, play indulged in for the purpose, and with other due conditions, will be an act of virtue, and even meritorious, if informed by grace. As regards dancing, the points to be attended to are, that the persons should be such as may properly take part—not a cleric or religious, for instance—that it should be during a time of rejoicing, . . . that the people should be moral and the music moral too, that the gestures should not be impure, and that other conditions of a similar kind should be observed. If, however, dancing were engaged in for the purpose of promoting unchastity, it would clearly be a vicious thing.¹

Lehmkuhl lays down the principle : ‘ Dances in which persons of different sexes take part . . . are not without danger, but not necessarily gravely dangerous : consequently they may be lawful according to the circumstances,’ and, solving a hypothetical case, continues :—

The Parish Priest, in indiscriminately condemning all dances and proclaiming all who take any part in them guilty of grave sin and unfit for sacramental absolution has transgressed the limits of prudence and truth. It would be more prudent to explain the dangers of dancing, . . . to dismiss without absolution those to whom dances are a proximate occasion and who cannot be induced to abstain altogether or take part only occasionally when they have some grave reason for their action and have adopted efficacious precautions : chiefly, however, to insist that everything external in the dance be moral, that the proceedings terminate at a rather early hour, and that girls be accompanied by persons of grave character. . . . The Parish Priest (in question) is under a misapprehension if he thinks that everything is arranged for the best if dances are completely stopped. For other occasions of sin are not thereby removed ; in fact, it is quite possible that worse occasions may be sought for all the more eagerly on that account.²

¹ In cap. iii. Isaiae.

² *Casus Consci.*, vol. i., pp. 209-10. Cf. S. Alphons., *Theol. Mor.* iii. 429 ; Ballerini, ii. 995, etc.

The position is well summed up by another less known writer: 'Are dances,' he asks, 'to be condemned as mortal sins? I answer that . . . they are not, because they are not unlawful in themselves but only on account of bad intentions or abuse or likely danger to individuals or some other circumstance of the kind.'¹ And another teaches us to make distinctions even when the Fathers and lawgivers made none: 'The Fathers,' he says, 'talk against dances; not against all . . . only against some. In that sense they are certainly to be understood, even though they draw no distinction themselves.'² All of which goes to show that, no matter how strong and unequivocal general statements may appear, they are to be applied in practice with such modifications as common sense and a fair appreciation of all the circumstances prudently suggest.

The law forbidding clerics to take part in dances or be present at them took its rise in an early Council of the sixth century.³ Adopted afterwards by other Councils, and gradually becoming the general law of the Church, it was finally ratified by the Council of Trent.⁴ It clearly contemplated dances of an improper character: 'Presbyteri . . . alienarum nuptiarum evitent convivia, nec his cetibus misceantur ubi amatoria cantantur et turpia, aut obsceni motus corporum choris et saltationibus efferuntur, ne auditus et obtutus sacris mysteriis deputatus turpium spectaculorum atque verborum contagione polluantur.' The treatment of this Decree by writers generally is not very satisfactory.⁵ For the most part they confine themselves to general statements, taking it apparently for granted that dances as a rule fulfil the description given in the Decree. When they come down to particulars, however, they make it clear that the distinction given above applies here too. Taking one of the most recent, Tanqueray, we

¹ Azorius, *Inst. Mor.*, p. 3, l. 3, c. 36.

² Francolinus, loc. cit.

³ Conc. Agathem., A.D. 506.

⁴ Sess. xxii., c. 1, *De reformatione*.

⁵ Lehmkuhl, e.g., speaks only of priests who join in the dance: 'Si clericus choreis saltando intersit.'—*Theol. Mor.* ii. 432.

find the following: 'Clerics are forbidden not merely to take part in dances but even to be present at them when anything improper happens in the course of them.' He then quotes the above Decree, and continues:—

If, however, they are private dances, in which nothing improper occurs, clerics are not forbidden to be present; in fact, in some places clerics sometimes attend them for the purpose of preventing anything immoral taking place. On this matter the particular law or legitimate custom of each diocese should be taken as the rule.¹

In attempting to fix the meaning of the Maynooth prohibition, we should apply the principle which we have found underlying the whole Catholic position, unless there be in the Decrees themselves some clear indication that the principle should be set aside. Now there is no such clear indication. What evidence there is points the other way.

In paragraph 459, page 135, we have the following enactment: 'Caveant Superiorissae ne . . . choreas illas . . . a bonis moribus alienas . . . in earum scholas introducinant.' Now there is a maxim of the law: 'Superior quod voluit dixit, quod noluit tacuit.' If a Superioress, therefore, introduces dances that *are* compatible with good morals, she is guilty of no offence against the Statutes of Maynooth. Would a priest who has a special interest in the convent—the Chaplain or Parish Priest, for instance—be justified in promoting the legitimate educational courses of the institution, the artistic department included? It seems absurd to maintain that he would not. But he certainly would not, if a rigorous interpretation be given to the general prohibition: 'nec ullo modo promoveant.' Therefore, a rigorous interpretation should not be given. 'Expedit concordare jura jurebus';² one law should be interpreted in the light of the other. 'Generi per speciem

¹ *Theol. Mor., De virt. just.*, p. 502 (ed. A.D. 1904).

As illustrating the modified sense in which general laws affecting clerics are to be taken occasionally, we might instance Lehmkühl's interpretation of the Lateran Decree forbidding priests to visit taverns. There is no distinction made in the law: in practice it has to be supplied. (*Theol. Mor.* ii. 432.)

² *De elect.*, in 6°; c. 29.

derogatur ; ' ¹ the general law is set aside by the particular. The general prohibition of Maynooth, as the particular regulation shows, applies only to improper dances : ' Ita profecto explicandi sunt Patres quamvis non distinguant. ' ²

Again, on page 109, we have this Decree : ' Ne permittant clerici saltationes in ullo aedificio sub eorum tutela posito ubi potus immoderate distribuitur, vel ubi, senioribus absentibus, utriusque sexus iuvenes congregantur. ' Again, ' Superior quod noluit tacuit. ' Where none of the abuses mentioned exist, the Parish Priest who grants the use of the hall is guilty of no violation of the Statutes. Yet he has adopted a most effective method of promoting, in the sense of the general statute, the entertainment for which the use of the hall is granted. Is there a contradiction in the Decrees ? Most unlikely. ' Expedit concordare jura iuribus. ' ' Generi per speciem derogatur. ' The general law binds him not to promote improper dances.

Whether, therefore, we consider the general spirit of ecclesiastical legislation, or the Maynooth Decrees themselves, we come to the conclusion that the Parish Priest mentioned by our correspondent is not necessarily guilty of a breach of the law, not exactly because he is not technically a ' promoter ' of the dance, but because the entertainment for which the building is used may, in this country at all events, be easily free from the abuses which originally called forth ecclesiastical legislation and which, as far as we can see, were contemplated also by the framers of the Maynooth Decrees.

In deciding what are, or are not, improper dances, the various principles quoted above will carry us a long way. Of the standards mentioned by St. Thomas, one, we think, deserves special emphasis—the character, namely, of the people who take part.

M. J. O'DONNELL.

¹ Reg. xxxiv. juris in 6°.

² Vide Francolinus above.

DOCUMENTS

ENCYCLICAL LETTER OF HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS X.
IN MEMORY OF ST. CHARLES BORROMEIO

LITTERAE ENCYCLICAE

VENERABILIBUS¹ FRATRIBUS PATRIARCHIS PRIMATIBUS ARCHIEPISCOPIS EPISCOPIS ALIISQUE LOCORUM ORDINARIIS PACEM ET COMMUNIONEM CUM APOSTOLICA SEDE HABENTIBUS

PIUS PP. X.

VENERABILES FRATRES SALUTEM ET APOSTOLICAM BENEDICTIONEM

Editae saepe Dei ore sententiae et sacris expressae litteris in hunc fere modum, iusti memoriam fore cum laudibus sempiternam eundemque loqui etiam defunctum,¹ diuturna Ecclesiae opera et voce maxime comprobantur. Haec namque sanctitatis parens et altrix, iuvenili robore vicens ac Numinis afflatu semper acta *propter inhabitantem spiritum eius in nobis*,² quemadmodum iustorum sobolem nobilissimam ipsa una gignit, enutrit, ulnisque complectitur suis, ita materni amoris instinctu de ipsorum retinenda memoria atque honore instaurando se praebebat apprime sollicitam. Ex ea recordatione superna quadam suavitate perfunditur et a mortalis huius peregrinationis miseriis contuendis abducitur, quod beatos illos caelicolas *gaudium suum et coronam* esse iam cernat; quod ni ipsis eminentem agnoscat Sponsi caelestis imaginem; quod novo testimonio suis filiis antiqua dicta confirmet: *diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum, iis qui secundum propositum vocati sunt sancti*.³ Horum autem praeclara facinora, non modo sunt ad commemorandum iucunda, sed etiam ad imitandum illustria, et magnus virtutis excitator est concentus ille sanctorum Paullinae resonans voci: *imitatores mei estote sicut et ego Christi*.⁴

Ob haec, Venerabiles Fratres, Nos, qui vixdum suscepto pontificatu maximo, propositum significavimus enitendi constanter ut 'omnia instaurarentur in Christo'; datis primum

¹ Ps. cxi. 7; Prov. x. 7; Hebr. xi. 4.

² Rom. viii. 11.

³ Rom. viii. 28.

⁴ 1 Cor. iv. 16.

encyclicis litteris¹ impense curavimus ut Nobiscum omnes intuerentur in *apostolum et pontificem confessionis nostrae*, . . . in *auctorem fidei et consummatorem Iesum*.² At quoniam ea fere est infirmitas nostra, ut tanti exemplaris amplitudine facile deterreamur, providentis Dei numine, aliud a nobis est exemplar propositum, quod quum Christo sit proximum, quantum humanae licet naturae, tum aptius congruat cum exiguitate nostra, Beatissima Virgo Augusta Dei Mater.³ Varias denique nacti occasiones recolendae memoriae sanctorum caelitum, communi admirationi obiecimus fideles hosce servos ac dispensatores in domo Domini, et, prout suus cuique locus est, Eius amicos ac domesticos, qui *per fidem vicerunt regna, operati sunt iustitiam, adepti sunt repromissiones*,⁴ ut illorum exemplis adducti, *iam nos simus parvuli fluctuantes et circumferamur omni vento doctrinae, in nequitia hominum, in astutia ad circumventionem erroris; veritatem autem facientes in charitate, crescamus in illo per omnia qui est caput Christus*.⁵

Altissimum hoc divinae Providentiae consilium in tribus maxime viris perfectum fuisse docuimus, quos magnos pastores eosdemque doctores diversa quidem aetas tulit, sed aequae prope-modum Ecclesiae calamitosa. Hi sunt Gregorius Magnus, Ioannes Chrysostomus et Augustanus Anselmus, quorum saecularia solemnia celebrari contigit per hos annos. Binis praeterea Encyclicis Litteris datis IV Idus Martias anno MCMIV et XI Calend. Maias MCMIX, doctrinae capita et christianae vitae praecepta, quotquot opportuna cadere in haec tempora visa sunt, e sanctorum exemplis monitisque decerpta, fusius evolvimus.

At quoniam persuasum Nobis est, ad impellendos homines, illustria Christi militum exempla longe magis valitura quam verba exquisitasque disceptationes;⁶ oblata feliciter opportunitate libentes utimur saluberrima instituta ab alio pastore sanctissimo accepta commendandi, quem huic aetati propiorem iisdemque paene iactatum fluctibus Deus excitavit, Sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae Cardinalem, Mediolanensium Antistitem, ante annos CCC a sa. me. Paulo V in sanctorum album relatum, Carolum Borromeum. Nec id minus ad rem; siquidem, ut memorati Decessoris Nostri verba usurpemus: 'Dominus, qui

¹ Litt. Encycl. '*E supremi*' die IV m. Octobr. MCMIII.

² Hebr. iii. 1; xii. 2, 3.

³ Litt. Encycl. '*Ad diem illum*,' die II m. Februar. MCMIV.

⁴ Hebr. xi. 33.

⁵ Eph. iv. 11 seq.

⁶ Encycl. '*E supremi*.'

facit mirabilia magna solus, magnificavit novissime facere nobiscum, ac miro dispensationis suae opere statuit super Apostolicae petrae arcem grande luminare, eligens sibi e gremio sacrosanctae Romanae Ecclesiae Carolum, sacerdotem fidelem, servum bonum, formam gregis, formam Pastorum. Qui videlicet multiplici fulgore sanctorum operum universam decorando Ecclesiam, sacerdotibus et populo praeluceret quasi Abel in innocentia, quasi Enoch in munditia, quasi Iacob in laborum tolerantia, quasi Moyses in mansuetudine, quasi Elias in ardenti zelo, quique imitandum exhiberet inter affluentes delicias Hieronymi corporis castigationem, Martini in sublimioribus gradibus humilitatem, Gregorii pastorem sollicitudinem, libertatem Ambrosii, Paulini caritatem, ac demum videndum ac perspiciendum ostenderet oculis nostris, manibus nostris contrectandum hominem, mundo maxime blandiente, crucifixum mundo, viventem spiritu, terrena calcantem, caelestia iugiter negotiantem et, sicut officio in angelum substitutum, ita etiam mente et opere vitam angelorum in terris aemulantem.¹

Haec Decessor ille Noster exactis quinque lustris ab obitu Caroli. Nunc vero, expleto anno tercentesimo ab imperitiis eidem sacris honoribus, 'merito repletum est gaudio os nostrum et lingua nostra exultatione in insigni die solemnitatis nostrae, . . . in qua . . . Carolo S. R. E., cui, auctore Domino, praesidemus, Presbytero Cardinali sacris decernendis honoribus, unice Sponsae suae nova imponeretur corona, ornata omni lapide pretioso.' Communis autem cum Decessore Nostro fiducia Nobis est, ex contemplatione gloriae sancti Viri, multoque magis ex eiusdem documentis et exemplis, debilitari posse impiorum proterviam et confundi omnes qui 'gloriantur in simulacris errorum.'² Itaque renovati Carolo honores, qui gregis ac pastorum huius aetatis exstitit forma, sacraeque disciplinae in melius corrigendae impiger fuit propugnator et auctor adversus novos homines, quibus, non fidei morumque restitutio proposita erat, sed potius deformatio atque restinctio, quum solacio ac documento erunt catholicis universis, tum iisdem stimulos addent, ut in opus, cui tam impense studemus, instaurationis rerum omnium in Christo, strenue conspirent.

Exploratum profecto vobis est, Venerabiles Fratres, perpetuo exagitata Ecclesia deseri a Deo nunquam omni consolatione destitutam. Eam namque *Christus dilexit . . . et semetipsum*

¹ Ex Bulla 'Unigenitus' an. MDCX, Cal. Nov.

² Ex eadem Bulla 'Unigenitus.'

*tradidit pro ea, ut illam sanctificaret et exhiberet ipse sibi gloriosam Ecclesiam, non habentem maculam aut rugam, aut aliquid huiusmodi, sed ut sit sancta et immaculata.*¹ Quin etiam, quo effusior licentia, quo acrior hostilis impetus, quo erroris insidiae callidiores afferre illi supremum videntur exitium, usque adeo, ut filios non paucos de gremio eius avulsos in vitiorum et impietatis gurgitem transversos agant, eo praesentiolem experitur tutelam Numinis. Efficit enim Deus ut error ipse, velint nolint improbi, in triumphum cedat veritatis, cui custodiendae Ecclesia advigilat; corruptio in incrementum sanctitatis, cuius altrix ipsa est atque magistra; vexatio in mirabiliorem salutem ex inimicis nostris. Ita fit ut, quo tempore Ecclesia profanis oculis videtur saevioribus iactata fluctibus ac paene demersa, tunc nempe pulchrior, validior, purior emergat, maximarum emicans fulgore virtutum.

Sic Dei summa benignitas novis argumentis confirmat, Ecclesiam opus esse divinum; sive quod in causa suscipiendi doloris maxima, ob irrepentes in ipsa eius membra errores et noxas, ei det superandum discrimen; sive quod ratum efficiat Christi verbum: *Portae inferi non praevallebunt adversus eam*,² sive quod eventibus illud comprobet: *ecce ego vobiscum sum omnibus diebus usque ad consummationem saeculi*,³ sive denique quod arcanae virtutis testimonium perhibeat, qua promissus a Christo, maturo huius in caelum reditu, *alius Paraclitus* in ipsam iugiter effunditur, ipsam tuetur et in omni tribulatione solatur; spiritus, *qui cum ipsa maneat in aeternum*; spiritus veritatis, *quem mundus non potest accipere, quia non videt eum nec scit eum, quia apud vos manebit et apud vos erit.*⁴ Hoc ex fonte vita et robur Ecclesiae derivatur; hinc quod eadem, ut Concilium Oecumenicum Vaticanum habet, manifestis notis instructa et 'tanquam signum levatum in nationes,' a quavis alia societate secernitur.⁵

Nec sane absque divinae potentiae prodigio fieri potest ut, diffuente licentia et passim deficientibus membris, Ecclesia, quatenus est corpus Christi mysticum, a doctrinae, legum finisque sui sanctitate nunquam desciscat; ex iisdem rerum causis pares consecutiones et utilitates derivet; ex complurium filiorum fide ac iustitia fructus capiat salutis uberrimos. Nec minus perspicuum haustae a Deo vitae habet indicium, quod in tam foeda pravarum opinionum colluvie, in tanto perduellium numero, in errorum facie adeo multiplici, constans et immutabilis perseveret, *columna et firmamentum veritatis*, in unius professione

¹ Eph. v. 25 sqq.² Matth. xvi. 18.³ Matth. xxviii. 20.⁴ Ioan. xiv. 16 sqq.; 26, 59; xvi. 7 sqq.⁵ Sessio iii. c. 3.

doctrinae, in eadem communione sacramentorum, in divina sui constitutione, in regimine, in disciplina morum. Idque eo plus habet admirationis, quod ipsa, non solum resistit malo, sed etiam *vincit in bono malum*, nec bene precari desinit amicis atque inimicis, de eo tota laborans idque assequi cupiens, ut et communitas hominum et seorsim singuli christianis institutis renoventur. Est enim hoc proprium eius munus in terris, cuius beneficia vel ipsi eius inimici sentiunt.

Mirabilis hic Dei providentis influxus in instaurationis opus ab Ecclesia provectum luculenter apparet ea maxime aetate, quae ad bonorum solacium dedit Carolum Borromeum. In eo dominatu cupiditatum, omni fere pertubata et offusa cognitione veritatis, perpetua erat cum erroribus dimicatio, hominumque societas in pessima quaeque ruens, gravem videbatur sibi conflare perniciem. Inter haec superbi ac rebelles homines consurgebant, *inimici Crucis Christi . . . qui terrena sapiunt . . . quorum Deus venter est*.¹ Hi non moribus corrigendis, sed negandis Fidei capitibus animum intendentes, omnia miscebant, latiore sibi aliisque muniebant licentiae viam, aut certe auctoritatem Ecclesiae ductumque defugientes, pro lubitu corruptissimi cuiusque principis populive, quasi imposito iugo, doctrinam eius, constitutionem, disciplinam in excidium petebant. Deinde, iniquorum imitati morem, ad quos pertinet comminatio: *Vae qui dicitis malum bonum et bonum malum*,² rebellium tumultum et illam fidei morumque cladem appellarunt instaurationem, sese autem disciplinae veteris restitutores. Re tamen vera corruptores exstiterunt, quod, extenuatis Europae per contentiones et bella viribus, defectiones horum temporum et secessiones maturarunt, quibus uno velut impetu facto, triplex illud, antea disiunctum, dimicationis instauratum est genus, a quo invicta et sospes Ecclesia semper evaserat; hoc est, primae aetatis cruenta certamina; domesticam subinde pestem errorum; denique, per speciem sacrae libertatis vindicandae, eam vitiorum luem ac disciplinae eversionem, ad quam fortasse nec aetas media processerat.

Decipientium hominum turbae Deus opposuit veri nominis instauratores, eosque sanctissimos, qui aut cursum illum praecipitem retardarent ardoremque restinguerent, aut illata inde damna sarcirent. Quorum labor assiduus et multiplex in restituenda disciplina eo maiori solacio Ecclesiae fuit, quo graviore haec premebatur angustia, comprobavitque sententiam: *Fidelis*

¹ Philip. iii. 18, 19.

² Is. v. 20.

*Deus, qui . . . faciet etiam cum tentatione proventum.*¹ Iis in adiunctis laetitiam Ecclesiae cumulavit oblata divinitus Caroli Borromei singularis navitas vitaeque sanctitas.

Fuit autem in eius ministerio, Deo sic disponente, propria quaedam vis et efficientia, non solum ad infrigendam audaciam factiosorum, sed etiam ad erudiendos Ecclesiae filios atque excitandos. Illorum namque et insanos cohibebat ausus, et inanes criminationes diluebat, eloquentia usus omnium potentissima, suae vitae et actionis exemplo; horum vero spem erigebat, alebat ardorem. Atque illud in ipso fuit plane mirabile, quod veri restauratoris dotes, quas in aliis disiunctas cernimus atque distinctas, ab iuvenili aetate in se omnes recepit in unum collectas, virtutem, consilium, doctrinam, auctoritatem, potentiam, alacritatem, effecitque ut in commissam sibi catholicae veritatis defensionem contra grassantes errores, quod idem erat Ecclesiae universae propositum, singulae conspirarent, intermortuam in multis ac paene restinctam excitans fidem, providis eam legibus institutisque communiens, collapsam disciplinam restituens, cleri populiue mores ad christianae vitae rationem strenue revocans. Sic, dum partes instauratoris tuetur omnes, haud minus mature *servi boni et fidelis* fungitur muniis, ac deinde sacerdotis magni, *qui in diebus suis placuit Deo et inventus est iustus*; plane dignus in quem cuiusvis generis homines tum e clero tum e populo, divites aequae ac inopes, tamquam in exemplar intueantur; cuius excellentiae summa in episcopi atque antistitis laude continetur, qua, Petri Apostoli dictis obtemperans, factus est *forma gregis ex animo*.² Nec minus movet admirationem quod Carolus, nondum exacto anno aetatis suae vicesimo, summos honores consecutus, magnis ac perarduis Ecclesiae negotiis tractandis adhibitus, ad perfectam cumulatamque virtutem, per contemplationem rerum divinarum, qua in sacro secessu animum renovaverat, in dies magis contenderet, eluceretque *spectaculum . . . mundo et angelis et hominibus*.

Tum vere Dominus coepit, ut memorati Decessoris Pauli V. verbis utamur, *mirabilia sua* in Carolo pandere; sapientiam, iustitiam, divini honoris et catholici provehendi nominis studium flagrantissimum, in primisque curam instaurandae Fidei Ecclesiaeque universae, quod opus in augusto illo Tridentino Consilio agitabatur. Cuius habiti laus ab eodem pontifice ab omnique posteritate sic tribuitur Carolo, quasi viro, qui, non ante illius exsequutor exstiterit fidelissimus, quam propugnator acerrimus.

¹ 1 Cor. x. 13.

² 1 Petr. v. 3.

Nec enim sine multis eius vigiliis, angustiis, laboribus omne genus, res est ad exitum perducta.

Haec tamen omnia nihil erant aliud nisi praeparatio quaedam vitaeque tirocinium, quo et pietate animus et mens doctrina et labore corpus exercerentur, ita ut modestus iuvenis ac de se demisse sentiens instar esset argillae in manibus Domini eiusque in terris Vicarii. Hanc scilicet rationem ineundae viae novarum rerum fautores illi contemnebant eadem stultitia qua nostri, minime secum reputantes, mirabilia Dei ex umbra et silentio parentis animi pieque precantis in apricum proferri, in eaque exercitatione germen futuri adscensus, haud secus ac in semente spem colligendae messis, includi.

Nihilominus, quod paullo superius attigimus, auspicata tam faustis initiis vitae sanctitas et actio tum se maxime explicuit effuditque fructus uberrimos, quum, 'urbano splendore et amplitudine relictis, bonus operarius in messem quam susceperat (Mediolanum), discedit, ubi partes suas in dies magis implendo, agrum illum, malitia temporum, vepribus turpiter deformem ac silvescentem, in eum restituit nitorem, ut Ecclesiam Mediolanensem, praeclarum exemplum redderet ecclesiasticae disciplinae.'¹ Tam multa tamque praeclara is est consequutus conformando instaurationis opus ad normas a Concilio Tridentino paullo ante propositas.

Enimvero Ecclesia, probe intelligens, quam sint *sensus et cogitatio humani cordis in malum prona*,² cum vitiis et erroribus dimicare nunquam destitit, *ut destruat corpus peccati et ultra non serviamus peccato*.³ Qua in contentione, quemadmodum ipsa sibi magistra est et impellitur gratia, quae *diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum*; ita cogitandi agendique normam sumit a Doctore gentium, aiente: *Renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae*.⁴ *Et nolite conformari huic saeculo, sed reformamini in novitate sensus vestri, ut probetis quae sit voluntas Dei bona et beneplacens et perfecta*.⁵ Quam quidem se metam contigisse Ecclesiae filius atque instaurator non fictus existimat nunquam; ad eam tantummodo niti profitetur cum eodem apostolo; *quae retro sunt obliviscens, ad ea vero quae sunt priora extendens meipsum, ad destinatum persequor, ad bravium supernae vocationis Dei in Christo Iesu*.⁶

Inde consequitur ut et nos cum Christo in Ecclesia coniuncti

¹ Bulla 'Unigenitus.'

² Gen. viii. 21.

³ Rom. vi. 6.

⁴ Ephes. iv. 23.

⁵ Rom. xii. 2.

⁶ Philip. iii. 13, 14.

*crescamus in illo per omnia, qui est caput Christus, ex quo totum corpus . . . augmentum facit in aedificationem sui in charitate,*¹ et Ecclesia Mater in dies magis efficiat ratum sacramentum divinae voluntatis, hoc est, *in dispensatione plenitudinis temporum instaurare omnia in Christo.*²

Ad haec animum non intenderunt auctores illi redintegrandae suo Marte fidei ac disciplinae, quorum conatibus restitit Borromeus; nec ea nostri melius vident, quibuscum strenue nobis, Venerabiles Fratres, est dimicandum. Nam et hi Ecclesiae doctrinam, leges, instituta subvertunt, habentes in lingua promptum cultioris humanitatis studium, non quod eo de negotio valde laborent, sed quo titulis ad ostentationem paratis pravitatem consiliorum queant facilius obtegere.

Quid autem re agant, quid moliantur, quod iter affectent, neminem vestrum fugit, eorumque consilia denuntiata per Nos fuerunt atque damnata. Proposita namque ipsis est communis omnium ab Ecclesiae fide ac disciplina secessio, eo vetere illa deterior quae Caroli aetatem in discrimen adduxit, quo callidius in ipsis fere Ecclesiae venis delitescit ac serpit, et quo subtilius ab absurde positis extrema deducuntur.

Utriusque pestis origo eadem; *inimicus homo*, qui ad humanae gentis perniciem haud sane exsominis, *superseminavit zizanium in medio tritici*,³ idem abditum iter ac tenebricosum; eadem progressio, idem appulsus. Etenim, quemadmodum prior illa olim, qua fortuna rem daret eo vires inclinans, optimatum partes aut popularium alteram adversus alteram concitabat, ut utramque tandem ludificaret atque pessumdaret; sic recentior ista clades mutuam exacuit invidiam egentium ac locupletium, ut sua quisque sorte non contentus vitam trahat usque miserrimam luatque poenam iis irrogatam, qui non *regnum Dei et iustitiam eius* quaerunt, sed caducis his rebus fluxisque adhaerescunt. Atque illud etiam graviolem facit praesentem conflictationem, quod, quum superiorum temporum turbulenti homines e doctrinae divinitus revelatae thesauro certa quaedam et fixa plerumque retinerent, hodierni non ante quieturi videantur quam excisa omnia conspexerint. Everso autem religionis fundamento, et ipsam civilem coniunctionem dirumpi necesse est. Luctuosum sane spectaculum in praesens, formidolosum in posterum; non quod Ecclesiae incolumitati timendum sit, de qua dubitare divina promissa non sinunt, sed ob impendentia familiis gentibusque

¹ Eph. iv. 15, 16.² Eph. i. 9, 10.³ Matth. xiii. 25.

pericula, maxime quae pestiferum impietatis afflatum aut impensius foveant aut ferunt patientius.

In hoc tam nefario stultoquo bello, cui commovendo dilando socii et adiutores potentes accedunt interdum vel ipsi, qui Nobiscum facere Nostrasque tueri res deberent prae ceteris ; in forma errorum adeo multiplici vitiorumque illecebris tam variis quibus utrisque haud pauci etiam e nostris blandiuntur, capti specie novitatis ac doctrinae, aut inani spe ducti, Ecclesiam posse cum aevi placitis amice componi, plane intelligitis, Venerabiles Fratres, nobis esse strenue obsistendum, iisdemque nunc armis excipiendum impetum hostium, quibus olim usus est Borromeus.

Primum igitur, quoniam ipsam, veluti arcem, impetunt fidem, vel eam aperte denegando, vel impugnando subdole, vel doctrinae capita pervertendo, haec a Carolo saepe commendata meminerimus : ' Prima et maxima Pastorum cura versari debet in iis quae ad fidem catholicam, quam S. Romana Ecclesia et colit et docet, et sine qua *impossibile est placere Deo*, integre inviolateque servandam pertinent.'¹ Et rursus : ' In eo genere . . . nullum tantum studium, quantum certe maximum requiritur, adhiberi possit.'² Quapropter ' haereticae pravitatis fermento,' quod nisi cohibeatur *totam massam corrumpit*, hoc est pravis opinionibus ementita specie irrepentibus, quas in unum collectas *modernismus* profitetur, sanitas est opponenda doctrinae et reputandum cum Carolo : 'quam summum in haeresis crimine profligando studium et cura quam longe omnium diligentissima episcopi esse debeat.'³

Haud opus est equidem cetera verba referre sancti .iri commemorantis Romanorum Pontificum sanctiones, leges, poenas in eos antistites constitutas quibus purgandae dioecesis ab ' haereticae pravitatis fermento ' esset cura remissior. Nonnihil tamen iuverit ad ea quae inde concludit diligenter attendere. ' Proinde, inquit, in ea perenni sollicitudine perpetuaque vigilia episcopus versari in primis debet, ut, non modo pestilentissimus ille haeresis morbus nusquam in gregem sibi commissum irrepat, sed omnis plane suspicio ab eo quam longissime absit. Si vero fortasse, quod pro sua pietate et misericordia Christus Dominus avertat, irreperit, in eo maxime elaboret omni ope, ut quam celerrime depellatur : quique ea labe infecti erunt, vel suspecti, cum illis agatur ad canonum sanctionumque pontificiarum praescriptum.'⁴

¹ Conc. Prov. I, sub initium. ² Conc. Prov. V, Pars I. ³ Ibid. ⁴ Ibid.

Verum nec propulsari possunt errorum contagia nec prae-caveri, nisi in recta cleri populique institutione pars curarum ponatur maxima. Nam *fides ex auditu; auditus autem per verbum Christi*.¹ Veri autem omnium auribus inculcandi necessitas nunc magis imponitur, quum per omnes reipublicae venas, atque etiam qua minime crederes, serpere cernimus malum virus; adeo ut ad omnes hodie pertineant adductae a Carolo causae hisce verbis: 'Haereticis finitimi nisi in fidei fundamentis firmi fuerint ac stabiles, summopere verendum esset, ne forte ab eis in aliquam impietatis ac nefariae doctrinae fraudem facilius adducerentur.'² Nunc enim, expeditioribus itineribus, quemadmodum ceterarum rerum, ita etiam errorum sunt aucta commercia, proiectisque ad licentiam cupiditatibus, in prava societate versamur, ubi *non est veritas . . . et non est scientia Dei*;³ *in terra quae desolata est . . . quia nullus est qui recogitet corde*.⁴ Quamobrem Nos, ut Caroli verba usurpemus: 'multam hactenus diligentiam adhibuimus, ut omnes ac singuli Christi fideles in fidei christianae rudimentorum institutione erudirentur';⁵ eademque de re, tamquam ne negotio gravissimo scripsimus Encyclicas Litteras.⁶ Etsi vero nolumus et illa Nobis aptare, quibus inexplibili desiderio flagrans Borromeus queritur, 'parum huc usque profecisse tanta in re'; nihilominus eâdem, qua ipse, 'negotii periculique magnitudine adducti,' addere stimulos velimus omnibus, ut, Caroli similitudinem arripietes, pro suo quisque munere aut viribus, in christianae restorationis opus conspirent. Quare meminerint patres familias ac domini, quo studio pastor ille sanctissimus eosdem constanter monuerit ut liberis, domesticis, famulis addiscendae christianae doctrinae, non solum copiam facerent, sed etiam onus imponerent. Clericis pariter memoria ne excidat, in fidei rudimentis tradendis a se operam dandam esse curioni; huic vero studendum, ut eiusmodi scholae suppetant plures, christi-fidelium numero ac necessitati pares et magistrorum probitate commendabiles, quibus adiutores adsciscantur honesti viri aut mulieres, prout Mediolanensis ipse praescribit antistes.⁷

Christianae huius institutionis aucta necessitas, quum ex reliquo nostrorum temporum morumque decursu eminet, tum

¹ Rom. x. 17.

² Conc. Prov. V, Pars. I.

³ Os. iv. 1.

⁴ Ierem. xii. 11.

⁵ Conc. Prov. V, Pars I.

⁶ Encycl. '*Acerbo nimis*,' die XXV m. Aprilis MDCCCCV.

⁷ Conc. Prov. V, Pars. I.

vero potissimum ex publicis discendi ludis, omnis religionis expertibus, ubi sanctissima quaeque rideri voluptatis loco fere ducitur, aequae pronis ad impietatem et magistrorum labiis et auribus auditorum. Scholam dicimus, quam *neutram*, seu *laicam* per summam iniuriam appellant, quum non sit aliud nisi tenebricosae sectae dominatus praepotens. Novum hoc praeposteræ libertatis iugum magna quidem voce et bonis lateribus denuntiastis vos, Venerabiles Fratres, praesertim in locis ubi audacius proculcata sunt iura religionis ac familiae et oppressa naturae vox imperantis ut adolescentium candori fideique parcat. Cui calamitati ab iis illatae, qui, quam ab aliis oboedientiam exigunt, eandem supremo rerum Domino recusant, quantum in Nobis est medendum rati, auctores fuimus ut scholae religionis opportune per urbes instituerentur. Quod opus quamquam hactenus, adnitentibus vobis, satis bene prospereque processit, nihilominus magnopere expetendum est ut in dies latius proferatur, hoc est ut eiusmodi magisteria et pateant ubique complura et praeceptoribus abundant doctrinae laude vitaeque integritate commendatis.

Cum hac primordiorum saluberrima disciplina valde coniunctum est officium sacri oratoris, in quo memoratae virtutes multo magis requiruntur. Itaque Caroli studia et consilia provincialibus in Synodis ac dioecesanis eo potissimum fuere conversa ut concionatores fingerentur, qui *in ministerio verbi* versari sancte atque utiliter possent. Quod idem, ac forte gravius, quae modo sunt tempora postulare a nobis videntur, quum tot hominum nutet fides, nec desint qui, captandae gloriolae cupidine, ingenio aetatis indulgeant, *adulterantes verbum Dei*, vitaeque cibum subducentes fidelibus.

Quamobrem summa vigilantia cavendum nobis est, Venerabiles Fratres, ne per vanos homines ac leves vento pascatur grex; sed ut vitali alimento roboretur per *ministros verbi*, ad quos illa pertinent: *Pro Christo legatione fungimur, tamquam Deo exhortante per nos: reconciliamini Deo;*¹ *per ministros et legatos non ambulantes in astutis, neque adulterantes verbum Dei, sed in manifestatione veritatis, commendantes semetipsos ad omnem conscientiam hominum coram Deo;*² *operarios inconfusibiles tractantes verbum veritatis.*³ Nec minus usui nobis erunt normae illae sanctissimae maximeque frugiferae, quas mediolanensis antistes, Paullinis verbis expressas, commendare solebat fidelibus: *Cum accepissetis a nobis verbum auditus Dei, accepistis illud, non*

¹ 2 Cor. v. 20.² 2 Cor. iv. 2.³ 2 Tim. ii. 15.

*ut verbum hominum, sed, sicut est vere, verbum Dei, qui operatur in vobis, qui credidistis.*¹

Ita sermo Dei vivus et efficax et penetrabilior omni gladio,² non solum ad fidei conservationem ac tutelam adducet, sed etiam ad virtutum proposita mire animos inflammabit; quia *fides sine operibus mortua est*,³ et non auditores legis iusti sunt apud Deum, sed *factores legis iustificabuntur*.⁴

Atque hac etiam in re cernere licet, utriusque instaurationis quam sit ratio dissimilis. Nam qui falsam propugnant, ii stultorum imitati inconstantiam, praecepti cursu solent ad extrema decurrere, sive fidem sic efferentes, ut ab ea recte agendi necessitatem seigungant, sive in sola natura excellentiam omnem virtutis collocantes, remotis fidei ac divinae gratiae praesidiis. Quo fit ut, quae a naturali honestate ducuntur officia nihil sint aliud nisi simulacra virtutis, nec diuturna illa quidem, nec ad salutem satis idonea. Horum igitur actio, non ad restaurationem disciplinae, sed ad fidei morumque eversionem est comparata.

Contra qui ad Caroli exemplum, veritatis amici minimeque fallaces, salutari rerum conversioni student, hi extrema devitant, neque certos excedunt fines, quos ultra nequit instaurationis ulla consistere. Etenim Ecclesiae eiusque Capiti Christo firmissime adhaerentes, non modo inde robur vitae interioris hauriunt, sed exterioris etiam actionis metiuntur modum, ut sanandae hominum societatis opus tuto aggrediantur. Est autem proprium divinae huius missionis, in eos perpetuo transmissae qui Christi legatione functuri essent, *docere omnes gentes*, non solum ea quae ad credendum, sed etiam quae ad agendum pertinerent, hoc est, uti Christus edixit: *servare omnia quaecumque mandavi vobis*.⁵ Ipse enim est *via, veritas et vita*,⁶ qui venit ut homines *vitam habeant et abundantius habeant*.⁷ Quia vero officia illa retineri omnia duce tantum natura est difficillimum, quin etiam multo positum superius quam ut humanae vires ipsae per se consequi possint; idcirco Ecclesia magisterio suo adiunctum habet christianae regimen societatis eiusque ad omnem sanctitatem instituendae munus, dum per eos qui pro suo quisque statu et officio sese illi ministros adiutoresve praebent, apta et necessaria salutis instrumenta suppeditat. Quod plane intelligentes verae instaurationis auctores, non ii surculos, praeservandae radicis gratia, coercent, hoc est, non fidem a vitae sanctitate seiungunt,

¹ 1 Thess. ii. 13.

² Hebr. iv. 12.

³ Iacob. ii. 26.

⁴ Rom. ii. 13.

⁵ Matth. xxviii. 18, 20.

⁶ Ioan. xiv. 6. ⁷ Ioan. x. 10.

sed utramque alunt foventque halitu caritatis, quae est *vinculum perfectionis*.¹ Idem, dicto audientes Apostolo, *depositum custodiunt*,² non ut gentibus notitiam eius occulant lumenque subducant, sed quo deductos ex eo fonte veritatis ac vitae saluberrimos rivos latius recludant. In eâque copia doctrinam ad usum adiungunt, illa utentes ad praeripiendam *circumventionem erroris*, hoc ad praecepta in mores actionemque vitae deducenda. Quamobrem instrumenta omnia ad finem vel apta vel necessaria comparant, quum ad extirpationem peccati, tum *ad consumptionem sanctorum, in opus ministerii, in aedificationem corporis Christi*.³ Huc sane spectant Patrum et Conciliorum statuta, canones, leges; huc adiumenta illa doctrinae, regiminis, beneficentiae omne genus; huc denique disciplina et actio Ecclesiae universa. Hos fidei virtutisque magistros intentis oculis animoque intuetur verus Ecclesiae filius, cui sua ipsius emendatio proposita est atque aliorum. His auctoribus, quos crebro memorat, in instauranda Ecclesiae disciplina nititur Borromeus; et quum scribit: 'Nos veterem sanctorum Patrum sacrorumque Conciliorum consuetudinem et auctoritatem, in primis oecumenicae Synodi Tridentinae secuti, de iis ipsis multa superioribus nostris Conciliis Provincialibus constituimus.' Idem ad concilia publicae corruptelae coercendae adductum se profitetur 'et sacrorum canonum iure et sacrosanctis sanctionibus, et Concilii in primis Tridentini decretis.'⁴

His non contentus, quo sibi melius caveret ne forte ab ea norma unquam discederet, a se statuta in Synodis provincialibus ita fere concludit: 'Omnia et singula quae a nobis in hac provinciali Synodo decreta actaque sunt, qua debemus oboedientia et reverentia, auctoritati ac iudicio Sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae, omnium ecclesiarum matris et magistrae, semper emendanda et corrigenda subicimus.'⁵ Quam quidem voluntatem ostendit eo propensioem, quo in dies magis ad actuosae vitae perfectionem grassabatur; nec solum quamdiu cathedram Petri occupavit patruus, sed etiam sedentibus, qui ei successerunt, Pio V et Gregorio XIII, quibus quemadmodum strenue suffragatus est ad pontificatum, sic in rebus maximis validum se socium adiunxit eorumque expectationi cumulate respondit.

Potissimum vero ipsorum voluntati est obsequutus instruendis rebus ad propositum sibi finem idoneis, hoc est ad sacrae disciplinae instauracionem. Qua in re prorsus abfuit ab illorum

¹ Coloss. iii. 14.

² 1 Tim. vi. 20.

³ Eph. iv. 12.

⁴ Conc. Prov. V, Pars. I.

⁵ Conc. Prov. VI sub finem.

ingenio, qui speciem studii fervidioris imponunt contumaciae suae. Itaque, incipiens *iudicium a domo Dei*,¹ primum omnium cleri disciplinae ad certas leges conformandae animum adiecit; cuius rei causa sacri ordinis alumnorum Seminaria excitavit, sacerdotum congregationes, quæ nomen *oblatis*, instituit, religiosas familias tum veteres tum recentiores adscivit, concilia coegit, quaesitis undique praesidiis coeptum opus munivit auxitque. Mox emendandis populi moribus haud remissiozem admovit manum, sibi dictum reputans quod olim prophetae: *Ecce constitui te hodie . . . ut evellas et destruas, ut disperdas et dissipēs, et aedifices et plantes*.² Quare bonus pastor ecclesias provinciae ipse per se nec sine magno labore lustrans, arrepta similitudine divini Magistri, *pertransiit benefaciendo et sanando gregis vulnera*; quæ passim deprehenderet incommoda, sive ex inscitia sive ex neglectu legum profecta, tollere atque eradere summa ope contendit; opinionum pravitati et exundanti coeno libidinum quasi aggerem obiecit a se apertos puerilis institutionis ludos et epheborum convictus; auctas, quas in Urbe primum excitatas noverat, consociationes Mariales; reclusa orbitati adolescentium hospitia; mulierculis periclitantibus, viduis, aliisque, tum viris tum feminis, egenis aut morbo seniove confectis, patefacta perfugia; pauperum tutelam ab impotentia dominorum, ab iniquo fœnore, ab exportatione puerorum, aliaque id genus quamplurima. Haec autem sic praestitit, ut ab eorum consuetudine toto caelo abhorreret, qui, in renovanda suo marte christiana republica, omnia cient agitantque vanissimo strepitu, divinae vocis immemores: *non in commotione Dominus*.³

Hac nempe altera nota, prout vos experiendo didicistis, Venerabiles Fratres, veri nominis instauratores distinguuntur a fictis, quod illi *quæ sua sunt quaerunt, non quæ Iesu Christi*,⁴ pronisque auribus excipientes insidiosa dicta ad Magistrum divinum olim conversa: *manifesta teipsum mundo*,⁵ superbas iterant voces: *Faciamus et ipsi nobis nomen*. Cuius temeritatis causa, quod etiam nunc fieri saepe dolemus, *cecidērunt sacerdotes in bello, dum volunt fortiter facere, dum sine consilio exeunt in proelium*.⁶

Contra qui societati hominum ad meliora deducendae sincero animo studet, is *non propriam gloriam quaerit, sed gloriam eius qui misit eum*; ⁷ seque ad Christi exemplum conformans, *non*

¹ 1 Peter iv. 17.

² Ier. i. 10.

³ 3 Reg. xix. 11.

⁴ Philip. ii. 21.

⁵ Ioan. vii. 4.

⁶ 1 Mac. v. 57, 67.

⁷ Ioan. vii. 18

*contendet neque clamabit, neque audiet aliquis in plateis vocem eius; non erit tristis neque turbulentus,*¹ *sed mitis et humilis corde.*² Hic et probatus Deo erit et salutis fructus consequetur amplissimos.

In eo quoque secernuntur alter ab altero, quod ille, humanis tantum innixus viribus *confidit in homine et ponit carnem brachium suum*;³ hic vero fiduciam omnem in Deo collocat; ab Ipso et a supernis opibus vim omnem et robur exspectat, iterans Apostoli verba: *Omnia possum in eo qui me confortat.*⁴

Has opes, quarum uberem copiam Christus effudit, vir fidelis in media quaerit Ecclesia ad communem salutem, in primisque precandi studium, sacrificium, sacramenta, quae fiunt *quasi fons aquae salientis in vitam aeternam.*⁵ Ea omnia inique ferentes qui, transversis itineribus et posthabito Deo, ad instaurationis opus contendunt, nunquam desinunt haustus illos purissimos, sin funditus exsiccare, at certe turbulentos facere, ut christianus grex inde arceatur. Qua in re profecto turpius agunt recentiores ipsorum asseclae, qui speciem quandam religionis nobilioris adhibentes, adminicula illa salutis pro minimo ducunt habentque ludibrio, praesertim sacramenta duo, quibus aut admissa paenitentium expiantur, aut caelesti dape roboratur animus. Quapropter optimus quisque summo studio curabit, ut collata tanti pretii dona maximo in honore habeantur, neve patietur in utrumque divinae caritatis opus hominum studia restringi.

Ita plane se gessit Borromeus, cuius inter cetera hoc scriptum legimus: 'Quo maior et uberior est sacramentorum fructus quam ut eius vis explicari facile possit, eo diligentius et intima animi pietate et externo cultu ac veneratione tractanda ac percipienda sunt.'⁶ Illa quoque memoratu dignissima, quibus curiones aliosque sacros concionatores vehementer hortatur, ut caelestis alimenti crebram gustationem in pristinam consuetudinem revocarent; quod idem Nos egimus decreto, cui initium: *Tridentina Synodus*. 'Ad saluberrimum illum, ait sanctus Antistes, sacrae Eucharistiae frequenter sumendae usum, parochi . . . et concionatores item quam saepissime populum cohortentur, nascentis Ecclesiae institutis atque exemplis, et gravissimorum Patrum vocibus et uberrima hoc ipso de genere Catechismi romani doctrina, et sententia denique Tridentinae Synodi, quae optaret quidem fideles, in singulis Missis, non solum spirituali

¹ Is. xlii. 2 sqq.; Matth. xii. 19.

² Matth. xi. 29.

³ Ier. xvii. 5.

⁴ Philip. iv. 13.

⁵ Ioan. iv. 14.

⁶ Conc. Prov. I, Pars II.

affectu, sed sacramentali etiam Eucharistiae perceptione communicare.¹ Qua vero mente, quo animo adeundum sit sacrum convivium, docet his verbis: 'Populus, cum ad frequentem SS^mi Sacramenti sumendi usum excitetur, tum etiam commonefiat, quam periculosum exitiosumque sit ad sacram divini illius cibi mensam indigne accedere.'² Quam quidem diligentiam postulare videntur maxime haec tempora nutantis fidei et languescentis caritatis, ne forte ex frequentiore usu debita tanto mysterio reverentia minuatur, sed potius in hoc ipso sit causa cur *probet seipsum homo, et sic de pane illo edat et de calice bibat.*³

Ex iis fontibus dives gratiae vena manabit, unde succum trahant et alantur humanae quoque ac naturales industriae. Nec enim actio christiani viri quae usui sunt et adiumento vitae despiciet, ab uno eodemque Deo, auctore gratiae ac naturae profecta; sed illud valde cavebit, ne in externis rebus bonisque corporis captandis fruendis totius vitae finis et quasi beatitas collocetur. His rebus igitur qui recte ac temperanter uti velit, eas conferet ad animorum utilitatem, Christi obtemperans dicto: *Quaerite primum regnum Dei et iustitiam eius, et haec omnia adicientur vobis.*⁴

Ordinatus et sapiens hic rerum usus tantum abest ut inferioris ordinis, idest societatis civilis bono adversetur, ut potius huius commoda maxime provehat; nec id inani verborum iactatione, qui mos est factiosorum hominum, sed re ipsa et summa contentione, usque ad bonorum, virium, vitaeque iacturam. Cuius exempla fortitudinis prae ceteris exhibent sacrorum antistites complures, qui, rebus Ecclesiae afflictis. Caroli ardorem aemulati, divini Magistri ratas efficiunt voces: *Bonus pastor animam suam dat pro ovibus suis.*⁵ Hi quidem, non gloriae cupidine, aut studio partium, aut privati alicuius commodi causa, ad se devovendos pro communi salute trahuntur, sed caritate illa quae *nunquam excidit*. Hac flamma, quae profanos oculos latet, incensus Borromeus, quum ob praestitam lue correptis operam se in mortis discrimen coniecisset, nihilominus praesentibus occurrisset malis non contentus, de futuris etiam sollicitum se sic ostendit: 'Omni rationi plane consentaneum est, ut, quemadmodum parens optimus, qui filios unice diligit, cum in praesenti tum in futuro eis prospicit ac parat quae sunt ad vitae cultum necessaria; ita nos paternae charitatis officio

¹ Conc. Prov. III, Pars I.

² Conc. Prov. IV, Pars II.

³ 1 Cor. xi. 28.

⁴ Luc. xii. 31; Matth. vi. 33.

⁵ Ioan. x. 11.

adducti, omni praecautione fidelibus provinciae nostrae in hoc Concilio provinciali quinto consulamus provideamusque deinceps quae experiendo cognovimus, pestilentiae tempore, salutaria esse adiumenta.¹

Eadem haec providentis animi studia et consilia, Venerabiles Fratres, per eam quam saepe commendavimus, catholicam actionem, in rem usumque deducuntur. In partem vero ministerii huius amplissimi, quod officia omnia misericordiae, sempiterno donanda regno complectitur,² selecti etiam e populo advocantur viri. Qui, ubi semel id oneris in se receperint, parati et instructi esse debent ad se suaeque omnia plane devovenda pro optima causa, ad obsistendum invidiae, obtreptioni et infenso quoque multorum animo, qui malefactis beneficia repensant, ad laborandum *sicut bonus miles Christi*,³ et currendum *per patientiam ad propositum nobis certamen, aspicientes in auctorem fidei et consummatorem Iesum*.⁴ Acerbum sane luctae genus, sed ad bonum civitatis apprime conducens, etiamsi plenam victoriam remoretur dies.

In his etiam, quae modo dicta sunt, illustria Caroli exempla intueri licet, atque inde sumere quae pro sua quisque conditione imitetur et quibus animum erigat. Etenim quem et singularis virtus et mira solertia et effusa caritas adeo spectabilem effecerunt, nec ipse tamen alienam sibi sensit hanc legem : *Omnes, qui pie volunt vivere in Christo Iesu, persecutionem patientur*.⁵ Itaque quod asperioris vitae sectaretur genus, quod recta semper et honesta retineret, quod incorruptus legum iustitiaeque vindex existeret, hoc ipso primorum in se invidiam collegit ; reipublicae gerendae peritorum vafriis artibus est obiectus ; magistratus habuit infensos ; in optimatum, cleri populique suspicionem venit ; flagitiosorum denique hominum capitale odium sibi conflavit, ad necem usque petitus. Quibus omnibus, quamvis miti esset suavique indole, invicto animo restitit.

Nec modo nihil cessit in iis quae fidei ac moribus exitio forent, sed ne postulationes quidem exceperit adversas disciplinae aut fidei populo graves, etiamsi allatas, ut creditur, a rege potentissimo et ceteroquin catholico. Idemque memor verbi Christi : *Reddite quae sunt Caesaris Caesari et quae sunt Dei Deo*,⁶ atque apostolorum vocis : *oboedire oportet Deo magis quam hominibus*,⁷

¹ Conc. Prov. V, Pars. II.

² Matth. xxv. 34 sqq.

³ 2 Tim. ii. 3.

⁴ Hebr. xii. 1, 2.

⁵ 2 Tim. iii. 12.

⁶ Matth. xxii. 21.

⁷ Act. v. 29.

non de causa tantum religionis optime meruit, verum etiam de ipsa societate civili, quam insanientis prudentiae poenas luentem commotisque suapte manu seditionum fluctibus paene submersam abduxit certissimae morti.

Eadem sane laus et gratia debebitur catholicis huius temporis viris eorumque strenuis ducibus episcopis, quibus in utrisque nullae officiorum partes, quae civium sunt, desiderari poterunt unquam, sive agatur de servanda fide ac reverentia *dominis etiam dyscolis* iusta praecipientibus, sive de ipsorum iniquis imperiis detrectandis, aequae remota tum procaci licentia delabentium in seditiones ac turbas, tum servili abiectioe excipientium quasi sacras leges impia statuta pessimorum hominum, qui mentito libertatis nomine iura omnia pervertentes, durissimam imponunt servitutem.

Haec nempe in conspectu terrarum orbis et in media luce praesentis humanitatis geruntur penes quandam potissimum gentem, ubi principem sibi sedem constituisse videtur *potestas tenebrarum*. Quo praepotenti sub dominatu iura omnia filiorum Ecclesiae miserrime proculcantur, extincto penitus in reipublicae rectoribus omni sensu magnanimitatis, urbanitatis ac fidei, quibus virtutibus eorum patres, christiano titulo insignes, tamdiu inclaruerunt. Adeo liquet, concepto semel in Deum et in Ecclesiam odio, retro sublapsa referri omnia, et ad antiquae libertatis ferociam, seu verius ad crudelissimum iugum, per unam Christi Familiam eiusque invectam disciplinam depulsum cervicibus, fieri cursum praecipitem. Aut, quod idem significavit Carolus, adeo est 'certum atque exploratum, nulla alia re Deum gravius offendi, nullaque ad vehementiorem iram, quam haeresum labe provocari; nihilque rursus ad provinciarum regnorumque interitum maiores vires habere, quam teterrimam illam pestem.'¹ Quamquam multo etiam funestior existimanda est hodierna conspiratio ad christianas gentes ab Ecclesiae sinu avellendas. In summa enim dissensione sententiarum ac voluntatum, quae propria nota est aberrantium a vero, in una re inimici consentiunt, hoc est in pertinaci iustitiae ac veritatis oppugnatione; cuius utriusque quia custos est ac vindex Ecclesia, in hanc unam confertis ordinibus impetum faciunt. Cumque se neutris in partibus esse, aut etiam causam pacis fovere dictitent, mellitis quidem verbis, at non dissimulatis consiliis, nihil aliud revera agunt, nisi ut insidias locent, addentes damno ludibrium,

¹ Conc. Prov. V, Pars. I.

fraudem violentiae. Novo igitur certaminis genere per hos dies christianum impetitur nomen; belli moles conflatur longe periculosior ac pugnae antea pugnatae, ex quibus tam amplam collegit gloriam Borromeus.

Inde exempla nobis omnibus ac documenta sumentes, pro rebus maximis, quibus et privata et publica salus continetur, pro fide ac religione, pro sanctitate publici iuris, alacri erectoque animo dimicabimus, dolenda quidem necessitate compulsi, sed suavi simul freti fiducia, omnipotentem Deum tam gloriosa in acie militantibus victoriam deproperaturum. Cui fiduciae robur addit Caroliani operis producta ad hanc usque aetatem vis et potentia, sive ad intemperantiam ingeniorum compescendam, sive ad obfirmandum animum in proposito sancto instaurandi omnia in Christo.

Licet nunc, Venerabiles Fratres, iisdem verbis dicendo finem imponere, quibus pluries memoratus Decessor Noster Paulus V. Litteras absolvit decernentes Carolo supremos honores: 'Aequum est igitur dare nos gloriam et honorem et benedictionem viventi in saecula saeculorum, qui benedixit conservum nostrum in omni benedictione spirituali, ut esset sanctus et immaculatus coram ipso, et cum illum dederit nobis Dominus tamquam fulgentem stellam in hac nocte peccatorum, tribulationum nostrarum, adeamus ad divinam clementiam ore et opere supplicantes, ut Carolus Ecclesiae quam vehementer dilexit, prosit etiam meritis et exemplo, adsit patrocinio et in tempore iracundiae fiat reconciliatio, per Christum Dominum nostrum.'¹

Accedat his votis cumuletque communem spem Apostolicae benedictionis auspiciam, quam vobis, Venerabiles Fratres, et vestro cuiusque clero populoque peramanter impertimus.

Datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum, die XXVI mensis Maii, anno MDCCCCX, Pontificatus Nostri septimo.

PIUS PP. X.

¹ Bulla 'Unigenitus.'

STATEMENTS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE IRISH HIERARCHY
AT MAYNOOTH MEETING, JUNE 21

PROTEST AGAINST THE ACCESSION DECLARATION

‘We protest against the Accession Declaration hitherto required from the Sovereign. Its statement of Catholic Doctrine is as false as it is insulting. At a great State function, where all other religions are spared, it singles out some of the most cherished tenets of the Catholic Church to travesty and denounce them in language of vulgar abuse. In the presence of Catholics, it openly suggests that equivocation is their heritage ; and it rudely presumes to convey that neither King nor Pope is above tampering with the sanctity of an oath.’

THE TREASURY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION IN IRELAND

‘The Bishops have read the “Statement on behalf of the Joint Committee representing Heads of Secondary Schools in Ireland,” which sets forth a clear and convincing proof of the unfairness of the Exchequer in dealing with Secondary Schools in Ireland as compared with the provision made for Secondary Schools in England, Wales, and Scotland, and wish to see it widely circulated. In this connexion the Bishops of Ireland consider it a duty to pass the following Resolution :—

“While the State provides all parts of the United Kingdom with grants for Secondary Education out of the Local Taxation Account, further large grants in aid of Secondary Education are made by the Treasury through the annual Estimates to England, Scotland, and Wales, without any equivalent whatever being given to Ireland.

“Moreover, in every branch of public education in Great Britain, and in the education under the control of the Board of National Education and the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction in Ireland, the entire cost of administration, inspection, and examination is borne by the Treasury ; but Irish Secondary or Intermediate Education is made an exception and the whole of these heavy expenses is put as a charge on the income of the Board, to which Parliament votes no grant-in-aid.

“This discrimination against Secondary Education in Ireland as regards grants-in-aid, and the cost of administration, inspection, and examinations, is plainly unfair and unjustifiable,

and inflicts a most grave wrong on this country by placing such an important branch of education in a position of serious disadvantage.

“ If the inequality and present unfairness in the distribution of Treasury Grants were amended, the additional fund would be sufficient to enable the Board of Intermediate Education to meet, *inter alia*, the reasonable demands of lay teachers in the Secondary Schools of Ireland.

“ We hope that the Irish Members of Parliament, without distinction of political Party, will actively interest themselves in forwarding this just claim for redress in a matter of such importance.”

SEPARATE NATIONAL SCHOOLS FOR BOYS AND GIRLS

‘ We repeat our protest against the continued effort of the Board of National Education and its officers to further destroy the separate schools for boys and girls. Apart altogether from moral considerations, we believe that the mixing of boys and girls in the same school is injurious to the delicacy of feeling, reserve, and modesty of demeanour which should characterise young girls.’

RESIDENCE IN NON-CATHOLIC SECONDARY SCHOOLS AND TRAINING COLLEGES IN ENGLAND

‘ Owing to the fact, which has recently come to our knowledge, of Irish girls going into residence in non-Catholic Secondary Schools and Training Colleges in England, we find it necessary to republish the following resolution, passed by the Bishops of Ireland at their General Meeting held on October 11, 1905 :—

“ We desire to associate ourselves with our brethren, the Archbishop and Bishops of the Province of Westminster, in the warning which they have deemed it necessary to issue against the frequentation by Catholics of non-Catholic Schools.

“ We do not, indeed, believe that this evil exists to any considerable extent amongst the Catholics of Ireland. Their spirit of faith and their religious instincts, without any special instruction of ours, have been sufficient to protect the great body of our people from so un-Catholic and perilous a course of action.

“ Yet there may be cases which, if left unrebuked, might lead to ruinous consequences for the children, boys or girls, immediately concerned, and become a cause of scandal to others. As things now are in Ireland, there is an ample supply of good

Secondary Catholic Schools, and nothing but an utter indifference to the interests of religion can explain the conduct of parents who, for some imaginary social or educational advantage, expose the faith of their children to the imminent dangers by which they must be surrounded, whilst being educated in non-Catholic Schools.”

SUNDAY SPORTS

The systematic practice of selecting Sundays and Holidays of Obligation for fixtures for sports was under the consideration of their Lordships. They ordered the publication of the Statute of the Maynooth Synod bearing on the matter. It is as follows :

‘We gravely admonish the Parish Priests and curates of their duty to strive earnestly to keep their parishioners from frequenting on Sundays and Holidays of Obligation horse races or other public sports by which the faithful may be hindered from attending Mass, and which may also involve the desecration of the Sunday.’

APPOINTMENT OF VICE-PRESIDENT AND DEAN

The Archbishops and Bishops also met for the consideration of Maynooth College business. The Very Rev. J. F. Hogan, D.D., was appointed Vice-President of the College in the room of the Most Rev. Dr. Gilmartin, Bishop of Clonfert. The Rev. Thomas O’Doherty, of the Diocese of Elphin, was appointed to the office of Dean.

MEETING OF COUNCIL OF CATHOLIC CLERICAL MANAGERS

The Annual Meeting of this Council was held in Dublin on Tuesday, June 14, 1910. The following correspondence was considered :—

ST. MARY’S, DROGHEDA,
May 26, 1910.

SIRS,—I am requested to inquire from you, for the information of the Central Council of Catholic Clerical Managers of Irish National Schools, whether there exist any new requirements to be complied with by Managers receiving money from your Department for building purposes in connexion with National Education in Ireland.

I have seen authoritative statements that there are such, and as I do not find any justification for them in your Rules

and Regulations for 1909-1910, I beg to ask for as full information on the subject as you may see your way to send me.

The information I seek concerns the necessity of Managers entering into contracts for the buildings, producing vouchers, etc. Such requirements handicap Managers considerably in the providing of local aid, seem uncalled for in the present circumstances of improving and erecting schools, and convey an insinuation of want of confidence in the integrity of the Managers.

The Council of Catholic Clerical Managers meets on the 14th prox., and any information you may be pleased to send me will be thankfully received before the 6th prox.

I am, Sirs, respectfully yours,

JOHN CURRY, P.P.

THE SECRETARIES,
BOARD OF NATIONAL EDUCATION,
DUBLIN.

OFFICE OF NATIONAL EDUCATION,
DUBLIN, *May 31, 1910.*

REV. SIR,—In reply to the inquiry in your letter of the 26th instant, I am directed to state, for the information of the Central Council of the Catholic Clerical Managers of National Schools in Ireland, that the following additions to the general conditions upon which grants have heretofore been made towards the building of vested National School-houses have recently been adopted by the Commissioners at the instance of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury:—

1. Managers shall in all cases enter into written contracts with the builders of the schools, and shall produce such contracts when called upon.
2. They shall further obtain and, if necessary, produce vouchers for all payments made by them, and shall similarly supply full evidence, when called upon, as to the nature and amount of the local contribution.

These further conditions will be duly embodied in the new issue of the Commissioners' Rules and Regulations.

I am, Rev. Sir, your obedient Servant,

W. J. DILWORTH,
Secretary.

REV. J. CURRY, P.P.,
ST. MARY'S,
SUNNYSIDE, DROGHEDA.

RESOLUTIONS.

The following resolutions were unanimously adopted :—

1. ' That we strongly deprecate the introduction of new conditions for making grants towards the building of vested National School-houses requiring that Managers shall in all cases enter into written contracts with the builders of the schools, and shall produce such contracts when called upon. Managers cannot always find a suitable contractor, or even any contractor at all ; and, in many cases, the undertaking of the work by the manager himself is the most effective way of procuring the necessary local aid.

2. ' We regret that the Board thinks it necessary to insist upon other conditions that seem to serve no useful purpose. The Managers are prepared now, as always, to satisfy the Board's officers as to the excellence of material and work. The report of the Board's architect should be sufficient and final. He has the Board's plans, specification, and estimate before him, and he is acquainted with the views of the Board's Inspector, who visits the building several times during its erection. The material structure, therefore, is a sufficient guarantee that the two-thirds grant has been well expended. The Managers, as business men, and as a matter of course, obtain receipts for all expenditure, or keep accounts of it ; but the new condition requiring them to produce vouchers for inspection seems hardly called for, and serves no useful purpose.

' It ought not to be necessary to add that if, in any rare or most exceptional case, owing to the local contribution being unusually large, a surplus remains in the Manager's hand, the amount would, as a matter of course, be devoted to the use of the school.'

3. ' That we express our grave disappointment that the offer made by us on behalf of the Catholic Managers, and endorsed by our Bishops, of providing half the expense of cleaning and heating the Primary Schools, on condition that the Treasury furnish the other half, has not yet been accepted by the Treasury.'

4. ' That the non-payment of fees for Irish in the junior standards is calculated to prevent a beginning being made in the teaching of our national language, and so to prevent the teaching of it even in the senior classes.'

5. ' That we protest against the regulation stating " the fees " (for Irish as an extra subject) " may be reduced or withheld at the discretion of the Commissioners." Too much

arbitrary power is placed by this regulation in the hands of the Commissioners. A want of confidence, very discouraging to teachers, thereby results, to the detriment of their zeal in the teaching. In no other Department of the National Education disbursements does such arbitrary power reside.'

6. 'That we direct the attention of all concerned to the expediency of utilizing the regulations for the issue of the Certificates of Merit laid down in Rule 119(c), and on page 74 of the Rules and Regulations of the Commissioners of National Education (1909-10).

'We believe these certificates would be great help in keeping pupils longer at school than is the present custom, to the great advantage of education. In Scotland, in 1908-9, upwards of 11,000 Certificates of Merit were issued, whereas in the same period only 380 were issued in Ireland. Parents and employers ought to be got to know that no child has had good education in a National School in the absence of such a certificate, and its possession, besides being a high compliment, would eventuate in being profitable.'

7. 'That we gratefully acknowledge the valuable work in the cause of education of the *Irish Educational Review*, particularly in its "Educational Notes"; that we renew our commendation of this excellent periodical, and hope that it may circulate extensively amongst Managers and Teachers. From its "Educational Notes" in the current number it is evident that Ireland suffers gross financial injustice:—(1) In getting £407,952 less than Scotland gets in the next annual grant—a difference unjustified by the difference in populations, and (2) in the denial of building grants to the Managers of our Provincial Training Colleges, while £100,000 are being provided in the present Estimates for building grants for Training Colleges and Trustees in England.'

8. 'That we regret to find that where there should be upwards of 2,000 trained assistant teachers, a corresponding number of untrained junior assistant mistresses are now employed in the National Schools of Ireland, to the detriment of the teaching profession of Ireland, of its Training Colleges, and of National Education generally.'

9. 'That the close and earnest attention of the Irish Members of Parliament be drawn to these matters, particularly at the time when the Education Estimates are coming on for discussion.'

10. 'That, referring to our former resolutions in respect of Model Schools, we sympathize with the people of Kilkenny in

their request that the Model School of that city should be devoted to the interests of Technical Education on the condition, of course, that a proper suitable school be provided for the Protestant population.'

11. 'That we, the members of the Central Council of the Catholic Clerical Managers' Association, demand the removal from the King's Accession Declaration of words that are blasphemous in their nature and grossly insulting to the Faith of millions of Catholics; and that copies of this resolution be sent to the Prime Minister and to Mr. John E. Redmond, M.P.'

12. 'That the Annual Meeting of the Central Council take place, in future, on the day after the meeting of the Maynooth Union.'

DIVISION OF DUES

S. CONGREGATIO CONCILII

LUXEMBURGEN. (*Luxemburg*)

ELEEMOSYNAE MISSARUM

Episcopus Luxemburgensis, datis ad S.C. Concilii litteris sub die 30 Iulii, 1909, exponebat ut sequitur:

'In dioecesi Luxemburgensi, ex consuetudine generali, parochi suis vicariis relinquunt diversa iura stolae, uti sunt emolumenta ex baptismo, ex benedictione mulierum post partum, etc. Aliam adhuc non parvam imminutionem parochialis congrua apud nos ex eo patitur quod, ex consuetudine immemoriali, vicarii, generatim non in domo parochiali habitantes, singulis Dominicis diebusque festivis necnon pluribus aliis occasionibus mensae parochi gratis assideant. Insuper parochi maiorem sibi assumunt partem oneris ex hospitalitate et visitatione aegrotantium et pauperum provenientis quin vicarii ex hoc capite nimis graventur. Ex omnibus hisce largitionibus tractu temporum firmatis, congrua parochialis plus aequo diminueretur nisi exstaret aliqua saltem compensatio, pariter ex consuetudine et tacito atque unanimi consensu parochorum et vicariorum introducta. Ex Missis nempe cantatis, tum fundatis tum adventitiis, quarum in unaquaque parochia magnus exstat numerus, ideoque a solo parochi persolvi nequeunt, parochi, cum vicariis suis eas committere cogantur, ab ea stipendii parte quae pro sacerdote celebrante vel in limine foundationis vel ab Ordinario pro Missa adventitia cantanda statuta est, aliquid sibi retinent ad

complendam congruam modo supradicto notabiliter imminutam. Quod pactum tacitum, die 29 Aprilis, 1898, a S. C. de propaganda Fide ad normam cuiusdam responsi S. C. Concilii diei 25 Iulii, 1874, pro fundatis Missis approbatum, post decretum *Ut debita sollicitudine* S. C. Concilii diei 11 Maii, 1904, in animis plurimorum ecclesiarum rectorum graves excitavit dubitationes. Sunt qui post publicatum hoc decretum, cum magno congruae parochialis detrimento, vicariis suis totum stipendium solvunt, quin aliquid ex vetere consuetudine supra memorata immutare ausi fuerint, timentes ne excitent populi admirationem turbentque bonam pacem parochos inter et vicarios. Alii, praesertim rectores quidam parochiarum magnarum, innixi responso S. C. de Propaganda Fide diei 29 Aprilis, 1898, nil innovandum esse duxerunt, ne ad eas rei familiaris angustias deciderent ut, aucta dispropor- tione emolumentorum parochi et vicariorum, impares fierent ad implendum obligationes receptas et suo statui convenientes.

‘Attentis hisce difficultatibus quibus apud nos premuntur parochi, a Sanctitate Tua humiliter peto ut, ad consulendum conscientiae parochorum, ad tuendam congruam parochialem, ad pacem ac concordiam parochos inter et vicarios servandam et admirationem populi vitandam, praxim hucusque receptam approbare digneris, iuxta declarationes a S. C. Concilii exhibitas in *Monacen.* 25 Iulii, 1874,¹ *Hildesien.* 21 Ianuarii, 1898, et responsum S. C. de Propaganda Fide diei 26 Aprilis, 1898, in *Luxemburgen.*’

Emi Patres S. Congregationis Concilii in generalibus comitiis die 26 Februarii, 1910, respondendum censuerunt :

Attentis particularibus circumstantiis iisque perdurantibus, pro facultate retinendi vigentem praxim, facto verbo cum SSmo.

¹ S. C. Concilii 25 Iulii, 1874.—Archiep. Monacen.—In parochorum redditibus etiam Missarum fundationes, singularum parochiarum propriae, et publicae functiones occasione exequiarum vel benedictionis matrimoniorum peragenda numerantur, quibus pro Missis sive fundatis sive casualibus certa stipendia ordinario maiora paracho assignantur, quae stipendia partem integram beneficii parochialis constituunt. Quaeritur, utrum parochi impediti celebrationem harum Missarum alteri sacerdoti sic tradere debeant, ut totum stipendium constitutum pro celebratione talium Missarum solvant, an potius sufficiat ordinarium vel aliquanto maius ab Archiepiscopo statuendum, ita ut quod supersit ab ipsis parochis, quibus Missae eadem in partem reddituum assignatae sunt, tuta conscientia retineri possit.

R. Attento quod eleemosynae Missarum, de quibus in precibus, pro parte locum teneant congruae parochialis, licitum esse paracho, si per se satisfacere non possit, Missas alteri sacerdoti committere, attributa eleemosyna ordinaria loci, sive pro Missis lectis sive cantatis.

SOME BREVIARY AND RITUAL CHANGES

S. CONGREGATIO RITUUM

MONITUM

AD EDITORES LIBRORUM LITURGICORUM

I. In rubricis Generalibus Breviarii Romani tit. IX, n. 6, post Festum Nativitatis B.M.V. inseri debet *Septem Dolorum, Dominica tertia Septembris.*

II. In parte hyemali Breviarii Romani in Festo S. Thomae Aquinatis, die 7 Martii, ubi legitur: '*Lectio IX, Homilia,*' etc., substituantur verba: '*In Quadragesima, lectio IX, de Homilia et comm. Feriae.*'

III. In Rubrica Breviarii et Diurnalis quae invenitur die 16 Septembris in Festo Ss. Cornelii et Cypriani Mm. et quae incipit: '*Si Festum Ss. Cornelii et Cypriani occurrerit Dominica,*' etc. . . . et concluditur *in 1 Vesp. et Laud. tantum,* verba *I Vesp. et* deleantur.

IV. In Missali Romano, tum in Festo Ss. VII Fundatorum, tum in Missa *Intret* de Communi plurim. Mart. 1 loco, ad Graduale legendum; '*in generationem et generationem,*' prouti legitur in textu S. Scripturae, Eccl. 44, 14.

V. In Rituali Romano, Benedictio novae Campanae, quae ad usum Ecclesiae, sive Sacelli, inserviat, adprobata per Decretum S.R.C. 22 Ianuarii, 1908, ponatur inter benedictiones reservatas in appendice, ante benedictionem simplicem novae Campanae, quae tamen ad usum Ecclesiae non inservit, nuper reformatam.

VI. Item in Rituali Romano, Benedictio Officinae Librariae et Machinae Typographicae nuper adprobata Decreto 12 Maii, 1909, inseratur inter benedictiones non reservatas, in appendice, ante benedictionem Domus Scholaris noviter erectae.

DECRETUM

Sanctissimus Dominus Noster Pius Papa X, referente infrascripto Cardinali Sacrorum Rituum Congregationi Praefecto, suprascriptas variationes Breviario, Missali ac Rituali Romano respective inserendas decrevit. Die 9 Martii, 1910.

FR. S. Card. MARTINELLI, S.R.C. *Praefectus.*

L. ✠ S.

PH. CAN. DI FAVA, *Substitutus.*

CONDITIONS OF ADMISSION TO RELIGIOUS ORDERS

S. CONGREGATIO DE RELIGIOSIS

EX AUDIENTIA SSMI.

diei 5 Aprilis, 1910.

DECLARATIONES CIRCA DECRETUM 'ECCLESIA CHRISTI,' EDITUM
DIE 7 SEPTEMBRIS, 1909, 'DE QUIBUSDAM POSTULANTIBUS
IN RELIGIOSAS FAMILIAS NON ADMITTENDIS.'

Circa Decretum *Ecclesia Christi* d.d. 7 Septembris, 1909, *De quibusdam Postulantibus in Religiosas Familias non admittendis*, ab hac Sacra Congregatione Negotiis Religiosorum Sodalium praeposita, sequentium dubiorum solutio expetita fuit :

I. An postulantes ad Novitiatum admissi ante publicationem decreti et in ipso comprehensi, valide ad professionem admitti queant, absque venia Apostolicae Sedis.

II. An ii, qui in aliqua Familia Religiosa primam tantum professionem emisierant ante publicationem decreti, valide admitti possint ad alteram professionem, scilicet solemnem Ordinibus Regularibus, et perpetuam in ceteris Institutis, si in decreto comprehensi fuerint.

III. An valide et licite ad Novitiatum admitti possint postulantes, qui a Seminariis vel a Collegiis sive ecclesiasticis sive religiosis, vel a Novitiatu dimissi quidem non fuerunt *formaliter*, sed *aequivalenter*, id est, quos Superiores induxerunt vel hortati sunt, ut sponte discederent ne dimitterentur.

IV. An recipi valeant ii, qui professionem votorum temporaneorum in aliqua Congregatione emisierunt, sed, peracto tempore, eamdem sponte non renovarunt.

Sanctissimus autem Dominus Noster Pius Papa X respondendum mandavit :

Ad I. Negative.

Ad II. Affirmative ; sed Superiores sub gravi obligatione tenentur : a) opportunas, secretas iuratasque informationes exquirere Superiorum Seminarii, vel Collegii, vel Instituti religiosi *a quo*, circa veras causas exitus alumnorum, de quibus agitur ; b) moraliter aliunde certos fieri et de bonis eorum religiosis moribus, et de solidae vocationis argumentis, et, si agatur de clericis candidatis, etiam de idoneitate litteraria. Et Superiores *a quo*, graviter onerata eorum conscientia,

tenentur sincere et sub iuramento secretas huiusmodi informationes a Superioribus *ad quos* exquisitas transmittere.

Ad III. Valide quidem per se, sed omnino illicite. Et ad fraudes vel abusus e medio tollendos in re tanti momenti, Superiores nullum ex huiusmodi candidatis admittant, antequam per accuratas et secretas informationes a Moderatoribus Seminariorum, vel Collegiorum ecclesiasticorum sive religiosorum, vel religiosi Instituti, in quo novitii fuerunt, sub fide iuramenti habitas, certi omnino fuerint, candidatos, de quibus agitur, neque formaliter dimissos fuisse, neque aequivalenter. Quod si de candidatis clericis agatur, pariter constare debet de eorum idoneitate litteraria.

Ad IV. Affirmative, praehabitis tamen iuratis informationibus, ut supra, in responsione ad II et III.

Contrariis quibuscumque, etiam speciali mentione dignis, non obstantibus.

FR. J. C. Card. VIVES, *Praefectus*.

L. ✠ S.

D. L. JANSSENS, O.S.B., *Secretarius*.

ADDITIONS TO THE BREVIARY :

ON THE FEAST OF ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, JANUARY 27

ADDENDA.

IN BREVIARIO ROMANO

Die 27 Ianuarii

IN FESTO S. IOANNIS CHRYSOSTOMI.

Episcopi Confessoris et Ecclesiae Doctoris

Ad calcem lectionis VI, post verba dictasse videatur, addatur :

Hunc vero praeclarissimum universae Ecclesiae Doctorem Pius decimus Pontifex maximus coelestem oratorum sacrorum patronum declaravit atque constituit.

Dominica I Iulii

IN FESTO PRETIOSISSIMI SANGUINIS D.N.I.C.

In corpore lectionum VII et VIII deleantur divisionis signa, et ante textum lectionis VIII addatur citatio : Enarrat. in psalm. 95, n. 5.

Si hoc festum extra Dominicam transferatur, deficiente alia lectione IX, Officii utcumque simplicis, erit sequens.

*Lectio IX**Serm. 31, alias 344*

Habuit ille sanguinem, unde nos redimeret ; et ad hoc accepit sanguinem, ut esset quem pro nobis redimendis effunderet. Sanguis Domini tui, si vis, datus est pro te ; si nolueris esse, non est datus pro te. Forte enim dicis : Habuit sanguinem Deus meus, quo me redimeret ; sed iam, cum passus est, totum dedit. Quod illi remansit, quod det et pro me ? Hoc est magnum, quia semel dedit, et pro omnibus dedit. Sanguis Christi volenti est salus, nolenti supplicium. Quid ergo dubitas qui mori non vis, a secunda potius morte liberari ? Qua liberaris, si vis tollere crucem tuam, et sequi Dominum ; quia ille tulit suam, et quae-sivit servum.

Te Deum laudamus.

Dominica infra Octavam Nativitatis B. Mariae V.

IN FESTO SANCTISSIMI NOMINIS MARIAE

Si hoc festum extra Dominicam recolatur, deficiente alia lectione IX, Officii utcumque simplicis, erit sequens.

Lectio IX

Beata, quae inter homines audire sola meruit prae omnibus : Invenisti gratiam. Quantam ? Quantam superius dixerat : plenam. Et vere plenam, quae largo imbre totam funderet et infunderet creaturam : Invenisti enim gratiam apud Deum. Haec cum dicit, et ipse angelus miratur, aut feminam tantum, aut omnes homines vitam meruisse per feminam : stupet angelus totum Dum venire intra virginalis uteri angustias, cui tota simul angusta est creatura. Hinc est quod remoratur angelus, hinc est quod virginem vocat de merito, de gratia compellat, vix causam prodit audienti, sane ut sensum promoveat, vix longa trepidatione componit.

Te Deum laudamus.

ON THE FEAST OF THE SEVEN DOLOURS

Dominica 3 Septembris

IN FESTO SEPTEM DOLORUM B.M.V.

Si hoc festum extra Dominicam reponatur, deficiente alia lectione IX, Officii utcumque simplicis, erit sequens.

Lectio IX.

Ecce, inquit, filius tuus : ecce mater tua. Testabatur de cruce Christus, et inter matrem atque discipulum dividebat pie-

tatis officia. Condebat Dominus non solum publicum, sed etiam domesticum testamentum; et hoc eius testamentum signabat Ioannes, dignus tanto testatore testis. Bonum testamentum non pecuniae, sed vitae aeternae; quod non atramento scriptum est, sed Spiritu Dei vivi, qui ait: Lingua mea calamus scribe, velociter scribentis.

Te Deum laudamus.

Die 3 Decembris

IN FESTO S. FRANCISCI XAVERII CONFESSORIS

Ad calcem lectionis VI, post verba Sanctis adscripsit, addatur:

Pius autem decimus ipsum sodalitati et operi Propagandae Fidei coelestem patronum elegit atque constituit.

DECRETUM

Sanctissimus Dominus noster Pius Papa X, referente infra-scripto Cardinali sacrorum Rituum Congregationi Praefecto, suprascriptas additiones, respectivis suis locis Breviarii Romani inserendas, suprema auctoritate Sua approbavit, Die 10 Novembris 1909.

FR. S. CARD. MARTINELLI, *Praefectus*.

PHILIPPUS CAN. DI FAVA, *Substitutus*.

L. ✠ S.

MONITUM.—*In festo sancti Paulini Episcopi et confessoris, sub finem lectionis VII, dicatur: QUIDQUID de suis donis, atque sub initium lectionis VIII dicatur in die MALO ab ira, et infra in die MALO liberabit.*

BLESSING OF A PRINTING PRESS

S. CONGREGATIO DE RITUUM

URBIS ET ORBIS

BENEDICTIO OFFICINAE LIBRARIAE ET MACHINAE TYPOGRAPHICAE

Sacerdos, stans ad valas, dicit:

Actiones nostras, quaesumus, Domine, aspirando praeveni, et adiuvando proseguere, ut cuncta nostra oratio et operatio a te semper incipiat, et per te coepta finiatur. Per Christum Dominum nostrum.

R. Amen.

Ingrediens, dicit:

Pax huic domui, et omnibus habitantibus in ea.

Deinde, inchoata antiphona Asperges me etc., varias officinae partes aqua benedicta aspergit, usquedum perveniat ad aulam principalem eiusdem, ubi sistit et dicit :

V. Adiutorium nostrum in nomine Domini.

R. Qui fecit coelum et terram.

V. Dominus vobiscum.

R. Et cum spiritu tuo.

OREMUS

Domine Iesu Christe, qui dixisti discipulis tuis : In quamcumque domum intraveritis, salutate eam, dicentes : Pax huic domui : veniat, quaesumus, pax illa super hanc domum et officinam ad libros imprimendos (evulgandos) praeparatam, et super omnes degentes in ea ; et cunctos, Domine, in ea laborantes ab omni calamitate animae et corporis eripere et liberare digneris ; reple scriptores, resctores et operarios spiritu scientiae, consilii et fortitudinis, et adimple eos spiritu timoris tui, ut mandata Ecclesiae fideliter custodientes, tibi digne et proximo suo salutariter valeant inservire. Bene~~X~~dic ergo, bone Iesu, qui es via, veritas et vita, hunc locum, et praesta, ut omnes illum inhabitantes, intercedente gloriosa et immaculata Virgine matre tua Maria, ad immarcescibilem gloriae coronam feliciter perveniant. Qui vivis et regnas Deus per omnia saecula saeculorum. R. Amen.

Deinde benedicit instrumenta et machinas, dicens :

OREMUS

Domine Deus, unice fons scientiarum, qui hominum ingenium ita illuminare dignatus es, ut nova artificiosa instrumenta invenirent ad paginas typis scribendas ; bene~~X~~dic, quaesumus, has machinas (hanc machinam), ut per libros ad utilitatem nostram prodeuntes nihil aliud te opitulante discamus, praeter scientiam tuam, quae vere ducit ad vitam. Per Christum Dominum nostrum. R. Amen.

Postea aqua benedicta instrumenta et machinas aspergit. Finita aspersione, dicit :

V. Dominus vobiscum.

R. Et cum spiritu tuo.

OREMUS

Exaudi nos, Domine sancte, Pater omnipotens, aeterne Deus, et mittere digneris sanctum Angelum tuum de coelis, qui custodiat, foveat, protegat, visitet atque defendat omnes in hac domo habitantes. Per Christum Dominum nostrum.

R. Amen.

Si benedicenda sit tantum officina libraria, omittitur secunda Oratio cum aspersione pro instrumentis et machinis. Quando autem benedicenda sint solummodo instrumenta vel machinae, praemissis versiculis : Adiutorium nostrum, etc. et Dominus vobiscum, etc., adhibetur tantum secunda Oratio cum aspersione.

DECRETUM

Sodalitas, cui nomen *Unione Tipografico-Cattolica Libraria* et finis est progressus sive incrementum curare, tum morale tum ipsius artis atque industriae typographicae et librariae, una cum religionis studio et fraterna sodalium communione mutuaeque ope praestanda, sapienter aequae rata est, Deum ac Dominum Iesum Officinae libris edendis aut venditandis propitium reddere atque invocare. Ita enim fiet, ut eiusmodi ars atque industria civili Societati in remedium cedat, ac tutamen contra omnigena errorum et inimicorum iacula : ita fiet, ut spiritu scientiae, sapientiae ac timoris Domini repleantur Officinae tum praesides et rectores, tum operarii ; ne quidquam edendum in perniciem ac malum vertat, sed ad salutem humani generis atque utilitatem conferat. Itaque ad supernum auxilium sibi praecipue comparandum, eadem sodalitas de officinae librariae et machinamenti typographici Benedictione proprias aptasque ritui formulas adhibendas, ac postea Rituali Romano inserendas, sacrorum Rituum Congregationis examini, atque Apostolicae Sedis supremae sanctioni humillime subiecit.

Quare, ad iuris tramitem, quum Emus. et Rmus. Dnus. Cardinalis Sebastianus Martinelli eidem sacro Coetui Praefectus et Relator, in ordinariis comitiis subsignata die ad Vaticanum habitis, eiusmodi Benedictionis ritusque formulas proposuerit ; Emi. et Rmi. Patres sacris tuendis Ritibus praepositi, re diligenter perpensa, rescribendum censuerunt : *Pro gratia*, die 4 Maii, 1909.

Demum, revisione rite peracta, hisce omnibus sanctissimo Domino nostro Pio Papae X ab infrascripto eodem Cardinali Praefecto relatis ; Sanctitas Sua sententiam ipsius sacri Consilii ratam habuit, et ritum ac formulam Benedictionis officinae librariae et machinae typographicae, prouti huic praeiacet decreto, approbavit, ac Rituali Romano inseri iussit. Die 12, iisdem mense et anno.

FR. S. CARD. MARTINELLI, *Praefectus*.
PHILIPPUS CAN. DI FAVA, *Substitutus*.

MOTU PROPRIO OF POPE PIUS X

MOTU PROPRIO

CONFIRMATUR CONSOCIATIO SACRI CORDIS IESU AD SCHOLAM PIAM,
CONCREDITURQUE AULA PIA SODALIBUS MARIANIS A MISERICORDIA

Quum disciplinae christianae atque eruditioni puerorum ex vico, qui a ponte Aelio initium capit et ad Vaticanum porrigitur, consultum vellet decessor Noster sanctae memoriae Pius IX, anno MDCCCLIX scholas elementorum ad aream Piam instituit, earumque curationem ac regimen Sodalibus Marianis a Misericordia dedit: quodque instituerat, id ipsum anno MDCCCLXI chirographo confirmavit. Tam longo spatio, sodales eo semper studio mandatum sibi munus administrarunt, ut exspectationi Pontificis cumulate satisfecerint. Quin etiam, gnari temporum, quae ad instituendam rite iuventutem novas usque opes requirunt, ii, ne adolescentulos, qui primordia studiorum supergressi essent, in illo aetatis aestu indefensos ab illecebris corruptelarum relinquerent, optimo sane concilio Consociationem iuvenum, a Sacro Corde Iesu appellatam, apud suas ipsorum scholas condiderunt. Orta autem haec est Consociatio sub initio Pontificatus Nostri, Nobis quidem valde probantibus: qui, ut consociatis proprius esset locus, quo convenirent, atque ubi pro suo instituto versarentur, impensa Nostra et ex munifica piorum hominum collatione, in horto scholae adiacente aedificium extruximus, cui de nomine Nostro *Aulae Piae* nomen adhaesit. Iam rei tam salubriter institutae placet auctoritatis Nostrae pondus addere, quo confirmata stabilitatem obtineat. Nos itaque motu proprio et certa scientia Consociationem Sacri Cordis Iesu ad Scholam Piam, quae consociatio in bonum alumnorum veterum condita, tamen aliis quoque adolescentulis viciniae patet, ratam habemus et confirmamus. Praeterea Sodalibus Marianis a Misericordia uti cura et gubernatio Scholae Piae demandata est, ita Consociationem hanc iuvenum curandam, regendam administrandamque in perpetuum tradimus. Item Aulam Piam cum omni aedificiorum accessione, quae vel iam facta est vel postea fiet in complementum Operis, eorumdem Sodalium custodiae et curae concedimus. Denique interdicimus, ne quis hanc Aulam et haec aedificia ad alios usus convertat, quam quibus iam nunc a Nobis, ceterisque beneficii auctoribus, destinata sunt.

Atque omnia, quae his Nostris litteris decreta sunt, rata esse volumus in perpetuum, contrariis quibusvis minime obstantibus.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum, die X Aprilis, MCMX, Pontificatus Nostri anno Septimo.

PIUS PP. X.

DECREE OF SACRED CONGREGATION OF CONSISTORY
REGARDING SECRET TO BE OBSERVED IN SELECTION
OF AMERICAN BISHOPS

S. CONGREGATIO CONSISTORIALIS

DECRETUM

DE SECRETO SERVANDO IN DESIGNANDIS AD SEDES EPISCOPALES
IN FOEDERATIS STATIBUS AMERICAЕ SEPTENTRIONALIS

Recta ecclesiasticae disciplinae ratio postulat, ut nomina eorum qui ad provisionem sedium episcopalium in *Foederatis Statibus* Americae Septentrionalis a cleri consiliis, iuxta leges ibi vigentes, S. Sedi proponuntur, secreta omnino serventur. Hoc exigit decus ecclesiasticae electionis et gravitas negotii, reverentia erga supremum Romani Pontificis iudicium quod invocatur, ipsaque iustitia candidatis debita. Nam cum horum nomina, ut saepe accidit, patefiunt, hoc ipso publicae discussioni exhibentur, quae pro varia hominum ac diariorum acceptione aliquando aequa est, saepius iniusta et iniqua. Quod, cum honori candidati, et aliquando absque facili plenaque reparatione, detrahit, tum etiam sereno S. Sedis iudicio et iustae electionis libertati impedimentum affert. Unde fit et optimi plures ne in candidatorum album referantur totis viribus refragentur, non solum ob iustissimum tanti officii timorem, sed etiam ne in vulgi ore versentur et in varias vituperationes incurrant.

Quae considerantes aliquot Rñi huius regionis Praesules alique etiam praeclarissimi viri, S. Sedem pro opportuno remedio rogaverunt.

SSñus autem D. N. Pius PP. X ut in re tanti momenti cognosceret quae iusta quae opportuna statui possent, omnes et singulos *Statuum Foederatorum* Americae Antistites audiri iussit.

Modo vero, de consulto Eñorum Patrum S. C. Consistorialis, iuxta vota ferme concordia omnium illius regionis Antistitum, ea quae sequuntur statuit, et ut ab omnibus ad quos spectat adamussim serventur mandavit :

I. Convenientibus dioecesanis consultoribus et parochis qui ius habent suffragium ferendi pro prima candidatorum propositione, vulgo *terna*, ab initio sessionis omnes et singuli coram praesule praesidente iusiurandum dabunt de secreto servando circa nomina quae in discussionem veniunt, et circa ea quae ex maiore suffragiorum numero probata manent, ut Episcoporum iudicio subiiciantur.

2. Si quis consultor, quod Deus avertat, iuramento desit, praeter alias poenas quibus obnoxius evadere potest, statim a consultoris officio removendus erit: si parochus, poena erit perpetua privatio iuris ad suffragium ferendum.

3. Episcopi idem secretum servare *sub gravi* obligantur: et ab initio sessionis in qua de candidatorum scrutinio agitur, Praeses de hac obligatione eos opportune admonebit.

4. Ad idem secretum *sub gravi* tenentur Apostolicae Delegationis administri, iuxta iuramentum quod ab iisdem praestari solet; et ii quoque ad quos forte Apostolicus Delegatus se dirigit ut opportunas notitias de candidatis habeat: qua re de sive verbis, sive litteris aliquem interpellat, ipse tenetur de gravi hac obligatione interpellatum docere.

5. Exemplar huius decreti in singulis curiis episcopalibus servetur, ut omni tempore singulis ad quos spectat norma et regula sit.

Praesentibus valituris contrariis quibuslibet minime obstantibus.

Datum Romae, die 30 Martii, 1910.

C. CARD. DE LAI, *Secretarius.*
S. TECCHI, *Adessor.*

L. ✠ S.

NOTICES OF BOOKS

NOTRE VIE SURNATURELLE. Son Principe et ses Facultés.
Charles de Smedt, S.J., Bollandiste. Tome Premier.
Bruxelles : Albert Dewit, 53 Rue Royale. 1910.

THIS learned treatise on the supernatural life is drawn from conferences, retreats, instructions, and addresses which the learned Jesuit had given in various parts of Belgium in recent years, and had been found helpful and useful by a large circle of hearers. It is needless to say that they are sound in substance and doctrine, but perhaps not so needless to say that in style and language they are exceedingly clear and readable. The learned author went to the right sources for his doctrine.

'Ces deux volumes' [he says] 'sont le fruit d'une lecture assidue des maîtres les plus illustres de la science théologique et de la science ascétique, notamment de saint Thomas d'Aquin et de Suarez, de saint Ignace, de saint François de Sales et de sainte Thérèse, et d'observations sur moi-même et sur les autres poursuivies pendant près de soixante années de vie religieuse et près de cinquante de vie sacerdotale, au cours de laquelle les loisirs que pouvaient lui laisser l'enseignement des sciences sacrées et plus tard les travaux hagiographiques ont été principalement consacrés à donner de nombreuses retraites spirituelles à diverses classes de personnes et à remplir les fonctions d'instructeur et de confesseur ordinaire ou extraordinaire dans plusieurs communautés religieuses des deux sexes.'

We have quoted this passage in full, because it gives a general indication of the character of the work, of the position and authority of the author, and of the line of treatment followed. To people in the world who wish to penetrate, more deeply than the Catechism, however advanced, will lead them, into the depths of eternal truths and the ways of eternal life, this work will be a safe and useful guide. To those who are more closely bound in religion, to priests, nuns, members of confraternities, etc., it will supply edifying and fruitful reading.

J. F. H.

CHRISTIAN PEDAGOGY ; or, The Education and Training of Youth. By Rev. P. A. Halpin. New York : Joseph F. Wagner.

IN these days, when the nature of education is coming to be better understood and its methods completely changed, there is a wide sphere of usefulness for a book such as this. The old-fashioned ways of mind-culture are fast disappearing, and being replaced by up-to-date rules. What is wanted now is not so much learning in the teacher as the capacity for imparting his knowledge in the most effective manner. Moreover, education is taking a new set, or a new direction in later times. It used to be enough formerly if the young mind was stored with sufficient information to fit a man for a profession or calling in the secular sense of the word. But the experience of our time shows that, unless the heart of youth is moulded in virtue at the same time that the intellect is imbued with knowledge, the careers of such as have been so trained without any effort to build up the moral character may be written down as huge failures from every point of view. And so it has come to pass that Pedagogy, or the true system of education, has reached the proportions and fullness of a real science which has for its object the insistence in the training of youth in a due regard to the great principles and facts that are taught and sanctioned by the Church of Christ. This science aims at turning out of the arsenal of knowledge a man who will not only be learned in the vulgar sense but who will also be a useful member of the social order and lead a life commensurate with his exalted destiny.

As a guide to this new system of education the book under notice deserves warm commendation. The author is well versed in philosophy, and keenly alive to the needs of laying proper emphasis upon the formation of the heart and character. He is familiar with the dangers of unchristian education, and frequently sounds the warning note where breakers are ahead of the teacher. His pen is facile, and makes the narrative easy to read, with the result that a vigorous graceful style robs the book of much of the dryness that is usually associated with subjects of the kind.

The book may be said to consist of two parts. In the first he notices the things that ought to find a place in Christian Pedagogy—such as the various faculties and their development, the virtues that are to be inculcated, and noxious influences to be overcome. The second part lays down the methods for

applying principles to practice and rules for teacher's guidance. Father Halpin's book will supply those engaged or interested in the education of youth with abundant food for earnest thought, and should command their careful attention.

P. M.

HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH OF THE UNITED STATES, ROME, ITALY. By Right Rev. Henry A. Brann, D.D., LL.D., Rector of St. Agnes' Church, New York City. New York : Benziger Bros.

'WHEN the late Archbishop Corrigan, two years before he died, gave me his manuscripts relating to the American College in Rome, of which he was one of the first students, he asked me to write its history.' In these opening words of his Preface the author gives what he evidently intended to be regarded as the prime reason of his having undertaken this work. He does not say why the Archbishop chose him for the purpose. The natural supposition is that he was and would generally be considered the proper man for it, and this for personal, literary and artistic, as well as purely professional reasons. The result amply justifies Archbishop Corrigan's choice. It is a fine volume of over 500 pages, profusely illustrated, and, for *pieces justificatives*, giving all official documents in the original, then translated, as well as many personal and local references from contemporaneous periodical literature. The author's aim was clearly to make it at once a work of reliable historical reference for the library and an interesting one for occasional recreative reading, like the old French *mémoires pour servir*.

The book bears the imprimatur of the Archbishop of New York. It is in large 8vo, brought out in Benziger's best style of illustration, letter-press, and binding, making, altogether, a fine ornamental volume for a priest's study or college library.

T. J. O'M.

THE GLORIES OF LOURDES. By Chanoine Justin Rousseil. Translated from the Second Edition by Rev. Joseph Murphy, S.J. London : R. & T. Washburne, Ltd. 1909.

THIS is an exceedingly interesting book written with great intelligence and piety, and translated with excellent effect by

a learned Jesuit. It is a memorial of the golden jubilee of the Apparition of Our Lady of Lourdes. It has had an immense circulation in France, and deserves an equally wide one in English-speaking countries. It is, indeed, as one of its French reviewers happily remarked, a brilliant work of science, apologetics and eloquence.

Upwards of two hundred volumes have been written about Lourdes since Our Lady appeared there to Bernadette Soubirous. The work of Henri Lasserre is no doubt the most striking and important of them all: but this volume of Chanoine Rousseil comes down to date, and presents all the important features of the shrine and its glories during the past fifty years. It is, of course, only a review: but it is a brilliant and effective one, easily read and entertaining from beginning to end. The personages connected with the shrine—bishops, doctors, hospital nurses, ladies and gentlemen of southern France who volunteered their services to 'Notre Dame,' as their forefathers did in the Ages of Faith—get their share of notice and recognition. A considerable part of the work is devoted to Bernadette Soubirous, and our only regret is that it is not longer and fuller. The efforts of the enemies of religion to discredit the shrine and its pilgrimages are discussed, and their methods laid bare. The whole machinery for verifying the miracles is described, and a general idea of the number and importance of the miracles given. Altogether the book well deserves attention. In future editions a little more care might be bestowed on certain expressions, but fortunately only a few are really glaringly defective.

J. F. H.

NOTE


THE PRIESTS' EUCHARISTIC LEAGUE

The address of the English Director of the Priests' Eucharistic League, is

REV. M. P. HANLON,

CATHOLIC CHURCH,

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OUR CHURCHES AND THEIR APPOINTMENTS

THE following articles may not contain very much that is original or that is new to most readers of the I. E. RECORD. In past pages of this Journal, as well as in the ordinary manuals of Theology, Canon Law, and Liturgy, will be found a good deal of the matter now brought together. At the same time many will possibly be grateful for having embodied in a concise and connected way the most recent legislation of the Church on such practical matters as the Church and its Appointments, the Altar and its Accessories, and Ecclesiastical Vestments and their form. It has been well said that belief in the Real Presence is the centre of the Catholic system of ritual. From this it is rational to infer that the innate reverence for the Blessed Sacrament, which is the energizing principle of our worship, should find suitable expression in an anxiety to keep our Churches up to the standard of rubrical requirements and, above all, to lavish upon those things that are intimately connected with the celebration of the Sacred Mysteries that solicitude which may be taken as an earnest of the belief that is in us.

THE PLACE OF SACRIFICE¹

In accordance with present Ecclesiastical discipline the normal place for the celebration of the Holy Sacrifice is a

¹ Cf. Gasparri. *De Sanctissima Eucharistia* ; Many, *De locis Sacris*, and *Praelectiones de Missa*.

Church or Oratory—public or semi-public—that has been set aside for divine worship either by the dedicatory prayers of the Roman Ritual, or by the more solemn consecrating rite of the Pontifical, and that has not been polluted, desecrated, or laid under interdict. From this general legislation departures are sanctioned only by *epikeia* or by special privilege of the Holy See. Thus, to provide for the exigencies of temporary overcrowding of the usual place of sacrifice, for the difficulties that arise in connexion with an epidemic or plague, for the circumstances of soldiers on a march, and for similar emergencies, special arrangements may with the sanction of the Ordinary be made in regard to the locality of the Holy Sacrifice.¹ In virtue of a Papal Indult Mass may, on certain conditions, be said in a private or domestic Oratory. The power of Bishops to permit its celebration in purely private Oratories was taken away by the Council of Trent,² but they still can even *jure ordinario* allow Mass in these cases, *per modum actus* and *ob magnas et urgentes causas*.³ Moreover, special faculties are granted them to sanction the celebration of the Holy Sacrifice in domestic Oratories or private houses if they are satisfied of the reasonableness of the cause.⁴ In Ireland Bishops' powers in this matter are strengthened by custom coming down from the penal days. A Papal Indult is also needed for celebrating Mass on board ship. This privilege, with certain restrictions, has been granted by the Holy See to American and Australian Bishops visiting Rome *ad limina*.⁵ The favour of a portable Altar is enjoyed in certain circumstances by Bishops and other prelates when travelling.

DEDICATION

There are two forms of dedication, viz., by the solemn rite of Consecration and the simple blessing of the Roman Ritual. All Churches and Oratories (public and semi-public)

¹ Cf. Many, *Praelectiones*, p. 13.

² Sess. XXII.

³ S. Cong. Conc., Dec. 20, 1856.

⁴ Cf. Appendix to Maynooth Statutes, p. 146.

⁵ Cf. Decr. S.R.C., June 30, 1908.

must at least be *blessed* before being used permanently for divine service. The ordinary minister of this blessing is a Bishop, but a priest may be delegated by the Bishop to perform it. The chief part of the rite consists in the recital of certain prayers and the sprinkling of the walls with Holy Water.¹ All Churches and the Oratories mentioned may also be consecrated with the solemn rite of the Pontifical. But it is necessary for the *licit* consecration that a fixed Altar, which should be the high or principal one, should also be consecrated at the same time. It is further required by Canon Law that the building and its site should form the absolute and inalienable property of the Ecclesiastical authorities of the diocese. The ordinary minister of consecration is a Bishop or a priest delegated by the Holy See in a very exceptional case. In the rite Chrism is employed to anoint the walls in twelve places. These may be selected so that six shall be on either side of the principal walls, two being near the Altar and two near the door. Over the twelve crosses, which mark the anointed spots, sockets are fastened to hold candles. These are lighted during the ceremony and on the anniversary of the Feast of the Dedication each year. While the principal efficacy of the Consecration inheres in the walls the chief effect of the blessing resides in the floor. All the clergy attached to Churches solemnly consecrated are bound to celebrate each year, as a Double of first class with an Octave, the anniversary of the Feast of Dedication, either on the actual date of the ceremony or on some other day appointed by the Consecrating Prelate at the time.² In Ireland, by special Indult, the Anniversary of all the Churches in the country is *simultaneously* celebrated on the second Sunday in October. The Office begins from *terce* on the day of Consecration. While Churches and Oratories that are dedicated in the less solemn way by the rite of the Roman Ritual are not entitled to celebrate the anniversary of the dedication all, however, are bound to celebrate each year the Feast of the Titular—that is, the person or Mystery that has given its

¹ Cf. Ritual, viii., c. 27.

² Cf. Decr. S.R.C., n. 3881.

name to the Church—as a Double of the first class with an Octave.¹

DESECRATION, POLLUTION AND INTERDICT

A Church loses its consecration or blessing by the simultaneous demolition of all the walls or the greater portion of them, or by the addition of a new portion greater in extent than the old structure. Repairs, such as roofing, plastering, veneering, and frescoing, do not deprive the Church of its sacredness, or render re-dedication necessary. The same is true of partial destruction and gradual restoration. When a Church has to be re-consecrated or re-blessed the same ceremonies have to be performed as in the first instance. The desecration of the Church does not affect the *fixed* Altars.

When a Church becomes polluted it is thereby deprived of its sacred character and rendered unfit for purposes of divine worship until it has been reconciled. This condition is brought about (1) by homicide that is voluntary and criminal, (2) by copious and culpable shedding of human blood, (3) by acts of grave immorality or indecency, (4) by the burial of an unbaptized adult or of an *excommunicatus vitandus*, (5) by the erection of a military station extending for a period of two days or more.¹ These various acts in order to give rise to the *indecentia* associated with pollution should be certain, public and committed in the Church itself and not in an accessory, such as the sacristy or cemetery. The Church being polluted, all its fixed Altars are similarly affected, so that until it is reconciled no office or function may be held except the administration of certain necessary sacraments, such as Baptism, Penance, Confirmation and the Viaticum.

The method of reconciling a polluted Church will vary according as it has been either solemnly consecrated or simply blessed. In the former case the ordinary minister is the Bishop or a priest delegated by the Holy See and

¹ The Titular of the *Church* should not be confounded with the *Patronus loci*.

² S.R.C., n. 2938.

using Holy Water blessed by a Bishop. In the latter case a priest delegated by the Bishop may reconcile the Church with the form found in the Roman Ritual.

To punish the people for some crime, or to break their contumacy, a Church is sometimes laid under interdict. This means the exclusion of the faithful from participating in the Divine Office and from receiving, with certain exceptions, the Sacraments. The limits are always defined when the censure is inflicted by the Bishop.

In a Church that has been dedicated to divine service, in the manner described, it is of course quite improper to hold any meetings or functions that are not of a strictly religious character.¹

THE MATERIAL EDIFICE²

Upon the purely architectural aspect of church-building the writer hesitates to speak. This is a matter altogether for experts. If a word of advice might be offered, he would counsel the selection of a fully competent architect who is likely to secure satisfaction both in design and in execution. Possibly these ends would be best attained if the architect were chosen after competition and if that plan were selected which most perfectly realizes the ends to be achieved in an edifice destined for the noblest purpose that art can serve. It goes without saying that an ecclesiastical architect should be alive to the exigencies of Sacred Art and able to reflect in his work the appropriate expression of religious truths and supernatural life. From this point of view a Catholic should be most satisfactory, but the hall-mark of faith is not always a test of competency. In regard to the design, any of the well-known styles—with the possible exception of the Grecian³—may be adopted. A Church, therefore, may be Roman, Byzantine, Romanesque, or Gothic in any of its various forms. The last-mentioned

¹ Cf. S.R.C., Dec. 19, 1693.

² Cf. Barbier de Montault, *Traité pratique de la construction des Eglises*; St. Charles Borromeo, *Instructions on Church Building*, translated by Wyler; Elliot, *Art and Ireland*; Mallet, *L'Art Chrétien*.

³ Cf. Lepore, *Arte Sacra*, p. 93.

has generally come to be regarded as the Catholic style and is now most frequently employed. But it lends itself to such a wealth of ornamentation with its stately towers, tapering spires, carved corbels, and sculptural decorations, that it is rare to find a modern Gothic Church that in perfect completion realizes all the beautiful conceptions of the style. The details of site and environment are easily arranged. The building should stand in a position of elevation and isolation. Great predilection was formerly shown for the Cruciform pattern which in nave, apse, and transepts symbolized the chief members of the Saviour's body as it lay in the tomb. But the prevailing tendency is now in favour of a rectangular structure with square or rounded apse. The custom of giving the Church an *orientation* or of placing the apse towards the East has come down from the fifth century,¹ and is still rigidly followed, even though it does not appear to be of any strict obligation. Assuming now that a Church is to be built, that a design is selected appropriate to the needs of the locality, and that an architect is appointed who is competent to carry out the details of the plan in an artistic fashion and alive to the high purpose for which the building is destined, it is proposed here to call attention to some of the liturgical features which every design for an Ecclesiastical edifice ought to present.

THE SACRISTY

Every design should provide for this essential adjunct. There is no rule about the location of the Sacristy. It is generally placed on the Epistle or right side of the Church, and its position should be such that the clergy may pass directly to the sanctuary or choir (if there be one) without having to go through the nave. It should be spacious, well aired and lighted. The Sacristy serves as a storehouse for a multitude of things. To secure proper order and cleanliness, it will be useful to see what these articles are and how they should be accommodated :—

(a) A combination vesting-bench with vestment drawers ;

¹ Cf. *Constitutiones Apostolicæ*, ii., c. 57.

the drawers should be capacious enough to allow the chasuble to be stretched at full length. They need not be very deep, one drawer being reserved for each colour. On the inner side of the bench a sort of gradino might be erected with small drawers for purificators, corporals, and amices. Each drawer should be labelled with the name of the article it contains. Separate receptacles should be reserved for soiled linens. A large cross ought to hold a prominent position over the centre of the vesting-bench, and near by should hang tablets with the names of the Bishop and Titular of the Church, prayers for vesting, and the *Oratio Imperata*. The *Ordo* should also find a place here. To save it from dust the surface of the bench may be covered with baize, and it is desirable that the wood of the drawers be moth-proof. Where there are more than one Altar in a Church, the names of the different Altars should appear over the spaces respectively allotted to vestments arranged for them. Albs, altar-cloths, cinctures, and surplices require special receptacles. Copes may be stowed away in large, flat drawers, so that there will be no necessity to fold them except as little as possible. They may also—and the same remark applies to the chasubles—be hung upon rests in long, narrow presses. This method has much to commend it. (b) Every Sacristy needs a strong cast-iron safe for the sacred vessels, Tabernacle keys, Holy Oils, Reliquiaries and other articles of value. (c) Missals, cruet-salvers, flower-vases, thuribles, candles, and other items of this kind must be suitably accommodated. (d) Washing apparatus for priests' hands, with soap and towel. (e) The *prie-dieu*, with the necessary charts, is best placed in a quiet corner of the Sacristy. (f) Writing-desk, with materials, is often useful and desirable. (h) The various Registers required for parochial purposes—for Baptisms, Confirmations, Marriages, Deaths, *Status Animarum*—should be kept securely under lock and key in strong presses or safes. (i) Another safe will be required for the documents and inventories comprising the Parochial Archives.¹ In Continental

¹ Cf. *Acta Syn. Tuam.*, 1908, Ap. vii., p. 57.

Churches an inventory of all Ecclesiastical assets is made every ten years, and this document, duly signed by the Rector in presence of two witnesses, is deposited in the Archives. (*j*) If there be any Foundation Masses, the obligations in regard to them should be indicated on a Tablet. (*k*) Lavatory arrangement is essential to every Sacristy.

In addition to the articles and requisites mentioned there are others that must be provided for either in the Sacristy or some annex. Such, for example, are the catafalque, pall, bier, candlesticks and things required for Exequial offices, brushes, dusters, flower-vases, and altar-boys' costumes. But everything in the Sacristy should be clean, neat and orderly located.

THE SANCTUARY AND ITS FURNITURE

The Sanctuary or Presbyterium is elevated by one or some odd number of steps above the floors of the nave, from which it is divided by the chancel or communion rail. Since in most parochial Churches there is no provision for the liturgical choir, it is desirable that the apse should be sufficiently large to leave ample space for the clergy who are engaged at High Mass from time to time. If the floor of the Sanctuary is of wood it should be covered with a carpet either wholly or in part. The colour of the carpet may be either red, green, or of any other appropriate hue. During the performance of liturgical functions all those not in choral dress are excluded from the Sanctuary. It is forbidden to have seats for lay persons in the Sanctuary.¹ Dividing the nave and transepts from the apse is a balustrade consisting either of a long, narrow slab of marble resting on pillars of the same material, or of a wooden rail resting on a wrought-iron grating. This structure should be about two feet and a half in height, and from six to nine inches broad at the top. It is provided with a suitable gate in the centre. Attached to the inside of the top portion is a linen cloth about two feet wide which runs all round and

¹ Cf. *Cer. Epis.*, i., c. 13.

is held by the Communicants under the chin when receiving Holy Communion. This cloth should be always immaculate. Instead of the cloth a small square linen pall, or a gilt paten with a handle, may be used. But the pall or paten of the Mass should never be given to the Communicants. The chief furniture of the Sanctuary is the Altar—which will be treated of subsequently—the Credence, benches for the Ministers and Acolytes, and whatever ornaments may be deemed suitable. The Credence is a small table at the Epistle side of the Altar, of such convenient dimensions as to hold all the requisites for a private or a solemn Mass. The surface is covered with a linen cloth and, unless the table is made of some ornamental material, this cloth should extend down to the ground on the principal Festivals. Near the Credence is a bench for the sacred ministers at a High Mass. The type of bench contemplated seems to be an ordinary long, plain seat without arm rests but with a single rail for back over which the ministers' vestments may be allowed to drop when they sit. The bench may have a covering corresponding in colour to the office for the day, except at Exequial offices, when it should be bare. Domestic or house chairs should not, if possible, be used for liturgical purposes.¹ The acolytes' bench is of a simpler pattern and need not have any back. Other ornaments in the Sanctuary should harmonize with the surroundings.

PULPIT AND CONFESSIONALS

In Cathedrals and other Churches where an episcopal throne is erected the pulpit, by way of exception to the general rule, is placed at the Epistle side. Its proper location is a point distant from the chancel about a third of the entire length of the nave. It may, however, be found necessary to bring it nearer the Altar. The material of the pulpit may be wood, stone, or marble. The style ought to be in keeping with the architecture. By reason of its prominence the pulpit lends itself to elaborate decorative

¹ Cf. Decr. S.R.C., n. 3804.

treatment, and may be made a thing of real artistic beauty. The ornamentation should be appropriate. Symbolical subjects, such as our Divine Lord as Teacher, the Evangelists and the Theological Virtues, suggest themselves as suitable. On the important Festivals it may be covered with a cloth of the colour of the Vestments used at Mass. A canopy or sounding-board over the pulpit is effective in throwing the preacher's voice forward and helping it to reach the distant corners of the Church. Right in front of the pulpit on the opposite wall, or sometimes suspended from the apex of the apse arch, one sees suspended in foreign Churches a large crucifix known as the *Vexillum Crucis*. The introduction of this seems most appropriate. The confessionals are essential in every Church, and they should be provided for in the original design, as their proper location is a matter of chief importance. Like the pulpit they should be in harmony with the features of the building and artistically constructed. In many Churches they are recessed in the walls, and this arrangement has much to recommend it. In the design aim should be directed to secure sizable, well-ventilated, and properly-screened apartments for priest and penitents in which the former can sit, and the latter kneel, with ease. The *crates* should be made of perforated zinc, which excludes the view but not the voice of the penitent, and fitted on the inside with a slide. In the penitent's apartment there ought to be a crucifix placed in front of him when kneeling. A common fault of both pulpits and confessionals is their smallness and narrowness. There should be a special confessional for deaf people and, while this must be at some distance, it is also desirable that it should be visible from the body of the Church.

HOLY WATER STOUP

Instead of a hole in the wall it is much better that the Holy Water Font should stand out as a separate object, either in the porch or inside the door. In the old Churches great attention was paid to this accessory. It was beauti-

fully ornamented. In form it might consist of base, pedestal, and ample circular bowl, the material being marble, stone, or wood, suitably executed. The bowl should consist of some non-corrodible substance.

THE BAPTISTERY

This is another adjunct of the Church which must be provided for in the original design if it is to have its proper importance recognized. The location is near the entrance on the Epistle side. A space large enough to accommodate six or eight persons is enclosed with a grill or metal railing, in the centre of which the font is erected. The lower part of the font is like the Holy Water stoup already described, except that the bowl is divided into two compartments, one of which holds the baptismal water and the other is connected by a small pipe with the Sacarium.¹ The other part of the font consists of a pyramidal cover or canopy which may be moved up and down by a pulley arrangement. When the font is not actually used the cover is securely fastened with lock and key. The things that ought to be near hand in the Baptistry are : (a) Ritual, surplice, stole and holy oils ; (b) blessed salt ; (c) vessel for pouring on the water ; (d) cotton on salver ; (e) candle and matches ; (f) water, soap, and towel for washing the priest's hands ; (g) small towels for drying infant's head and white linen veil ; (h) book to enter names before transferring to Register. All these articles might be accommodated in a small ambry or press made in the wall. The Baptistry lends itself to great decorative treatment. The walls may be painted with appropriate emblems or subjects. The form of pedestal is often octagonal.²

¹ The Sacarium consists of a pit about two feet square and six feet deep, dug into the earth at some convenient place outside the foundations of the Church and covered with a large flag. The object of it is to receive the water, absorb it into the soil, and so save it from danger of irreverence. If there is no Sacarium in connexion with the font, the water used in Baptism may be allowed to fall from the child's head into a basin and afterwards thrown into the Sacarium of the Sacristy.

² Cf. St. Charles, op. cit.

CHURCH BELL

According to the *Instructions* of St. Charles, if there is no belfry, the bell may be erected upon some one of the walls of the Church. It may also be hung in a tower adjacent to the Church. At all events the bell is necessary, not only for ornament but also for use in summoning the faithful to divine service. The various functions of the bell are well expressed in the lines :—

Laudo Deum verum, plebem voco, congrego clerum,
Defunctos ploro, pestem fugo, festa decoro.

In selecting a bell the chief consideration should be its *tone*, the quality of which depends on the character of the metal as well as on the relative dimensions of width and thickness. The bell-caster should be able to produce a bell with an agreeable tone. But an expert should be requisitioned to test the instrument before hanging. This concern is all the more commendable where chimes are desired. The bell is usually adorned with the figure of a saint and an appropriate inscription.¹ It may be consecrated by a Bishop according to the *Pontifical* or blessed by a priest, delegated by the Bishop, with the form in the *Ritual*.² The ceremonies suitable for both occasions will be found in the work just mentioned.

THE ORGAN

The selection of this instrument belongs entirely to the capable expert who is acquainted with the exigencies of the Church, its acoustic properties, and its accommodating capacity. In this connexion some questions arise. First, there is the proper location. In most cases the organ-gallery is placed at the end of the nave and over the chief entrance of the Church. This disposition is not always the best, because the casing of the pipes, unless it is done very carefully, obstructs the view of the large window generally placed in the western gable. For this

¹ Cf. *Benedicenda*, by Father Schulte, Ap. B.

² Cf. form approved by Congregation of Rites, January 22, 1908.

reason most authorities recommend that the organ should be placed near the Altar. But no rule can be laid down to meet all cases. Next, the question of size and selection of stops has to be solved with the aid of skilled advice. The maker must also be chosen with care. Music and its appropriate rendering enter so largely into the service of the Church and affect so materially the devotional attitude of the worshipper that all these details deserve to be carefully considered.¹

THE STATIONS OF THE CROSS

These are now an essential feature of every Church and it is very advisable that provision for them should be made at the earliest opportunity. The devotion is of comparatively recent introduction—dating from the fifteenth century—so that in the medieval Churches the Stations were not contemplated in the original design. In all Churches of modern times the proper location of the Stations is scarcely of less importance than the appropriateness of their general get-up. The figures, whether painted, sculptured, or cast, should be such as to stimulate true devotion and inspire proper religious sentiments.² They ought to be artistic and decorative. Else they become stumbling-blocks of bad taste. If painted they may be done on canvas, metal or porcelain. In this case attention should be paid to the frames which ought to be in keeping with the style of architecture of the Church. Square frames are not always suitable and quarter-foils will sometimes be more properly preferred. But in no case should the frames be so elaborate as to detract from the representative character of the picture. If sculptured, they may be done in marble, stone or wood. Modelling in baked earth is pretty common and is generally recommended before plaster-casts. In all cases the suitable arrangement of the details in each picture is a matter of moment. It will take the opinion of the expert to say what is best in each instance.

¹ Cf. Bewerunge, Rev. H., 'Some Remarks on the Organ,' I. E. RECORD, February, 1899.

² Cf. Mallet: *L'Arte Chretien*,

Painted subjects are more expressive, perhaps, and more realistic, while figures in relief, whether carved or cast, seem more in harmony with the stillness and calm of the Church itself. A word or two may be useful here on the formalities of Canonical Erection ¹:—

Before Erection.—Authorization to erect the Stations may be obtained: (a) directly from the Holy See, (b) from the Superior-General of the Franciscan Order, (c) from the Bishop who is empowered by Special Indult to subdelegate the faculty. (Where there is a Franciscan Monastery the Fathers, on the authorization of their local Superiors, are usually deputed for the erection.) The authorization to erect the Stations and the permission of the Ordinary of the Diocese and of the Superior of the Church in which erection takes place, must be obtained in writing under the pain of nullity.

After Erection.—Immediately after erecting the Stations a *proces-verbal* of the act should be made out and all the documents above referred to deposited in the Archives of the Church. This is not required for validity, but as a proof that the Stations were canonically erected. Further, if the crosses require to be renewed in the future, the priest who is duly authorized to bless them may proceed on the strength of the permission granted by these documents if he can assume that it still subsists.

Method of Erection.—(1) Fourteen crosses are required to represent the Stations at Jerusalem. It is to these crosses that the indulgences are attached. They are, therefore, the most essential part of the whole arrangement.

(2) The crosses must be made of *wood*. Any other material is invalid for the purpose of the Stations. The crosses may be painted, but not in such a way as to destroy the semblance of the material of which they are made. They ought not, therefore, be gilt, and they should not carry any crucifixes or figures.

(3) They should be blessed by the priest, duly authorized to erect the Stations, in the place of erection, and affixed to

¹ Beringer, *Les Indulgences*, i., pp. 430, etc.

the walls either by the same priest or by some other deputed by him. It is not essential in any way that the priest who puts up the Stations should perform the exercises immediately afterwards. This may be desirable.

(4) The crosses should be separated by some distance from one another. How great this should be is not specified. *Aliqualis distantia* are the words used in one of the Decrees.¹ But the Stations should not be so closely grouped together that the space between the first and last exceeds no more than three or four paces.

N.B.—The pictures are not necessary for the indulgences. They are, however, valuable as a help to meditation on the incidents of the Sacred Passion and as a stimulus to devotion. They may be blessed with a suitable form. The crosses may be affixed either to the top or bottom of the pictures, or they may be fastened directly to the wall. In arranging the Stations one may begin either at the Gospel or Epistle side, but care should be taken to arrange them in conformity with the pose and attitude of the figures on the pictures.

Changing the Stations.—

1°. Seeing that they are not essential, the pictures may be renewed as often as may be necessary without prejudice to the indulgences, if only the old crosses are retained.

2°. If all the crosses or half of them are renewed simultaneously, the indulgences are lost, and a new erection is required. But a few of them may be replaced from time to time without any such loss.

3°. In case of repairs to the Church, all the Stations may be taken down and put up again. In the interval, of course, the indulgences cannot be gained. They need not be rearranged in the same order, nor is it necessary to affix the same crosses to the same pictures. The Stations may also be removed from one part of the Church to another, as long as they continue to be in the same *place*, morally speaking, as that for which the faculty of erection was granted.

4°. When a new Church has been built on exactly the

¹ N. 194.

same site as the old one, it is doubtful if the Stations belonging to the pre-existing building can be re-erected in virtue of the original powers. It is safer to procure a fresh authorization. Similarly, if a domestic Oratory be changed from one room in a house to another the old Stations cannot be validly transferred.

THE CEMETERY

The Ritual supposes that contiguous to every Church is the last resting place of the faithful.¹ This is not always so in fact. But wherever the cemetery is located the site should be dry, elevated, and enclosed on all sides with well-built walls whose gates, surmounted by a cross, are locked, except when the faithful find it necessary to enter. The ground should be tastefully laid out and intersected with gravel walks. Flowers of appropriate symbolism may be planted here and there, even over the grave plots, but everything should be excluded that is not in keeping with the religious atmosphere of the place or that does not breathe the genuine Catholic spirit. Thus, monumental ornaments should be eschewed that are pagan in meaning, such as Father Time, the broken column, urn, etc. The want of knowledge on the part of Catholic sculptors is often responsible for a number of these forms that signify the reverse of what is clearly intended. The cross is the fitting symbol for every grave, and it should never be absent.² The cemetery may be consecrated by a Bishop according to the rite of the *Roman Pontifical*, or it may be simply blessed according to the *Roman Ritual*³ by a priest who is delegated by the Bishop.

If it is customary to bury priests in the cemetery, a special portion shall be reserved for themselves. Similarly a special part, but *not blessed*, ought to be set aside for the interment of unbaptized persons and others excluded, for certain reasons, from Christian burial.

¹ *Rit. Rom.*, tit. vi.

² *Ibid.*, tit. vi., c. i., n. 18.

³ *Tit.* viii., c. xxix.

*Ceremonies of Blessing.*¹—If the Bishop is to bless the cemetery solemnly, certain preparations are to be made. The day before five plain wooden crosses (without the images) are set in position in the earth. The largest is placed in the centre and the other four—which are about six feet high—are arranged one before, one behind, and one in a line with either arm of the central cross. Three sockets to hold candles are placed on the top and on the end of either arm of each cross. Near each there should be a triple candlestick, or some arrangement for holding the candles before the Bishop inserts them in the sockets on the crosses. Before the large cross a carpet is spread on which is the faldstool with the vestments, and near the faldstool there should be a table with all the other articles necessary for the function. When the Blessing is performed by a delegated priest only the large central wooden cross is required. The other things to be provided are suggested in the Ritual. In both cases the ceremony should take place in the morning, and the Pontifical contemplates the celebration of a Mass immediately afterwards, provided, of course, that the Church is adjacent.

A cemetery loses its blessing, or becomes *desecrated*, only when it ceases to serve the purpose for which it was established. Canon Law admits a few causes on account of which the Bishop may have a cemetery turned to profane uses. The pollution of a cemetery is brought about in the same manner as that of a Church. The method of reconciliation will vary according as the cemetery is solemnly blessed by a Bishop or simply by a delegated priest. In the latter case, a priest can reconcile it without any Episcopal delegation.²

PATRICK MORRISROE.

¹ Cf. Schulte, *Benedicenda*.

² Cf. Many, *De Locis Sacris*, p. 238.

SOME PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING 'SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION'

THE human mind is not content to observe particular facts as they occur. It remembers and compares them, notes their resemblances and tries to *classify* them, endeavours to reach *general truths* about them, to discover the *laws* of their occurrence. In other words, it tries to *interpret* the facts which make up its experience, and to *explain* these to itself by discovering their *causes*. The discovery of the *proximate* causes of the varied facts of human experience is the work of the special sciences; the discovery of their more remote causes is the task of the general science—philosophy. For this knowledge of things through their causes, proximate and ultimate—'*cognitio rerum per causas, proximas et ultimas*'—there is a natural yearning implanted in the human heart; and whether the search bring him happiness or not, man will continue to prosecute it.

The main outlines of the method he should follow are laid down for him in Logic. His work will largely consist in *generalizing from particular facts of sense-experience*. The process by which he discovers and proves general truths about particular facts is nowadays designated by the title of *Induction*; and for the principles that are to guide him in this process he will naturally turn to the Logic of Induction. Here he will find an extensive and rather unsettled body of teaching about the so-called presuppositions of Induction, 'Causality' and 'Uniformity of Nature'; about the methods of analysing his experience and generalizing therefrom by the aid of accurate observation and experiment; about the discovery of 'laws' or 'generalizations' or 'general truths' by a sort of guesswork known as the 'formation of hypotheses'; about the conditions required for a legitimate or useful hypothesis; about the tests by which a hypothesis may be 'verified' or 'established,' and

the means by which particular facts and laws may be 'explained.' In this body of doctrine, as expounded in most English works on Induction since the time of Mill, there are certain more or less tacit assumptions and tendencies which insinuate erroneous and harmful notions in regard to the scope and limits of human knowledge, certitude and science in general.¹ On some of these I now purpose to offer a few remarks.

Among the presuppositions of Induction many authors set down in the first place the *Principle of Sufficient Reason*: that 'no judgment can be true, and no fact can be real, without a sufficient reason why it is so, and not otherwise.' This simply postulates that reality is intelligible, and its explanation attainable—at least to some extent. All actual search after truth presupposes that some truth can be found, and the gradual discovery of truth justifies the assumption. Unless we assume that we can discover truth, it is idle to seek for truth. The postulate is therefore reasonable and necessary. But at the outset its meaning is essentially vague, and it is only by progress in the discovery of truth that we can gradually attach definite meanings to the terms 'sufficient reason,' 'intelligible,' 'explanation,' etc.

It would, for example, be a mistake in method no less than an error in fact to assume, even in regard to the inorganic universe, that no judgment about the latter can be accepted as true without the same sort of cogent evidence which compels intellectual assent in the pure mathematical science of abstract mechanics; that a fact is 'intelligible' or 'knowable' only in so far forth as it illustrates the laws of mechanical motion and inertia; that the introduction of 'purpose,' 'design,' 'intelligence,' 'final causes,' as factors to help in explaining the processes of Physical Nature is 'unscientific' inasmuch as these factors cannot be 'computed' in terms of the laws and principles of mechanics, and are therefore themselves not scientifically 'intelligible.' Any such narrowing of the concept

¹ Cf. I. E. RECORD, July, 'Some Questionable Tendencies in the Logic of Scientific Method,' pp. 1 sqq.

of what is 'knowable' or 'intelligible' is entirely gratuitous and unwarranted. Yet the positivist philosophy which has been popular in scientific circles for generations insinuates this misleading interpretation of what is in itself a true and reasonable principle. For this philosophy would have us believe that what is beyond the range of sense-experience is 'unknowable' (*Agnosticism*); and that the phenomena of sense-experience are 'knowable' or 'intelligible' only in so far as their uniform co-existences and sequences throughout space and time exemplify and constitute the 'laws' of mechanics (*Positivism, Mechanical Atomism*). Reality may surely be 'knowable,' even though not amenable to any such laws; and there may be some reality within the reach of our intellect even though it be beyond the reach of our senses. It was the misfortune of English philosophy, under the influence of such men as Hume and Mill, to sink into this *Sensism*. By declaring all reality to be in ultimate analysis *a flow of sensations in the individual consciousness*, they really declared all 'knowledge,' all 'rational explanation' of human experience, impossible. We shall see an illustration of this in their futile attempts to explain and justify men's belief in the Uniformity of Physical Causation. The Positivism which endeavours to interpret all human experience as a process ruled by mechanical necessity has for its obverse side Agnosticism—that is, a declaration of inability to assign any ultimate rational ground that will explain human experience as a whole. This, like all scepticism, is really an abandonment of the Principle of Sufficient Reason; for it says, in effect, 'We believe certain things, but ultimately we do not and cannot know why.'

The Principle of Sufficient Reason is a postulate not only of Induction but of all search for truth. But *what* we will be satisfied to accept as an ultimately 'sufficient' reason for all experience will obviously depend on the view which careful and prolonged reflection on that experience will lead us to form about reality as a whole. The empiricist so interprets experience as to end in agnosticism about the suprasensible and in inconsistency about what

he calls the 'scientific laws or generalizations' of sense-phenomena. In his attempt to account for the reliability of these generalizations, their stability, their characteristic of necessity, he really explains this away, and leaves no rational ground for human certitude.

Another extreme interpretation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, another narrow view about the 'intelligibility' of experience and the possibility of 'explaining' the latter, is that of Hegelian Idealism. This is the very antithesis to Empiricism. The latter fails to account for the 'must,' the element of necessity, which characterizes, in varying degrees, our judgments about reality; the former errs by attributing the same absolute intellectual necessity to *all* our judgments about reality. In a word, it claims that the world as a whole is 'intelligible' and capable of 'rational explanation' only on the assumption that the latter is one vast self-contained and self-explaining system of ideas or thought-relations which reveal themselves to individual minds as endowed with the same metaphysical necessity which characterizes our abstract judgments about the possible essences of things. This, too, is an assumption which unduly narrows the scope of 'explanation' and the sphere of what is 'knowable' or 'intelligible.' Nor is it a necessary postulate, this assumption of *Idealistic Monism* that all reality is one great mental or intellectual system, one great Thought or Idea, unfolding itself in individual minds according to necessary laws of logical thought; for surely we can make progress in knowledge without the aid of such an assumption; and, besides, there is at least this other alternative postulate—the postulate of *Theism*—that the sense-world reveals itself to the human intellect not as the self-evolution, at once logical and real, of a Sole Being that is at once Thought and Reality, but rather as a distinct system dependent no less on a Supreme Will for its existence than on a Supreme Intelligence for its intelligibility. It may be that the whole world of human experience (including the human mind itself) is the creature of a Supreme Free Will, governed by laws laid down by a Supreme Intelligence (*Theism*); and not the logically

necessary unfolding or evolution of one Sole Idea-Being (*Idealistic Pantheism*); nor the obverse and unknowable background of the transient panorama which constitutes the individual man's sense-consciousness (*Empiricism, Agnosticism*).

These are three alternative points of view—there are others also—from which individual writers on Inductive Logic may proceed to lay down principles for the guidance of the student in his search after truth, whether in science, in philosophy, or in theology. The differences between them are gradually revealed in the respective ways in which writers of each of these schools treat of Causality, Hypothesis, and Generalization (based on the law of Nature's Uniformity), as well as in the different ideals they set up regarding Scientific Explanation and Physical Certitude. Their views on the nature of Explanation and Certitude underlie their teaching on the other points mentioned, and, being more fundamental than the latter, call for our attention in the first place. On some of the current logical teachings about Explanation and Certitude, I purpose, therefore, to offer a few remarks here.

What the strict Aristotelian *Demonstration* is to the pure Deductive Sciences, that *Scientific Explanation* is to the Inductive Sciences. We are said rather to demonstrate a 'truth' and to explain a 'fact': but the difference is only a verbal one. A 'truth' is a judgment that is in conformity with some reality which it purports to interpret; the judgment itself is the logical truth, the reality is the ontological truth. The reality itself has several names: 'being,' 'thing,' 'event,' 'fact,' 'phenomenon.' The judgment which asserts that a thing 'is' or 'exists,' that a fact 'takes place,' that an event 'happens,' is said indiscriminately to assert a 'truth' or a 'fact.' The expressions 'That is a *fact*' and 'That is *true*' are synonymous. Now to give a *causal* demonstration (a *demonstratio propter quid*—*διότι*) of the truth of such an assertion is evidently the same as to explain fully why and wherefore the thing or event or phenomenon exists

or takes place as it does—to 'show' or 'demonstrate' it in and through its connexions with all its causes.

Nevertheless, the term 'Demonstration' seems by preference to be applied to the process by which we connect abstract truths with their first principles, and 'Explanation' to the process by which we connect our concrete knowledge of the existence and happening of facts, events, phenomena, with a knowledge of their causes and of the modes in which, or the laws according to which, they are produced by those causes. We may know that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles without knowing *why*; and we may know that ice commences to form on the top of a pond and not at the bottom, without knowing *why*: to answer the first 'why' is to *demonstrate* a theorem in geometry; to answer the second is to *explain* a phenomenon in physics. To demonstrate truths is simply to show their connexion with simpler truths which we already understand, and ultimately with *first principles*, to show *how* they are involved in the latter, to harmonize and fit them in with that part of our knowledge to which they are logically or rationally akin. To explain facts is simply to show *why* they happen, *how* they occur, *how* they are connected with their *causes*, what these causes are, and what are the *laws* according to which they bring these facts about. We demonstrate consequent by antecedent until we reach *first principles*: we explain effects by causes until we reach *remote causes*, and, ultimately, the One, Uncreated *First Cause*.

In this discovery of causes and of the laws which guide their activities, *Scientific Explanation* essentially consists. We explain a physical 'fact' or 'phenomenon' when we show it to be an instance or application of some physical 'law.' But this 'law' itself may be only a generalized statement of the uniform occurrence or happening of the fact in certain definite circumstances; and, if so, the 'law' itself needs explanation, suggesting, as it does, a distinct '*why*' of its own. And so we try to 'explain' the 'law' itself in turn; this we do either by resolving it into already known laws if we can prove it to be the expression

of their combination, or else by showing it, if we can, to be a narrower or more special application of some wider known law.¹ Thus we proceed, bringing the particular under the universal, resolving the complex into the simple, always endeavouring to reach the ultimate principles of truth and the first causes of reality. Thus, too, we pass from the special sciences, which deal with the *proximate causes* of *limited groups* of phenomena and the *proximate* principles of special departments of knowledge, into *philosophy*, which aims at offering an ultimate explanation of all things and of all truths—as far as the human mind can offer such—by tracing all things and all truths to the One Divine Being Who is the First Cause and Principle of all.²

In contrast with this *Theistic* view of 'Explanation'—as a knowledge of things *through their causes*, terminating

¹ Cf. Joseph, *Introduction to Logic*, pp. 475 sqq.

² Each of the special sciences has its own 'proper' principles. Many of these, as in the physical sciences, for example, are only inductively established laws, of which, therefore, we have only physical certitude. Others are necessary principles, as in pure metaphysics, mathematics and logic. Of *logical* principles a recent very competent writer says that 'every explanation must be consistent with them, but they will not themselves explain anything' (Joseph, *op. cit.*, p. 466). It seems to me rather that they are an ultimate cause of all our intellectual assents in so far as these *are* intellectual. No doubt, *psychological causes* are rightly distinguished from *logical reasons*, but in the case of ultimate, self-evident principles they would appear to coincide (cf. Maher, *Psychology*, p. 331, n. 13). 'We may point to facts,' Mr. Joseph continues (*ibid.*, p. 1), 'from which it follows that we must believe a proposition; but we do not thereby explain the proposition. It is the thing believed, and not our believing, which must be shown to follow, if we are to say that we are finding an explanation.' But 'the thing believed' is the proposition. And unless the proposition itself were seen by us to follow from our previous interpretations of experience neither would our belief in it follow from these. Similarly we give our assent to the *existential* propositions embodying the facts because we have the testimony of our senses that the facts *are* so. The next question is: *why* are they so? Or, to apply the same question to one great assent underlying all Inductive Inference: we believe that physical agencies are uniform in their activities because *they are* uniform, but *why are they* uniform? Philosophers differ in their answers to this ultimate question because they differ in their views as to the nature of Reality as a whole. The Sufficient Reason which satisfies all theists, why this and all facts are so—the one which they consider the *only* true reason—is that the Will of God has made them so. Whence can a 'notion of what a rational universe should be,' or 'a belief that the universe is rational' be derived, if it be 'not derived from experience'? (*ibid.* p. 469)—i.e., from experience as revealed not merely to the senses but to intellect? For all facts, including the existence of the First Fact, which is the First Cause of all other facts, experience, in this full sense, is our ultimate court of appeal.

ultimately in the recognition of a Supreme First Cause, the Deity, on Whom the universe of sense depends—we have the *Hegelian-Idealistic* view of Explanation as the knowledge of things *through their relations to other things*, terminating in the conviction that all are parts of one systematic, self-existent, self-explaining whole.¹

Writers of this school *identify* 'reality' with 'thought,' and endeavour to show that 'things' are 'sets of unalterable relations' established or constituted by 'mind.' The effect of this attitude on their logic is to extend the necessary and universal relations which we institute between our abstract concepts, to what we call the concrete world of external phenomena: in other words, to assume or postulate that External Nature is governed by the same necessary laws as govern our necessary judgments. To suppose thus that everything which actually *exists* or *happens* does so by the same necessity by which whatever happens has a cause, by which a thing is what it is, by which two and two are four, etc., is to confound the actual with the possible, the existent with the merely thinkable, the physical and moral necessity which governs those things and occurrences that are dependent on the Divine Will and on human free-will with the logical and metaphysical necessity which characterizes the relations established by our thought between abstract, possible essences. Hence these authors set up the strict Aristotelian concept of Science—the knowledge by which we know that a thing 'cannot be otherwise than it is'—as the ideal of *all* science, even of physical and moral phenomena; whereas it really applies only to those sciences which yield metaphysically necessary judgments about abstract objects of thought considered by the mind in a 'possible' state, i.e., as apart from actual existence and free from all change. Professor Welton, for example, lays down as a 'postulate of knowledge' in regard to the actual world, that we must assume its

every detail even the smallest as so determined by conditions that, under the circumstances, it *could not possibly be other than*

¹ Welton, *Logic*, ii., ch. vii., § 159; cf. Joyce, *Principles of Logic*, pp. 248-251, 338.

it is. That the given is *necessary* is an assumption without which it would be helpless to attempt to explain it, for all explanation resolves itself into ascertaining the *exact conditions* by which the given is determined. *When the conditions of every detail of a phenomenon are so fully and exactly known that not only a phenomenon of this general character, but just this very phenomenon, with exactly these details, and each in exactly this amount, must follow from those conditions and from those only, then that phenomenon is fully explained.* Doubtless in the vast majority of cases such thoroughness . . . is not attained . . . But the ideal of explanation is the same: it is thorough in so far as the given can be shown *to be the necessary consequence of certain definite and necessary conditions.*¹

The 'necessity' referred to here is that which characterizes science in the strict Aristotelian sense, whereby we are said to know a thing *scientifically* when we know that it cannot possibly be 'other than it is.' To demand such 'necessity' as a hall-mark of all scientific explanation is tantamount to a declaration that we can have no scientific knowledge of the concrete, actual, existing world at all, but only of the abstract, possible objects of thought conceived by our own intellects.

Father Joyce, in his *Principles of Logic*,² contrasts this [Idealistic] account of Explanation as that of the *part* by the *whole* of an *organism*, with the scholastic [Theistic] account as that of *effect* by *cause* in an *organization*. Of course the Idealist conception of the Universe as one in *nature* or *being* (*Monism, Pantheism*), and not merely one in *order* (a 'Cosmos' distinct from the Infinite Being who created it; *Dualism, Theism*), and of individual 'things' and 'events' as not *really distinct* from one another but as made up of groups of 'relations' conceived by that one Mind, which is the world—such a conception is entirely erroneous.³ But its evil effect on the doctrines of 'Explanation,' 'Demonstration,' and 'Science' is to unduly narrow these concepts by setting up for them too exacting and even

¹ *Manual of Logic*, vol. ii., pp. 188-9 (italics mine).

² Pp. 338-9.

³ A trenchant and destructive analysis of these Neo-Hegelian views will be found in Professor Veitch's *Knowing and Being* (Blackwood, 1889).

impossible ideals, rather than, as Father Joyce states, to make them purely provisional and involve them in an endless regress. Even in the scholastic view of Explanation there is a true sense in Mr. Bosanquet's remark that 'nothing can be known rightly, without knowing all else rightly';¹ for all research into the ultimate reason of logical first principles and other axiomatic *truths* leads us ultimately to the Divine Intellect; and all research into the ultimate causes of *existing things* leads us ultimately to the Divine Will; and we take it that Divine Wisdom has so planned the created cosmos and inter-related its parts that the whole might be understood in the part, and the part in the whole, if these were known 'rightly,' i.e., *comprehensively*; but to know them thus would be to see into the *Fiat* of the Divine Will, which is proper to God alone: the only 'must,' the only 'necessity' there can be in *actual* things and events, past, present, future, is that they *must* be as God freely wills them to be.

Since the immediate causes of any individual phenomenon depend on remote ones, and these on remoter ones still; and since in this way no individual phenomenon in Nature is isolated, but each is bound up with all others; a *full and complete* knowledge of any one would necessitate a like knowledge of all Nature. If, therefore, the latter were regarded, according to the Monistic view, as a closed system subject to absolute logical necessity or determinism, and if we were certain of the truth of that view—as we are of its falsity—we could entertain hopes of a complete and perfect knowledge of all reality, and our knowledge of physical causation would be an *absolutely certain* knowledge of an *absolutely necessary* relation between phenomena. Few, however, have the hardihood to put forward such a claim. 'As the universe is a systematic whole,' writes Professor Welton, '[the totality of the conditions of any concrete phenomenon] is, in its primary meaning, that whole system. In this sense an ultimate analysis is obviously impossible. . . .'²

¹ *Logic*, p. 393, *apud* Joyce, *ibid*.

² *Logic*, ii., p. 119.

If, however, the whole physical universe and all its activities be regarded as contingent and dependent on the free, creating and conserving influence of a Supreme, Self-existent, Necessary Being, distinct from this universe, then obviously our certitude about these activities and their laws cannot be *necessary, absolute, metaphysical*, but only *contingent, conditional, physical*.

It is worth while to contrast these two views—the Theistic and the Monistic—as to the nature and origin of the ‘necessity,’ the ‘*must*,’ which we attach to the general physical truths or laws that we reach by Induction.

There is a general inclination amongst modern philosophers not to recognize as a law any general formula or statement to which we can conceive an exception. We should, they think, so formulate our laws, by finding out accurately and expressing hypothetically all the conditions for their truth, that they may admit of no exception as stated. But when we pass from the abstract world of Mathematics and from the First Principles of Thought and Being in Logic and in Metaphysics, where the mind abstracts from the concrete reality and marks out clearly for itself the grounds for its judgments;¹ when we come to complex and concrete reality as revealed in the physical world through sensation and try to grasp the laws according to which phenomena take place; it is not so easy to apprehend *all* the causes and conditions of their appearance and so to embody these in our formulas that the latter will be true *by an absolute necessity of thought*.² Of course if such care be taken, our judgments in all departments of human knowledge will be of the same inviolable necessity, but they will be *all abstract and hypothetical*. If we make provision for all possible conditions, including the Divine Will and also human free-will for moral and physical facts, then our universal judgments in these departments will be as necessarily true as our metaphysical judgments. The propositions: ‘*If the natural causes of the planetary movements*

¹ Cf. Welton, *Logic*, ii., p. 202; Mellone, *Introductory Text-book of Logic*, pp. 265-270.

² Welton, *ibid.*, p. 205.

continue to exist and to act as heretofore, uninterfered with by a higher Power, the sun will rise to-morrow,' and 'If the inhabitants of the town A are exactly of the same mind and character as those of the town B, they will make an equally gallant defence when attacked—are as necessarily true as 'If a triangle be inscribed in a semicircle it will be right-angled.' All three are alike embodiments of the Principle of Identity in this way: 'If a given cause or reason be sufficient to produce or account for a given fact or truth, it will produce or account for it absolutely continually, universally.' And in so far as they embody that principle they share in its absolute necessity.

But, then, they are only *hypothetical*, and the 'If' in the first two judgments involves more than it is given to man to fathom in regard to any future cases of them; for they deal, not with *abstract, possible* objects of thought, but with *concrete, actual* things and events. Our assurance about the categorical proportion that 'the sun will rise to-morrow' is not absolute or necessary, but contingent on our certitude that the causes of the planetary motions will continue to exist and to act unimpeded as in the past; and since all that is dependent on the free-will of the Creator, our certitude about it cannot be absolute.¹ In the second case, similarly, our ignorance as to any future fulfilment of the antecedent is increased by the intervention of the free-will of man. Hence it is that our knowledge of the continued occurrence or recurrence of *concrete, existing* phenomena, whether physical or moral, is hypothetical and contingent; for the permanence of the grounds on which they are based is hidden from us. I am not *compelled*, therefore, to assent to the categorical proposition that 'the sun will rise to-morrow.' To have *cogent* evidence either for or against it would imply on my part a *certain* knowledge of the Divine Will. From which it follows that man can never analyse the conditions or antecedents of a concrete, actual fact or phenomenon sufficiently to be compelled by the evidence to pronounce *categorically* that it *will recur*.

¹ Cf. Joyce, *Logic*, p. 237.

Truths for which we have necessary or cogent evidence—‘necessary’ or ‘metaphysical’ truths—are all *abstract*: they formulate relations between aspects of reality *apart from their existence or happening*.¹ Even when categorical in expression, as, e.g., ‘Triangles inscribed in semicircles are right-angled,’ they are *conditional in thought* as regards actuality of their antecedents. The logical necessity of these relations between subject and predicate is the necessity by which any abstract of object thought is identical with itself, with all that the mind apprehends in it. It is a necessity that pertains to the abstract essences of things. So long, therefore, as we deal with purely abstract judgments, such as those of mathematics, we can analyse the grounds for the abstract relations we establish, and can see these to be cogent. Such truths are called ‘necessary,’ because they express hypothetically necessary relations between abstract objects of thought. But when we deal with generalizations about concrete, existing things, beyond actual sense-experience, our analysis must always leave an unknown and uncertain residue, that, namely, which is the ground for the persistence—through the changing conditions of time and space—of the elements about which we are thinking. For truths, therefore, which imply the actual existence, beyond experience, of the elements of reality to which they refer, the ground or evidence can never be cogent, can never *necessitate* our assent. These are called, and rightly called, ‘contingent’ truths, because they make such mental assertions about things as will hold good only *if those things persist* in the concrete existence and activity with which we know them to have been endowed within our experience.

Of course if we express this assumption about their persistence in formulating ‘a general judgment concerning natural phenomena’²—that is, a judgment affirming their

¹ They are ‘altogether independent of any *physical process*. In some cases we see that certain concepts, statically considered, stand in a relation of identity (or difference) under pain of a contradiction in terms. . . . In other cases a causal relation is involved in the very nature of the abstract concept, apart from any dynamic efficiency.’—Joyce, *op. cit.*, pp. 238-9.

² Welton, *ibid.*, p. 205.

universal repetition throughout all time and space whenever and wherever *all the conditions of our hypothesis are verified*—we are, *eo ipso*, making our law as abstract, hypothetical, and necessary as any law of mathematics; and we can say of it when thus formulated 'that if it is once true, it is always true, and that so far as it is true it is necessary in that system of reality'¹: for all conceivable reality is subject to the Laws of Thought, and therefore to the Principle of Identity.

In this sense—and it may be well to call attention to it here—*every* judgment, even the particular, elementary interpretation of a sense-experience, such as 'It rains,' is *necessarily* and *universally* true: in the sense that if true at all it is always and everywhere true. If it rained at a particular time and place it is true throughout all time and space that it did rain then and there. The Laws of Thought are thus involved in all intellectual judgments, and it is just because they are that all truth—all true judgments—can be described in a real, admissible and intelligible sense as 'necessary.' This necessity is purely logical, i.e., it belongs to the mental act of judgment, and virtually amounts to this, that if the judgment is true it cannot be otherwise than true.

Such necessity supposes and is dependent on a mental analysis and comparison of certain elements or aspects of *reality*. It is not, therefore, a *psychological* necessity, for the mind may abstain altogether from analysing the elements of reality in question or pronouncing any judgment upon them. There is no necessity about the actual occurrence or existence of such a mental process: it need never have taken place. But granting that the process of analysis has taken place, it will lay bare the grounds for the judgment formulated. If this be about abstract objects of thought the objective grounds will be, or may be, cogent; if it be an attempt to affirm a general law about the actual happening of phenomena, the grounds for a categorical statement will not be cogent, for, to use the words of Green,

¹ Ibid.

'any proposition about a natural phenomenon is true of it *only under conditions of which we do not know all*, while a proposition about a geometrical figure . . . is true of it under conditions which we completely know'¹

The general propositions in which natural or physical laws are thus formulated *do not usually express*, but rather abstract from, the one all-important condition on which their absolute truth depends—the positive Will of the Creator; and hence we speak of their necessity and universality—or their necessary and universal truth, which we call 'physical'—as being not 'absolute' but 'hypothetical,' 'contingent,' i.e. dependent on the Free Will of the Creator.² To the ordinary formulas, therefore, which express the 'laws' of 'Physical Nature' we can conceive exceptions. The Author of Nature can derogate from them, i.e., He can so alter or interfere with the conditions of the existence and activity of created agencies that our formula, which did not count on such interference, may be in a particular case inapplicable. If we formulated our law so as to include and take account of such interference, the law thus hypothetically formulated could not be disturbed by such intervention. This is why logical, metaphysical and mathematical laws or truths are unchangeable: because they deal with hypothetical relations which obtain, by a necessity of thought, between abstract objects that are considered apart from all actual existence of the concrete things in which they are realized.

The general truths of physical science, on the other hand, and of the sciences which deal with phenomena dependent on the free activity of man, are not *inviolable* in their necessity nor absolutely all-embracing in their universality. They are, nevertheless, truths to which we can give a *certain*, i.e., a steady, firm assent, because we know that the Divine interference with natural agencies, being controlled by Divine *Wisdom*, will not be arbitrary or capricious; and that although men are free, and thus masters of their own

¹ *Phil. Works*, vol. ii., pp. 249-50, *apud* Welton, loc. cit. (italics mine).

² Cf. Joyce, *Logic*, p. 237.

acts, they nevertheless act with such a degree of uniformity as to give solid grounds for *morally universal* and *morally certain* generalizations about the things that are dependent on their activity.

Modern logicians may deprecate the introduction into a treatise on Logic¹ of such metaphysical theses as that God has created and conserves and governs the universe and concurs with its activities, and that man is endowed with free-will, for the purpose of explaining the nature and grounds of physical and moral certitude. But the fact is that these matters cannot be satisfactorily explained, either in Logic or outside it, without adopting some attitude or other as to the ultimate nature, origin and mode of existence of this visible universe which furnishes the human mind with all its data for knowledge. Metaphysical assumptions of some kind are inevitable in Logic, even although it is in Metaphysics and not in Logic that they should be justified. If John Stuart Mill introduces into his Logic, as he does, the assumption of the Empiricist or Phenomenist Philosophy, that all Reality is ultimately analysable into spontaneously associated *sensations* of the conscious mind, and if Professors Bosanquet and Welton build their Logical doctrine on the Idealist assumption of Hegel and Green—the assumption which *identifies Reality with Thought* by declaring the former to be *constituted* by 'thought-relations,'—scholastics need not apologize for rejecting both the one and the other assumption as unsatisfactory and erroneous: for attributing a larger rôle to intellect than the Empiricists and a larger rôle to sense than the Idealists: for replacing the Agnosticism of the former and the Pantheism or Monism of the latter by the Philosophy of Christian Theism which teaches that the world was created by an All-wise Deity and is conserved and governed by His Power and Providence.

The hypothetical necessity of Physical Laws receives a rational explanation in the philosophy of Theism which recognizes the universe as a contingent reality, freely created,

¹ Cf. Joyce, *Logic*, pp. 237-8; Rickaby, *First Principles*, pp. 89, 93, 102.
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conserved and governed by the Power and Wisdom of a Necessary Being. The absolute, logical necessity claimed for Physical Laws by the philosophy of Monistic Idealism, besides running counter to common sense and everyday experience, remains enshrouded in the same mist of mystery as the *Fatum Ineluctabile* of the Stoics.¹ The world of sense-experience furnishes adequate grounds for proving the existence of a Necessary Intelligence and Will distinct from itself. The Monism of Hegel and his followers interprets this same world as the purely intellectual manifestation of a Necessary, self-existent Mind or Idea. In its exclusive attachment to the conceptually *abstract, universal* and *necessary* relations established by our human intellects between the objects of our thought-processes, Monism loses sight of the other great aspect of reality—its phenomenal aspect, reality as revealed to our senses. But in the light of sense-experience we are forced to believe that what actually exists is not abstract but concrete, not universal but individual, not unique but manifold. Of these things or realities our intellects can gain true though inadequate knowledge by the system of *universal* thought-relations which it establishes between *abstract aspects* of these things, and whereby it interprets the latter. No doubt, in formulating these relations our intellects are guided by certain absolutely immutable and necessary principles called Laws of Thought: we cannot *think* reality except according to these laws. But these laws themselves—the Principles of Identity, Contradiction, etc.—called ‘*formal*’ because they are standards to which all valid thought must conform—

¹ This applies equally to the ‘mechanical’ necessity ascribed by Empiricists to the processes and laws of Nature. It is no *ultimate* explanation of this necessity to say that it is ‘mechanical.’ If all Nature is merely one vast machine or mechanism, who made it? The necessity we ascribe to the course of *actual* Nature in time and space is not the necessity we ascribe to abstract judgments about possible essences: it is not purely intellectual. The only immediate source it can have is our experience of the order, regularity, uniformity of all Nature, compelling us to interpret the latter as a *Cosmos*, as the work of an *Omnipotent Will* directed by *Supreme Wisdom*. The only necessity for which we can rationally account in actual Nature is that by which it pursues the course marked out for it by the Divine *fiat*. To say as a *last word* about the course of Nature that it is ‘mechanical,’ is scarcely any better than to ascribe it to mere chance, or to pronounce it an insoluble enigma.

are not mere innate, subjective, empty intellectual grooves, themselves devoid of *material content*, and with which Thought clothes or *invests* all its material: they too are *material* and have content because they too are formed by the intellect operating on the data of sense-experience. It is only the intellectual faculty of acquiring them that is innate and prior to all individual experience.

The abstract relations grasped by intellectual thought continue to grow in complexity under the reasoning power of the mind, and the more complex of them are *explained* by referring them to the less complex from which they were deduced: the less complex are a *causa cognoscendi* as regards the more complex.

But we must not forget that this is all in the order of *abstract thought*; nor imagine that *concrete reality* is also a system in which the simpler element is the *causa essendi* of the more complex. No; to conceive the Real World as nothing else than a system of logically-reasoned, abstract relations, regarded or thought of as objective, is either to ignore the evidence of our senses altogether and regard concrete sense-phenomena as *unreal*, or else to *impose upon* the Physical World revealed in the data of sense-experience, as the only laws that govern it, certain relations that are considered as a subjective product of pure thought independent of all experience, and which are on that account regarded as of absolute necessity—that is, whose violation would be unthinkable. This is simply to ignore the concrete for the abstract, and to reduce Reality to a *subjective creation of the mind*. It gives a fictitious sort of objectivity to that 'mental construction' which it calls 'the world' or 'Reality,' and is calculated to convey an erroneous impression about the 'necessity' of the laws that govern the Physical Universe. To conceive the latter as a closed system of activities every fact or phenomenon in which will be 'explained' by establishing *between it and the whole* certain relations of an absolutely immutable character, and to regard nothing as 'scientifically known' or 'explained' except in so far as it can be shown to be subject to such absolutely necessary relations, is to

impose gratuitously a metaphysical or absolute necessity on the activities of Physical Nature, to accept a one-sided, abstract, unreal conception of the universe, to arbitrarily narrow 'scientific' knowledge to the domain of *pure abstraction*, and to regard the totality of *things in the concrete* as *scientifically unknowable*.

No doubt if we had an ideally perfect scientific knowledge of any phenomenon or fact we should know that 'it could not possibly be other than it is.'¹ But no human mind ever has known or ever can know any *concrete fact or phenomenon* in that way. It can know thus only the *abstract relations* which *itself discerns* in phenomena. It can know too that the things from which it abstracted the *data* for these relations exist in conformity with these relations, *granted that as a fact they exist*: but that such things *must* exist by any necessity arising from *thinking* them in the abstract is utterly unwarranted and untrue. The reality of the phenomena revealed to us in sense-experience as constituting the Physical Universe does not contain or show forth any *absolute* necessity for its existence as a concrete system; though it gives rise to a *hypothetical* necessity *in the relations by which we conceive it in the abstract*.

This necessity which characterizes these abstract thought-relations or judgments that make up our scientific knowledge is not imposed upon objects by our minds. The intellect derives from sense-experience by the process of abstraction the (abstract) elements which it compares. On comparing these elements with one another (in judgment and reasoning) the mind does not *impose* any subjective relations or categories (with a number of which many modern philosophers, following Kant, suppose it to be equipped) upon the elements it compares, but it *sees* relations *arise* or exist between those elements: relations endowed with varying degrees of necessity, according to the degree of abstractness in which the elements are conceived, and all founded upon the nature of the elements

¹ Aristotle, *Anal. Post.*, i., 2; Welton, *Logic*, ii., p. 188; cf. *supra*, pp. 137-8.

themselves. From the fact that those elements can be apprehended by the intellect in the abstract—free from their conditions of concrete existence in time and space as phenomena of sense-experience—the relations between them, logical, mathematical and metaphysical, are likewise apprehended as fixed, static, unchangeable. But while we can understand that those necessary and universal relations apply to Reality *as thought of in the abstract* by the intellect, that is, to the elements abstracted from sense-experience—we must also remember that the intellect can discern, between those same elements *as given in sense-experience*, other relations—not logical nor metaphysical nor mathematical, but *physical*—relations that are not necessary in the sense that any modification of them would be unthinkable, but which are stable, nevertheless, and permanent, in the hypothesis and in the measure that certain influences, to which their concrete existence in time and space is subject, will not interfere with these relations.

It is needless to dwell any longer here on the erroneous conceptualism of Hegelian idealists regarding the relations between Thought and Reality, between Abstract and Concrete, between the object of the Intellect and the object of Sense. Nor is it necessary to do more than merely indicate that the only satisfactory way of grasping and reconciling the terms of those relations is to be found in the Scholastic doctrine of *Moderate Realism*: the object of the Intellect, while it is apprehended formally as abstract and universal *only* by the Intellect, is nevertheless really and fundamentally present and inherent in the concrete object of Sense: '*Universale est formaliter in mente et fundamentaliter in re*'; 'The Universal exists *formally as such* only in the intellect but it *has a foundation in the thing* (of sense-experience).'¹

P. COFFEY.

¹ Cf. Joyce, *Principles of Logic*, pp. 132-136.

DISESTABLISHMENT

SPEAKING in the House of Commons in 1851, on Lord John Russell's ridiculous Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, John Bright said :—

This Irish Church is an institution, if I understand it rightly, placed in Ireland for the purpose of converting the Roman Catholics of that country ; for the purpose of being the bond of union between Great Britain and Ireland. Observe, now, what this Church has had at its disposal. It has had the whole power and favour of the Crown, and the whole power and favour of Parliament. It has had all the laws Parliament could make to help it, and it has had the whole administration of these laws in its own hands. It has had the army and the police at its disposal. It has collected rates from all the Catholics of Ireland, and it has carried on a war with the peasantry for tithes to that extent that it has been acknowledged by Lord Stanley, the leader of gentlemen opposite, that to gain £12,000 value of tithes the Government of this country, aiding the Irish Church, had to spend £28,000 in military and police. It has had all the patronage of Ireland at its disposal ; it has had all the dignitaries of State. It has been, in short, a Church of ascendancy and of domination in Ireland. What is more, it has had an amount of property at its disposal equal to at least a principal sum of £20,000,000, the annual income of which has been received by its bishops and its ministers. This Church has been allied with the civil power ; and there has not been an act of oppression which the civil power has committed in Ireland which has not been committed either in obedience to that Church, or with its most cordial and constant assent. Nay, more, that Church has denounced every statesman who ever made an effort to give anything like freedom to the Roman Catholic population of Ireland. The noble lord at the head of the Government has himself been denounced within my recollection by those in favour of the Church of Ireland, because he was suspected of being friendly to the rights and liberties of our Catholic fellow-subjects. And, after all, the Irish Catholics have not been exterminated, and their religion has not been suppressed.

Every impartial person will admit that so far as it goes this is a tolerably accurate description of the English State Church in Ireland. Bright was its enemy from the moment he entered public life to the day of its disestablishment. So far back as 1839—the year after the passing of the Tithe Commutation Act—he said at Rochdale:—

In unfortunate Ireland there is a Church established by law, countenanced by the Government, and supported by an army of some twenty-five thousand men, wringing its maintenance from an almost starving population, seven-eighths of whom entirely disagree with it in principle and in doctrine.

The Tithe Commutation Act of 1838, as I have already said in this review, gave the Church a new lease of life by transferring the payment of Tithes from the peasants to the landlords; the landlords, of course, taking care ultimately to make the tenants repay the Tithes to them in the shape of rent.

In 1730 Bishop Boulter wrote:—

The number of Papists in this kingdom is so great that it is of the utmost consequence to the Protestant interest here to bring them over to the Church of Ireland. . . . But the ignorance and obstinacy of adult Papists is such that there is not much hope of converting them.

‘The ignorance and obstinacy’ of the Papists remained unconquered even up to 1869, despite the wealth lavished on the Church by the State in order to forward its missionary labours. With reference to the missionary labours of the Church, Mr. Gladstone gave the following figures to the House of Commons:—

In 1672	the Protestants	were to the Catholics	as 45 to 120
„ 1730	„	„	60 „ 120
„ 1784	„	„	60 „ 120
„ 1801	„	„	40 „ 120
„ 1834	„	„	30 „ 120
„ 1861 ¹	„	„	30 „ 120

¹ After a terrible famine had swept the land, decimating the unfortunate and poverty-stricken Papist peasantry, but leaving practically untouched the favoured and prosperous Establishment, the proportion of Protestants to Catholics continued substantially the same as in 1834.

Nevertheless, in 1861, the English State Church in Ireland seemed to be a firmly established institution ; and I suppose no one dreamt less of its *disestablishment* than Mr. Gladstone himself. English statesmen regarded the Church as a bulwark of the Constitution, and every attempt to tamper with it in any way was discouraged.

In 1843 Mr. Ward, an English Member, moved the adoption of an Address to the Crown, declaring ' that the laws which regulate the present distribution of Church property in Ireland are not conformable to reason, or to the practice of any Christian country ' ; and praying for such a settlement ' as will remove all grounds of complaint, and give satisfaction to the Irish people.' Mr. Ward suggested that the Revenue of the Establishment should be cut down, and the residue divided among the principal religious denominations in the country, in accordance with population. Thus : to the Establishment he would allow £70,000 a year ; to the Presbyterians and Wesleyans, £70,000 a year ; to the Catholics, £412,000 a year.

The Government strongly opposed this resolution. Lord Elliot, the English Secretary in Ireland of the day, said that the compact entered into at the Union guaranteeing the maintenance of the Establishment should be kept. He said that he could see no difference between the existence of a ' Protestant Establishment and of a Protestant Sovereign ' ; and that as long as the latter ' must profess one of two creeds ' the ' two religious persuasions could not be placed on a footing of perfect equality.' This was taking high ground, and a great many people thought that Lord Elliot's position was quite logical. But his argument came really to this : because England, a Protestant state, was bound by law to have a Protestant Sovereign, Ireland, a Catholic nation, was bound to support an English Protestant Church. Lord Lytton once said that the ' Irish Church was the greatest Irish bull in the world ' ; albeit it was not an Irish bull, but an English bull. Nothing, perhaps, can give a better idea of the apparently invulnerable position of the Establishment than the fact that Ward's

motion was counted out. The English House of Commons did not think the subject worth discussing.

In 1844 Ward returned to the charge, moving for a Committee of the House to enquire into 'the present state of the temporalities of the Church in Ireland.' The Government opposed this motion strenuously. Lord Elliot said 'to alienate any portion of the revenues of the Church, and to apply it to other than Church purposes, would be unjust and inexpedient.' Sir James Graham said:—

For my part, I can only repeat that the attempt—I will not say to subvert the Church, for that might be disallowed—but to take a large portion of its revenues either for Roman Catholic endowments, or for secular purposes, is forbidden by justice, forbidden by the compact entered into by the united Parliament, and forbidden by the sanction of the highest moral obligations.

Sir Robert Peel made a characteristic speech. He said:—

I consider it infinitely safer to stand on the compact [entered into at the Union] unless the overwhelming necessity of public policy compels me to change my opinion; and I am convinced that there is no such overwhelming necessity [at present].

Ward's motion was defeated by 274 votes to 179.

In 1846 Mr. O'Brien, Member for Northamptonshire, asked Sir James Graham and Lord John Russell what was their intention with respect to the Establishment. Sir James Graham said that he was 'opposed to any policy destructive' of the Church; and Lord John Russell said that he 'had never held the opinion that the Irish Church ought to be destroyed.' In 1847 Lord John Russell told William Smith O'Brien that the Government had no intention of dealing with the Church. In 1849 the Government refused to appoint a Committee to enquire into the state of the Establishment, and in February, 1853, Lord John Russell again declared that it was not the intention of the Government to deal with the subject.

In 1854 Mr. Sargent Shee took a practical step for the 'reform' of the Church. He introduced a Bill to suspend

395 benefices and to reduce the income to the Bishops by £169,000 a year, which sum he proposed to divide between the Catholic and Presbyterian Churches. The Bill was rejected 'as wholly uncalled for' by 117 to 31 votes. Between 1854 and 1865 the question more or less hung fire. On March 28, 1865, a Welsh Member, Mr. Dillywyn moved :—

That in the opinion of this House the present position of the Irish Church Establishment is unsatisfactory, and calls for the early attention of Her Majesty's Government.

The motion was opposed by the Government. Sir George Grey, the Home Secretary, said that no 'practical grievance existed,' and that 'in attempting to redress the theoretical grievance, a great shock would be given to our laws and institutions.' Mark, this speech was made by a Liberal Home Secretary, in March, 1865. The disestablishment of the English State Church, he declared, would give such a shock to 'our laws and institutions that the subject was not to be entertained. I have no hesitation,' he added, 'on the part of the Government, in opposing the motion.'

In September, 1865, the Fenian organ, the *Irish People*, was seized; and in November some of the Fenian leaders were placed upon their trial for treason-felony. Then the people of England were amazed and alarmed to learn that a great revolutionary organization, formed to overthrow English rule in Ireland, had been steadily at work while they were consoling themselves with the belief that Ireland was in a state of tranquil loyalty. In February, 1866, the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended. In the same year Sir John Gray moved: 'That the position of the Established Church in Ireland is a just cause of dissatisfaction, and urgently demands the consideration of Parliament.' The Government of Lord John Russell opposed the motion; 'not' said the 'Irish' Secretary, Mr. Chichester Fortescue, 'on grounds of abstract justice,' but 'upon considerations of common sense, possibility, time, and circumstance.'

The 'Chapel Bell' had not yet been rung. The debate on Sir John Gray's motion was adjourned, but never resumed.

In May, 1867, Sir John Gray moved :—

That this House will, on Wednesday, 29th day of this instant May, resolve itself into a Committee to consider the temporalities and privileges of the Established Church in Ireland.

This extremely moderate motion was defeated by 195 to 183 votes. Mr. Gladstone took no part in the division. He was of opinion that the time for 'Parliamentary action' had not yet arrived. In May a Bill continuing the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act was read a second time in the House of Commons without opposition. Meanwhile an attempt at insurrection had been made in various parts of Ireland, and a plot for seizing Chester Castle was discovered. In September two Fenian prisoners were rescued from a police van in Manchester and a policeman was killed ; and in December a gaol in London was blown up with a view of rescuing a Fenian prisoner.

In March, 1868, John Francis Maguire called for a Select Committee to consider the state of Ireland, and in a powerful speech gave a most alarming description of the condition of the country. The 'Chapel Bell' had been rung : then it was that Mr. Gladstone first took off his coat to deal with the subject. The 'Irish' Secretary, Lord Mayo, tried to minimize the importance of Fenianism, saying that it was an organization of American growth, and did not much affect Ireland. Mr. Gladstone replied in a memorable speech. He said :—

But, the noble earl [Lord Mayo] said that this was a matter of foreign importation, that it came from another land, that it was only the Irish in the United States of America who formed the hot-bed of Fenianism. In passing, I think it is but fair to say that, although there may be many things difficult for us to explain with respect to the rather free development of Fenian proceedings in the United States, yet I believe that intelligent Americans are rather in the habit of pluming themselves, just as the noble earl plumes himself on the fact that Fenianism is a plant of

foreign growth ; that although it has its development in America, it has its root in Ireland. This is not the point to which I would call the noble earl's attention ; what I would venture to indicate to him is this. To make his argument complete, he told us that the Irish in Australia and the Irish in Canada had no Fenian instincts or impulses. But if that be so, does it not immediately compel us to ask, what is the difference between Ireland and Australia ? or what is the difference between Ireland and Canada, which gives one character to the Irishman in Canada or in Australia, and another to the Irishman in Ireland ? Well, sir, there are these differences—and grave enough they appear to me to be—that neither in Canada nor in Australia does an Irishman labour under the slightest difficulty with regard to the fruits of his industry and labour, and in neither of them is he confronted by the spirit or by the remaining institution of a hostile ascendancy.

Next, in a famous sentence, he sounded the death-knell of the English Church Establishment in Ireland. He said :—

In order to the settlement of the question of the Irish Church, that Church, as a State Church, must cease to exist.

Having once taken off his coat, Mr. Gladstone lost no time in throwing himself vigorously into the work of Church Reform. On March 23, 1868, he gave notice of his three memorable resolutions :—

1. That in the opinion of this House it is necessary that the Established Church of Ireland should cease to exist as an Establishment, due regard being had of all personal interests and to all individual rights of property.

2. That, subject to the foregoing considerations, it is expedient to prevent the creation of new personal interests by the exercise of any public patronage, and to confine the operations of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners of Ireland to objects of immediate necessity, or involving individual rights, pending the final decision of Parliament.

3. That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty humbly to pray that, with a view to the purpose aforesaid, Her Majesty would be graciously pleased to place at the disposal of Parliament her interest in the temporalities of the Archbishoprics, Bishoprics, and other ecclesiastical dignities and benefices in Ireland, and in the custody thereof.

On April 30 Mr. Gladstone moved that a Committee of the whole House should be appointed to consider the Acts of Parliament relating to the Establishment. This motion was carried by a majority of 330 against 270 votes. The House then went into Committee, and on April 30 Mr. Gladstone's first resolution was carried by a majority of 330 against 265 votes. On May 7 the two remaining resolutions were carried without a division. On May 14 Mr. Gladstone obtained leave to bring in a Bill

to prevent, for a limited time, new appointments in the Church of Ireland, and to restrain, for the same period, in certain respects, the proceedings of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners.

On May 22 the Bill was read a second time, by 312 votes against 258 ; and on June 16 it was read a third time, without opposition. But on June 29 it was rejected in the Lords by 192 votes against 97. On July 31 Parliament was prorogued, and December 11 dissolved.

Gladstone went to the country with the cry of Disestablishment. He addressed a great many meetings in Lancashire. In all of them he put his Irish policy to the front ; in all of them he dwelt on the power of Fenianism, and upon the state of smothered revolt in Ireland. The Liberals won at the General Election, and Gladstone became Prime Minister. On March 1, 1869, he introduced 'the Church Bill.' The measure proposed

to disestablish and disendow the Protestant Episcopalian Church in Ireland, and to deprive the Presbyterian Church and the Catholic College of Maynooth of the grants hitherto enjoyed by them, due regard being had to vested interests

Of the £15,000,000 possessed by the Church (according to calculation), £10,000,000 was to be given to that institution and the remaining £5,000,000 to be applied to purposes of general or special utility in Ireland. The Act was to come into operation on January 1, 1871. The Bill was read a second time on March 23, by 368 against 250 votes ; and a third time on May 31, by 361 to 247 votes.

The position taken up by the wiser men in the Lords was that a strenuous opposition should not be offered to the Bill on the second reading ; but that the best terms possible should be obtained for the Church in Committee. The second reading, however, was opposed but carried by 179 votes against 146. The most important amendments carried in Committee were :—

(1) The increase of the sum to be given back to the Church from £10,000,000 to £14,000,000 ; and,

(2) The appropriation of the surplus to religious purposes—some of these purposes to be the maintenance of residences for the clergy of the Catholic and Presbyterian Churches.

This scheme was called at the time ‘ concurrent endowment.’ The ‘ concurrent endowment ’ was rejected by the Commons, but a compromise was finally arrived at in reference to the amount of money to be given back to the Church ; Mr. Gladstone finally agreeing to add £840,000 to the £10,000,000 originally fixed by him.¹

A collision between the two Houses was prevented in no small measure by Lord Cairns, Archbishop Tait, and Lord Granville. Lord Cairns clearly saw that disestablishment was inevitable ; and that perhaps as regarded disendowment the Church could not get better terms by the postponement of the question. The fact is not generally known that while the discussions were going on between the two Houses Mr. Gladstone was disposed to fling up the Bill, but was outvoted in his cabinet ; and Lord Granville, who led in the House of Lords, declined to obey Gladstone’s orders to withdraw the Bill at a critical moment. He moved the adjournment of the debate instead, and entered into negotiations with Lord Cairns and Archbishop Tait ; and so the Church Bill became law.

Mr. Gladstone’s pronouncements on the influence exercised by the Fenian movement in the disestablishment of

¹ I have heard it said that the revenues of the Church amounted to £16,000,000, and that the Church surplus was nearer to £6,000,000 than £5,000,000.

the Church, are historically remarkable. He said, in the House of Commons, on March 30, 1868 :—

It has only been since the termination of the American War and the appearance of Fenianism that the mind of this country has been greatly turned to the consideration of Irish affairs.

In April, 1868, he said in the House of Commons, in reply to Mr. Gathorne Hardy :—

The right hon. gentleman says, ‘ Why did you not deal with the Irish Church in 1866, when you asked for the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act ? ’ My answer is, for a perfectly plain and simple reason. In the first place, circumstances were not ripe then as they are now. Circumstances, I repeat, were not ripe, in so far as we did not then know so much as we know now with respect to the intensity of Fenianism.

What is more remarkable is the statement which Mr. Gladstone made at Dalkeith ten years after the passing of the Church Act. He said :—

What happened in the case of the Irish Church ? That down to the year 1865, and the dissolution of that year, the whole question of the Irish Church was dead ; nobody cared about it, nobody paid attention to it in England. Circumstances occurred which drew the attention of the people to the Irish Church. I said myself, in 1865, and I believed, that it was out of the range of practical politics. When it came to this, that a great gaol in the heart of the Metropolis was broken open under circumstances which drew the attention of the English people to the state of Ireland, and when in Manchester a policeman was murdered in the execution of his duty, at once the whole country became alive to Irish questions, and the question of the Irish Church revived. It came within the range of practical politics.

I may supplement the pronouncements of Mr. Gladstone by the following statements from Lord Dufferin and Lord Derby :—

LORD DUFFERIN.—I entirely agree with the noble earl [Granville], and with the late Lord Lieutenant of Ireland [Lord Kimberley], that the attention of this country and the conscience of England with respect to this question [the Church]

were much stimulated, if not altogether awakened, by the fact of Fenianism.

LORD DERBY.—A few desperate men, applauded by the whole body of the Irish people for their daring, showed England what Irish feeling really was, made plain to us the depth of a discontent whose existence we had scarcely suspected, and the rest followed of course.

No wonder that Isaac Butt should have said, in a letter addressed to Mr. Gladstone, that his declarations

impressed upon the Irish nation the conviction that the leaders of the Fenian attempt at revolt had done a service to Ireland which years of agitation and parliamentary action had failed to accomplish. They taught them clearly and distinctly that it was Fenianism which had given you power to carry your great measure of religious equality. It was Fenianism which gave you courage to propose it. If English policy towards Ireland were to be reversed, it was to Fenianism the result of that reversal was due.

R. BARRY O'BRIEN.

BASIS OF MONISM—EVOLUTION

THE doctrine of evolution has now become so popular that it is not without some misgivings one can venture to question its truth. If one were justified in gauging the popularity from the articles which frequently appear in popular magazines, from the cheap pamphlets which everywhere abound, from the stock on show in the book-shop windows, and from the contents of the railway bookstalls, it must surely be immense. Everyone nowadays, from the high-class specialist patiently pursuing his hobby to the coal-heaver enjoying his after-dinner pipe, is prepared to discuss nebular hypotheses, geological periods, missing links, and all the rest of it. So familiarized have we become with the doctrine that we are beginning to forget—indeed, many of us seem to have already forgotten—that it is or ever was only a theory, merely a working hypothesis; and we speak of evolution in the same off-hand way as we speak of the revolutions of the earth round the sun or the succession of day and night. It is evolution everywhere, all evolution, and nothing but evolution; everything is explained, the world is an open book, there remain no more problems to annoy little minds. And so humanity passes light-heartedly along, highly pleased with the world, and humming gaily to itself the sentiment in Will Waterproof's Monologue:—

Let raffs be rife in prose and rhyme,
 We lack not rhymes and reasons,
 As on this whirligig of Time
 We circle with the seasons.

It is no easy matter to free oneself from the prepossessions which must get hold of one from such general popularity enjoyed by a doctrine which in itself has undoubtedly many attractions. It is much easier and far more pleasant to be in the fashion. And yet, I think, a

fair-minded man may well have his doubts whether the fashion is right. If you take up a bundle of cheap literature on the subject, and read hastily through it, you will very probably be inclined to accept the teaching ; but if you study seriously the ablest and most sincere authors on the question, you cannot help arriving at the conclusion that evolution is far from being an established hypothesis. Writers of the school of Haeckel and Laing, who seem to be possessed of an overmastering desire to imitate Mark Tapley and 'come out strong,' will persuade you that any form of anti-Darwinism is as much out of place at the present day as the chemistry of Thales or the geocentric astronomy of Ptolemy : and there is undoubtedly a danger that your enthusiasm may get the better of your reason when you find men like Edward Clodd portraying the history of the universe as the unbroken record of the evolution of gas into genius, and others, like Victor Hugo, proclaiming themselves the tadpoles of Archangels. But if, after allowing your first fervour to cool down and the excitement to wear off, you look more closely into the matter and examine the whole case in detail, you will find that the proof principally relied upon for the continuity of evolution is the bold, fearless assertions of scientific men—masters, no doubt, many of them, in their several departments, but monomaniacs, apparently, when the general question of evolution is mooted.

Now it should be borne in mind that even the most conservative section of Christianity has nothing to fear from evolution. Catholics are often taunted with a declaration that the doctrine of evolution is a complete overthrow of dogmas which they have traditionally regarded as infallible ; that they are fighting for very life against evolution ; and that, consequently, they must reject all forms of the theory if they are still to consistently adhere to their own doctrines. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Catholics are free, and are prepared to accept any conclusion whatsoever which can be logically deduced from sound premises in any department of science. Nor are they in the remotest degree afraid of their faith being

shaken by the teaching of science on evolution or on anything else, starting as they do from this position: '*Etsi fides sit supra rationem, nulla tamen unquam inter fidem et rationem vera dissensio esse potest.*'

Whatever, therefore, can be proved by science can be accepted by the most orthodox Christian. But groundless suppositions and bald statements of imaginary facts cannot be reasonably taken either as convincing proof of evolution or as sufficient refutation of Christian dogmas. It is against pseudo-science of this kind that Catholics protest; and they enter their protest not for the sake of theology merely, but in the interest of science itself. On the other hand, when conclusions have been scientifically established they should be accepted by the theologian and substituted, if need be, for what has been heretofore scientifically inaccurate in his teaching: for theology is itself a science, and a science subject to development. No good, but only harm, can come from ultra-orthodox defenders of Christianity refusing to recast their doctrines and bring them into conformity with the true conclusions of progressive science, for unnecessary conservatism will injure religion just as immoderate liberalism will tell against science.

But the unprejudiced student of work defending the evolution doctrine, no matter what his religious views may be, must protest, in fairness to Christianity and Catholicism as well as in fairness to science itself, against the unwarrantable attitude of evolutionary writers in regard to religion, to evolution, and to science generally.

A very slight acquaintance with evolutionary literature is enough to satisfy one that many of those who are never weary of proclaiming their abiding impartiality to all parties, their honest sincerity in the cause of truth, and their philanthropic desire to enlighten their fellow-men, to relieve them of that dogmatism which is characteristic of Christianity and the intellectual tyranny which is the principal trait of Catholicism, are themselves the greatest intellectual despots of all. In the writings of one school at any rate, of this name, it is easily observable that the

writers are not very anxious about truth, and care very little whether the supposed facts which they parade as science be science or insanity, provided they get an opportunity of having a fling at that embodiment of everything that is malicious, the Church of Rome. It does not much tend to enlist a person's intellectual sympathies in the cause of a school, or to heighten one's opinion of its methods, when one finds its champions, instead of attending to their own pursuits, continually going out of their way to calumniate a Church which, to say the very least, has notably improved humanity, and which has produced not a few minds that can claim as large a share in bringing science up to the position it occupies at present as many of those who make it part of Catholic teaching that science and religion are essentially antagonistic. The antagonism only exists in the minds of infidel writers; and even from their own point of view there is really far less cause for antagonism than they generally suppose.

For though it has been dinned into our ears till we are almost deaf that the name of the greatest man that ever lived is Charles Darwin, and that all or nearly all the 'absolute revolutions in the conceptions of science,' which we so often hear of nowadays, are due to the author of *The Origin of Species*; still, when the case for evolution is calmly examined, it will be found that the writings of the last sixty years or so have not added very much to the store of our evolutionary knowledge.

It can scarcely be contended with any semblance of plausibility that evolution as a process of nature was discovered in the nineteenth century. Men must have been aware of evolution since they were able to observe anything. Growth and decay among human beings, among animals and plants, must have been recognized even by Palæolithic man as evolutionary processes; the burning of a stick and the sharpening of a stone weapon must have brought the same truth home to his mind. Evolution is, and has always been, going on everywhere around us, by chemical action and by mechanical means, by accident and by design: the boiling of the kettle, the burning of the

gas, the striking of a match ; the work of the factory, the mill, the quarry ; the labours of the farmer, the baker, the shoemaker ; thunderstorms, earthquakes, hail, rain, frost, snow, and so on ; all manifest modes of evolution. We did not require advanced scientists to tell us this ; nor is there any reason why the most orthodox theologian should be afraid to accept it. Yet you will find serious men of science flouting all this matter of commonplace knowledge in your face and challenging you to deny it, if you dare. But,

We think no more of deadly lurks therein,
Than in a clapper clapping in a garth
To scare the fowl from fruit.

For nobody wishes to deny it : we all accept it : we are all evolutionists.

But this is not what is commonly meant when we speak of evolution. In the modern acceptation of the term evolution indeed includes those transformations which are continually going on in inanimate nature, but it embraces a great deal more. In its most extreme form evolution implies the gradual growth and development of all things that are in the universe from some primordial matter, the origin of which is unknown, if it ever had a beginning. Short of this, there may be any number of evolutionary systems according as they are restricted to different spheres of nature.

In a broad, general way evolution may be conveniently divided into two kinds, theistic and atheistic. Deism, though enjoying a medium amount of popularity, especially in England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is long since dead as a theological system. As regards Theism we are all, even the most orthodox amongst us, perfectly free to adopt the view of evolution which, while recognizing the existence and universal Providence of God, maintains that everything up to, and as far as I am aware even including, the body of the human person, has been evolved from a primitive fire-mist. But the question we have to decide is whether the view is correct or not ; whether or not we have scientific facts to support the

hypothesis. We need not, however, discuss this phase of the problem separately, as we shall be able to judge of its merits from an examination of the atheistic position.

By atheism I understand not only the frank denial of the existence of God but also all forms of make-believe which deny implicitly the existence of a personal God distinct from the material universe. And it is interesting as well as instructive in more ways than one to observe how anxious infidel and really Godless writers are to retain the name of God ; and indeed to have a God of some kind whom they religiously adore, and bow down before, and speak of in the most reverential terms : whether He be the Unknown or the Unknowable, or the Universe, or Nature, or Humanity : all capitals, observe. But they are atheists all the same.

According to the atheistic teaching this boundless universe of ours is eternal and uncreated ; and all things which make up the innumerable varieties of the vast cosmos, not excepting what some of us refer to as the spiritual soul of man, have been evolved from some primitive form of matter which was perhaps a nebula, perhaps something else. But nebula is really a fine term, and atheism should not readily give it up. There is, therefore, no God and no need for a God : given eternal matter and motion, and possibly force, the world can get on well enough ; and must evolve in time, unlimited time, all the gigantic sun-systems that fill the vastness of the universe, not to speak of the puny inhabitants of this miniature planet, which is only a speck in the immensity of space.

But the world is not eternal, to begin with. Apart from the utter hopelessness of a theory which postulates an eternity of uncreated matter, the best scientific opinion of the present day is positively against any such supposition. I might indeed appeal to almost every branch of science against eternal matter, and to practically all the scientists of note from Newton to Huxley and Weismann, to Maxwell and Kelvin and Stewart ; but let one illustration suffice.

We hear a great deal nowadays about the Law of the Conservation of Energy, but seldom do we find any

reference to another law which exists side by side with it, the Law of the Dissipation of Energy. The sum of energy in the universe may be constant and destined to remain constant, though taking various forms, as heat, light, electricity, magnetism, radio-activity, chemical or mechanical change ; but it is no less certain that the available energy of the universe, that is, the energy available for doing work, is steadily decreasing, and that a time will surely come when the world will be brought to a stand-still. The tendency of all energy is to become heat energy, into which it is slowly but surely being converted, so that a point must be reached when there will be no form of energy in the universe but heat uniformly diffused. Consequently, there will be no means within the universe to transform the heat into any other form of energy, and complete physical exhaustion will be the result.

Now, as Lord Kelvin has well pointed out, this Dissipation of Energy proves that the world must have had a beginning as it must surely come to an end. For if the world was eternal, why has it not already, nay untold ages ago, reached this ultimate stage towards which it is gradually tending ? It certainly had time enough with an eternity at its disposal. Or, to use Professor Balfour Stewart's illustration :—

If we could view the universe as a candle not lit, then it is perhaps conceivable to regard it as having been always in existence ; but if we regard it rather as a candle that has been lit we become absolutely certain that it cannot have been burning from eternity and that a time will come when it will cease to burn.

Some scientists, and especially the astronomers, are seemingly enraptured with the view of the world which contemplates the mechanism of the universe as something like a big clock that after the lapse of ages runs down, gets wound up, and starts off again. But apart from the absolute gratuitousness of the hypothesis, it is perfectly manifest that neither a clock nor anything else can get wound up without a winder ; and when all the energy of the world has run down to heat energy, how is it going to be wound up unless by some power outside itself, for *Nemo*

dat quod non habet, which is expressed in the English proverb : ' Nothing can be got out of a sack but what is in it.'

Here, then, at the very outset atheistic evolution is met by a condition of things which makes it impossible. The advocates of the theory are quite conscious of the initial difficulty under which their system labours ; but they are not, many of them, honest enough to face it squarely. Some coolly ignore the difficulty of their position and persist in telling you that the world has gone on in revolving cycles of immense duration from all eternity, and that it shall continue for all eternity repeating the same stupendous revolutions,

The hollow orb of moving circumstance
Mov'd round by one fixed law.

Others have no trouble in finding an easy solution of this as of many similar difficulties,

the resources of the Unknowable being equal to all emergencies. Enjoying the hospitality of its ample territory the most violent contradictions and implacable inconsistencies can rest in tranquil repose. . . . There, at least, all objections are answered, all difficulties are solved, all doubts are assuaged by the one great axiom so well—if not wisely—expressed by Dr. Hodgson : ' Whatever you are TOTALLY ignorant of, assert to be the explanation of everything else.'¹

' Thus conscience does make cowards of us all.'

So much for the origin of the world. In approaching the question of the evolution of all things from some primitive starting-point, Professor Du Bois-Reymond, an evolutionist and an avowed materialist to boot, finds himself confronted with the following seven problems, which he calls ' Enigmas ' :—

- (1) The nature of Matter and of Force.
- (2) The origin of Motion.
- (3) The origin of Life.
- (4) The apparently designed order of Nature.
- (5) The origin of sensation and consciousness.
- (6) The origin of rational thought and speech.
- (7) Free-will.

¹ Maher, *Psychology*, p. 524.

The first, second, and fifth of these are, in the opinion of Du Bois-Reymond, 'transcendental,' or beyond possibility of solution. The others, in his judgment, have certainly not yet been solved, but *perhaps* may be solved some day. As to the last, he much doubts whether it should not also be classed as 'transcendental.'¹

It is a rather formidable array of problems for which we can find no solution, and perhaps may never find any. One cannot help wondering where the evolution, that continuous process we hear so much about, can find a place. When you eliminate these seven 'enigmas' from the universe, there is precious little left from which to deduce a *Law* of Continuity or Evolution. But it will undoubtedly be enlightening to hear Professor Ernest Haeckel, the 'Prophet of Jena,' disposing of these trivial difficulties of Du Bois-Reymond, whom Haeckel himself on the same page honours with the high-sounding title of 'the all-powerful secretary and dictator of the Berlin Academy of Sciences':—

In my opinion [he writes] the three transcendental problems (1, 2, and 5) are settled by our conception of substance; the three which he (Du Bois-Reymond) considers difficult, though soluble [*sic*] (3, 4, and 6), are decisively answered by our modern theory of evolution; the seventh and last, the freedom of the will, is not an object for critical scientific inquiry at all, for it is a pure dogma, based on an illusion, and has no real existence.²

Were Christian apologists compelled to substitute twaddle of this kind for argument, what a roar of ridicule would go up from scientific infidels! 'Oh, wad some Power the giftie gie us!'

Now, it does not require any very great knowledge of Physics to enable one to gather from the writings of such eminent physicists as Lord Kelvin, Sir William Crookes, Sir Oliver Lodge, Professors J. J. Thomson, Rutherford, etc., that we really know no more about the nature of

¹ Gerard, *The Old Riddle and the Newest Answer*, p. 32.

² *Ibid.*

Matter and Force than our great grandfathers did. The revelations of the Crookes' tube and the discovery of radio-activity have left us in a state of greater mystification about the ultimate nature of matter than we ever were before. The very absurdity of the theories propounded in Monsieur le Bon's two works, *The Evolution of Matter* and *The Evolution of Force*, strongly suggests to the reflecting mind that we are still far from anything like a satisfactory answer to the question: What is Matter?

The following passage will give a general notion of the present state of our knowledge on this question:—

For, although it is now pretty well known [writes Sir Oliver Lodge] that atoms of matter are not the indestructible and immutable things they were once thought (seeing that, though we do not know how to break them up, they are liable every now and then to break up and explode, and so resolve themselves into simpler forms), yet it can be granted that these simpler forms are likewise themselves atoms, in the same sense, and that if they break up they will break up likewise into atoms: or ultimately, it may be, into those corpuscles or electrons or electric charges, of which one plausible theory conjectures that the atoms of matter are really composed.¹

The extraordinary properties of the dark space in the Crookes' tube have so far baffled all attempts at explanation, and have only suggested hypotheses which, if established, would change our whole outlook on the physical world. Sir William Crookes himself conjectured that we have here matter in a 'fourth state,' neither solid, nor liquid, nor gaseous.

The solution of the problem presented by these extraordinary phenomena has been worked out chiefly by the Cambridge physicists under the leadership of Professor J. J. Thomson, and it bids fair to revolutionize our ideas on the whole subject of the constitution of matter.²

The origin of life is the citadel on which all the available forces of evolutionary science are now concentrated. After

¹ *Life and Matter*, p. 28.

² *The New Physics and Chemistry*, by W. A. Shenstone, F.R.S., p. 35.

the famous experiments of Pasteur there ensued a cessation of hostilities; but latterly, and especially since the discovery of radio-active substances, and as a result of the discovery, the campaign has been renewed with redoubled energy. Some pretentious works have recently appeared dealing with spontaneous generation and professing to settle the question of what we call vital activity by means of the mechanical explanation. But radiobes, it would seem, are not destined to achieve any greater success in life than our old unfortunate friend Bathybius: the problem is still unsolved, and the difficulties against the mechanical theory as set forth in any hand-book of Scholastic Philosophy remain still unanswered.

Dr. Windle's comparatively recent work, *What is Life?* is a fair exposition of the present state of the question, and anyone who reads the book will surely come to the conclusion that whether spontaneous generation will ever be shown to be an actual occurrence or not, it cannot be regarded as anything like a scientifically established fact; indeed, Dr. Windle's impartial statement of the case is sufficient to make even the layman understand that the problem of abiogenesis is just where Pasteur and Tyndall left it: *Omne vivum e vivo, omnis cellulae a cellula, omnis nucleus e nucleo*. The Law of Continuity in evolution cannot therefore be so enunciated as to cover the passage from non-living to living without external interference, the creative act of God.

It is, of course, perfectly legitimate to make the hypothesis that spontaneous generation is possible for the purpose of seeing, as it were, how the Law of Continuity or Evolution would look if the hypothesis was established; but it is quite another thing to formulate the so-called law so as to include spontaneous generation, as if it were an actuality, justifying the procedure by a grand declaration that, though abiogenesis is not now observed, it must have been a reality at some point of time in the distant past, or that at some future date it will be assigned a place among scientific certainties. Such a method is not surely scientific. Science must indeed deal with hypotheses as well as

with facts ; but it is certainly not scientific to confound them.

There is no solid reason whatever for thinking that life does arise spontaneously from non-living matter ; neither is there any reason for supposing that it is likely that it should arise in that way. To argue from evolution in general to spontaneous generation is to put the cart before the horse. Abiogenesis may come to be accepted on objective evidence as the real origin of life ; but is such a contingency any fair proof for the existence at the present time of a continuous evolution ? Is the possibility or even likelihood of something being discovered in the future sufficient justification for theories reaching from the beginning to the end of time ? At the very most we should suspend our judgment till we have some sound reason for making definite pronouncements : at the present moment all the evidence is dead against abiogenesis and evolution. Yet you find worshippers at the shrine of science speaking and writing glibly about spontaneous generation

As though some hoary problem over which
The world had puckered immortal brows
Were solved at last and all life launched anew.

The origin of motion is an old problem with many phases. Of this, at any rate, we are certain, that no body large or small can begin to move itself. Newton's first law of Motion, that a body will remain at rest for ever unless some force compels it to move, is the best established conclusion in the whole range of science. Haeckel, by virtue of his transcending wisdom, tells us, in a free and easy way, that ' movement is an innate and original property of substance,' but when there is question of choosing a guide in Natural Philosophy few will have any difficulty in deciding on their merits between Newton and Haeckel.

Though a body at rest cannot of itself begin to move, the question still remains, whether motion ever began in the world at all, whether, in other words, it may not have been from eternity ? From the metaphysical point of view it is a question which each must decide for himself. For

my own part, motion without beginning are ideas as irreconcilable as the terms of a self-contradictory judgment. But we know that our present world is not eternal, and consequently that motion cannot be eternal, for you cannot have motion without something moving.

The next 'enigma' in Du Bois-Reymond's list is 'the apparently designed order of nature,' but as this involves the teleological argument for the existence of God I will not stop to consider it here. With regard to the 'origin of sensation and consciousness,' it requires but little reflection to make it manifest that the difficulties which beset the origin of life are here vastly augmented. I have already, in previous articles, touched upon the two remaining 'enigmas,' 'rational thought and speech' and 'free-will,' so that I need not at present discuss them further.

What, then, remains for the grand 'theory of evolution which, as the little scientific manuals are never tired of assuring us, unless a scientific man believe, he is undoubtedly lost' ?¹ Simply this, that if there is such a thing as evolution at all, apart from the transformations which accompany chemical action in the inanimate world, and exclusive of the spiritual soul of man, it must be confined to the development of species or of varieties in the organic world and in the world of animal life.

Whether any such evolution takes place or has taken place in the past it is for the specialists, each in his own particular department of science, to say if they can. But those who are not specialists, and above all those who scarcely know the difference between botany and zoology, should persistently abstain from making final pronouncements on matters which they know nothing about. And even in the case of those who have specialized in particular directions, it should be carefully borne in mind that the question of evolution is by no means one of authority but solely one of evidence. On objective evidence, and objective evidence alone, must the problem be solved, if indeed it ever finds a solution.

¹ Dr. Windle in *The Catholic Church and Science*.

As affording a general survey of the present state of our knowledge I will quote a passage from the first of Father Wasmann's Evolution Lectures delivered in Berlin, January, 1907 :—

In the case of the species of the same genus, the genera of the same family, and often for families of the same order—even for orders of the same class—the *probability is in support of evolution*, and we meet with actual points of contact proving the relationship between the various forms. But the higher we ascend in the systematic categories, and the more closely we approach the great chief types of the animal world, the scantier becomes the evidence ; in fact, it fails so completely that we are finally forced to acknowledge that *the assumption of a monophyletic evolution of the whole kingdom of organic life is a delightful dream without any scientific support*. The same may be said of the assumed monophyletic evolution of the whole animal kingdom on the one hand, and of the whole vegetable kingdom on the other, from one primary form respectively.¹

Father Wasmann then proceeds to quote, in support of his position, such authorities as Hertwig, Boveri, Wettstein, Steinmann, Koken, and Diener, men who cannot be accused of any ' theological bias.'

This being the present state of science with regard to evolution in the organic and the animal kingdoms, it follows that, *a fortiori*, we are far from having established the evolution of Mind, of Morality, of Religion, and of Culture generally.

R. FULLERTON.

¹ *The Problem of Evolution*, p. 15.

SOME THEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE PSALMS

WE are told in the Second Book of Kings that when David offered to build a temple to the Almighty, his offer was rejected because he was a man of war and blood. He must have felt the rebuke keenly, but he obeyed, and so pleased was Jehovah with his obedience that, although He did not permit him to build a material edifice, He allowed him to build a spiritual temple with the spoils taken from his foes; and, we may add, one infinitely more splendid and enduring than even Solomon's in all its glory.

The walls of this mighty structure are conterminous with the whole field of Theology, and, therefore (dropping the simile), it is not our intention to touch upon all the matter dealt with therein, but there are a few topics connected with the interpretation of the Psalms that have been matter of discussion from the earliest times and that must prove interesting to every thoughtful reader of them.

Those which I mean to discuss in this paper are four : (a) How far are we to expect to find in the Psalms predictions of the Messiah? (b) the hope of 'future life? (c) what is the meaning of the assertions of innocence on the one hand, and (d) the terrible imprecations on the other?

There are modern Rationalists who contend that in none of the Psalms is there any true prediction of the Messiah; or if the Messianic hope finds any expression at all, so uncertain are the outlines and so dim is the colouring that it ceases to be little more than the faintest shadow. With these men it is not my intention to argue, as we hold no common premises. I shall content myself with saying that if you eschew from Jewish history the hope of Him who is to come there is no enigma comparable to it. In this expectation the Jewish people lived, moved, and had their being; it was their pillar of cloud by day and fire

by night ; it is interwoven in the warp and woof of every page of their chequered history. And bearing in mind the promise given to David (2 Kings vii.) it would be far more difficult to account for the absence than for the presence of this hope, at least in *his* psalms.

Others, however, especially devotional and patristic interpreters, have gone to the opposite extreme.¹ Tertullian, for instance, says that nearly all the psalms are personal to Christ (*personam Christi sustinere*), and he regards the first as a prophecy of Joseph of Arimathea. St. Hilary remembered some who thought that everything in the Book of Psalms should be referred personally to our Lord, and that there was nothing therein that was not proper to Him (*nihil quam quod Ei sit proprium*). From the inscription *in finem* found in the titles of many of those sacred canticles, St. Augustine (in Psalm lix.) thought these were certainly Messianic, and his reason was *finis enim legis est Christus* ; while we know that this inscription *in finem* is a translation of the Hebrew מַצְחֵלֵל, *lamnatzach*, for the chief musician or precentor. 'Knowledge of Hebrew,' says Dr. Barry,² 'made St. Jerome the greatest among Latin commentators, the want of it led St. Augustine to employ his astonishing powers in speculations that avail hardly at all when we seek the true purport of Psalms and Prophecy, or would enter into the history of Israel.' A devotional French writer named Champon published a work on the Psalms some years ago, and in it he sets down this thesis which, to his mind, is almost a matter of faith : 'Le sens propre et vraiment littéral des Psaumes dans l'ensemble et au détail, a pour objet Jésus-Christ et son épouse la sainte Eglise, leurs mystères et leurs combats, leurs tribulations et leurs gloires.'

But latterly, at least, all serious Catholic commentators have avoided both extremes. They admit, as they needs must, the Messianic element, and lay aside those imaginary interpretations by which the plain language of the Psalms is strained and distorted. Nevertheless, there exists a

¹ See decision Biblical Commission, May 1, 1910.

² *Tradition of Scripture*, p. 231.

vast difference of opinion as to the principle of interpretation to be followed in the avowedly Messianic compositions. Some expositors there be who maintain that whenever our divine Lord or any New Testament writer quotes a psalm as applying to the Messiah, we are then and there bound to explain the whole as prophetic of Him. For, they argue, if this method of interpretation be not adhered to, we are left without rudder or compass to guide us. Where are we to draw the line? Are we to say of one verse: this is true of David; and of another: this is true of Christ. Left without some fixed rule we may take or reject what we please. We freely admit that at first blush this seems very plausible, but our common sense tells us we can never admit any canon of exposition which involves far greater difficulties than those it intends to surmount, and such, we submit, this is. For it would compel us to give words and phrases a meaning which is not their proper and natural one; as we find in many of the Psalms, parts of which were fulfilled in Christ's life or passion, terrible expressions of hatred and revenge, admissions of sinfulness, imprecations we should like to utter with bated breath. If, therefore, this canon were adopted we should be obliged to give to all these passages a distorted and altered meaning—an expedient no one would say we should have recourse to. For, although the Author of Sacred Scripture may intend a deeper meaning than that which lies on the surface, it would be an outrage on His wisdom to say He intended a different one.

Let us test the rule by a few examples. We have the authority of our Blessed Saviour that a portion of Psalm xl. is prophetic of Himself. In this occurs the well-known verse: 'For even the man of My peace, in whom I trusted, who did eat bread with Me, hath greatly supplanted Me.' It is highly instructive to notice how the Redeemer applies this to Himself. After introducing it with the formula 'that the Scripture may be fulfilled,' He drops the first part, viz.: 'the man of My peace in whom I trusted'; for, knowing from the beginning who would betray Him, He could not have trusted Judas. Thus we seem to have our Lord's authority for taking not only a

portion of a psalm, but even a part of a verse as relevant to His life and passion. But even if this be not conclusive, we submit that this very psalm before us deals a death-blow to the afore-mentioned canon of interpretation; for, to apply it fully to Christ is simply impossible. How, for example, interpret verse 5: 'O Lord, be merciful to me, heal my soul, for I have sinned against Thee'; or verse 11: 'But Thou, O Lord, have mercy on me, raise me up again, and I will requite them.' I might verify the same truth by going through several of the Psalms. Moreover, in further proof of our position we may add that although nearly half of the Messianic quotations found in the New Testament are taken from the Book of Psalms, never does any inspired writer, or our Lord Himself, sanction a citation as relevant to the Christ in which a confession of sinfulness is found. And, in truth, this is what we should expect from the very nature of the case. The Psalms foreshadow Christ because the writers of them are types of Christ. Now it is of the essence of a type to be imperfect: it is by virtue of its imperfection that it becomes a prophecy.

Look, for instance, at David. Both he and our Saviour were engaged in forming a theocracy on earth. They both had enemies who tried every method which open violence or cunning, subtle fraud could suggest to subvert this kingdom: the greatest foes of both were pretended friends, and of each it may be written 'his own receives him not.' But here the analogy ceases. Who would have the blasphemous hardihood to assert that the dark shadow which fell on David's life was typical of Him that knew no sin? And, therefore, the language in which that sin is confessed and repented of cannot be predicated of Christ. It is true, indeed, that God placed on Him the iniquities of us all, but personal sin is one thing, to be a victim for sin another.

We cannot say for certain how many of the Psalms are Messianic. We know that about thirty-six (almost one-fourth) are applied to our Lord by New Testament writers, but whether there are more we cannot be quite sure. Not all, however, of these are Messianic in the same way or to

the same extent; for there are some that even literally can find their fulfilment only in the Christ. Such would be ii., xv., xlv., lxxi., cix. Others, in their literal meaning, treat of David or some other personage in the Old Law, and only mystically of Christ. Such would be xxxiv., lxviii., cviii., and perhaps iii., iv., v., ix., x. And, finally, there are many that so treat of the just man in general that in their perfect and highest sense they can be understood only of Him who was just *par excellence*.

The mill of Heaven grinds slowly because it is eternal. Up to David's time very little was revealed of the Messiah, yet never was there an epoch when fallen man was left without hope. From the *Protocvangelium* the human race had learned that the woman's seed would, at some future time, crush the serpent's head. From the blessing of Noe it had known that salvation would come through the posterity of Shem, that in the seed of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob all nations would be blessed. The last-mentioned prophet foresaw that the sceptre would not pass from Judah until the advent of the Expected One. Through Moses the Israelites learned that the future Saviour would be a great prophet, who was to be obeyed at the peril of one's soul. And, finally, to David it was revealed that His throne should last for ever, and that His seed should reign throughout the everlasting ages. But in the Psalms, especially the Davidic, the Messiah is clearly proclaimed in His triple rôle of King, Priest, and Prophet, as also His divine nature and eternal generation. 'In these' (Psalm i.), says St. Ambrose, 'not only is Jesus born for us, but He suffers His passion, He dies, He rises again, He ascends into Heaven, and sits at the right hand of His Father.'

We have said that the nature of a type is to be imperfect, and how beautifully we see this illustrated in the Prophet, Priest, and King of the Old Law—offices that find their highest perfection and significance in our Blessed Lord. The prophet was the man of God raised above the people to proclaim the truth. But he did not tell the whole truth. He spake as it was shown him—through a glass

and in a dark manner—thus leading the minds of the people on to some greater prophet who would not only tell the whole truth, but be Himself the way, the truth, and the life. So, again, with the priest. The blood which he sprinkled on the day of atonement was that of a dumb animal which had no power to take away sin. He confessed his imperfection by offering sacrifice not only for the sins of the people, but for his own sin. God gave the type but showed his imperfections before the very eyes of the people, that He may thus teach them to look forward to that true Priest who was without sin, and would destroy sin for ever by the sacrifice of Himself. And as it was with the priest and prophet, so also with the king. He was the Lord's Anointed and intended as a model of Divine justice. But we know how Solomon disappointed the hopes that were centred in a reign that began so gloriously. After him the crown was divided in twain, and the fair image of godliness connected with the name of king became fainter and fainter. The poor and the widow and the orphan cried, and there was none to help them. Again God gave the type, but smashed it in pieces that His people may look forward to Him who would be King of Justice and King of Peace. Your modern 'higher critic' may scoff at this line of argument, but it was convincing to St. Paul, and it satisfies me also.

The question of future life, as dealt with in the Psalms, need not detain us long. Let us say at once that they furnish us with no certain proofs of this momentous doctrine. Only four or five passages at most can be quoted where even a flickering light from the eternal hills is thrown upon this truth. And even these are not thoroughly convincing: they insinuate a probability rather than point to a certainty. Nor need this cause us any alarm, if we remember that God's revelation in this, as in other matters, was gradual. Indeed, up to Daniel's time men seemed to speak concerning immortality and a future life in rather uncertain accents. For it was according to the divine plan that the Jewish people should be witnesses of two great dogmas—that God was one and eternal, and that

this eternal Being loves and cherishes those that obey Him and keep His laws. These were the two great fundamental truths upon which everything was to rest, and so great was their importance in His sight that He would suffer no rivals. And just as we do not expect to find the doctrine of grace formally discussed in St. John's Gospel, nor the divinity of Christ in the Epistle to the Romans, neither let us be surprised if this question of a future life is practically absent from the Psalms.

The eschatology of the Old Testament [says Dr. Delitzsch]¹ leaves a dark back-ground, which, as is designed, is divided by the New Testament revelation into light and darkness, and is to be illumined into a wide perspective extending into eternity beyond time. Everywhere where it begins to dawn in this eschatological darkness of the Old Testament it is the first morning rays of the New Testament sun-rise which is already announcing itself.

Up and down through the Psalter we come across expressions of innocence that have often been stumbling-blocks as if they smacked of the spirit of him who said: 'My God, I thank Thee that I am not like the rest of men.' We might meet this difficulty by saying that the consciousness of sin was not so deep in the Old as in the New Testament. For, after all is said and done, the two great facts that show sin in its true light are eternal punishment and the death of Christ. Of the first we have seen the Psalmist had no clear concept, and although he wrote of the sacrifice of the cross, and must have had some insight into its significance, still it had not yet been an accomplished fact, nor did he know, in full measure, the awful nature of that atonement. Therefore it is only natural to conclude that he was not aware of the dire malignity of that which caused it. Besides, the Spirit of God was not fully given until Pentecost, and although He was the source of justice in the Old as in the New Covenant, it needs no proof to say that His influence was far less then than now.

¹ Introduction to the Psalms.

At the same time we must admit that nowhere do we find in the world before Christ such a deep consciousness of sin as in the Psalm *Miserere*; and if at times we merit such expressions as 'thou hast proved my heart, and visited it by night, thou hast tried me by fire, and iniquity hath not been found in me (Psalm xvi. 3); and again: 'the Lord will reward me according to my justice, and will repay me according to the cleanness of my hands' (Psalm xvii. 21)—they are not the feelings of the proud, boasting Pharisee but the honest confession of one who is striving to do his best and is not consciously committing sin. Had Paul of Tarsus written before Israel's sweet psalmist we might well say that such diction of the latter is simply an echo of the *nihil mihi conscius sum*.

We now come to the last question I mean to deal with in this paper, and one perhaps which has caused more real uneasiness than any of the others—the imprecations. I am not going to add anything new to the subject, but simply to put before my readers the more plausible opinions that have been put forward in this connexion. It need hardly be said that the Rationalists make these imprecations one of their great charges against divine revelation. According to them, these expressions are quite incomprehensible; they are, as Hupfeld¹ calls them, *animi indomiti effrenataeque irae expressio*. With these we shall hold no controversy. Neither can we accept the well-meant solution put forward by many Catholic and Protestant commentators that the verbs, which are rendered in the Vulgate and English versions as optatives, may be equally well translated by the future. This is an exploded theory. Nor can we regard as orthodox the view of those who maintain that the prayers are contrary to the spirit of Christian charity, and are merely preserved as 'monuments of antiquity.'² This evidently cannot be true, since the Church has adopted them from the beginning and will use them as her prayers to the end of time. And, *apropos* of the explanation given by these commentators, viz., the want of charity evinced

¹ Hupfeld *apud* Cornely, vol. ii., p. 123.

² Haneberg, p. 356.

in these execrations, it may be well to note that the gulf between the law of charity as it existed under the Old Law and as it exists under the New is not at all so wide as many seem to think. They imagine that as regards charity many things may be good and lawful under the Mosaic ordinance which would be impious under the yoke of Christ. This is not so. For, whatever differences exist are to be taken, as St. Thomas tersely and truly puts it, *secundum perfectum et imperfectum*.¹ And so far is it from being true that in the Old Law the love of enemies was unknown and the hatred of enemies permitted that St. Paul (Rom. xii.) could find no better words to inculcate the love of enemies than those of the Book of Proverbs (xxv. 21).

Others account for these imprecations by the supposition that David, who was in many respects a type of our Lord, was in this also: that he saw into men's hearts. According to these there would be nothing uncharitable in our prayer if we were to ask Almighty God to turn into hell at once such as He knows to be irretrievably plunged into hatred of Himself and His Church. Nay, when we consider the terrible ruin of innocence and virtue that even one bad man causes, it would seem to be the only charitable course. The question, therefore, is: Had David such a gift of discernment as would enable him to look into men's hearts and recognize reprobates? For if he had, it would only be natural that a Church which prays for the humiliation of her enemies in her own Litany, and which can discern what is heresy and what is not, should adopt as a large portion of her devotions the imprecatory psalms. In proof of David's being endowed with this charism they adduce such texts as 2 Kings xiv. 20; Ps. x. 6; xiii. 1; lxviii. 39. Here, then, according to these is the ground of these imprecations: David was gifted with an insight into the hearts of men, and saw those who would be irrecoverably lost, and prayed according to the mind of St. Paul when he said 'let such a one be anathema.'

The last opinion which I shall give seems to have been

¹ *Summa* ii., 1, q. 108, a. 3.

looked upon with greater favour by the Fathers, and is adopted by St. Thomas himself. According to this view the imprecations are merely prophecies. 'We need great prudence here,' says St. Chrysostom,¹ 'for the words, if they are considered only as they are uttered, perturb many who do not give attention . . . but let no one be disquieted, it is a prophecy under the appearance of an imprecation.' In the same strain Theoderet (in Psalm xxxiv.) And St. Thomas² says: 'Ut omnia intelligantur prolate non ex zelo vindictae propriae sed divinae justitiae cui se conformant just.' And in truth we find this hypothesis justified by several examples in the Sacred Volume. When the Almighty, for instance, brought into existence the creatures of the deep, He said: 'increase and multiply, and fill the waters of the sea.' This may be called a blessing if you will, but it is still a prophecy of their future fecundity. Again, is not Isaias predicting the destruction of Tyre when he says: 'howl ye ships of the sea . . . be silent you that dwell on the island . . . be thou ashamed, O Sidon.' Again, when he speaks of the New Jerusalem: 'open ye the gates and let the just nation that keepeth the truth enter in,' is he not predicting? 'Come down, sit in the dust, O virgin daughter of Babylon, sit on the ground . . . take a mill-stone and grind meal . . . uncover thy shame, strip thy shoulder, make bare thy legs, pass over the rivers' (xlvii. 1). Who will say that this is not a prophecy?

And indeed we have the most convincing proof of this in the case of Judas. No more withering imprecations can be found than those uttered against this unfortunate man in Psalms lxviii. and cviii. And yet we have the authority of the Holy Ghost, through St. Peter, that these are simple predictions. "Men, brethren, the Scripture must needs be fulfilled which the Holy Ghost spoke before by the mouth of David concerning Judas"; and then he quotes Psalms lxviii. and cviii.

The divine element which lies at their heart [says Dr. Barry,³ speaking of those imprecations] is an appeal to justice rudely

¹ In Ps. cviii.

² In Ps. xxxiv.

³ *Tradition of Scripture*, p. 262.

conceived with violence in the expression and often a lack of pity in executing its behests. Could it well have been otherwise? Do you, at our day, though Christians, never call in times of war upon the God of Battles? or, if we saw with our eyes what it is they ask in their prayers for victory over the foe, should we think it very unlike the demand of a revengeful Israelite. To him every war was a holy war; the heathen and their gods fought against his God: an undeniable fact, since the triumph of Chemosh or Hadad would have carried with it the disappearance of Hebraism. If the Law had 'weak and needy elements' in its ritual, so had it in its tribal morality; yet we have not quite solved the problem of Christian states and holy wars, nor is it long since the Turks were to Europe as the Amorites to Israel—a religious menace to be fought with prayers and the sword.

PATRICK V. HIGGINS.

ARDPATRICK—I

ARDPATRICK is a parish in the barony of Coshlea, in the present Bruff deanery, in the diocese and County of Limerick. It is four miles distant from Kilmallock to the south-east, and two miles to the west of Kilfinane. Its ancient name until the coming of the National Apostle was *Tulich na Fenii*, or the 'Hill of the Fenians.' That these clans were long associated with the neighbourhood is shown from the names of the district, in which we find *Suidh Fionn* ('Seat of Fionn Mac Cuhall'), *Glenisheen* ('the Glen of Isheen'), *Tubber Isheen*, and *Labba Iskur*.

The modern name, Ardpatrick, is derived partly from the high ground or hill on which the town stood and partly from the name of the saint who favoured and blessed the place by his presence. Starting from the present Catholic church, which stands at the opening of a picturesque glen, one has to make a steep ascent to the west for a quarter of a mile in order to reach the Hill of Ardpatrick, which is three or four hundred feet above the level beneath. On it are the ruins of this ancient and celebrated shrine. After ascending the hill—an undertaking that requires a sound chest to accomplish—one finds himself above on a very large rounded surface rather than on a plateau. In the nearer or eastern portion of this is the very frequented cemetery, within the walls of which are the ruins of the ancient church and adjoining house or monastery. Adjacent to these, but outside the western wall of the cemetery, a small portion of the round tower is still in existence. A holy well is in close proximity. Thus clustered around the House of Sacrifice are the residence of the clergy, the round tower, and the well.

What hallowed memories hover around those places, and cling to them as closely as the ivy that entwines them !

ST. PATRICK'S VISIT TO ARDPATRICK

According to Dr. Lanigan, St. Patrick came to Munster in A.D. 445. Ussher places the date at 449. After his visit to Cashel, and after establishing a church at Kilfeacle in the present barony of Clanwilliam, in the south-west of Tipperary county, Patrick gave his blessing to the people of Muscraidhe and departed from them. He then came into the County of Limerick, and we find him at Cullen, Pallas Green, and Kildeely, all in the ancient territory of Ara Cliach. The County of Limerick was at that time divided into two great territories, Ara Cliach and Hy Fidgente. According to the Most Rev. Dr. Healy, Archbishop of Tuam, in his *Life of St. Patrick*, the territory of Ara Cliach is represented by the present diocese of Emly; whilst Hy Fidgente would embrace nearly the whole of the present diocese of Limerick. This is confirmed by the *Tripartite Life*, in which it is stated that St. Patrick went from Kildeely in Ara Cliach to Hy Fidgente, in which apparently was Knockea, where Lomman, son of Macc Eire, made a feast for him. If we accept this opinion, for which we have the authority of the Archbishop of Tuam, the boundary of Hy Fidgente to the east at that time would correspond with the eastern limits of the present diocese of Limerick. At a later date the authorities represent the territory of Hy Fidgente as lying exclusively to the west of the Morning Star and Maigue rivers. Thus it lay at the left of the Morning Star and of the Maigue from its intersection by the former river, which occurs at a distance of a mile to the west of Athlacca.

After laying out and cultivating his Master's vineyard at Kildeely, in the confines of the baronies of Small County and Coonagh, the Apostle preached the Gospel, confirming his divine mission by miracles and prophecies, through the northern and western parts of the County of Limerick. He did not proceed farther to the west than this county. His mission to Munster seems to have been confined to the present Counties of Tipperary and Limerick and the Decies. Ardpatrick would be on his way from western Limerick to

the Decies territory, whither he went before leaving the province.

Having finished his mission to Knockpatrick and any other parts of the west of the county that he may have visited, during which he prophesied that St. Brendan should be born one hundred and twenty years afterwards in west Munster, he came to Ardpatrick. The *Tripartite Life* says: 'Then he went into the Southern Deisi. He desired a cloister in Ard-Patraic; and Patrick's flagstone is there and the plan of his church.' Colgan says that the traces of the limits of the church then erected were still to be seen in his time. St. Patrick selected the site of his church. He also left his flagstone there, which was called in Latin *Lapis Patritii*, and was long afterwards to be seen. Canon O'Hanlon, in his *Lives of the Irish Saints*, writes: 'According to tradition while in the south part of this county he (St. Patrick) founded a church, or monastery, on the summit of a hill, afterwards called Ardpatrick; and here are the remains of a round tower, as also those of an ancient temple.'

We have no means of knowing how long the holy missionary stayed in Ardpatrick, apart from the statement in the *Book of Lismore*, which we shall give later on. His abode there was long enough to found a church, or at least to set the work going. Derball, son of Aed, is given in the *Tripartite* as the dynast, or chief of the locality. This Derball, called by Jocelyn 'Cearball,' was a sceptic and an unbeliever who wished to test the power of the saint, and to show that he could not work miracles. This nobleman of Munster, as he was called by the writer just named, would not give leave to St. Patrick to build a church within his territories. At no great distance from the residence of this potentate there was a lake, fair and large, which presented a pleasant prospect to the eye. Its name was Loch Longa; but its identification has not been ascertained. Owing to the interposition of a great mountain, called Kennsebhred, the dun of Derball was deprived of a very desirable and splendid view of the lake. When the holy missionary urged the noble chieftain to permit him to build

a church, the latter replied: 'If you remove this great mountain, that deprives me of the pleasant prospect over that broad and spacious lake, lying in Fera-Maighe-Feine, on the further side, I will then yield to your request for building a church.' It adds little to throw light on the situation of the lake to be informed that Fera-Maighe-Feine is the present barony of Fermoy, in the County of Cork. However, St. Patrick prayed to God, and it is related that the earth swallowed down the mountain. The name of this mountain was Cenn-Febrat, which is now represented by the mountain over Kileruig, east of Redchair. It would be in the western portion of the Slieve Riach mountains, which extend from Glenbrouhane in a south-westerly direction to Redchair, and Seefin, the seat or burial-place of Finn. The perfidious chieftain refused to perform his promise, and declined to give a site for a church. The saint prayed to God a second time, and the mountain swelled up to its former height and dimensions. He also predicted that no magnate or Bishop should be born of the family of this tyrant and scoffer, and that he must soon lose his hold of the land by being called away from life. A remarkable depression on the side of the mountain, called *Belach Legtha*, or the 'Pass of Melting,' stood in olden times as a traditional memorial of the miracle.

Colgan¹ writes regarding this remarkable incident in the life of St. Patrick:—

Thence continuing his journey, he [St. Patrick] turned towards South Munster, and in the country of the Southern Decies he measured a site for a church to be erected on a certain hill, which thenceforth assuming his name is called Ard Patrick, i.e., Patrick's Hill, where there is a stone held in veneration, called Patrick's Stone, and where the remains of the original church are seen in outline. But *Belial Derbhall*, son of Aedh, dynast of that place, opposed the man of God, wishing to prevent the erection of the church, and to drive the erector of it out of his territory. Previously, however, either for mocking him, or that he might shew that the virtue of the Christian faith was vain or empty, he sought from him a certain condition which he

¹ *Trias Thaumaturga*, Sept. Vita.

thought to be absolutely impossible, saying : ' If, pointing at the great mountain *Ceann Feabhrad*, you remove that mountain, so that I might enjoy an uninterrupted view of the lake beyond it, called *Loch Long*, and of the country of the *Feara Muige Féne* wherein it lies, I will believe in Christ, and obey thy commandments.' Patrick, on hearing this, and casting a firm hope in the promise of the Lord, who promised his servants ' If you have faith as small as a grain of mustard seed, you shall say to this mountain remove hence and place thyself in the sea, and it shall be done ' ; fixing his mind in God he prays, and while praying the mountain began with stooping summit to give way, and as if to become level with the ground to descend gradually to the earth. Which, when the tyrant saw he exclaimed, saying, even though he were to remove a thousand mountains yet would he not agree with his wishes or doctrine. To whom the herald and prophet of truth replied : ' Since you are such an opponent of truth, and tempter of the Lord the Creator, may thy seed be subject to malediction, may there never issue therefrom a king, prince, or prelate, but be always exposed to the plunderings and pillagings of the neighbouring peoples, as is the grass of the field exposed to the grazing oxen.' And there is in the aforesaid mountain, in a place where a diminution of the mountain is observed to begin, an open way which, deriving its name from that circumstance, perpetuates the memory of the miracle, for it is commonly called *Bealach Leightha*, i.e., ' the road of the melting or dissolving,' because at that place the mountain was first seen to suffer a reduction or diminution.

In the foregoing incident what looks like a malediction is not to be taken as such in reality. The form of expression used by the saint is to be understood not in a literal but in a prophetic sense. To make the matter clearer, St. Patrick did not imprecate evil on the obstinate chieftain and his offspring, but, under the inspiration of Providence, he foretold that evil should befall them.

The *Book of Lismore*, in describing the mission of St. Patrick in Munster, says that he came

to Cean-Abrat-Sliabh-Cáin¹ towards the south, and to *Tulach-*

¹ Ceann-Abrat of Sliabh, or Sliabh Riach, otherwise called Luigha Finn, wherein is the pass called Bearna Derg. Ceannfeabhrad (or Feabhrad) was the ancient name of a part of the mountain of Sliabh Riach, to the

na-Feinne,¹ now called Ardpatrik, where Eoghan Leith-dherg, son of Aengus,² king of the two provinces of Munster, was and the nobles of the two provinces about him. Then Patrick pitched his tent, and the king of Munster with the nobles of his people came, and placed his head on the bosom of Patrick, and genuflected to him. Patrick remained there for a week, raising the dead to life, and healing the people of their diseases, infirmities and all other complaints. Patrick was then given his own choice, and Eoghan (Owen) Leith Dearg returned to Rosach-na-Righ,³ to his own Dun, and the Munster nobles to their Duns and fine abodes.

It requires no great strength of imagination to picture to oneself from the above language the splendour and wealth appertaining to the men of Munster and the general prosperity of this province at that time. That happy state of affairs prevailed in Ireland when she had the making of her own laws, the control of her own business, and, subject to Providence, the direction of her own destiny.

We are next introduced to the meeting between St. Patrick and the famous Cavilte in the following style :—

‘ Now, Cavilte, my good man,’ said Patrick, ‘ why was this hill upon which we are called Findtulach ? ’

‘ I will tell you why truly,’ said Cavilte. ‘ It was from this we went, three battalions of the Feini, to fight the battle of Ventry. We took our spears and smooth-shafted lances, and Finn viewed the hill about him, and said it is a *fine hill*, and what better name will it have than Finntulach ? ’

south-west of Kilfinane, in the south of the County of Limerick, and on the confines of Cork. There was a battle fought at Ceann-Abrat by Oilioll Olum and his stepson Maccon. The latter was defeated, and he fled to Wales to solicit assistance, and some time after put into the Bay of Galway, accompanied by Bene, a Briton, and a great number of foreign auxiliaries; and seven days after his arrival obtained a signal victory over King Art and his forces.

¹ Tulach-na-Feinne, is the Hill of the Fian, or ancient Irish standing army.

² Aengus was baptized by St. Patrick, and thus became the first Christian King of Munster.

³ Rosach-na-Righ was the palace of Eoghan Leith Dearg, King of the two Munsters.

Cavilte then sung the poem which follows in praise of Ardpatrik :—

1. Thou pleasant high hill, the resort of the fair Feini,
Thou wert accustomed to a mighty camp, and famed warrior bands.
2. The following food we for dinner had on the hill of the smooth plain,
Beautiful blackberries, haws and nuts of the hazel headland,
3. Soft shoots of the thorn-briar and sprays of wild garlic abundant,
We ate in the month of May fresh sprouts . . . of water-cress.
4. Birds from the dense woods were cooked in the Fianian camp.
Choice trout from *Bearramuin*, they are not small from the mountain cliffs,
5. Swift salmon from Lindinne, eel from the noble Shannon,
Woodcocks genuine and real, beavers from their lonely haunts.
6. Saltwater fish from the countries of Baoi¹ and Berre,²
Featherfew, long and clean, and dilse from the shores of Cleir³
7. Many a time did the son of Lughaidh swim the laky Lee.
We used to come in hosts and multitudes upon thy side,
O thou Tulach.

In the *Seventh Life of St. Patrick*, Part III, page 162, we read the following paragraph :—

The holy man, having heard these things, giving thanks, on withdrawing thence, turned eastwards to a certain hill not far distant, where he founded a church, commonly called after his name, *Ard Patruic*, i.e., *Collis Patritii*, 'Patrick's Hill.' The inhabitants of the former place, *Dal Ruinntir*, much grieved that the man of God did not fix his seat with themselves, followed him to the aforesaid place, endeavouring to that end to bring him back to their territory. But the blessed prelate, though he did not acquiesce to their demand, did nevertheless, on account of their devout wishes, impart to them his blessing, foretelling that their posterity, though subject to extern rulers, would nevertheless produce a great and chosen band, both of soldiers and clergy.

¹ Baoi is O'Sullivan's territory, Berehaven.

² Berre is another territory of Berehaven.

³ Cleir, not certain; perhaps Clareisland.

There is a local tradition that St. Patrick sought hospitality for a night at Ballinanima, in the parish of Kilfinane, lying just by Ardpatrik. There was neither fire nor milk in the house. The time of his unexpected visit was Christmas Eve. He told the occupant of the house to bring in some rushes, which were at the time covered with snow. The peasant obeyed ; and as soon as he placed the rushes on the hearth they ignited. Thereupon a newly-calved cow came to the door of the house in which the saint was. The traditional legend has it that the green rushes burn, and that ever since, on each recurring Christmas Eve, there is a new milch cow in Ballinanima. There is no use in dwelling upon this legend longer than is necessary to relate it.

The church, owing to the high ground on which it is situate, attracts one's attention in the plain below at a distance of many miles ; whilst for the same reason the church, in its turn, affords the visitor a splendid view of the length and breadth of the Golden Vein, unfolds before his eyes one of the most fertile and magnificent tracts in nature, and even gives him an opportunity of extending his vision beyond its broad limits into Cork, Tipperary, and the distant hills of Clare. There, indeed, is a sight that will not soon leave the memory. What wonder is it if in this noble County of Limerick in days gone by were fought battle after battle, age after age, and century after century, by the Celt against the invaders hungering for the possession of such a prize ? The surprise would be if he did not strive to retain or regain his inheritance ; if seeing his churches seized, plundered, and dismantled, or turned to the purposes of another cult, the exercise of his religion prohibited under punishments worthy of a Nero, himself disinherited, his lands confiscated and distributed among a horde of adventurers, he would not, with the traditional courage and daring of his race, try the fortunes of war with the enemy, and sometimes cross swords with them under adverse circumstances in what was a fruitless endeavour to repel their cruelty and rapacity.

There are two ways of entering the cemetery, which is

a much-frequented one. The nearer entrance is at the eastern side, but near the northern angle, where, owing to the nature of the ground on the outside, the wall is high and is scaled by a series of projecting stone steps. The main entrance is in the western wall of the cemetery, and consists of a stile of dressed stone, with a centre piece on which coffins are laid when borne for interment, and a narrow aperture on either side, widening as it ascends, through which the coffin-bearers and all others enter in their turn—such an entrance as is usually to be found to all the cemeteries of the Kilmallock Rural District.

THE CHURCH

Opposite the entrance in the western wall, and at a distance of about a perch from it, is the church, in the cemetery of about half an acre in extent. Like ancient churches in general it lay from east to west. It was built of very strong masonry, as if it were intended that it should defy the storms of ages. Its length was 85 feet, and its breadth 24 feet. The east and west gables are in utter ruin. The side walls at the east end have also fallen into ruin for the length of 33 feet. No trace of a window is visible on any of the remaining walls. There is a doorway in the north wall, distant by $21\frac{1}{2}$ feet from the western gable. It is $6\frac{1}{2}$ feet high and 4 feet 4 inches wide on the inside, where it is topped by a flat arch (or a small segment of a large circle) built of hammered brown sandstone, which is to be found in abundance in the locality. On the outside this doorway had two arches attached to each other, the outer one being semicircular and the inner pointed. The outer or semicircular one was built with chiselled brown sandstone. The pointed arch and the sides supporting it were built with chiselled limestone. The arch was 5 feet 4 inches in height, and 3 feet 2 inches in breadth. The side walls are about 18 feet in height and 5 feet in thickness. The materials used in them are large blocks of red stone and cement of lime and sand mortar. Some of the stones that are seen in the lower parts of the walls

are each at least $1\frac{1}{2}$ tons in weight. The side walls projected $6\frac{1}{2}$ feet beyond the west gable.

There was another building attached to the church at the north-east corner. It extended toward the north. Small portions of its walls are still to be seen. The length of it was 25 feet, and its breadth was 18 feet 6 inches. The walls were 3 feet 8 inches in thickness. The stones used in its construction were smaller than those that are to be seen in the church above described. This edifice was unmistakably the residence of the clergy who were attached to the church, and whose duty it was to discharge the sacred functions in it. On its altar they performed the immaculate Sacrifice, that pure oblation which the Prophet Malachy in the distant past foretold should be offered up throughout the world from the rising to the setting sun. In its baptismal font they poured the grace of regeneration into the souls of countless children, which disposed them for braving the dangers and the trials of life. They chanted the Vespers often and again in the choir. Those priests often distributed to the people at the communion rails a Bread that was sweeter and more precious and more extolled than the manna with which God fed his chosen people in the desert. From the pulpit set in that church they announced the Gospel and preached the word of God with earnestness, and doubtless, too, often with an eloquence which in the melodious language of the Gael resounded with musical harmony around those walls, penetrated the hearts, moved the affections, excited the hopes and elevated the feelings of audience after audience, who followed each other in unintermitting succession for twelve hundred years. The dust and mouldering bones of countless generations of Ardpatrik priests and people intermingle in the encircling cemetery, awaiting the sound of the archangel's trumpet calling them to the Resurrection. There priests and people are associated in death as they were in life.

In viewing the ruins one is struck by the proximity of the priest's house to the church. These were actually attached to each other. The wall of the church was also

the wall of the house in which the priests dwelt. The ruins at Dromin also testify that the clergy used to live close to their churches. From where I write I can see the castle-shaped building, now toppling and falling fast to decay, which was attached or added on to the western or front gable of the church. This formed the residence of the clergy of Dromin in ages that are gone. The clergy now do not generally reside so near the churches as they did then; whilst in some cases the distance they have to travel from their residences to their duties vastly increases their labour and subjects them to the vicissitudes of an ever-changeful climate.

THE ROUND TOWER

Though I have very often had occasion, when attending funerals to Ardpatrick, to survey its religious monuments with the eye, still I am indebted for the dimensions of the round tower, as well as of the other objects heretofore described, principally to the Letters of the Ordnance Survey, 1840. The ruin of the round tower stands at a distance of 39 feet to the north-west of the church, and of about 20 feet from the cemetery wall on the outside. What now remains of it is but a mere stump. To the north and east it is not higher than 11 feet; to the west 6 feet; whilst to the south it is breached to within 5 feet of the ground. In the inside it is filled with rubbish. At 5 feet in height from the ground its circumference is 56 feet. Its masonry is of a very good description, no stones but well-hewn ones having been used in its composition.

In his *History of Limerick*,¹ published in 1826, Fitzgerald says of it: 'At Ardpatrick stood a fine round tower, the greater part of which fell a few years since.' This is all he says about this once splendid tower. This interesting monument of the past was demolished by a storm in 1824. Our rulers would not take the trouble of guarding against such a catastrophe. Instead of erecting lightning conductors to preserve from destruction such

¹ Vol. i., p. 390.

venerable monuments, having behind them a record which if not rivalling in antiquity that of the pyramids of Egypt, is lost in the dim and distant past; they who have undertaken to manage our affairs for us adopted the policy of neglecting and obliterating all tokens of the past, apparently desirous that Irishmen should forget that this country had an ancient and creditable history. The *Down Survey*, 1656, says of the church and tower: 'Upon ye Ard Patricke are ye walls of a church and a watch tower.' In the *Proceedings* of the Royal Irish Academy,¹ Mr. Johnson Westropp gives a plate of the tower as it existed in 1655. It is represented as having three stories, but with the top portion gone. Through the summit of the then remaining portion there was a rather deep rent at the centre.

According to local tradition, the tower was called *Clugtig Ard Paudrig*, or 'Bell House of Ardpatrik.' It was in a good state of preservation until the accident that occurred to it in 1824. It was 88 feet in height, and surmounted by a conical top. There were four apertures near the top, each of which faced one of the cardinal points. The doorway was about 12 feet from the ground. The upper portion of the tower was blown off when the church was dismantled, between 1640 and 1642, by Murrough O'Brien, the notorious, faithless, and recreant Earl of Inchiquin. The small portion of it that now remains is but the relic of its former existence and the silent witness of the once ecclesiastical importance of Ardpatrik.

According to the Windell MSS., R.I.A., the excavation of the tower was made in 1842, when it was found that

The interior to a considerable depth was filled with earth and the rubbish of the fallen building, some oyster shells, an article rather strangely found so far inland, and calculated to excite attention by reason of similar substances having been found last year in the interior of Cloyne tower. . . . The remains of this round tower stand a few, say sixteen, yards distant from the N.W. angle of the ancient church, not in the part of the churchyard now used as a burial place. The plinth of the tower

¹ Vol. xv.

is on a lower level by about five feet than that of the church. The ground slopes gradually from the church to the tower ; from that to the base of the hill rather more precipitously. About fifty feet in height of the south side of the tower remained until 1817, when it fell over towards the north-west, as may be seen by the stones cut to the curve which are scattered around.

The interior was excavated to a depth of six feet. Among the rubbish are described the following :—

Earth and small stones, many oyster shells, bones, horses' and swine teeth, one tusk, one short horn, but no human remains ; one piece of cut stone, evidently the top of a window, a piece of brass-like metal handle, probably of some slight article, a small piece of bone squared and polished, a bit of amber three inches long, two broad, one thick, coarse and unwrought ; several portions of charcoal.

The tower is called at the place, ' Cluica.'

THE HOLY WELL

At the short distance of about 60 feet south-west from the church, St. Patrick's Well is to be found. Being in the field, and the top or mouth of it not large, it is not perceived till one draws near it. In olden times it was known by the double name of *Tubber Paudrig* and *Tubber na Monach*, respectively translated, ' Patrick's Well,' and the ' Monk's Well.' It is outside the usual order of wells : it looks very remarkable, and in the striking appearance it presents to the visitor it excites and attracts his interest, as well as his curiosity. It is encased or lined with a wall of mason work, raised to an equal height with the surface of the ground, where it forms a square, whose side is $2\frac{1}{2}$ feet. It is said to have been at one time 25 feet in depth, but, owing to stones and rubbish having fallen in, is not now so deep. The water does not rise higher than a depth of 10 or 12 feet from the surface of the ground, or the summit of the well, as it has been described. There is no apparent outlet for the water, yet it never overflows. Formerly, according to local statement, the well was walled in at the surface of the ground, and roofed over. No trace, however, of roof or wall is now to be seen. This holy well

was held in much repute in the neighbourhood, because it was believed to have a curative virtue for diseases of the eye.

THE ABBEY

Some of our writers tell us that there was an abbey in Ardpatrick. No ancient records of it are extant. Gough's *Camden* speaks of it in the following manner: 'At Ard Patrick, 19 miles south from Limerick, is said to have been a monastery founded by St. Patrick.' In his *History of Limerick*, published in 1786, at page 433, Ferrar writes: 'Ardpatrick is situated in the barony of Coshlea, nineteen miles south of Limerick. St. Patrick founded an abbey here, of which no historical account can be found.' Archdall¹ writing on Ardpatrick, says: 'In the barony of Coshlea and four miles south-east from Kilmallock, St. Patrick founded an abbey here.' Fitzgerald,² on the authority of Archdall, mentions this abbey, and, like Ferrar, adds that no historical account can be found of it. By an inquisition of the 11th of March, xxxii. 2 Elizabeth, it was found 'that the land of Ballingawsee, Ballecowynge, Ballynanyng, and Balligertayne, containing forty acres of the great measure, annual value, besides reprises, 6s. 8d., were parcel of the possession of this abbey' (Ardpatrick).³

It is unnecessary to observe that the above, as well as all other inquisitions, instituted by English monarchs and governments in this country, were held with a view to replenish a needy exchequer, or reward their satraps and minions, out of the proceeds of the wholesale plunder and public robbery of Irish churches and monasteries.

In the *Proceedings* of the Royal Irish Academy,⁴ the monastery at Ardpatrick is said to have been a small one.

ST. CELSUS AT ARDPATRICK

A very notable event in connexion with the abbey was the death of Ceallach or Celsus, Primate of Armagh, which occurred in it on the occasion of his visiting Ard-

¹ *Mon. Hib.*, vol. ii.

² *History of Limerick*, vol. i., p. 389.

³ Down Survey, 1657.

⁴ Vol. xxv.

patrick.¹ St. Celsus was one of the most interesting and distinguished prelates that are to be found in the long series of the illustrious successors of St. Patrick. It would not be surprising if there was ample field enough for the zeal of a prelate in an age of which it may be said that the 'temple of Janus' was often opened in Ireland, and warfare was a thing of frequent occurrence. The country was distracted by internecine strife, and must have been exhausted and disordered by ceaseless wars between the natives and the Danes.

The political condition of Ireland being such as it was, it should be no wonder if there were an ample field for the tireless zeal of St. Celsus, who succeeded to the archbishopric on September 23, 1105. He initiated a better order by laying down rules of discipline for the clergy and people; by erecting churches, whose very appearance, as if constant preachers, were calculated to draw people's thoughts heavenwards; and above all by his charity and exemplary conduct. In the year 1106, the first after his consecration, after visiting many parts of Ulster, he made a visitation throughout Munster, where he seems to have been well received. The object of his visitation appears to have been of a temporal as well as of a spiritual nature. He was so successful even in his temporal object that, in addition to those dues or contributions which, according to what was called the 'Law of St. Patrick,' were accustomed to be paid to the See of Armagh, many presents were made to him. After visiting Connacht he returned to Armagh.

After the lapse of twenty-three years we find him again in the heart of Munster, at Ardpatrick, and in his illness. In the interest of religion, in Armagh and elsewhere, he ardently wished to be succeeded by St. Malachy as archbishop. Accordingly, when he saw his end approaching in Ardpatrick he drew up an instrument, or will, in which he gave expression to his desire or intention that St. Malachy, then Bishop of Connor, should be appointed to the primatial see. He communicated this will to persons

¹ *Four Masters*, at A.D. 1129.

who were present and to persons who were absent. He communicated it in a particular manner to the two kings of Munster, whom he charged by the authority of St. Patrick to use their best efforts to have it carried into effect. He desired that in the interest of religion St. Malachy should succeed him. A short while before the death of Celsus Malachy had a vision, in which he beheld a woman, tall in stature and reverend in countenance, holding in her hand a pastoral staff. He asked her who she was, and she replied that she was the wife of Celsus ; by which we are to understand that she was the church of Armagh, for in canonical language the church or diocese of a Bishop is styled his spouse, to which he is inseparably and irrevocably wedded or united. The tall woman handed the staff to him and disappeared. Celsus on his death-bed in the course of a few days sent his staff or crozier to St. Malachy, to denote thereby the person who was to be his successor. When Malachy cast his eyes on the crozier he perceived that it bore the exact resemblance of the one he had seen in the vision.

The will referred to above was made by St. Celsus on the Hill of Ardpatrik, where, being then in the fiftieth year of his age, he breathed his holy soul into the hands of his Creator on Monday, April 1, A.D. 1129. In accordance with his will his body was borne to Lismore and interred there with honour and ceremony befitting his rank and dignity, in the burying place of the Bishops, on the following Thursday, which fell on April 4. His name is commemorated in the Roman Martyrology at April 6. Some writers speak of him as being a very learned man and an author. Others, however, express doubt on the two points. At all events, there are two other distinctions that no student of Irish history can withhold from him : he was deeply imbued with a zeal that was untiring and a sanctity that was as unselfish as it was eminent.

The *Annals of the Four Masters*, at 1129, pronounce the following eulogium on him :—

Celsus, successor of St. Patrick, a son of purity, and Archbishop of the west of Europe, the only head obeyed by the Danes

and Irish, both clergy and laity, after having ordained Bishops, priests, and persons of every ecclesiastical degree, after having consecrated many churches and cemeteries, after having bestowed jewels and wealth, after having established wholesome regulations and morals among all classes, both clergy and laity, after having passed his life in fasting, praying, and celebrating the divine ceremonies, after having worthily received the sacraments of Extreme Unction and Penance, yielded his spirit to heaven at Ardpatrik, in Munster, on Monday, the first day of April, in the fiftieth year of his age, and his body was conveyed on the Wednesday following to Lismore, in accordance with his own will, and he was waked there with psalms, hymns, and canticles, and he was interred with honours in the tomb of the Bishops on the next day, Thursday.

M. CANTY.

[*To be continued.*]

DOCUMENTS

THE SUBURBAN BISHOPRICS

CONSTITUTIO APOSTOLICA

DE SUBURBICARIIS DIOECESIBUS

PIUS EPISCOPUS

SERVUS SERVORUM DEI

AD PERPETUAM REI MEMORIAM

Apostolicae Romanorum Pontificum sollicitudinis, vel ab ipsis Ecclesiae primordiis, praecipua pars fuit ut christiani populi salus efficaci et constanti ministerio illorum esset commendata, de quibus scriptum est : *Attendite vobis et universo gregi, in quo vos Spiritus Sanctus posuit episcopos regere Ecclesiam Dei*. Inter hos principem sane locum obtinent qui, e numero Patrum Cardinalium, sedes occupant Urbi propiores, quibus proinde nomen inditum est Suburbicariis.

His Antistites et amplitudine dignitatis et excellentia doctrinae, non minus quam ceteris virtutibus, praesertim liberalitate, munificentia, studio provehendae fidelium salutis, quantum splendoris et opis in loca contulerint ipsorum iurisdictioni subiecta, ad haec usque tempora historiae monumenta testantur. Verum recentius rerum hominumque adiuncta longe immutata, ipsorum regimen effecerunt in dies difficilius. Hinc enimvero memoratae dioeceses graviore in necessitate versantur et impensiores curam vigilantiamque desiderant. Nam qui antea temporibus suburbani populi, colendis agris plerique dediti, quietam vitam tutamque ducebant, hodie, multiplicatis commerciis, expeditioribus itineribus, auctoque proinde numero confluentium hominum, in quotidianum vocantur Fidei morumque discrimen. Ex altera vero parte obeunda Cardinalibus in Urbe negotia adeo sunt multiplicata, ut eorum paene mole obruantur, praesertim ob tot tantasque quibus Ecclesia nunc premitur necessitates. Quo fit ut suppeditandis auxiliis et impendendis curis, quibus, commissae iisdem dioeceses in praesenti rerum conditione maxime indigent, ac praestandae operae in negotiis quae apud Apostolicam Sedem pertractantur, ingravescente praesertim aetate, tempus et vires interdum non suffi-

cient. His de causis Apostolicae Sedi opportunum et necessarium visum est suburbicariis dioecesibus eorumque regimini aliquam temperationem afferre, qua Cardinales Episcopi Suburbicarii, sarcta tectaque eorum dignitate in dioecesibus sibi commissis, per efficacius Suffraganeorum ministerium suppetias haberent, atque ita et pastoralis sollicitudo ipsis fieret aliquanto levior et suarum dioecesum spiritualibus necessitatibus melius consu-leretur.

Quare omnia matura deliberatione complexi, adhibitisque in consilium pluribus S. R. E. Cardinalibus, quos inter Suburbicariis, firmo manente iure constituto de optione et nominatione Patrum Cardinalium ad suburbicarias dioeceses, vi praesentium Litterarum constituimus ac praecipimus ut circa Episcopos Cardinales Suburbicarios eorumque Suffraganeos legum capita, quae infra scripta sunt, perpetuo inviolateque serventur.

I. Cardinalis, ad Sedem suburbicariam promotus, ipse verus est Episcopus dioecesis, cuius possessionem inibit eadem ratione qua ceteri episcopi residentiam habentes.

II. Disciplina quae huc usque viguit ut Emis Episcopis Sabinensi et Veliterno adiutor daretur suffraganeus Episcopus, ad omnes extenditur Cardinales Suburbicarios, quibus idcirco singulis suus erit in posterum suffraganeus Episcopus cum sede titulari.

III. Suffraganeus a Summo Pontifice nominabitur et sui officii possessionem capiet, litteras nominationis exhibendo Episcopo Cardinali.

IV. Cardinalis Suffraganeo adtribuat et vi praesentis Constitutionis irrevocabiliter adtribuisse praesumitur, omnia ad regendam dioecesim necessaria ita ut uni Suffraganeo sint in dioecesi gubernanda eadem iura et officia ac Episcopo residenti, quae hisce litteris contraria non sint.

V. Suffraganeus dioecesim gubernat nomine et vice Cardinalis.

VI. Cardinali vita functo vel renuntiante vel ad aliam dioecesim translato, Suffraganei iurisdictio non cessat, sed ipse dioecesim tunc regit nomine Sanctae Sedis ad instar Administratoris Apostolici.

VII. Ipse debet quotannis de statu dioecesis etiam oeconomico ad Cardinalem referre.

VIII. Ubi fieri poterit pars aedium episcopalium a Sancta Sede destinabitur Suffraganeo et Curiae.

IX. Ad unum Cardinalem pertinent solemnes oleorum bene-

dictiones et pontificalia in festis anni maioribus, prout in *Caere-
moniali episcoporum* descripta sunt; nisi forte Cardinalis ipse
velit ea Suffraganeo committere.

X. Cardinalis debet Missam, sicuti ceteri episcopi residentes,
pro populo applicare.

XI. Insigne tantum Cardinalis domui episcopali, cathedrali
aede, aliisque templis, piisve de more locis et actis Curiae
apponatur.

XII. Solium in dioecesi et nomen in canone Cardinali uni
competit.

XIII. Cardinalis, etiam absens, facultate pollet per universam
dioecesim largiendae indulgentiae dierum biscentum.

XIV. Uni Cardinali, quo tempore in dioecesi commoratur,
ius est pontificalia in eadem peragendi aut permittendi.

XV. Beneficia Capitulorum sive cathedralium sive colle-
gialium et beneficia parochialia Sanctae Sedi non reservata,
nequeunt a Suffraganeo, servatis servandis, conferri absque
Episcopi Cardinalis consensu.

XVI. Cardinalis ius est vigilandi dioecesim, et, si oppor-
tunum duxerit, etiam lustrandi, ne quid fides aut ecclesiastica
disciplina detrimenti patiatur.

XVII. Potest in sua dioecesi Cardinalis matrimoniis assistere
et reliqua sacramenta ministrare omnia. Candidati tamen ad
tonsuram et ad ordines doctrinae periculo subiiciantur et pro-
bentur a Suffraganeo; cui ceterum non licet ordines conferre,
aut conferendos alii committere absque venia Cardinalis.

XVIII. Synodus haberi nequit sine consensu Cardinalis;
eiusque nomine convocanda est. Synodi autem decreta ante-
quam promulgentur, Cardinali cognoscenda deferantur, eiusque
nomine promulgari debent.

XIX. Beneficia etiam parochialia in dioecesi ne uniantur,
dividantur, dismembrentur, inaudito Cardinali.

XX. Idem Cardinalis audiri debet, antequam Seminarii rector,
professores, oeconomus nominentur.

XXI. Vita functo Suffraganeo vel renuntiante vel ad aliam
dioecesim translato, Cardinalis per vicarium dioecesis administra-
tioni providebit, donec a Sancta Sede nominetur successor.

XXII. Vita functo Cardinali eadem debentur iusta funebria
quae Cardinali Episcopo residenti.

Igitur quaecumque his Litteris decreta, declarata, sancita
sunt ab omnibus ad quos pertinet servari volumus ac mandamus,
eaeque rata, valida, firma in omnes partes esse ac fore decernimus,

contrariis non obstantibus quibuscumque, etiam specialissima mentione dignis. Cardinales autem qui modo Suburbicariis dioecesium praesunt, eas regere pergant, ut ante, nisi velint ac petant praesenti Constitutioni se accommodare.

Datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum, anno Incarnationis Dominicae millesimo nongentesimo decimo, die 15 Aprilis, Pontificatus Nostri anno septimo.

C. CARD. DE LAI, S.C.C. *Secretarius.*

A. CARD. AGLIARDI, S.R.E. *Cancellarius.*

Loco ✠ Plumbi.

Visa : M. Riggi C. A., *Not.*

NEW SODALITY IN SWITZERLAND

LITTERAE APOSTOLICAE

ERECTIO SODALITII SUB TITULO MISSAE REPARATRICIS IN ARCHISODALITATEM PRO UNIVERSA HELVETIA CUM FACULTATE AGGREGANDI ET CUM COMMUNICATIONE INDULGENTIARUM

PIUS PP. X

Ad perpetuam rei memoriam.—Refert ad Nos dilectus filius Ioannes Ev. Kleiser, protonotarius apostolicus et canonicus B. Mariae Virginis Friburgi, per decretum sub die XXIV Novembris mensis, anno MDCCCXCIX, ab Ordinario dioecesis Lausannensis et Genevensis editum in instituto Societatis Marienheim appellatae, Friburgi Helvetiorum, canonice erectam fuisse piam sodalitatem sub titulo Missae Reparatricis, ipsumque Ioannem sive alium sacerdotem ab eodem delectum atque in munere successorem, confraternitatis illius Rectorem fuisse designatum. Finis sodalitatis enunciatae est honorem Dei a christianis omissione Missae festivis diebus laesum per alterius Missae auditionem piare, ita ut sodales iidem praeter Missam consuetam, diebus dominicis ac de praecepto festis, quasi locum christifidelium negligentium obtinentes, alteram Missam audire teneantur, et si gravi de causa impediuntur, quominus ad alterum sacrum illis diebus assistant, fas sit ipsis vel se Eucharisticis dapibus eadem illa dominica reficere, vel intra hebdomadam Sacro adstare.

Verum cum praedictae Sodalitates iam in Gallia, Belgio, Hollandia, Austria, Britannia, Hispania ac Germania institutae sint respective Nationales, id est in unaquaque natione Archi-

sodalitas existat, reliquarum centrum et caput ; et supradicto Friburgensis sodalitiū Moderatori, in votis admodum sit, ut societatem eandem Friburgi erectam, ad gradum ac dignitatem archisodalitiū pro tota Helvetia evehere dignemur, additis peculiaribus indulgentiis, quae iam concessae sunt similibus archisodalitatibus, et nuperrime archisodalitio dioecesis Argentinensis per similes apostolicas litteras die XXV Iunii mensis, anno MDCCCXVI datas ; Nos votis his annuendum, quantum in Domino possumus, existimamus. Itaque ut frugifera huiusmodi societas potiora capiat incrementa, illi omnes et singulas indulgentias conferimus quibus Argentinensis archisodalitas pollet. Nimirum omnibus et singulis fidelibus ex utroque sexu qui ipsam Friburgensem a Missa Reparatrice nuncupatam societatem in posterum ingredientur, die primo eorum ingressus, si vere poenitentes et confessi Sacram Synaxim sumpserint, plenariam ; ac tum inscriptis quam in posterum inscribendis eadem in societate sodalibus in cuiuslibet eorum mortis articulo, si item vere poenitentes et confessi, vel, quatenus id facere nequiverint, nomen Iesu ore, si potuerint, sin minus corde devote invocaverint, et mortem tamquam peccati stipendium submisso animo susceperint, etiam plenariam ; denique iisdem nunc et posterum similiter existentibus societatis eiusdem sociis, si item admissorum confessione expiati ac coelestibus epulis refecti, singulis annis die festo Perdolentis Virginis ab ortu, et die festo Sanctae Annae Deiparae Virginis Matris, dominica infra octavam sollemnitatis SS. Corporis Christi Domini, et feria quinta in Coena Domini, a primis vespere ad occasum solis dierum huiusmodi, propriam respectivae societatis ecclesiam, si extet in locis ubi ipsi sodales degunt, secus cuiusque curiale, aut aliud quodvis publicum templum visitent, ibique pro Christianorum Principum concordia, haeresum extirpatione, peccatorum conversione ac S. Matris Ecclesiae exaltatione pias ad Deum preces effundant, quo ex iis die id agant similiter plenariam omnium peccatorum suorum indulgentiam et remissionem misericorditer in Domino concedimus. Insuper iisdem confratribus sive sororibus, quoties corde saltem contrito, iuxta societatis tabulas pietatis quodvis sive charitatis opus exerceant, de numero poenaliū dierum in forma Ecclesiae consueta expungimus sexaginta. Sed largimur fidelibus iisdem si malint fas sit, excepta plenaria in mortis articulo lucranda indulgentia, reliquis plenariis sive partialibus indulgentiis functorum vita labes poenasque expiare. Praesentibus perpetuis futuris temporibus valituris. Praeterea cum

maxime peropportunum Nobis videatur, ut etiam in Helvetia centrum constituatur pro huiusmodi Sodalitio, apostolica Nostra auctoritate, praesentium vi, perpetuumque in modum Sodalitatem superenunciatam a Missa Reparatrice nuncupatam Friburgi Helvetiorum erectam in Instituto Societatis *Marienheim* appellatae in Archisodalitatem cum propriis privilegiis erigimus atque instituimus.

Archisodalitatis autem sic erectae Moderatori potestatem facimus nominandi zelatores atque zelatrices facultate gaudentes legitime ac valide recipiendi atque aggregandi sodales. Ipsi denique moderatori, et memoratis zelatoribus et zelatricibus praesentibus et futuris similiter perpetuo, apostolica Nostra auctoritate concedimus, ut ipsi alias quascumque eiusdem nominis atque instituti societates in tota Helvetia existentes, canonice sibi aggregare queant; illisque omnes et singulas indulgentias, relaxationes ipsi Archisodalitati a Sede Apostolica concessas, dummodo aliis communicari possint, in forma Ecclesiae consueta communicare valeant, servatis tamen Clementis PP. VIII Nostri Praedecessoris Constitutione, aliisque apostolicis ordinationibus desuper editis. Decernentes praesentes litteras firmas, validas et efficaces existere et fore, suosque plenarios et integros effectus sortiri et obtinere, illisque ad quos spectat et spectare poterit in omnibus et per omnia plenissime suffragari, sicque in praemissis per quoscumque iudices ordinarios et delegatos iudicari et definiri debere, atque irritum et inane, si secus super his a quoquam, quavis auctoritate, scienter vel ignoranter contigerit attentari. Non obstantibus contrariis quibuscumque. Volumus autem ut praesentium litterarum transumptis, seu exemplis etiam impressis, manu alicuius notarii publici subscriptis, et sigillo personae in ecclesiastica dignitate constitutae munitis, eadem prorsus fides adhibeatur, quae adhiberetur ipsis praesentibus si forent exhibitae vel ostensae.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum, die VI Aprilis, MCMX, Pontificatus Nostri anno septimo.

R. CARD. MERRY DEL VAL, *a Secretis Status*.

L. ✠ S.

THE 'MISSA PRO POPULO'

S. CONGREGATIO CONCILII

THEANEN (THEANO)

MISSARUM PRO POPULO

Die 9 Aprilis, 1910

SYNOPSIS DISPUTATIONIS.—In oppido Gallutii dioecesis Theanensis sex numerantur paroeciae, quarum quinque iam a remoto tempore unitae sunt paroeciae principali, quae insimul Collegiata est sub titulo S. Stepheni protomartyris. De his quinque paroeciis disceptatur an verae paroeciae sint a principali distinctae, et an earumdem rectores oneri celebrandi Missam pro populo diebus festis subesse debeant. Cum enim hodiernus Episcopus praefatos parochos monuisset ut, iuxta indultum sibi a Sacra Congregatione concessum, in festis suppressis Missam ad Episcopi mentem litarent in bonum seminarii, parochi nonnisi ad tempus et in obsequium Episcopi iussa ipsius facere declaraverunt, asserentes in vim unionis unicam tantum eo in oppido paroeciam existere, et proinde 'che non sono obbligati a celebrare *ad mentem Episcopi* le Messe nei dì festivi abrogati, come hanno sempre praticato a non celebrarle sino alla venuta dell' Amministratore Apostolico Mons. Caracciolo. Che se per questo applicarono le poche Messe, fu perchè in Curia si disse che ciò era *ad tempus* per supplire alle spese straordinarie dallo stesso sostenute e che si sostenevano per la stessa amministrazione. Che se al venerato ordine dell' E. V. R^{ma} i sottoscritti pure si sono finora uniformati, lo è stato per lo stesso intendimento, cioè delle spese non lievi dall' E. V. sopportate, e non perchè siano tenuti.' Instabant itaque apud Episcopum, ut 'voglia confermare la pratica da essi poveri parroci sempre tenuta, di celebrare cioè le sole annue Messe ventitrè per ognuno e sgravarli da altro peso non dovuto.' Ut autem statim intelligatur quare de obligatione celebrandi tantum annuas Missas 23 parochi loquantur, referam Capitulum Collegiatae S. Stephani, cui sex parochi adnumerabantur, ob imminutos redditus, anno 1850, obtinuisse a S. Congregatione EE. et RR. sanationem et condonationem praecedentium omissionum et pro futuro 'usque dum *le risaie* ad pristinum statum restituantur' reductionem onerum Missarum et annuas 270, quae ex fundatione 1135 erant. Porro, suppressa Collegiata, cum ex canonicis tantum sex parochi supersint, hi suae obligationi satisfaciunt applicando annuatim

unusquisque Missas 23, scilicet eam partem quae unicuique canonico obtigeret pro rata reditus. Notandum praeterea in precibus S. C. EE. et RR. oblati anno 1850 additum non fuisse elenchum legatorum quorum reductio postulabatur; verum ceu de more munus rescriptum exequendi et conficiendi novam tabellam Episcopo commissum fuit, qui hoc postremum negotium Capituli Primicerio concredidit. Porro in nova tabella a Primicerio confecta, quam modo exhibent parochi et de cuius authenticitate Episcopus dubium non movet, primo loco ponuntur: *Missae pro populo*, quae ex 365 ad annuas 91 reductae fuerunt. Haec est quaestio, quam Episcopus resolvere non audet et quam proinde S. V. O. definiendam proposuit.

Cum autem quaestionis solutio praecipue desumenda videatur ex natura quinque paroeciarum, quae nunc sub titulo sunt S. Mariae del Casale, S. Iacobi Apostoli, S. Bartholomaei Apostoli, S. Laurentii et SS. Clementis et Donati, praestat documentum antiquius quod habetur unionis ecclesiarum Gallutii ecclesiae S. Stephani referre. Huiusmodi documentum est Bulla quaedam Iulii II, anno 1505 nono calendas Februarii data, in qua haec inter cetera leguntur: 'Nobis nuper exhibita petitio continebat, quod olim b. m. Angelo tit. S. Laurentii in Damaso Presb. Card. in Regno Siciliae et Terra citra pharum dictae Sedis Legato pro parte tunc archipresbyteri dictae ecclesiae S. Stephani et praefatorum Capituli exposito, quod ecclesiae S. Andreae de Carpulo et S. Mariae de Sipicciano ac S. Donati de Sancto Donato, necnon S. Reparatae de Sancta Reparata, et S. Clementis de Sancto Clemente ac S. Honuphrii de Sancto Honuphrio, necnon S. Quiri de Sancto Quiro et S. Mariae de Casali parochiales, ac S. Blasii de Sancto Blasio, nec non S. Silvestri de Sancto Silvestro . . . sine cura ecclesiae territorii sive districtus terrae Gallutii dictae dioecesis a tempore foundationis earumdem ecclesiarum et per tantum tempus, cuius initii memoria hominum non existebat, fuerant et esse consueverunt ac tunc existebant immediate subiectae dictae ecclesiae S. Stephani ac eidem Capitulo, etc. . . . Idem Angelus Cardinalis et Legatus tunc archipresbyteri et Capituli S. Stephani praedictorum in ea parte supplicationibus inclinatus, praefatas ecclesias . . . cum omnibus iuribus et pertinentiis suis eidem ecclesiae Sancti Stephani, seu illius mensae Capitulari, auctoritate suae legationis perpetuo univit, concessit et incorporavit, ita quod liceret eidem archipresbytero et Capitulo S. Stephani per se, vel alium seu alios corporalem possessionem unitarum ecclesiarum et cappellaniae iuriumque et per-

tenantiarum praedictorum propria auctoritate libere apprehendere et perpetuo retinere illarumque fructum redditus et proventus in suos ac mensae et unitarum ecclesiarum et cappellaniae huiusmodi usus et utilitatem convertere, etc. . . . Cum autem sicut eadem petitio subiungebat ut ipse archipresbyter et Capitulum S. Stephani in pacifica possessione tam parochialium quam sine cura ecclesiarum et cappellaniae unitarum praedictarum a tanto tempore, cuius memoria hominum non existit, fuerint et sint, illarum curam et gubernationem canonicis, presbyteris et clericis dictae ecclesiae S. Stephani committendo, ita ut fructus earundem unitarum ecclesiarum et cappellaniae inter omnes canonicos, prebyteros et clericos ac alias personas ipsius ecclesiae S. Stephani, ac aliis unitis ecclesiis praedictis ita divinis officiis deservientes distribuantur et dividantur, ac ratione divisionis huiusmodi singuli canonici, presbyteri et clerici eiusdem ecclesiae S. Stephani unam congregationem sive societatem inter se facere videantur, sintque etiam ipsi Capitulum et canonici S. Stephani in pacifica possessione, vel quasi, eligendi ad archipresbyteratum, etc. . . . Nobis fuit humiliter supplicatum ut unioni, annexioni, incorporationi et consuetudini praedictis, pro illarum subsistentia firmiori, robur Apostolicae confirmationis adiicere, ac pro potiori cautela singulas parochiales et sine cura, per dictum Angelum Cardinalem et Legatum unitas de novo, ac post unionem huiusmodi fundatas ecclesias praedictas praefatae mensae perpetuo unire, adnectere et incorporare aliasque in praemissis opportune providere de benignitate Apostolica dignaremur. Nos igitur . . . huiusmodi supplicationibus inclinati, unionem, annexionem, incorporationem et consuetudinem praedictas auctoritate Apostolica tenore praesentium approbamus et confirmamus, supplemusque omnes et singulos defectus si qui forsitan intervenerint in eisdem, et nihilominus pro potiori cautela parochiales et sine cura, ut praefertur, unitas ac post unionem huiusmodi fundatas singulas ecclesias praedictas, quibusvis modis et ex quorumcumque personis seu per literas resignationes, etc. . . . cum omnibus iuribus et pertinentiis suis eidem mensae capitulari de novo respective perpetuo auctoritate et tenore praedictis unimus, adnectimus et incorporamus, ita quod liceat eisdem archipresbytero et Capitulo per se vel alium seu alios corporalem possessionem per dictum Legatum unitarum continuare . . . proviso quod propter unionem, annexionem et incorporationem huiusmodi parochiales et sine cura ecclesiae unitae singulae praedictae debitis non fraudentur obsequiis et

animarum cura in dictis parochialibus ecclesiis nullatenus negligatur, sed illarum ac sine cura ecclesiarum singularum praedictarum congrua supportentur onera consueta. Nos enim ex nunc irritum decernimus et inane, etc.' Sequuntur suetae clausulae irritantes.

Adest praeterea vetus exemplar sessionis Synodi Provincialis Capuanae in qua coram Archiepiscopo et Episcopis comparuit archipresbyter oppidi Gallutii qui, postquam superius exposita commemoravit et Bullam Iulii II exhibuit, retulit: 'Datum est nuper intelligi Reverendissimum Ordinarium Theanensem velle aliquid supradictis innovare, et Capitulo suas ecclesias parochiales praedictas ad libitum conferre, et desuper Bullam praedictam, ut superius dictum est, expeditam et concessam dictis Capitulo et canonicis, ut dictat, observari petit comparens ipsi nomine, quo in dicta Provinciali Synodo per Ill^{mos} et R^{mos} DD. Archiepiscopum et Episcopum ordinari et decerni dictos canonicos et Capitulum S. Stephani praedicti esse manutenendos in eorum pacifica possessione nihilque innovari circa unionem praedictam et perceptionem et divisionem fructuum ac potestates eligendi personas in dicta ecclesia S. Stephani ad archipresbyteratum et primiceriatum iuxta etc., et nihil innovari, cum omni qua decet reverentia, tenorem Bullae praedictae, et ita petit et supplicat omni modo meliori.' Subditur autem: 'Cura animarum sit apud Collegium, exercitium vero cum sit approbatarum personarum a R^{mo} Episcopo secundum formam S. Concilii Tridentini ex eodem tamen Collegio, sine Bullis illius. Provisum per Ill^{num} et R^{num} D. Archiepiscopum Capuae de voto et concilio R^{morum} Episcoporum ibidem praesentium. Capuae die 10 Novembris, 1577.'

His praemissis ad facta enucleanda, referam parochos oppidi Gallutii instare ut declarentur immunes ab onere Missae pro populo sequentes ob rationes:

'Perchè la natura del beneficio, che ciascuno di essi parroci possiede, ha carattere non di vera parrocchia ai sensi del S. C. di T. (sess. XXIV, cap. 13, de *Reform.*), ma di una vera economia. In altri termini il beneficio che ciascun parroco possiede non è originariamente di istituzione parrocchiale. Esse non rappresenta che una prebenda del patrimonio collettivo della Collegiata.

'Che a comprovare meglio la natura del beneficio, essi parroci presentano al loro Ecc^{mo} O. D. l'originale Bolla di Giulio II, 9 Febbraio, 1505 . . . nonchè un manoscritto antico di pag. 22, ed una decisione del Sinodo Provinciale di Capua del 10 Nov.,

1577 sull'indole e natura della Collegiata di S. Stefano, che cioè : *Cura animarum sit apud Collegium, exercitium vero cum sit approbatarum personarum a Revmo Episcopo, secundum formam Concilii Tridentini, ex eodem tamen Collegio sine Bullis illius.* E da ciò risulta chiaro, che, secondo la costituzione della Collegiata, i parroci non sono che tanti Vicari della stessa.

‘ In qual modo poi debba intendersi la unione delle parrocchie alla Collegiata di S. Stefano, oltre che risulta dalla stessa Bolla, virtù della quale, come collettiva ed unica è la cura *apud collegium*, collettivo ed unico è pure il peso, si fa chiaro ancora :

‘ a) dai libri delle Messe, dai quali risulta (si presenta all' Ordinario Diocesano il libro dal 1805 al 1830) che le Messe *pro populo* e Pii Legati si portavano dal Collegio Capitolare, ripartite per 12 Canonici e 4 Porzionari, compresi i Canonici Parroci ; quale ripartizione non avrebbe avuto luogo se le Parrocchie fossero state autonome e la cura non fosse stata collettiva ;

‘ b) dal fatto che presso niuna Parrocchia, ma solo presso la Collegiata, trovasi il libro delle Messe *pro populo* e dei Pii Legati.

‘ Perchè, venuta la soppressione della Collegiata, ogni Canonico non Parroco ebbe dal Demanio, per la prebenda soppressa, un assegno di circa L. 200, e ai Canonici Parroci, ai quali sono successi gli attuali parroci, fu fatta salva la sola prebenda in grazia della cura. Sicchè i 6 Parroci, successori dei 6 Canonici Parroci della Collegiata, posseggono, ognuno, quella prebenda che possedeva il Canonico Parroco, la quale essendo spoglia della quotorale e cultuale, già in potere del Demanio, appena dà, al netto, L. 200 annue, giusta la liquidazione fatta dal Fondo per il Culto.

‘ Infine giova far osservare per ragione che, *similia similibus*, anche nei Comuni limitrofi di Mignano, diocesi di Teano, di circa 3600, e di Roccadevandro, diocesi di Monte Cassino, di circa 3500 abitanti, vi sono delle Chiese Collegiali sopresse, nelle quali pure unica era la cura e collettiva la Messa *pro populo*, e con questa differenza, che mentre in ciascuno dei detti due Comuni la popolazione è uguale a quella del Comune di Galluccio, forse pure superiore ; la prebenda, fatta salva per cura, in quella di Roccadevandro tiene un reddito netto sopra le L. 1000, ed in quella di Mignano sopra le L. 800.’

Afferunt praeterea rescriptum S. C. EE. et RR. et elenchum Missarum, de quibus supra, ex quibus confirmari contendunt onus applicandi Missas *pro populo* Capitulo Collegiatae S. Stephani inesse, ideoque ab eo sex parochos, qui non sunt nisi Capituli vicarii amovibiles, exemptos esse declarandos.

Ex alia vero parte Episcopus rationem dubitandi habet ex eo quod, quidquid de antiqua unione sit, in facto modo sex parochi 'hanno avuto Bolla propria, hanno chiesa propria con propri redditi, indipendente l'uno dall'altro nel ministero parrocchiale, hanno popolazione propria, e ciascuno è fornito di separata prebenda ed hanno anche il supplemento di congrua.'

Ceterum observari posset haud bene perspectum esse ex superius relatis documentorum verbis per unionem ecclesiarum parochialium ecclesiae Collegiatae Sancti Stephani immutatam fuisse earum naturam ita ut ex pluribus paroeciis una tantum efformanda esset. Siquidem in Bulla Iulii II semper distinctio manet et repetitur inter ecclesias parochiales et ecclesias sine cura animarum quae Collegiatae unitae fuerunt, ac de omnibus expresse cavetur: 'provisio quod propter unionem, annexionem et incorporationem huiusmodi parochiales et sine cura ecclesiae unitae singulae praedictae debitis non fraudentur obsequiis, et animarum cura in dictis parochialibus ecclesiis nullatenus negligatur, sed illarum . . . congrua supportentur onera consueta.' Quoad reliqua tandem animadvertendum videtur rescriptum S. C. EE. et RR. et elenchum Missarum allatum evidenter ad rem non facere: factum vero quod hucusque parochi se non obligari putarunt ad Missas *pro populo* et illas non applicarunt, non posse in re, de qua agimus, argumentum constituere ad illos ab onere eximendos, cum non constet non esse abusum, et quia contra Tridentini decreta vim non haberet consuetudo, etsi legitima admitteretur.

Hisce habitis, ad propositum dubium:

An parochi oppidi Gallutii exempti sint ab obligatione applicandi Missam pro populo in casu;

Emi Patres S. C. Concilii, in plenis comitiis die 9 Aprilis, 1910, respondendum censuerunt: *Non constare.*

C. CARD. GENNARI, *Praefectus.*

BASILIIUS POMPII, *Secretarius.*

L. ✠ S.

NEW RULE OF CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE

S. CONGREGATIO CONSISTORIALIS

NOVA APOSTOLICAE CANCELLARIAE REGULA PRO SUBSCRIPTIONE CONSTITUTIONUM APOSTOLICARUM

De novis Apostolicis Constitutionibus edendis post ea quae in Apostolica Constitutione '*Sapienti consilio*' statuta sunt,

SSm̃us Dominus Noster Pius PP. X, audito quorundam Eñorum S. R. E. Cardinalium consilio, decernere dignatus est, ut Constitutionibus huiusmodi in posterum una subscribant Cardinalis S. R. E. Cancellarius, et Cardinalis qui officio praeest ad cuius competentiam res pertinet in eadem Constitutione pertractata; et ut duplex earumdem Constitutionum exemplar, alterum a Summo Pontifice, alterum a memoratis patribus Cardinalibus subscriptum in Apostolicae Cancellariae tabulario custodiatur et servetur.

Die 15 Aprilis, 1910.

De speciali mandato SSm̃i D. N. Pii Papae X.

R. CARD. MERRY DEL VAL, *a Secreti; Status.*

USE OF CALENDAR BY REGULARS IN CHARGE OF A PARISH

S. CONGREGATIO RITUUM

SECOVIEN (SECKAU)

DE USU KALENDARIi PRO REGULARIBUS, QUI PAROECIAM IN
DIOECESI ADMINISTRANT

Hodiernus Rñus Dñus Episcopus Secoviensis, a Sacra Rituum Congregatione reverenter petiit solutionem sequentis dubii:

An Regulares, qui Paroeciam in dioecesi administrant, sive Ecclesia Parochialis sit Monasterio incorporata sive non, teneantur in Missis servare Kalendarium Ordinis, an Kalendarium Dioecesanum?

Et Sacra Rituum Congregatio, exquisito voto Commissionis Liturgicae, proposito dubio ita respondendum censuit: Si Paroecia sit Monasterio vel Domui Religiosae incorporata, aut eiusdem Monasterii seu Domus curae in perpetuum vel indefinitum tempus concredita, vel Communitas apud ipsam Parochialem Ecclesiam Divina peragat Officia, in Missis Kalendarium Religiosorum semper adhibeatur; secus item in Missis Kalendarium Dioecesanum semper servetur; iuxta Decreta num. 4051 *Urbis*, 15 Decembris, 1899, et *Canonicorum Regularium Lateranensium Congregationis Austriae*, 11 Februarii, 1910.

Atque ita rescripsit, die 22 Aprilis, 1910.

L. ✠ S. FR. S. CARD. MARTINELLI, S.R.C., *Praefectus.*
PETRUS LA FONTAINE, *Epis. Charystien., Secretarius.*

APOSTOLIC LETTER TO THE CHAPLAINS OF THE
BASILICA OF LOURDES

LITTERAE APOSTOLICAE

CAPELLANIS BASILICAE LAPURDENSIS (LOURDES), DIOECESIS
TARBIENSIS, INSIGNIA CHORALIA CONCEDUNTUR

PIUS PP. X

Ad perpetuam rei memoriam.—E Lapurdensi Basilica in honorem Immaculatae Beatae Virginis immani structura ac mirificis artis operibus intra fines dioecesis Tarbiensis erecta atque ornata, quasi e fonte perenni in universum terrarum orbem caelestia charismata manant. Huc innumerae fidelium turmae gratiarum sequestrae Virginis opem implorantium, non intermissa peregrinatione confluunt tam flagranti germanae pietatis studio, ut ibidem praesenti tempestate veterum christianorum religio reviviscere videatur. Quare cum idem templum inter insigniora catholici nominis sanctuaria iure meritoque recenseatur, consentaneum rationi existimamus, clerum qui eadem in Basilica divino cultui inservit, sacrorum etiam insignium ornamento renidere, ut simul et christianae plebis obsequium sibi magis magisque conciliet, et ipso habitu prodatur quantum amplitudine ac dignitate ceteris antecellat. Hoc consilio cum venerabilis frater Franciscus Xaverius Schoepfer, Episcopus Tarbiensis, preces Nobis exhibuerit, gravissimo commendationis officio suffultas Cardinalis Sacrorum Rituum Congregationi Praefecti, ut Capellanis titularibus ipsius Basilicae Lapurdensis peculiaria quaedam choralia insignia de benignitate Apostolica largiri dignaremur, Nos votis his annuendum libenti quidem animo censuimus. Quare ex certa scientia ac matura deliberatione Nostris deque Apostolicae Nostrae potestatis plenitudine, praesentium vi, perpetuumque in modum concedimus, ut capellani titulares Basilicae B. Mariae Virginis Immaculatae vulgo de *Lourdes* appellatae, intra fines sitae dioecesis Tarbiensis, nunc et in posterum existentes, induere queant lineum amiculum manicatum sive rochetum, nec non desuper mozetam sericam nigri coloris cum subsuto, ocellis, globulis ac fimbriis coloris violacei. Largimur insuper ut gestare queant chordulam coloris caerulei e collo pendentem cum numismate quod ex adversa parte Lapurdensis Virginis Imaginem referat, aversa autem effigiem nostram, hoc inscripto titulo ' Pius X Pont. Max., instante Francisco Xaverio Schoepfer, Episcopo Tarbiensi,

anno Iubilaei Apparitionis expleto, concessit, MCMIX.' Verum concedimus, ut Capellanis titularibus memoratae Basilicae Lapurdensis liceat deferre insignia huiusmodi intra limites dioecesis Tarbiensis : Capellani vero ad honorem B. M. V. Lapurdensis, id est sacerdotes extra-dioecesani, annuente eorundem Ordinario, a venerabili fratre Episcopo Tarbiensi absque numeri limitatione ad hanc dignitatem nominati, tantum in templo Deo sacro in honorem B. M. V. in oppido Lapurdensi uti possint vestibus et signis Capellanis ordinariis in dicto templo inservientibus concessis. Decernentes praesentes litteras firmas, validas atque efficaces semper existere et fore, suosque plenarios et integros effectus sortiri et obtinere, illisque ad quos spectat et in posterum spectabit, in omnibus et per omnia plenissime suffragari, sicque in praemissis per quoscumque iudices ordinarios et delegatos iudicari et definiri debere, atque irritum esse et inane, si secus super his a quoquam, quavis auctoritate, scienter vel ignoranter contigerit attentari. Non obstantibus Constitutionibus et Ordinationibus Apostolicis ceterisque contrariis quibuscumque.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum sub annulo Piscatoris, die V Iulii, MCMIX, Pontificatus Nostri anno sexto.

L. ✠ S.

R. CARD. MERRY DEL VAL, *a Secretis Status*.

DECISIONS OF THE BIBLICAL COMMISSION

COMMISSIO DE RE BIBLICA

DE AUCTORIBUS ET DE TEMPORE COMPOSITIONIS PSALMORUM

I. Utrum appellationes *Psalmi David*, *Hymni David*, *Liber psalmorum David*, *Psalterium Davidicum*, in antiquis collectionibus et in Conciliis ipsis usurpatae ad designandum Veteris Testamenti Librum CL psalmorum ; sicut etiam plurium Patrum et Doctorum sententia, qui tenuerunt omnes prorsus Psalterii psalmos uni David esse adscribendos, tantam vim habeant, ut Psalterii totius unicus auctor David haberi debeat ?

Resp. Negative.

II. Utrum ex concordantia textus hebraici cum graeco textu alexandrino aliisque vetustis versionibus argui iure possit, titulos psalmorum hebraico textui praefixos antiquiores esse versione sic dicta LXX virorum ; ac proinde si non directe ab auctoribus ipsis psalmorum, a vetusta saltem iudaica traditione derivasse ?

Resp. Affirmative.

III. Utrum praedicti psalmoreum tituli, iudaicae traditionis testes, quando nulla ratio gravis est contra eorum genuinitatem, prudenter possint in dubium revocari ?

Resp. Negative.

IV. Utrum, si considerentur Sacrae Scripturae haud infrequentia testimonia circa naturalem Davidis peritiam, Spiritus Sancti charismate illustratam in componendis carminibus religiosi, institutiones ab ipso conditae de cantu psalmoreum liturgico, attributiones psalmoreum ipsi factae tum in Veteri Testamento, tum in Novo, tum in ipsis inscriptionibus, quae psalmis ab antiquo praefixae sunt ; insuper consensus Iudaeorum, Patrum et Doctorum Ecclesiae, prudenter denegari possit praecipuum Psalterii carminum Davidem esse auctorem, vel contra affirmari pauca dumtaxat eidem regio Psalti carmina esse tribuenda ?

Resp. Negative ad utramque partem.

V. Utrum in specie denegari possit davidica origo eorum psalmoreum, qui in Veteri vel Novo Testamento diserte sub Davidis nomine citantur, inter quos prae ceteris recensendi veniunt psalmus II *Quare fremuerunt gentes* ps. XV *Conserva me, Domine* ; ps. XVII *Diligam te, Domine, fortitudo mea* ; ps. XXXI *Beati quorum remissae sunt iniquitates* ; ps. LXVIII *Salvum me fac, Deus* ; ps. CIX *Dixit Dominus Domino meo* ?

Resp. Negative.

VI. Utrum sententia eorum admitti possit qui tenent, inter psalterii psalmos nonnullos esse sive Davidis sive aliorum auctorum, qui propter rationes liturgicas et musicales, oscitantiam amanuensium aliasve incompertas causas in plures fuerint divisi vel in unum coniuncti ; itemque alios esse psalmos, uti *Miserere mei, Deus*, qui ut melius aptarentur circumstantiis historicis vel solemnitatibus populi iudaici, leviter fuerint retractati vel modificati, subtractione aut additione unius alteriusve versiculi, salva tamen totius textus sacri inspiratione ?

Resp. Affirmative ad utramque partem.

VII. Utrum sententia eorum inter recentiores scriptorum, qui indiciis dumtaxat internis innixi vel minus recta sacri textus interpretatione demonstrare conati sunt non paucos esse psalmos post tempora Esdrae et Nehemiae, quinimo aevo Machabaeorum, compositos, probabiliter sustineri possit ?

Resp. Negative.

VIII. Utrum ex multiplici sacrorum Librorum Novi Testamenti testimonio et unanimi Patrum consensu, fatentibus etiam

iudaicae gentis scriptoribus, plures agnoscendi sint psalmi prophetici et messianici, qui futuri Liberatoris adventum, regnum, sacerdotium, passionem, mortem et resurrectionem vaticinati sunt; ac proinde reiicienda prorsus eorum sententia sit, qui indolem psalmorum propheticam ac messianicam pervertentes, eadem de Christo oracula ad futuram tantum sortem populi electi praenuntiandam coarctant?

Resp. Affirmative ad utramque partem.

Die autem 1 Maii, 1910, in audientia utrique Riño Consultori ab actis benigne concessa, Sanctissimus praedicta responsa rata habuit ac publici iuris fieri mandavit.

Romae, 1 Maii, 1910.

FULCRANUS VIGOUROUX, P.S.S.,

LAURENTIUS JANSSENS, O.S.B.,

Consultores ab actis.

NOTICES OF BOOKS

THE LIFE OF ST. CLARE, ascribed to Father Thomas of Celano, O.S.F. (A.D. 1255-1261). Translated and edited from the earliest MSS. by Father Paschal Robinson, of the same Order, with an Appendix containing the rule of St. Clare. London: Fisher Unwin. 1910.

ST. CLARE OF ASSISI. By the Very Rev. Leopold de Cherancé, O.S.F.C. Sole authorized translation by R. F. O'Connor. London: R. & T. Washbourne. 1910.

It is natural that St. Clare should share in the glory of St. Francis, and when so much attention has been given to the seraphic friar that the reflection of it should shine on the name and fame of the holy virgin who did for the devout female sex what Francis did for his brethren. The two works just published will make the name and virtues of St. Clare better known in English-speaking countries, and nobody who reads them, or either of them, will withhold a tribute of love and veneration to the holy and gentle virgin, as seraphic and pure and unworldly as Francis was himself.

The work of Father Paschal Robinson is a translation from the early MSS. of the life and work of the saint. It is an exceedingly fascinating little volume, well written, well-illustrated, and neatly turned out. In a critical and at the same time pious introduction the author discusses the sources from which his text is drawn; and from the literary point of view this is perhaps the most important part of his work. The life of the saint is based on the work of a contemporary writer whom the author believes to be Thomas of Celano, although he admits that the identity of the biographer is by no means certain, and suggests that possibly new light may yet be thrown on the question. Whoever its author may be it is worthy of the best specimens of authentic Franciscan literature that have come down to us. I need say nothing more of the life, except to recommend it to all who wish to live even for a few days in the company of one of the purest and most attractive of the heavenly virgins the Church has honoured on its altars.

Our own countryman, Mr. R. F. O'Connor, has given us

another life of St. Clare translated from the French of the well-known Capuchin, Father Leopold de Cherancé. To the same author we are indebted for the *Lives of St. Francis of Assisi, St. Anthony of Padua, and St. Margaret of Cortona*; and, like Father Robinson, he too is an expert in Franciscan literature and all that pertains to it. His *Life of St. Clare* is written in an easy, flowing style, and is more modern in tone than that of Father Robinson. We miss in it, of course, the quaint and simple forms which abound in the work of Thomas of Celano, and are faithfully reproduced by Father Robinson; but to many it will perhaps be more welcome than the other. Both works are good; both are admirable; and those who read either or both will be the better of them.

J. F. H.

THE LIFE OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST, THE SON OF GOD.
In Meditations. By Maurice Meschler, S.J. Translated from the Fourth Edition of the German original by a Benedictine of the Perpetual Adoration. Two vols. 8vo. Freiburg: B. Herder.

THIS is the most consecutive and complete series of Meditations that have yet appeared in the life of our Divine Lord. To give an idea of the contents of the book it is necessary to state its purpose. The aim of the author is three-fold: First, to bring into stronger light all the mysteries of Holy Faith, and to show how they prove to us the divinity of the Church, the sublimity of our religion, and the beauty of the Christian life. Secondly, to present us with a picture of Christ enriched with the varied hues and tints of colouring that are reflected in the pages of the Gospels, that thus we may the more easily admire and love the exhaustless charms of His Personality. Thirdly, to give us each mystery in its own appropriate setting and with all the attendant circumstances.

It will be seen, then, that the end of the work is not so much doctrinal or exegetical as devotional. In this it differs from most of the other kindred books that have appeared in recent times. The author indeed has not entirely eschewed all the results of modern Scriptural research and Biblical interpretation. He has made use of the extensive knowledge that has been garnered in these fields by modern scholars, but only to make it subserve his main object in making the Person of our Lord the better known in order to be the better loved.

The Meditations cover the whole period of Christ's human life, with a short glimpse at His eternal life of the Word in the bosom of the Father. Every incident comes in for notice, and the lessons which it teaches are duly emphasized. The book will be sure to make for general edification. Priests and religious will find it particularly useful. The translation is done into clear and smooth flowing English.

HINTS FOR CATECHISTS ON INSTRUCTING CONVERTS. By Madame Cecilia, Religious of St. Andrew's Convent, Streatham. London: R. & T. Washbourne. 1910.

THIS work is fortunate in having its Preface written by His Grace the Archbishop of Westminster; for comparatively few people know who Madame Cecilia is, and it is interesting to hear from the Archbishop the words: 'Those who have zeal and leisure to take part in this great work of making known the Gospel of Jesus Christ in all its fullness to the multitudes of this country who know it only in a fragmentary and faultily interpreted shape, will owe a debt of grateful thanks to the authoress of *Hints for Catechists on Instructing Converts*. In this little work the fruits of a wide and ripe experience are placed at their disposal, and there are few, even among those who have had much to do with converts, who may not learn something from its pages. May the blessing of God be upon this book, for His glory and the sanctification and salvation of many souls.' I should think these words will go a long way to make a success of this little book.

J. F. H.

'AND THE WORD WAS MADE FLESH'; or, Short Meditations on the Fifteen Mysteries of the Rosary. By Ephraem. London: St. Anselm's Society.

THE author of this little volume modestly conceals his identity. He need not, however, be ashamed of his work. Unpretentious as it is, it will supply lovers of the Rosary with the means of deriving every possible fruit from this Devotion by helping them with appropriate meditations on each mystery. The plan is very simple. The description of each mystery, such as it is found in the ordinary Prayer-books is given at the head of the chapter. Then follows an explanation of the attendant circum-

stances, with moral and devotional reflections of a practical kind. The maxims taught by the various phases of the human life of Christ are emphasized and set forth as the principle that ought to guide our lives. The language is direct, simple, and clear. The booklet is certain to make the Devotion of the Rosary better known and more highly appreciated. The publication does credit to the enterprise of 'St. Anselm's Society.'

RITUS CONSECRATIONIS ECCLESIAE nach dem Römischen Pontificale für den Gebrauch des Assistierenden Klerus und der Sänger. Ratisbon, Rome, &c. : F. Pustet.

THOSE who have to assist at the Consecration of a Church will find this manual useful. It gives the text of the Roman Pontifical for the rite, together with the musical setting of the parts that are to be sung by the clergy and choir. The arrangement of the music and text with explanatory rubrical notes in a single volume will prove a very great convenience.

A PULPIT COMMENTARY ON CATHOLIC TEACHING. A Complete Exposition of Catholic Doctrine, Discipline, and Cult in Original Discourses. By Pulpit Preachers of our own Day. Vol. III : The Means of Grace. New York : Joseph F. Wagner.

A YEAR'S SERMONS. A Complete Course of Original Sermons, chiefly on the Gospels, for all the Sundays and Principal Feast-days of the Year. By Pulpit Preachers of our own Day. Fourth Series. New York : Joseph F. Wagner.


THESE two volumes of sermons belong to the same series, and form part of a plan for giving a complete exposition of Catholic Doctrine, Discipline, and Worship, by way of original discourses composed by some of the best preachers of the day. It will be observed that the work is being brought out by an enterprising American firm. Hence we shall be prepared to find that nearly all the authors of the sermons are from the same side of the Atlantic.

The reviewer is not thoroughly convinced of the utility of the sermon-book as an aid to effective preaching. It seems to him to be more desirable to go for the matter to original sources,

such as the Scriptures, Theology, and, above all, the writings of the Fathers—with whom few latter-day preachers acknowledge due familiarity—than to borrow from the sermon-book. However this may be, there will be always a large number of missionary priests who rely for their ordinary Sunday effort in the pulpit upon a cursory read of the ready-made sermon. For such as these the two volumes under review are about as good as they can easily find. The discourses are sound and practical; the style is simple, clear, and direct; the matter is well-selected, to the point, and carefully put together.

If one may form a judgment on the merits of the two volumes from reading a sermon here and there, they may be recommended as likely to offer useful suggestions to the young preacher for his ordinary Sunday discourses.

P. M.



THE JUBILEE OF HIS GRACE THE ARCHBISHOP OF DUBLIN

WE print amongst the documents of this month the autograph letter in which His Holiness Pope Pius X congratulates His Grace the Archbishop of Dublin on the silver jubilee of his Episcopate. The letter of His Holiness is couched in language of extreme cordiality and affection. Its appreciation of the life and labours of the Archbishop will bring joy to the heart of every Irish Catholic at home and abroad. No praise, no eulogy, could be more welcome to His Grace than that of the Vicar of Christ; no approval of his administration more consoling than that which refers to his diocese in the words, *quam sancte sapienterque gubernas*. Indeed, well may the Holy See crown with favours and encomiums its 'Beloved Son'; for throughout the wide domain of the Catholic Church it has had no more devoted, able, judicious and generous supporter than His Grace. In trying and critical times he has always said the word which kept his people on the right road, and at the end of twenty-five years of his administration the authority of the See of Rome is not only undimmed and unquestioned amongst the Catholics of Dublin, but is, if anything, stronger than it ever was before.

The outpouring of feeling amongst his own people, and amongst all Irishmen wherever they may be, would have

been so great and so enthusiastic on this occasion that His Grace very naturally shrank from facing the ordeal. He has just gone through what was probably one of the most laborious years of his episcopate; and whilst His Grace has never shirked any labour that tended to the advancement of religion, he has, with a modesty worthy of his greatness, recoiled before the task of listening to endless laudations of himself. The clergy of Dublin were anxious to mark in some signal way their devotion to their pastor-in-chief, to testify their sense of the impartiality, the justice, the kindliness, the consideration with which they have been ruled. Even this His Grace would not allow.

But the laity of Dublin and of Ireland were as eager as the clergy to honour the Archbishop. Some were anxious that at least he would allow his portrait to be painted by some great artist and presented to our National Gallery as a lasting memorial of the Jubilee; but they scarcely dared to make the proposal. Others had in contemplation gifts of various kinds. All these were put unreservedly under the ban.

When people remembered the breathless anxiety with which news was awaited from Rome twenty-five years ago, and the universal joy caused by the announcement that Pope Leo XIII, having taken the appointment into his own hands, had satisfied the national desire by the elevation of Dr. Walsh; when they remembered the immense relief with which the news was received, and the tremendous advance in the national life which placed in the chair of Laurence O'Toole a man in sympathy with every Irish national feeling, they were able to realize more fully the amount of their indebtedness to Dr. Walsh. Then casting their minds back over the intervening years they saw him indefatigably at work, spending himself in their service, building up the edifice—spiritual, intellectual, material—of the Church, giving every institution and every undertaking the benefit of his clear judgment and keen business capacity. In this respect Maynooth alone owes more to him than she can ever repay. She had special claims on him, indeed, but they have been fully

recognized. Nor could the part taken by His Grace in the work of education in all its grades be forgotten, and particularly the movement which he kept going unceasingly and has resulted in the University of which he is the first Chancellor. No man of his day has led a more active and laborious life, and not one has devoted gifts and acquirements of the highest order and of the most varied kind to nobler ends.

The activities of His Grace were so great in every direction that it is impossible in a brief space, writing as we do during the holidays and under difficulties, to do them anything like justice. We must, moreover, respect even the spirit of His Grace's injunction. But we cannot forget that the IRISH ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD is indebted to him for a thousand favours of one kind or another. He has been its best friend and most helpful patron for many years. He has honoured it with contributions of the greatest value. He has always been deeply interested in its welfare ; and best of all, from the editorial point of view, he has been kind and considerate, and has made allowances for many faults and shortcomings, and never shown the slightest inclination to worry the humble individual to whose inexperienced hands he entrusted it more than fifteen years ago.

We wish His Grace from our heart many happy years, and pray that he may be long spared not only to the priests and people of Dublin, but to the whole Irish race, of which he is one of the greatest and most illustrious sons.

J. F. HOGAN, D.D.

THE PRINCIPLE OF THE 'UNIFORMITY OF NATURE': ITS RELATIONS TO INDUCTION AND TO DEDUCTION

IN a previous article¹ we saw that *all* search whatsoever for a scientific knowledge or explanation of the facts of human experience presupposes that these facts are intelligible, that they have a 'sufficient reason.' Hence the *Principle of Sufficient Reason* is not a *special* presupposition of *Induction*. But since the aim of *Induction* is to reach—as far as may be—general truths or laws about certain domains of our experience, principally the domain of Physical Nature, it does and must presuppose in a special way another assumption, namely, that the agencies which it studies be uniform in their modes of operation throughout space and time. Only in so far forth as these agencies act regularly, uniformly, will our generalizations about them be reliable. About what is variable, unstable, capricious, we can make no certain or scientific general statement. We can have science only of what is orderly and amenable to law. Therefore, underlying the Inductive Process by which we establish general Laws of Nature, there is a postulate known as the *Uniformity of Nature*. It has been stated in many alternative ways by logicians, philosophers, and scientists, the most usual formula, perhaps, being this one: '*The same physical causes, acting in similar circumstances, produce similar results.*' There has been also much discussion about its precise import and relation to *Induction*, about the origin of our belief in it and the grounds on which we yield it our assent.

Before examining those questions, a word about the sphere of application of the principle may not be out of place. Strictly speaking, it applies only to the action of *non-free* or *necessitating* causes; these we call 'physical' or 'natural' causes in the present context, as distinct from the free, self-

¹ I. E. RECORD, August.

determining activity of the human will. The action of the former produces physical uniformity, that of the latter only uniformity in the wider sense—moral uniformity. But it would be a mistake to imagine that this looser and less reliable sort of uniformity which characterizes the phenomena dependent on human activity, is an insufficient groundwork for *scientific* knowledge of these domains: the very existence of the various social and economic *sciences*, their co-existence with human free-will, disproves any such assumption.¹ About the generalizations of the latter sciences we can, of course, have only moral certitude, not physical; and it is to non-free causes and to the law of physical uniformity that I now purpose to direct attention.

Is the Law of Uniformity, as understood, to apply to the action of non-free causes, an axiomatic, self-evident, necessary, 'analytic' principle—like the Principle of Causality, for example, that 'Whatever happens has a cause'? Or is it rather a derived, 'synthetic,' *mediately* evident truth, to which we assent only on grounds of experience? Some have held the former, some the latter, view. As a matter of fact the principle can be and has been interpreted in two ways. Understood as a *hypothetical* judgment, it is a self-evident, axiomatic truth; regarded as *categorical*, it is a truth of experience.

The hypothetical judgment, 'If, or whenever, or wherever, the same physical (non-free) cause acts in similar circumstances (and therefore unimpeded, not interfered with by other causes), it will always produce the same sort of effect'—is an axiomatic, analytic, self-evident judgment. For, as Father Joyce expresses it, 'the very concept of a natural agent, devoid of free-will, involves that, under the same circumstances, its action will be of the same kind.'² It is a judgment whose truth the mind grasps directly and intuitively from an adequate understanding of the notions involved in it: 'physical, non-free cause,' 'repeated action unimpeded,' 'similarity of effect.'

But the principle thus stated, makes no *categorical*

¹ Cf. Maher, *Psychology*, 4th edition, pp. 423-4.

² *Principles of Logic*, p. 237.

assertion about any individual case. It 'supposes the First Cause to preserve the ordinary operation of natural laws.'¹ This supposition is explicitly contained in the reference to 'similar circumstances.' A case of interference by the First Cause would *alter* the circumstances. Such a case would not come under the principle. As stated, therefore, the principle is metaphysically necessary. It is, moreover, *self-evident* to anyone *who understands the import of the concepts involved in it*. These, however, are complex concepts, and to acquire them is a work of time; for which reason we may admit that the principle, even understood hypothetically, is, to use the words of Mill,² 'by no means one of the earliest which any of us . . . can have' reached. It is a *propositio per se nota in se—in itself*. That is, it is an analytic, *a priori* proposition, whose truth is grasped by the mind intuitively as soon as the concepts involved in it are fully analysed and juxtaposed in thought. But we may freely admit that the principle in question is not a *propositio per se nota quoad omnes*, that it is not—like 'two and two are four'—immediately evident to everybody, because not everybody has clear and definite notions about the nature of a physical or non-free cause, its activity in similar conditions, and uniformity of effect.

We need to become familiar with the ordinary operations of Nature in order to conceive the notion of *natural cause*, i.e., of a cause which is *not free to determine itself*—as the human will does—to produce this, that, or the other effect; a cause which is *not indifferent* to any effect, but which has one definite, fixed line of action, one stable tendency which it endeavours as it were to fulfil, to satisfy by its action. But as soon as a person *has* formed, from his experience of the uniform recurrence of natural phenomena, his idea of a '*physical or natural cause or agent, acting repeatedly in similar sets of circumstances*,' he will see intuitively, by an analysis and comparison of that concept with the concept of '*uniform production of the same effect*,' a metaphysically necessary connexion.

¹ *Principles of Logic*, p. 238.

² *Logic*, III., xxi., § 2.

The Principle of Uniformity, understood in this *hypothetical* or *formal* sense, is, however, nothing more than a *purely formal* generalization of an abstract judgment, which prescind from the actual existence or occurrence of any such entity as a 'physical or non-free cause.' It does not *imply* that *there are* such causes in existence, nor that they act repeatedly in similar circumstances, but merely states that 'IF such causes do exist and act thus, they will always produce the same class of effects.'

It may perhaps be objected that we could not have formed the notion of 'non-free causes' at all, unless there *were* such causes in the world revealed to us by our senses. This, however, is scarcely so. The data of our sense-knowledge must, of course, have presented such uniformity as *suggested* the idea of 'non-free' causes to us. But we might conceivably have been mistaken in adopting that suggestion and judging that the causes of those phenomena were really non-free: just as those philosophers who deny free-will maintain that we are really mistaken in concluding from the facts of our own internal experience that we have free-will. However this may be, the *hypothetical* statement of the Principle of Uniformity evades this question of fact in regard to non-free causes. The categorical statement of the same principle, however, implies and asserts the fact of their existence.

It is not, therefore, in the *formal* generalization of the abstract principle—in the assertion that '*If (whenever, wherever, as often as) any physical cause acts in the same circumstances it will produce similar effects*'—that the difficulty lies, but in its *material* generalization, i.e., (a) in asserting that *there are and have been and will be such causes* in existence, and (b) in proving that the various cases which we allege to be actual instances illustrative of the principle are indeed such.¹

In order, for instance, to be able to apply the abstract Principle of Uniformity in (a) establishing by Induction the general law that 'An iron bar is lengthened by the

¹ Cf. Mercier, *Logique*, p. 330.

application of heat,'¹ and in (b) applying this law to any particular case, we must be able not merely to assert the *formally* general (hypothetical) principle that 'Natural or non-free causes produce the same results if they act repeatedly in similar circumstances,' but we must be able furthermore to assert categorically (a) that *heat acting on iron* is such a cause, and will therefore always lengthen an iron bar, and (b) that this particular case is really a case of an iron bar acted on by heat.

The general *categorical* assertion that '*The causes which are at work in the Physical Universe are non-free, or fixed by nature in their mode of action, and that therefore they always have acted and always will act uniformly*' goes distinctly farther than the hypothetical principle that '*If a cause is fixed necessarily to one mode of action it will act uniformly in similar circumstances.*' Yet those two distinct and separate statements are sometimes identified, or rather confounded, under the common designation of the 'Uniformity of Nature.' And those who rightly distinguish between them incline to limit the latter title to the abstract, *hypothetical* principle, describing the *categorical* assertion as *belief*² 'in the maintenance of the present order of things in the universe.' Thus Dr. Mellone, in his *Introductory Text-Book of Logic*,³ draws

an important distinction between two meanings of the Uniformity of Nature: (1) the Uniformity of Causation, (2) the maintenance of the present order of things in the universe. Experience [he continues] shows us that there are general 'laws'—i.e., kinds of orderly succession in the outward course of events: such as appear in the succession of day and night, summer and winter, seed-time and harvest, life and death. The regular succession of events in a thousand different ways accustoms us, from force

¹ We assume here, with Mill, whatever about the conventions of formal logic, that all such physical laws and general truths reached by experience, *imply the existence or occurrence* of the things and events to which they refer.

² This 'belief' extends to the past no less than to the future, to the distant as well as to the near; it is a conviction which has for its object the *existence and operation*, throughout time and space, of *natural* or *necessitating* causes.

³ Pp. 281-82.

of habit, to expect things to happen in a regular order ; and we find that the expectation is fulfilled. This constitutes an overwhelming presumption in favour of the maintenance of the present arrangements in Nature ; but it does not show that derivations from this order are impossible. An explanation, bred by experience and custom, that events will occur in a certain way is not the same as a knowledge that they must so occur ; and this knowledge is not in our possession. We have no grounds for affirming that the sun *must* rise to-morrow morning ; there is only an overwhelming presumption in favour of the expectation that it will. But the principle of Uniform Causation tells us nothing as to the permanence of the present 'choir of heaven and furniture of earth.' It only says that the same cause will have the same effect ; and to this there are no exceptions. The same cause may conceivably never act again ; but this does not affect the truth of the principle that *if* it did it would have the same effect.

But, then, is the Inductive Process, by which we establish a Law of Physical Nature ('*If S is M it is P*': '*If a bar of iron be heated it will be elongated*'), an application merely of the *hypothetical* 'principle,' or does it also involve the categorical 'belief'? The answer is that if the Laws of Physical Nature are anything more than statements of mere *abstract possibilities* ; if they are taken to imply the *actual existence and operation*, throughout space and time, of the agencies they refer to ; then the Inductive Process by which we reach them *does undoubtedly* imply not only the hypothetical principle but also the categorical belief. And that Physical Laws are interpreted in this latter sense, as informing us not about mere *abstract possibilities* but about *concrete actualities, past, present and future*, there can be no doubt. In reference to such a law, for example, as '*Heating (M) an iron bar (S) causes its elongation (P).*' Dr. Mellone¹ says that 'the connexion between *M* and *P* is independent of time and place. We can reason backwards to unobserved cases in the past, and dip into the future and be sure that *P* will always be produced by *M*.'

But *how sure* can we be about this latter? No surer than

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 265.

we can be that heat and iron (*M* and *S*) will continue to exist; for unless they continue to exist the operation can never take place. And what certitude have we that they *will* continue to exist? The physical, hypothetical certitude which Dr. Mellone describes as an 'overwhelming presumption.' In fact we cannot extend or apply a single physical law to a single *future* case—or to a single *past* or *distant* case for that matter, if it lies outside our actual experience—without assuming (*a*) that the causes it refers to are 'necessary,' 'natural,' or 'non-free' causes, and (*b*) that they have acted, are acting, or will act in the case contemplated without any obstacle or impediment from the intervention of other causes.

Similarly, Father Joyce¹ seems to take the 'Principle of Uniformity' as embodying not merely the abstract judgment that 'A non-free cause acts uniformly in similar circumstances,' but also the judgment that such causes *do* exist and act in the Universe, when he says that 'in that principle we have the guarantee that our universal judgment will be verified in fact. Our judgment that *A as such* is the cause of *a*, would help us but little, unless we further knew that in the real order the same cause does actually always produce the same effect.'

This being the sense in which Mill understood the Principle, it is no wonder that he regarded it as synthetic, as reached by experience, not as analytic and self-evident like the mere hypothetical statement of Uniformity. If, therefore, the Principle of Uniformity be understood to assert categorically our belief in the actual existence and operation, throughout space and time, of non-free causes, we have to determine (1) what are the ultimate rational grounds on which we assent to this principle and (2) what are its relations to the processes of Induction and Deduction respectively.

Firstly, as to its nature and the grounds of our assent to it. We must bear in mind that it is a synthetic, or *a posteriori* generalization from experience, about which we have

¹ *Principles of Logic*, p. 219.

physical certitude.¹ Our concept of physical or 'non-free' cause is not innate. We form it gradually from our acquaintance with *uniformity* in the processes of Physical Nature. From our experience of the uniform activities of the physical universe we abstract the notion of *necessary* or *non-free* cause, fixed in its mode of action: just as from our own internal experience of our own activity and from observation of the activities of men in general we abstract the notion of *free* or *self-determining* cause, not fixed to one mode of acting in similar circumstances. Having then defined for ourselves a non-free or physical cause as 'one which will always act the same way, by a necessity of its nature or constitution, in similar circumstances,' we *deliberately judge that the causes of which we have experience in Physical Nature verify our definition*: we judge that they will always act the same way in similar circumstances in the future as in the past, *provided something unwonted, extraordinary, unforeseen, does not occur*. Thus, while we quite recognize that at least apparent exceptions to uniformity have occurred in the past; that our knowledge of the forces of Nature is limited; that unknown agencies, not calculated by us, may have interfered and may again interfere and surprise us by upsetting our expectations; nevertheless we consider it prudent and reasonable to base upon our actual experience of general uniformity, imperfect and possibly interrupted though this may be, a firm belief or expectation that the same regularity which has obtained within the limits of our actual experience will obtain also outside these limits. Thus, actual experience of uniformity may be regarded as the *proximate, psychological* ground of our belief in uniformity beyond this experience.

But we must go farther if we are to assign an *ultimate rational justification* for this belief. If I am asked why I believe that Nature is uniform beyond the actual range of my own personal sense-experience, it will not suffice to answer: 'because I have found it uniform within this

¹ Cf. Maher, *Psychology* (4th edition), p. 420: 'The latter generalization [that the "laws of nature are constant"] is a *contingent* truth which we can easily conceive subject to exceptions.'

range.' No doubt this gives the psychological cause of my expectation that the uniformity extends beyond my experience; and no doubt I may quite prudently and reasonably act upon this belief. I may go on investigating Nature as a scientist, observing, experimenting, conjecturing general truths or laws, generalizing from experience and in this way passing beyond experience; even discovering and establishing Laws of Physical Nature: I may do all this without once pausing to inquire what rational grounds I have at any time for going a single step beyond my actual experience of Nature and inferring anything with any rational certitude about what is beyond this experience. But what right have I to infer that because a thing has existed or an event happened uniformly in a certain way, within my very limited experience, it therefore does or will or must exist or happen in the same way beyond? What right had Leibnitz to think or say that ' 'Tis all like here. . . . The present is pregnant with the future; the future may be deciphered in the past. . . . The distant is mirrored in the near'?¹ The '*leap*' beyond experience takes place in every single induction we make, because we believe in the 'Uniformity of Nature.' But what right have we to believe in it? What view of Nature will afford us a rational justification of this belief?

Philosophers differ in assigning this ultimate rational ground of our belief in the Uniformity of Nature because they differ in their views about the ultimate nature of the Universe itself. The justification scholastics offer—in common with all who admit Creation and the dependence of all Nature on the Providence of an All-wise Deity²—is simple and intelligible. By reasoning from effect to cause, by means of a *posteriori* arguments

¹ 'C'est tout comme ici. . . . Le present est gros de l'avenir; le futur se pourrait lire dans le passé. . . . l'éloigné est exprimé par le prochain.'—*Apud Venn, Empirical Logic*, pp. 81, 124.

² The Scottish school of philosophers are content to say that this belief is the natural expression of an innate, instinctive law. There is no denying the natural tendency; but to say that the belief must be 'the effect of instinct, not of reason,' is hardly to explain it. The tendency to the belief should not be called an 'instinct'; for, although its exercise is spontaneous and unreflective, still, on reflection, we can assign a rational basis for it,

whereby we apply self-evident principles, like the Principle of Causality, to the facts of sense-experience, we establish with certitude the existence of an All-Powerful, All-Wise, Supreme Being, Who has freely created the Universe, freely conserves it in existence and freely concurs with the activity of all created agencies ; Who has manifestly *ordered* and *arranged* and *designed* the Universe, the 'Cosmos' as it is rightly called ; Who has evidently endowed the agencies of this Visible Universe with *fixed* tendencies in virtue of which they act uniformly unless whenever or wherever He chooses to interfere (miraculously) with the established *physical* order for some higher (*moral*) end. Knowing all this, we know that natural causes will continue to exist and to act uniformly *in accordance with His will and as long as He wills*. Knowing, too, that He is All-Wise, we know and believe that He will not interfere with the uniformity of Physical Nature *capriciously* so as to render our reliance on it uncertain. Since He created its agencies 'for man's use and benefit,' this Divine Purpose forms a firm basis for our trust in their stability. His occasional miraculous suspensions of its laws are for our greater good, and cannot in any way weaken our belief in its general uniformity.

Thus it is that our conception of Physical Nature as the work of an All-Wise Creator and Ruler forms the ultimate rational justification of that belief in the Uniformity of Nature which is partially embodied in the formulation and application of every Physical Law. Not that we need to have deliberately convinced ourselves of God's Existence, Creation and Providence *before* we can make a single inductive generalization from actual experience in any department of natural research : we may assume the Uniformity of Nature and utilize our postulate *as scientists* without justifying to ourselves the usage we make of it. But if we want to justify *philosophically* this usage, we must of course put some rational interpretation on both Nature and Thought—upon our experience as a whole.

The Existence of God can be proved independently of the assumption that Nature is Uniform in the sense in

which this uniformity has just been explained. Hence the scholastic justification of the postulate is free from all circular reasoning in addition to being intelligible and adequate. But perhaps the fallacy is involved in applying belief in Uniformity to individual inductive generalizations before we have explicitly assigned to this belief its ultimate rational basis? No, because every such generalization is provisional: the assumption of Uniformity involved in it awaits whatever rational justification we may be able to supply for it when we reflect upon it.

Mill was right, as we have seen above,¹ in saying that belief in the general Uniformity of Nature (in the categorical sense) is 'by no means one of the earliest'² of our beliefs: it is not a mental assent which must *precede* every scientific induction we make: it is partially embodied in each and gradually extended over all Nature. But he failed utterly to assign any ground for rational, scientific certitude whether about this widest law of Uniformity of Nature or about any minor generalization reached by induction. He sought to show that the minor generalizations we make without explicit advertence or assent to the General Uniformity of Nature can be only mere *enumerative* inductions, i.e., more or less hazardous extensions of *observed* uniformities to the region *beyond* our actual experience; that our belief in the general Uniformity of Nature is a gradual summing up of these hazardous conclusions; and that nevertheless this summing-up process gives us the *highest attainable scientific* certitude about this Law of Uniformity, this widest of all generalizations. The general Uniformity of Nature, is, he teaches, a generalization from a number of less general uniformities themselves reached by a 'loose and uncertain mode of induction *per enumerationem simplicem*.' The Law of the Uniformity of Nature

is itself an instance of induction, and by no means one of the earliest which any of us, or which mankind in general, can have made. We arrive at this universal law by generalization from many laws of inferior generality. . . . As, however, all rigorous

¹ P. 230.

² *Logic*, III., xxi., § 2.

processes of induction presuppose the general uniformity, our knowledge of the particular uniformities from which it was first inferred was not, of course, derived from rigorous induction, but from the loose and uncertain mode of induction *per enumerationem simplicem*.¹

And of this latter process he had already said : ‘ It consists in ascribing the character of general truths to all propositions which are true in every instance that we happen to know of. . . . In science it carries us but a little way. We are forced to begin with it ; we must often rely on it provisionally, in the absence of means of more searching investigation.’² There is here apparently no rational basis assigned on which this ‘ loose ’ process can produce scientific certitude. Yet it is by this process we ascend to the ‘ particular uniformities,’ and, by a second application of it, from these to the ‘ general uniformity,’ on which the validity of the whole inductive process is to be based. The principle so obtained must necessarily be, as Professor Welton expresses it,

untrustworthy in a twofold degree ; for it is an inference, uncertain in its very essence, from other inferences of the same dubious character. . . . Mill’s argument on this point is indeed nothing but a *petitio principii*. We are, he says, ‘ to consider no minor generalization as proved except in so far as the law of causation confirms it ’ (III., xxi., § 3), and yet that law is to be derived from those very same minor generalizations which it is called upon to ‘ confirm.’³

Mill is, of course, mistaken in thinking that we cannot make a strict, scientific induction without having *previously* justified our belief in the general Uniformity of Nature. He thinks we can only make ‘ enumerative ’ inductions : and upon these alone he endeavours to base our belief in that general uniformity, which will then turn around and confirm them. His attempt to avoid the charge of inconsistency in basing the validity of the ‘ rigorous ’ process upon the ‘ loose and uncertain ’ process reveals once more

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid., iii., § 2.

³ Welton, *Logic*, ii., pp. 42, 43.

a rather naïve *petitio principii*. The difficulty he had to face was this: Enumerative Induction, i.e., generalizing from the mere *counting* of instances, is admittedly a hazardous process and cannot give certitude. How, then, can we be certain of the Uniformity of Nature, and through it, of our *scientific* inductions, if itself is grounded exclusively on this hazardous process of enumeration? Mill commences his answer¹ with this statement: 'Now, the precariousness of the method of simple enumeration is in an inverse ratio to the largeness of the generalization.' Assuming this, he points out that the subject-matter of the Law of Uniformity—which is the 'largest' generalization of all—is 'so widely diffused that there is no time, no place, and no combination of circumstances, but must afford an example of its truth or of its falsity,' and that it was 'never found otherwise than true.'² From this he concludes that the Law of Uniformity 'takes its place among the most firmly established as well as the largest truths accessible to science.' This is a plausible piece of reasoning until we advert to the fact that its opening statement *assumes what is to be proved*. The reason why we regard a wide enumerative induction as safer than a narrow one, the reason why one which is found to range without exception over an extensive region of time and space yields more certitude, is because we are made morally certain by it that the special observed uniformity in question is not a *casual* but a *causal* one, and *because we are already convinced that a causal uniformity will persist beyond and outside our experience*, in other words, that *Nature is Uniform*. Did we not already believe in the Uniformity of Nature, all enumerative induction, whether wide or narrow, in fact all inference beyond actual experience, would be equally hazardous. To assume thus that we can differentiate between wide and narrow inductions in an attempt to prove that we can believe Nature to be uniform is simply to beg the question at issue.

¹ *Logic*, III., xxi., § 3.

² What about his previous recognition [III., iii., § 2] of phenomena which 'seem altogether capricious,' about the 'course of nature' being 'not only uniform' but 'also infinitely various'? Again, what about miracles? Or about the impossibility of inferring what *must* be, or even what *will* be, merely from what *was* or *is*?

Mill's attempt, therefore, to assign a rational basis for belief in the Uniformity of Nature breaks down. And hence he is unable to justify the individual scientific inductions by which we establish isolated laws of Nature ; for in every one of these inductions there is a partial application of the Principle of Uniformity ; every one of them transcended the actual sense-experience of the individual ; every one of them 'did most certainly outreach the boundaries of observation as then and there obtained'¹ : and in the empiricist philosophy which reduces all knowledge to sense-experience there is nothing to justify a single step beyond the present data of the individual's sense-consciousness. This philosophy recognizes no channel of knowledge beyond the senses, and reduces all Nature, all Reality, to a mere flow of conscious sensations in the individual mind. The step, therefore, beyond what is *actually observed*—in fact, the step beyond the contents of the present transient moment of consciousness—is, for the phenomenist, at best a presumption, a 'hazard,' a 'leap,'² a speculation, about the validity of which we may have a more or less strong *expectation, hope, opinion, probability* ; but not *certitude* proper : at least, not a *scientific* or *reasoned* certitude for which any sufficient rational grounds can be assigned.

In the sensist philosophy there is room for knowledge of individual *fact* or *phenomenon* alone ; for *law, necessity, the universal*, there is no logical place. In the scholastic doctrine, that the universe is dependent on the Free-Will of an All-Wise Creator and Ruler, there is an intelligible place for *physical* or *conditional* certitude about the nature, activities and laws of physical agencies, conceived as subject to the Will and Wisdom of that Creator. The *Idealist* philosophy errs in the opposite extreme from Sensism by attributing to the processes of External Nature an absolute, metaphysical necessity to which they can have no real claim. The advocates of this philosophy—to which we have already called attention³—prefer to speak of the *Unity*

¹ Venn, *Empirical Logic*, p. 131.

² Bain, *Inductive Logic*, Book iii., chap. 1, § 1.

³ I. E. RECORD, August.

of Nature, rather than its Uniformity. They tell us that 'the world must be conceived as a systematic totality, with a thoroughgoing interrelation of parts . . . that nature is a unity . . . a system which remains identical with itself amidst the unceasing changes of relations between its parts, and which, by its own nature, necessitates and determines those changes.'¹ And they assert this 'unity' as a postulate or 'presupposition,' without which intelligible experience would be impossible.²

Now, it is true, undoubtedly, that unless the world were a harmonious system of interrelated elements, *regular, uniform, consistent with itself* throughout all its changes, we could not arrive at a rational knowledge of it ; for knowing implies defining, arranging, and classifying things ; and the validity of those processes obviously *depends on the condition that their objects have abiding, permanent natures*. Whatever is knowable, therefore, is reducible to order within a system. But in this sense the unity implied in Reality is of course *unity of order, unity by relation, not unity of being or essence* as these philosophers would have us believe. Their pantheistic postulate will not stand the test of critical analysis. In the real world as revealed to us through our senses we detect a *unity of order*, but not a *unity of being* ; we see in it manifold evidences which justify us in inferring that it is created, conserved, and ruled by some guiding Intelligence distinct from it ; but we do not by any means see in it only such *logically necessary* connexions and relations as would justify us in believing it to be a mere manifestation or evolution of the activity of some immanent Intellect. We can prove that 'the choir of heaven and furniture of earth' are dependent on Divine Providence, on the Wisdom and Free-Will of the Deity, and we can therefore be *physically, hypothetically* certain of the generalizations we reach by means of Induction about the modes of existence and activity of agencies created in time and space ; but *absolute or metaphysical* certitude about these modes of existence and activity the very

¹ Welton, *Logic*, ii., pp. 4, 5.

² Ibid.

nature of the agencies and the essential limitations of the human mind itself preclude us from ever reaching.

Passing now to the second question raised above,¹ we may inquire what is the precise rôle played by the Principal of Uniformity in every process by which we establish inductively a general physical law: what exactly is its relation to Induction? Briefly this: it is the *standard* according to which we generalize both formally and materially every abstract relation of cause and effect which we discover in the physical universe; a rule of the widest generality, the indefinite scope of which we gradually realize by the application of it to wider and wider generalizations in various departments of Nature. If we have determined by the methods of inductive analysis that a certain kind or species of physical agency, *A*, is the physical cause of *a*, we can forthwith generalize our discovery that '*A* as such is the physical cause of *a*,' by stating that 'Whenever and wherever *A* is operative there will *a* be found'; and in doing this we are only making a special application of the wider Principle of Uniformity which tells us that 'Whatever can be predicated of a physical cause or nature *in the abstract* (as *causally* connected therewith) can be predicated of all instances of that cause or nature.' It is not that the *general* Law of Uniformity is reached first, and the *narrower* law (that '*A* will produce *a*') *deduced* logically from it. In neither case—and indeed in no case—is the Induction of a General Law a *ratiocinative process*, a *logical inference*. The inductively established law is never the conclusion of an inference. Inference may have been involved in the subsidiary processes by which we reached the abstract judgment '*A* as such is the physical cause of *a*'; but the immediate mental process by which the law is reached is a process of *judgment* (following on *abstract conception*), not a *logical inference* in the strict sense of a conscious derivation of one judgment from another or others which imply the former logically.² But if Induction is not

¹ P. 234.

² Cf. Joyce, *op. cit.*, pp. 217, 227; though elsewhere he defines Induction as the 'legitimate inference of universal laws from individual cases' (p. 215): he uses the word here presumably in the wide sense of *derivation*,

inferential, there can be no meaning in the statement we meet so commonly in logical treatises that the Principle of Uniformity is the *major premiss*—*whether immediate or remote*—*of every induction*.¹ The principle does not help us to *reach the abstract truth* connecting cause and effect ('*A as such* is the physical cause of *a*'): it is in *generalizing* the latter (to '*All A's will produce a*') that the principle finds a partial application; just as in applying this generalized truth to particular cases by the syllogism the Aristotelian *Dictum de omni* is partially applied. There is, therefore, a sense in which the Law of Uniformity bears a relation to the mental ascent from particular to universal, analogous to that which the axiom of the Aristotelian syllogism, the *Dictum de omni*, bears to the descent from universal to particular.

Every deductive syllogism in the first figure is a special or narrower application of the *Dictum*. For instance, the syllogism 'Man is mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal,' may be thus expressed: 'Mortality, which is predicated of the class, man, can be similarly predicated of Socrates who belongs to that class'; from which it appears too that the *Dictum* cannot be regarded as an *ultimate major premiss* of all syllogisms in the first figure, but rather as a *fundamental, standard syllogism* ('*All M is P; S is M; therefore S is P*') symbolizing that type of mental process and by its self-evidence justifying the latter.²

So, too, Induction is a distinct mental process of ascent from particular to universal; and every such ascent is a narrower and more special exercise of the fundamental, standard, typical Induction by which we reach the widest Law of Physical Nature, viz., that *natural causes act uniformly*—that *whatever (a) has been discovered to be really due to a physical cause (A) in any observed instance or instances, will be always and everywhere produced by that cause*. And,

not in the sense of a *logically* 'inferential process' in which the Principle of Uniformity would be a major premiss (p. 218).

¹ Cf. *Palæstra Logica*, p. 130; Mellone, *op. cit.*, p. 384.

² Cf. Venn, *op. cit.*, p. 126: 'When the *Dictum* was assigned as the ground of the individual inference, all that we were doing was to generalize this latter.'

just as the *Dictum de omni* is not a principle whose truth must be consciously grasped by the mind *beforehand*, as a condition for reasoning validly by the syllogism, but is rather a generalization of the syllogistic process, implicitly involved in every syllogism and explicitly grasped only by a deliberate, reflex analysis of this process itself, so the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature is not a truth which must be grasped as a logical antecedent to justify the generalization made in each separate induction, but is rather itself a wider induction partially involved in every special induction and explicitly grasped and formulated only when the mind comes to analyse those special inductions afterwards.

In every scientific induction of a physical law, belief in the Uniformity of Nature is, therefore, operative. For we embrace the belief that the cases we are dealing with are *necessitating* causes (i.e., causes invariably followed by the same effects), when, in the first or *abstractive* stage of the process, we convince ourselves from an observed case or cases that 'the nature *A* is necessarily connected with the effect *a*.'¹ And in the second or *generalizing* stage, in which we pass from this *abstract* judgment to the *universal* judgment, 'All *A*'s will always and everywhere produce *a*,' we still more explicitly assent to what is a partial application of the general principle that 'in the real order the same cause does always actually produce the same effect.'²

But if the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature is thus shown to be a general expression or summing up of the mental process by which we pass *from* observed cases *through* the *abstract*, to the *universal* judgment—from 'Some (observed) *M*'s are *P*,' *through* '*M* as such is *P*,' to 'All *M*'s are *P*,'—is not the self-same principle equally involved in the downward process by which we pass deductively or syllogistically from the universal 'All *M*'s are *P*' to its special applications in the conclusions 'These or those *S*'s, which are (other, new, hitherto unobserved) *M*'s, are also *P*'? Undoubtedly, the Principle of Uniformity is involved in the application of the syllogism to any actual

¹Joyce, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

²Ibid.

sphere of reality. The *Dictum de omni* informs us that 'Whatever can be predicated of a class can be predicated about any member of the class.' But in order to make the predication about any *new instance* of a class in any actual sphere, we must (a) *identify the instance as a member* of that class, and (b) assume that *all the members have a stable, uniform nature which constantly demands the same predicates.*

When dealing with the merely *formal* aspect of the syllogism we regard the terms of the latter as expressing *abstract concepts* of *possible class-essences*, apart from the question of their *verification* or *realization* in any actual sphere of reality. We *suppose* each abstract thought-object to be fixed, stable, unchanging. We have not, therefore, to raise the question whether *there is really* a corresponding uniformity, regularity, stability, in the actual spheres within which we suppose these concepts to apply.

It is when we pass from the purely *formal* and hypothetical processes of arranging and *dividing abstract concepts* logically according to intension and extension, and then reasoning '*consistently*' from them, to the *material* and categorical processes of *classifying things*, of *verifying* our *definitions* of the latter and reasoning '*truly*' or '*demonstratively*' about them, that we feel called upon to justify our belief in that *real* uniformity in things, which is the objective ground and condition of our thinking, judging and reasoning rightly about them.¹

Dr. Venn, in his *Empirical Logic*,² asks the interesting question: How is it that an analysis of Induction raises the question as to the origin of our belief in the Uniformity of Nature, while no corresponding difficulty is supposed to be felt in respect of Deduction? He takes the example

¹ 'Geometrical proofs rest on the intuition of spatial relations, and algebraic on the intuition of quantitative relations . . . In fact, our belief in the uniformity of space, and in the uniform formation of the numerical series, stands to mathematical reasoning as our belief in the uniformity of nature stands to inductive. Deny them, and in either case no general proposition remains possible any longer. Nay more, no demonstration remains possible even about a particular case.'—Joseph, *Logic*, pp. 506, 507.

² P. 124.

of a man bitten by a cobra. We believe the man will die. We may assign our reason in either of two ways : —

'*Deductive*: All men who are bitten die. The man *XY* is bitten. Therefore *XY* will die.

'*Inductive*: The men *A, B, C . . .* were bitten and died. The man *XY* has also been bitten. Therefore *XY* will die.'

Ask him who gives the deductive answer why he considers that the reason he assigns is a sufficient one: he will tell you that it is so because 'what holds good of a class holds good of every member of that class.' Now ask a similar question of him who gave the inductive answer: ask him why does he consider the fact that '*A, B, C . . .* and all men who have been bitten died' to be a sufficient reason for believing that *XY* will die: he will tell you finally that he considers it to be a sufficient reason 'because Nature is uniform.' Now why is the man who gives the deductive answer let alone at this point and not called on to explain why he believes that 'What holds good of a class holds good of every member of that class,' while the man who gives the inductive answer is not let alone, but has to justify his belief that 'Nature is uniform'? I have suggested that it is because the former is not supposed to be concerned with the *application* of his class-concepts to the real world, but only with their *consistency* within the sphere of abstract thought in which they have been conceived as fixed, static, unchanging; while the latter is supposed to be concerned with the *truth* of those concepts, with *their application to the real world*, and therefore with the *existence of uniformity in the real world itself*. And hence, the moment a person attempts to *apply* a syllogism within any domain of actual reality he is committing himself to a belief in the 'Uniformity of Nature' regarding certain classes of things within that domain.

Hence, too, those logicians who are inclined to view their science as concerned exclusively with the consistency of thought refuse to go behind such ultimate *logical* generalizations as the *Dictum de omni* and the *Uniformity of Nature*. Understanding by a *logical* ground or reason for assent to

a judgment, always some *wider generalization* which includes the latter, they observe, and rightly, that there is no possible wider generalization than either of the two in question; and they conclude that the justification of our assent to such principles falls within the province of Psychology or Metaphysics rather than of Logic.¹

P. COFFEY.

¹ Cf. Venn, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

THE ALTAR AND ITS ORNAMENTS¹

THE altar is the most essential item of the entire church. In ancient times it differed very little in shape from an ordinary table. According to the present discipline the altar proper must consist of stone, and be consecrated by a Bishop.² Two kinds are distinguished: the *fixed* and the *portable*. The latter is a square or rectangular slab of marble, granite, or other durable stone of such a size that it will conveniently hold the chalice, host and ciborium. The dimensions prescribed for the Roman altar-stones are about 14 inches square and 2 thick.³ The *fixed*⁴ altar, on the other hand, consists of a single, large rectangular slab of same material resting on a base or supports, to which it is so united that the whole forms one solid structure. The size of the altar will vary with the requirements of particular places, but the standard dimensions set down the length at 10 feet, the width to the gradine at 28, and to the front of tabernacle at 22, inches, and the height above the predella about 40 inches. The thickness of the slab should be about 2 inches, or sufficient to allow the insertion of the chamber for the relics. The predella should be about 4 feet wide, and the steps leading up to it, which are usually uneven in number, might be about 6 inches high and 12 deep.⁵ The altar ought to be at some distance from the *rere* wall⁶ of the sanctuary, and its foundation should not be within 3½ feet of a sepulchre containing a corpse.⁷ The table and its supports form one solid mass. The *stipes* may assume various forms. It may consist (*a*) of four small solid walls with the centre filled up with

¹ Cf. Van Der Stappen, *Sacra Liturgia*; De Amicis, *Ceremoniale Parochorum*, tom. i., 1910.

² *Rub. Mis.*, t. xx.

³ Cf. *Visitatio Urbis*, an. 1894.

⁴ Fixed Altar in Canon Law has a different meaning.

⁵ Authors say that the predella should be of wood on account of the coldness of the marble.

⁶ Cf. *Pontifical, Cons. All.*

⁷ Cf. n. 3944.

masonry ; or (b) of three walls with a vacuum in front ; or (c) of one wall at the back with three pillars in front ; or (d) of four pillars like the supports of a table. When the *stipes* are walls they may be of stone, brick or cement, but in this case there should be a large coign or pillar at either angle joining the table with the predella. The junctions of the *stipes* and *mensa* are anointed with chrism. It is unnecessary to say that the surface of the table should be very smooth and polished, so that it may be carefully washed at regular intervals.

RELICS AND CONSECRATION¹

No altar may now be consecrated without relics. The custom has come down from the times when Mass was offered over the tombs of the martyrs. The relics are true fragments of the bodies of two canonized saints who were martyred. They are surrounded with a small sheath or case, and inserted in a cavity called the sepulchre. In portable altars there is a small hole cut in the front of the upper surface of the stone in which the relics with three grains of incense are placed. The cavity is then covered with a small slab, which is firmly cemented. At the four corners and in the centre will be found five crosses marking the places where the anointing was performed. In fixed altars the relics, with the incense grains and a parchment scrip attesting the consecration, are wrapped in a case or sheath, sealed with the Bishop's seal, and then deposited in the sepulchre. The location of the sepulchre will vary with the different styles of the *stipes*. If the support consists of a solid block of masonry or brickwork the sepulchre may be inserted (a) in the upper part, so that the table would directly rest upon, and cover, it ; or (b) at the back ; or (c) in the front midway between the predella and *mensa*. When the supports consist of pillars the sepulchre is inserted in the slab in the centre, or a little to the front. In all cases where the sepulchre is not covered directly by the table there should be a small slab, which is cemented care-

¹ Cf. Schulte, *Consecranda*, passim.

fully over the opening and engraved with a cross. The junctions of *stipes* and *mensa* are anointed with chrism at the ceremony of consecration. When there is no support in front the anterior portion of the slab is anointed, and the spot is marked by a cross.

LOSS OF CONSECRATION

Portable altars lose their consecration (*a*) by a *notable* fracture or by breaking off a piece signed with the cross; (*b*) by the removal of the cover of the sepulchre, even though the relics remain intact. If only a little of the cement is disturbed the blessing remains. Fixed altars become desecrated (*a*) by an *enormous* fracture of the table; (*b*) by removal of any of the supports so that the joint is broken; (*c*) by disturbing the *moral* identity of the support where the *stipes* form one mass; (*d*) by disconnecting the table and its supports even for an instant; (*e*) by the removal or fracture of the cover of the sepulchre. If the cementing has merely become loose, fresh cement may be blessed and laid on by the Bishop or some priest duly authorized or sub-delegated by him. The mere erasure of the episcopal seal does not cause loss of consecration.

A fixed altar is polluted when the church is polluted, but it does not become desecrated on the church losing its blessing. Before a consecrated altar is dismantled the Bishop's authority is generally required.

PRIVILEGED ALTAR

To Masses said at a privileged altar is attached a plenary indulgence, in virtue of which every Mass offered up at this altar for a person who has died in the friendship of God has the efficacy of liberating the person's soul from Purgatory. In the sense of this privilege a *fixed* altar is one that is permanent and dedicated to some saint. It need not be such as described above. As a rule the indulgence is only applicable to the suffering souls. It is very rare to have it available for the living, and still rarer for both living and dead. The privilege may be *local* or *personal*. In the

former case it is attached to a certain definite place, and it will depend on the Indult of Concession whether it may be gained every day in the week, or only on certain days. Clement XIII granted the privilege to every altar for the Commemoration of All Souls,¹ and Pius VII conceded the same to all the Masses said in a church where the Forty Hours' Adoration is being carried out. The Vincentian Sisters of Charity obtained similar privileges for Masses said in their Oratories.² It may be noted that the indulgence is gained only for one soul for which the Mass is applied, and that the obligation of saying a Mass of this kind is not fulfilled by gaining an indulgence on some other title and applying it for the desired intention. Neither confession nor prayers for the Pope's intention are required. In regard to the *personal* privilege, this belongs to a particular person and not to a particular place, so that anywhere such a priest says Mass he enjoys the favour. Each one should see how far his Indult extends, whether for every day or only for special days each week. The privilege is often attached to membership of certain associations. Thus, priests who make the Heroic Act of Charity enjoy it every day of the year.³ A priest who undertakes to say Mass at a privileged altar satisfies his obligation wherever he says the Mass if he has a personal privilege unless a definite altar is designated as a *conditio sine qua non*.

THE CROSS

A cross bearing the image of the Saviour crucified is an indispensable ornament of the altar. The Rubrics define its position as in the centre between the candlesticks,⁴ but since in modern altars this part is usually occupied by the tabernacle, the cross may be placed over the latter.⁵ The cross here contemplated should be large and conspicuous, so as to be seen by the people from every portion of the church.⁶

¹ May 19, 1761.

² S. Cong. Ind., Feb., 1905.

³ Pius IX, 20 November, 1854.

⁴ Tit. xx.

⁵ S.R.C.D., June 11, 1904.

⁶ *Cer. Epis.*, i., cap. xii.

An Instruction issued by the Apostolic Visitation of the Churches in Rome prescribes that for altars of medium size the upright staff should be over 18, and the transverse bar over 10, inches, and Benedict XIV reprobates the saying of Mass with crucifixes so small that they are almost invisible to the congregation.

The cross should not be placed on the throne that is used for the monstrance,¹ nor upon a pall or corporal. The arrangement, therefore, by which the top of the tabernacle is made to serve as a base both for the monstrance and the cross is against the Rubrics, the reason being that thus the same honour is given to the image and the reality. Where the Blessed Sacrament is solemnly exposed the cross should be removed from the altar. Whether this applies to the time during which Mass is said at such an altar is controverted. A decree of the Congregation of Rites dated September 2, 1741, leaves the retention or exclusion of the crucifix to the custom of individual churches. If the cross is retained it ought not to be incensed at Solemn Masses.²

It is in good taste to have the cross made of the same material as the candlesticks, but, absolutely speaking, it may consist of any other suitable substance. There is no blessing required, but if desirable the cross may be blessed by a simple priest with the form used *pro imaginibus*.

When there is a large picture or statue of the crucifixion placed in a commanding position over the altar, the cross may then be dispensed with; but in this case the crucifixion should form the principle feature of the representation.

All the crosses in the church—that are used for worship and not for mere ornament—should be covered with a violet veil from the first Vespers of Passion Sunday up to the morning Office of Good Friday. On Holy Thursday the covering is white for the cross of the altar where the Mass is celebrated.

During the exercise of any function or office the cross should be saluted with a genuflection by all except the

¹ Cong. of Rites, 2 June, 1883.

² November 29, 1738.

celebrant and privileged dignitaries. From the adoration on Good Friday to None on Holy Saturday all without exception should genuflect.¹

CANDELABRA AND LIGHTS

The Rubrics of the Missal require at least two candlesticks on every altar where Mass is said. The *Ceremoniale Episcoporum*,² which contemplates cathedral churches where solemn functions take place, prescribes six—three on either side of the cross—and suggests that each corresponding pair should be graduated in size, the tallest being next the centre. For the most part, however, the six are of uniform height. Provision may be made for more where exposition of the Blessed Sacrament takes place. In private Masses it is required by the Rubrics³ that a third candle be lighted at the Epistle side, outside the altar, from the Consecration to the Communion, to indicate the Real Presence, but custom has dispensed in most places with this light, so that it is no longer of obligation unless where the Ordinary wishes to enforce it.⁴ The candelabra may be made of precious metals, brass, bronze, or wood suitably gilt. On solemn occasions it is fitting to have more ornamental patterns. The altar candlesticks ought not to be used for the bier or catafalque.⁵ There is a decree of the Congregation of Rites forbidding the use of the multi-branched candlesticks for Mass purposes.⁶ The Rubrics contemplate the use of a separate stand or candlestick for each light. Imitation candles, or souches, with a real candle inside, are not strictly rubrical, yet they are tolerated.⁷ Acolytes' candlesticks should be pretty large.

Clergy of inferior dignity to a Bishop are permitted only two lights at a strictly private Mass, unless privileged to use the Bugia. By reason of special solemnity, arising from circumstances either of time or place, more than two may be used⁸ at a Low Mass. Similarly more than two are per-

¹ N. 3059.

² I., c. 12.

³ T. viii., n. 6.

⁴ Cong. of Rites, July, 1904.

⁵ *Rit. Rom.*, t. vi., c. 1.

⁶ N. 3137.

⁷ N. 3448.

⁸ Nn. 3059, 3065, etc.

mitted at a *Missa Cantata*. In Solemn Masses with Sacred Ministers six seems to be the proper number. For solemn Expositions of the Blessed Sacrament the minimum of twelve candles is required even in poor churches, and at least six where the monstrance is not employed—that is, in a private exposition.¹ At other functions the number of lights to be employed will be indicated in the general directions regarding the ceremony.

About the *quality* of the lights a distinction is to be made between those employed *ad cultum* and those employed either *ad ornatum* or for dispelling darkness. In regard to the former recent legislation has enacted that the Pascal Candle and the two principal candles used for Mass should consist of pure bees' wax *in maxima parte*; and that all the others placed upon the altar should contain bees' wax *in maiore vel notabili parte*.² For Ireland the Bishops have authentically interpreted this rule to mean that the Pascal and the two Mass candles should contain 65 per cent., and the other altar candles 25 per cent., bees' wax respectively.³

Unbleached wax is used in connexion with Offices for the Dead. In circumstances where the number of candles used is in excess of the rubrical prescriptions, it would seem that the foregoing rules apply where the lights are placed upon the altar, but not where the lights are arranged outside the altar, as, for instance, on the predella. For in the latter case the additional lights, it may be said, are used not so much *ad cultum* as by way of ornament to enhance the general effect. For purposes of affording necessary light in the church any of the ordinary illuminants may be adopted, if only attention be paid to their becomingness and suitability. Electric light may be availed of for this end in accordance with the prudent judgment or tacit consent of the Ordinary, but the Congregation of Rites has recently declared that where used the arrangement of the electroliers should not present a theatrical appearance.⁴ Obviously also, these lights should not be placed before statues,

¹ Nn. 3480, 1922, etc.

² December 14, 1904.

³ I. E. RECORD, December, 1905, p. 566.

⁴ November 22, 1907; January 17, 1908.

relics, or the Blessed Sacrament, since this would be to employ it *ad cultum*.

IMAGES AND RELICS

Every fixed altar should be dedicated to some saint or mystery, and it is fitting that it ought to have a picture or statue of this saint. This is known as the 'principal image,' and may not be changed without the authority of the Holy See. In the case of a portable altar the picture may be changed with the consent of the Bishop.

In regard to these statues and images the law of the Council of Trent¹ should be observed, which enjoins episcopal authentication and forbids departures from established usage in the method of representation. Merely beatified saints may not be publicly represented on the altar without an Apostolic Indult.²

Images may not be placed upon the tabernacle or upon the throne of exposition.³ Their proper location is on the gradine between the candlesticks.⁴ While the Blessed Sacrament is solemnly exposed they should be removed from the altar unless placed there *ad ornatum*.

It is not lawful to have two images of the same saint for veneration in one church.⁵ This does not apply to representations of our Lord or the Blessed Virgin under different titles. The picture combining the Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary as one subject may not be exposed for public veneration without the authority of the Holy See.⁶

Statues and images exposed for worship in churches are to be covered from first Vespers of Passion Sunday up to the *Gloria* in the Mass of Holy Saturday. An exception is made in favour of statues of St. Joseph—if placed outside altars—during the month of March, where special devotions are carried out in honour of the saint.⁷ The same is true of statues carried in procession *tempore Passionis*.

The material of which images are made should be solid

¹ Sess. 25.

² N. 1097.

³ Nn. 2613, 3673.

⁴ *Cer. Eps.*

⁵ N. 3732.

⁶ N. 3492.

⁷ N. 3332.

and durable. Precious metals, marble, wood are suitable. Even *papier-mâché* and wax, with certain modifications, are permissible. But the Liturgical Academy in Rome has decided that a blessing may not be given to statues made of gypsum, chromo-prints, photographs, and similar productions. As a rule statues may not be draped with clothing.

Relics of canonized saints that have been declared by the Ordinary to be authentic may be exposed for worship by the faithful. By relics are understood (*a*) bodies of saints or portions of them; (*b*) matter that flows or oozes from the body; (*c*) garments worn by saints and the instruments of their torture and death; (*d*) linens and things that have been in contact either directly or indirectly with holy persons. To be entitled to public veneration relics must belong to the first or third class. Their authenticity is usually established by the episcopal seal, which ought to be affixed where the objects are genuine.

The *Ceremoniale Episcoporum* suggests that the reliquaries might be placed between the candlesticks.¹ On the occasion on which they are exposed for veneration—such as the greater festivals and those of the saints to whom they belong—two lights should burn before them.² They should not, of course, be exposed during Exposition of the Blessed Sacrament, and those put upon the altar by way of ornament ought to be removed—like flowers and similar things—during Dead Offices and, also, during Passion-tide.³ It is not lawful to put them before the door or on the top of the tabernacle. Neither is it lawful to carry them in procession under a baldachino or canopy, unless they are instruments of the Sacred Passion.⁴ It has been said that two lights should burn before the relics of a saint exposed for veneration. If the relics are those of the Holy Cross or others intimately associated with our Blessed Lord the number of lights should be more.

¹ I., c. xii.

² N. 3029.

³ Cf. previous page *re* Statues.

⁴ N. 2647.

FLOWER-VASES

Vases with flowers, blooms and other sweet-smelling sprays may also be placed to ornament the altar.¹ It would seem that natural flowers are more appropriate than artificial. They certainly look better if only they are kept fresh; and an efficient Altar Society will be of great help in this direction. When artificial flowers are used they should not be made of those vulgar, tawdry stuffs that fade so quickly and make such a sorry show in their flimsy get-up. The proper place for these floral ornaments is towards the back of the altar-table, or on the gradine between the candlesticks. It is scarcely becoming to have large pots filled with earth resting upon the table of the altar where the Sacred Species so often repose. In no cases should these vases be put directly in front of the door of the tabernacle.

Since ornaments are the accompaniments of joy and gladness it is fitting that they should be removed from the altar whenever they are out of joint with the spirit of the season. Hence, during Lent, Advent, and other days of penance—and, generally speaking, whenever the colour of the Office is violet—there should be no ornaments except the cross and candlesticks.² To this rule *Laetare* and *Gaudete* Sundays are exceptions, as well as Holy Thursday, Holy Saturday, and the days during Lent and Advent when vestments other than violet are used. It need not be said that the rule does not apply to Benediction of the Most Holy Sacrament which takes place within the aforementioned periods.

ALTAR-CLOTHS AND ANTEPENDIUM

The Rubrics of the Missal³ prescribe three cloths for covering the altar-table, two of which should cover the surface and the third or uppermost should, in addition, project an inch or two at the front and extend to the predella on either side. The length of the third cloth is *de rigueur*. Recent decisions of the Congregation enforce it in spite of

¹ *Cer. Epis.*, i., c. xii.² De Herdt.³ Tit. xx.

custom to the contrary.¹ The cloths should be made of linen, or at least of hemp in lieu of linen. Any other material even of equal whiteness is not rubrical.² The cloths require to be blessed by the Bishop or some one delegated by him. A fringe or border of lace upon a coloured background may be attached to the front portion of the upper cloth. It should not be more than about four inches in depth, and it may have some appropriate design and motto painted or embroidered. In addition to the cloths mentioned the table, where it consists of marble, and the altar-stone proper are covered with a waxed cloth called the *cere-cloth* (*chrismale*). The object of this is to save the linens from immediate contact with the stone and thus preserve them from dampness. The waxed surface of the *chrismale* should be next the stone.

When the Sacred Offices are over for the day the altar should be spread over with a cover made of wool or similar material to keep away the dust from the linens. St. Charles suggests *green* as a suitable colour for the cover, but any other appropriate colour may be used. In ancient times the corporal belonged to the altar-linens and extended the whole length and breadth of the table, its great size being necessary to receive the offerings of the faithful. But about the eleventh century its dimensions were restricted to the present size, and it is now regarded as an appendage of the chalice.

The sacred relics were formerly kept under the altar, and were covered with a veil for greater reverence. A relic of this usage is still preserved in what we now call the *antependium*, or screen which hangs down before the front portion of the altar. The antependium should consist of the same materials as that of which the vestments are made, and when in position it should be quite extended, it being unlawful to have it arranged in folds or tucks. It may be wrought with suitable designs. The colour of the antependium ought to correspond with that of the Office for the day. The obligation of conformity, however, is not

¹ N. 4022.

² N. 2600.

very grave, and where changes cannot be easily provided it is enough to use white or cloth of gold for all occasions.¹ The Congregation of Rites has forbidden the use of a small frame or veil which only covers a portion of the front of the altar.² White is the colour of the antependium for all Expositions of the Blessed Sacrament. The only exception is where a Mass is said in vestments of another colour (black excepted), and Benediction takes place immediately afterwards, so that there is no time to change the antependium.

MISSAL AND STAND

The Missal, to be legitimately used for Mass, must have been published with the permission in writing of the Ordinary of the place and bear the attestation by the same authority of its agreement with the official archetypal edition. It is of importance that it contain all the most recent Masses granted by the Holy See to the country, particularly where the Missal is to be used. Since all priests have now, as a rule, to regulate their Masses in accordance with the local calendar, it is well to bear in mind that certain religious Orders—those, namely, who enjoyed immemorial custom at the time of the recension of the Missal in 1570—have the right to use Missals which differ from the ordinary Roman edition. The points to be looked for in a good book are convenient size, excellence in quality of paper, legibility and clearness in type, correctness in printing, and durability in binding. The edges of the leaves are usually gilt and the cover ornamented. The *Ceremoniale* appears to speak of a silken cover,³ but owing to the ornamental character of the binding it is invariably dispensed with. A set of markers, eight in number, with each pair differing in colour, is necessary to render the manipulation of the Missal easy. To secure the book from ill-usage care should be taken to keep the markers properly adjusted. The stand may be of wood or metal, and adapted to the size of the book and the general surroundings. It may be covered with a cloth of the colour of the Office of the

¹ Cf. *Rub. Mis.*

² N. 4000.

³ I., c. xii.

day. Instead of the stand (*legile*) which is commonly employed, the Rubrics seem to contemplate a cushion (*pulvinus*), but the former will be found to be more serviceable. For *Requiem* Masses the small Proprium or Extract from the Roman Missal is convenient. So, too, for solemn Masses the Book of Epistles and Gospels for the whole year will have its utility in churches where these Masses are of frequent occurrence. Cathedral churches and others, in which episcopal functions are performed from time to time, ought to be provided with the Canon which contains the Ordinary of the Mass and the prayers for the preparation and thanksgiving.

CHARTS

As an aid to the memory certain prayers, which the celebrant is supposed to say without turning to the Missal, are printed on charts placed against the gradine of the altar. Though the Rubrics only speak of one, three are of common use, one being in the centre and one at either corner. The charts should be put aside or laid horizontally on the altar when not required. To serve the purpose for which they are intended, the print ought to be fairly large and legible. In many cases the type is so overladen with ornamental lettering that it is next to impossible to decipher the text. This is a fault, for it renders them almost useless. Since Leo XIII ordered the recital of special prayers after Low Masses another chart is required to contain these. It is desirable, in certain cases at all events, that these prayers should be given both in the original Latin as well as in the approved vernacular version. The altar-charts are generally set in suitable frames and covered with glass, but all the charts should be kept in good order and discarded as soon as they cease to be presentable.

OTHER UTENSILS

Among other things to be provided, not so much as permanent adjuncts of the altar as to meet the contingencies of divine service, may be mentioned the Cruets, Finger-towel, Purificatory Bowl and Bell.

The Rubrics¹ direct the cruets to be made of glass, or at least of some transparent material. The reason for the selection of this material lies in the facility of keeping it clean and distinguishing its contents. Cruets of gold and silver are, however, tolerated,² but in this case each vessel should be stamped with some distinguishing mark to prevent mistakes. Besides, they must be kept scrupulously clean to avoid danger of rust. As regards form, no pattern is prescribed, but the jar-shaped design, with firm base and narrow neck, is convenient. Covers are necessary to keep off the flies and insects that are attracted by the smell of the wine. For solemn occasions a more elaborately decorated set may be employed. The cruets rest in a small salver. There is nothing in the Rubrics about its material, but uniformity would suggest the same as for the cruets. There might be another vessel or bowl to receive the water poured on the priest's fingers at the *Lavabo*,³ but if the salver is used the water should not be allowed to remain in it, but should be at once emptied into a little recessed-basin, or *piscina*, in the sanctuary wall which communicates either with the earth directly or with the sacrum.⁴

With the cruets on the salver is the finger-towel and, in these countries, a small spoon. Needless to say the finger-towel must be clean and spotless. It need not be very large and may be made of linen or hemp. The Rubrics do not prescribe the spoon, but a decree of the Congregation

¹ Tit. xx.

² S. R. C., April 28, 1866.

³ Ewer and basin are only allowed to dignitaries.

⁴ This sacrum is similar in construction to that in connexion with the baptistry. The subterranean outlet or pit is sunk in the soil convenient to the sacristy, the face being built of mortarless masonry and the opening being covered with a large flag which is a few feet beneath the surface of the earth. A basin communicating with it is placed in some suitable corner of the sacristy and kept covered. There might be another inlet from the sanctuary as described. The sacrum is to receive the water used in purifying the priest's fingers after distributing Holy Communion and in washing his hands after using the Holy Oils; the water employed in the preliminary washings of the purificators and corporals; and, in general, the water associated in any way with things that are blessed or sacred. No solid matter is to be thrown into the sacrum, and it does not seem proper to have it serve as a receptacle for the ordinary water used in washing the priest's hands, except on the occasions mentioned. Whenever necessary the sacrum ought to be thoroughly cleaned out.

of Rites¹ sanctions its use. With us it is usually placed on the salver, but in some places it is placed in the chalice over the purificator. It ought not, for obvious reasons, be put in the bottom of the chalice. A purificatory bowl or vessel will be required whenever Communion is given outside the ordinary time at Mass, or whenever the priest's fingers after touching the Sacred Species cannot be purified in the ordinary way. It may be placed on the gradine at the Epistle side. It should have a cover. A little finger-towel or purificator is also required. The water should be removed after use by the priest himself.

The bell required by the Rubrics of the Missal² is what commonly corresponds with this name; that is to say, a hollow, truncated cone of bronze or cast metal with a straight handle at the narrow outer end and an ear at the inside, to which the movable clapper or tongue is attached. It should have some mark or emblem to designate its sacred purpose.

The *carillon*, or chime, is not forbidden, but attention should be paid to the tones, which ought not to be discordant. A decree of the Congregation of Rites³ forbids the use of an instrument described as the Indian cymbal. This does not appear to be the same as our 'gong'; so that the latter is hardly condemned. According to the Rubrics the bell is to be rung during Mass at the *Sanctus* and Elevation. Its use at other times is largely governed by custom. One decree⁴ directs the bell to be rung at a private Mass, even though no one is present but the server; other decrees⁵ forbid it at private Masses during Exposition of the Blessed Sacrament; and another⁶ directs that it is not to be rung at private Masses said at altars visible from the choir during the public Office. From this it would appear to be more correct to omit ringing the bell at Masses said at side altars during the celebration of a public Mass at the principal or high altar.

PATRICK MORRISROE.

¹ February 6, 1858.

² Tit. xx.

³ No. 4000.

⁴ July 18, 1885.

⁵ Nn. 3157, 3448.

⁶ N. 3814.

SOME RECENT DISCOVERIES IN HYMNOLOGY

ALTHOUGH the study of hymnology has been unflaggingly pursued by a small band of continental scholars for half a century, it is only in recent years that English students have taken up the subject seriously. The most up-to-date work for all delvers in the science of hymnology is *Analecta Hymnica medii aevi*, by Blume and Dreves, began in 1886, and now extending to fifty-two volumes. The work is a noble monument of scholarship and industry on the part of two learned Jesuits, Father Clemens Blume and Father Guido Maria Dreves, though the latter left the Society in 1905. Other labourers in the same field are the late Dom Baeumker, Canon Chevalier, Koch, and Zahn, while Great Britain can boast of Rev. W. H. Frere, Rev. G. R. Woodward, Rev. H. M. Bannister, and Messrs. Cowan, Love, and Lightwood. Julian's *Dictionary of Hymnology* (2nd edition, 1907) is also a valuable work. The desideratum, however, of the near future is a comprehensive handbook that will summarize for us the net result of the labours of hymnological scholars during the past twenty-five years. No doubt, in course of time, hymnology will be subdivided, so as to make tuneology a distinct subject, as hitherto the genesis of the *hymns* has also included that of the *tunes*. In the present paper I wish to give an account of some recent discoveries in hymnology, with special reference to the sources of some well-known hymns, thus rectifying many statements that had long been accepted in text-books on liturgical and extra-liturgical hymns.

Hymns are repeatedly alluded to in the New Testament, and the early Christians were solaced by singing canticles. As early as A.D. 260 the Council of Antioch condemned Paul of Samosata for his opposition to hymnology. From the Eastern Church the singing of hymns gradually got introduced into the Western Church; and the Celtic musicians

in Great Britain and on the Continent completed the triumph of liturgical hymns, a triumph which was materially heightened by the Benedictine monks. Irish readers can feel a certain sense of satisfaction in the fact that the great Pope St. Gregory (whose Irish origin is treated of in an article in this year's *Kirchenmusik-Jahrbuch*, xxiii.) particularly delighted in the hymns of St. Columba. St. Hilary of Poitiers is known to have written hymns (A.D. 356-362) against the Arians, but the only specimen of his powers is preserved in the Irish *Liber Hymnorum* of the ninth century, namely, *Hymnum dicat turba fratrum*. This brings us to the epoch of the *Te Deum*, the origin of which was for centuries ascribed to SS. Ambrose and Augustine.

St. Ambrose wrote very beautiful hymns, of which sixteen are now regarded as authentic. However, the most recent investigations are at one in deciding that the *Te Deum* was composed by St. Niceta of Remesia. Curiously enough the provenance of this glorious poem is confirmed by an Irish manuscript of the eighth century.

The most remarkable discovery in recent hymnological researches is that of the old cycle of hymns prior to the fifth century, due to the patient zeal of Father Blume, S.J., in 1908. This eminent scholar was able to identify the early monastic cycle of hymns for the week with the cycle described in manuscripts of the eighth and ninth centuries, known as the 'Anglo-Irish cycle.' It is of interest to note that the set of hymns for Vespers in the new cycle introduced by Irish monks in the seventh century is identical with the set of hymns for every week evening (for Matins, Lauds, and Vespers) sent by Pope St. Gregory the Great to St. Columba. The series of hymns for the Proper of the Season and the Common of Saints was practically fixed before the year 1050, and was almost the same in all countries in communion with the Holy See, but the Proper of the Saints afforded scope for various diocesan Uses in the different countries. Irish influences are most perceptible in the Canterbury Hymnal of the mid-tenth century, and in the Winchester Troper of the year 980 or 985. Similarly, Sequences originated in

the Irish Abbey of St. Gall about the year 870. This musical form was suggested by our Irish St. Moengal, who gave a pattern Alleluia to St. Notker *balbulus*. Of the hundreds of Sequences of pre-Reformation days, only four were retained in the revised Roman Missal of 1570, but, about the year 1725, the *Stabat Mater* was added. In this connexion it is well to note that there is a fine fourteenth-century Troper in the University Library, Cambridge, formerly belonging to St. Patrick's Cathedral, Dublin. I may further note that the 'Corpus' Missal (1014) formerly belonged to the Abbey of Clones, Co. Monaghan, while the 'Drummond' Missal (1095) belonged to Glendalough. A third Irish Missal is known as the 'Rosslyn,' was in use in Downpatrick, and dates from 1185. At Oxford is a beautiful twelfth-century Irish *Graduale*, with musical notation. There is a splendid fourteenth-century *Processionale* (described in the Winchester Troper), which formerly belonged to St. John's Church, Dublin, while the exquisite Psalter of Christ Church, Dublin, dating from 1370, is now in the Bodleian Library, Oxford.

It is generally agreed that the hymns *Pange Lingua*¹ and *Vexille Regis* are the compositions of Venantius Fortunatus, and date from November 19, 569 (on the occasion of the bringing to Poitiers of a relic of the true Cross), but it has been amply proved by Dreves that Venantius also composed the lovely hymn to the Blessed Virgin, *Quem terra pontus aethera* set to the tune of *Amore Christi nobilis*, and the *Salve* processional hymns.

The beautiful hymn *Christus novae Jerusalem* was written by St. Fulbert of Chartres, who died in 1085, and it was almost immediately adopted in the Western Church for Easter—completely superseding the older hymn, *Rex aeternae Domine*, which is quoted in the Rule of St. Cesarius of Arles, who died in 542. This latter old hymn in the second recension of the Roman Breviary in 1632, appears as *Rex sempiternae coelitus*.

¹ This *Pange, Lingua, gloriosi proelium certaminis* must not be confounded with *Pange, lingua, gloriosi corporis mysterium*, written by St. Thomas Aquinas.

Much speculation has hitherto been indulged in as to the author of the magnificent Pentecostal hymn *Veni Creator*, but Dreves has conclusively proved that the authorship must be ceded to Rabanus Maurus, who died in 856. There is much greater difficulty as to the authorship of the lovely sequence *Veni Sancte Spiritus*, but though it is generally held to be the work of Pope Innocent III, who died in 1216, the latest researches go to prove that Stephen Langton wrote it. It was not written earlier than 1190 or 1195, though the date may possibly be after 1200. The tune to which *Veni Creator* was adopted belongs to the Easter hymn of St. Ambrose *Hic est dies verus Dei*, and it was also borrowed for the thirteenth-century hymn, *Salvator mundi Domine*.

For long St. Bernard has been regarded as undisputed author of the charming hymn, *Jesu dulcis memoria*, but the illustrious Solesmes Benedictine, Dom Pothier, has discovered a copy of it in manuscripts of about the year 1070, in which its ascription is assigned to a Benedictine Abbess. The full text consists of 53 stanzas. St. Bernard's supposed authorship was dated as from about the year 1135, but Dom Pothier's discovery disproves such an ascription. The tune was borrowed from *Christe, Redemptor omnium*. Another hymn for the feast of the Most Holy Name of Jesus—a feast of English origin—is *Exultet cor praeconcordiis*, the earliest copy of which is to be found in the *Trim Breviary*, an early fifteenth-century office book belonging to St. Mary's Abbey, Trim, Co. Meath, now in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin (B. 3.12). Dreves considers that this hymn was specially written for the feast, and it was printed in 1493. It is as well to add that St. Bernard's claim to the hymn *Salve caput cruentatum* is not sufficiently established, and it cannot be traced earlier than the fourteenth century. Nor can the beautiful Complin hymn, *Salve Regina*, be ascribed to the founder of Clairvaux, as it is to be met with in manuscripts of the year 1100: it was written and composed by Hermannus Contractus, and it is to be found, with the music, in a Durham manuscript of the year 1200.

Hymnologists are practically agreed in crediting the *Dies Irae* to Thomas of Celano, O.F.M., although the verse *Libera me Domine* is to be met with in a Bodleian manuscript of the tenth century, while the *Lacrymosa* is in a Karlsruhe manuscript, written *circa* 1200. They are also agreed as to the authorship of the *Stabat Mater*, namely, by Jacopone of Todi, O.F.M. Another great Franciscan poet was St. Bonaventure, whose hymn *In passione domini* occurs in the Office of the Holy Cross. But a fourth Franciscan hymn writer has hitherto been ignored: this is Jean Tisserand, O.F.M., whose obit at Paris is chronicled in 1494. To Tisserand is due the joyful Easter hymn *O Filii et filiae*; and the plain chant melody (2nd mode) is of contemporary date. Julian, in his *Dictionary of Hymnology* (2nd edition, 1907), says that the hymn only dates as far back as 1656, but it has recently been discovered as from the pen of Tisserand in a little French book printed at Paris in 1530. Both music and words are in a French book of sacred music printed at Paris in 1623, but the air is probably contemporary with the words, namely, the mid-fifteenth century.

Of recent discovery is the ascription to Thomas à Kempis, the immortal author of the *Imitation of Christ*, of over a dozen beautiful hymns, to be found in a Karlsruhe manuscript of the fifteenth century. This discovery is due to Dreves,¹ although Mone had printed some of the hymns, yet without being able to prove the authorship. It may be added that four of these hymns, namely, *En dies est dominica*, *Quisquis valet numerare*, *O amor quam aestaticus*, and *Jerusalem luminosa*, are included in *Hymns Ancient and Modern* (new edition, 1904).

Following in the wake of the Franciscan movement, a school of hymnody arose to which we owe the famous *Laudi Spirituali*, a precious manuscript—dating from the year 1336—now preserved in the Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale at Florence. Many of the hymns, however, may be dated back to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In particular the still popular *O beata beatarum* is to be met

¹ *Anal. Hymns*, xlviii.

with in a Vienna manuscript of the twelfth century, quoted by Dreves, but the tune to which it has been set is an Italian melody, *Alta Trinita beata*,¹ as given in the *Laudi*. Towards the close of the fourteenth century Bianco da Siena added materially to the vernacular hymns of the Italian *Laudi*, and further additions were made during the following century, the whole being printed in 1485. It was not, however, until 1563 that Razzi, at Venice, published the *Laudi*, with music, after which came the Oratorian revival under St. Philip Neri.

Many non-Catholic writers persist in the attribution of much of the early sixteenth-century German hymnody to the rising Lutheran influence, but it has now been amply proved that the hymns of the Hussites and of the Bohemian brethren are by no means original, many of them being merely translations from the Latin adapted to old plain chant melodies. The first printed collection of the Bohemian brethren contains 89 hymns, and was published in 1501. Subsequently, in 1531, appeared Weisse's collected vernacular hymns (157), for the use of the 'Unitas Fratrum,' also known as the 'Bohemian Brethren,' or 'Moravians.' In 1524 appeared Luther's first hymn-book, containing eight hymns, and in 1545 his final revision of hymns, by V. Babst, was published at Leipzig, containing 101 hymns, of which Luther is said to have written 36, although it is necessary to note that 28 of these are translations or paraphrases from pre-Reformation sources. As regards Luther's musical genius, he has also been credited with the composition of at least two dozen hymns, but under the searchlight of recent investigations, his claims have been whittled down to thirteen. Of these thirteen, five are exceedingly doubtful, so that according to the latest authorities, Luther can only be given the credit of having composed eight hymns, including the famous *Ein feste Burg ist unser Gott*, first printed in 1529. The so-called 'Luther's Hymn' cannot be ascribed to the pseudo-reformer: it had appeared in 1523 as set to the older hymn *Nun freut euch, lieben Christengemein*, and

¹ Dr. Burney's error in transcribing the first word of the title as 'Alla' has been copied almost to the present day.

was a popular folk-tune. Similarly, recent hymnologists are inclined to doubt Luther's claim to *Vater Unser*, his versification of the Lord's Prayer. Rev. W. H. Frere says that Luther, both in words and music, 'made much use of already existing materials,' and he considers that 'it is very difficult to say where translation and paraphrase end, and original work begins.' Even the tune used by Luther for his hymn against the Pope and Turk (written during the time of the crusade against the Turks in 1541), *Erhalt uns, Herr*, was adapted to a pre-Reformation plain chant melody.

Ave verum, corpus natum, has now been traced to a Reichenau manuscript of 1370, where it is ascribed to Pope Innocent VI, who became Pope in 1352. *Cor Jesu, cor purissimum* is to be met with in an Office of the Sacred Heart, printed at Orleans in 1732. *O Deus, ego amo Te*, originally written in Spanish by St. Francis Xavier in 1546, does not appear to have been translated into Latin until the middle of the seventeenth century: it is first printed in the *Coeleste palmetum* (1669), and was the work of a Jesuit father. Not many are aware that Pope's English translation of this beautiful hymn was made at the request of another Jesuit, Father Adam Pigott, S.J., who died at Croxden Park, April 30, 1751.

A critical English history of sequences is a desideratum, but it must be observed that Notker *balbulus*, as previously stated, modelled his best-known work on the lines of the pattern *Alleluia*, given him by an Irish monk, Moengal, or Marcellus, and taught him by another Irish monk, Mael-Isu, or Yso, who died May 14, 871. His *Liber Sequentiarum* was collected in 885, dedicated to Luituard, Bishop of Vercelli, but the original autograph copy has disappeared. However, there is a faithful transcript of the musical notation dating from the year 925, but without the words. Ekkehard ascribes 50 sequences to Notker, but modern research has reduced that number to 47, omitting the famous *Media vita in morte sumus* ('In the midst of life we are in death'), first found in a manuscript of the eleventh century, and almost universally sung at Complin on the eve of *Laetare* Sunday, being subsequently introduced by Luther

into the Burial Service. Of course, Notker's fame as a musician is a matter of common knowledge, but recent investigations tend to prove that some of his melodies were really adaptations from folk tunes. As an instance, Notker's *Scalam ad coelos* for the Common of Virgins was undoubtedly set to a popular secular melody, *Puella turbata*, and there is good reason to believe that he also adapted his *Cantemus cuncti melodum* to the same tune.

It has frequently been stated that the counter-Reformation brought no great additions to Catholic hymnody, but in Germany alone numerous valuable collections appeared, e.g., those of the years 1537, 1567, and 1573, and in particular Dean Leisentret's *Catholicum Hymnologium Germanicum*, printed in 1584, of which a second edition was issued in 1587. The Guild of St. Cecilia at Andernach published a very fine collection entitled *Catholische Geistliche Gesange*, in 1608, containing Latin and German hymns, both original and translated, and mostly set to modern tunes.

In England, the so-called Anglican hymnody of the late sixteenth century is really in great part an adaptation from pre-Reformation days, while in the Masses and Motets all the best work was composed by Catholic musicians like Tallis, Tye, Whyte, Byrd, Bevin, Dering, Phillips, Johnson, Bolt, Parsons, and others. It only remains to add that the earliest printed modern collection of Latin and English hymns, but without music, is *Evening Office of the Church*, in 1745, followed twenty-one years later by Charles Barbaudt's *Catholic Hymn Book*, with music (1766). Many of the hymns and tunes (including the still popular *Adeste Fideles*) have been taken from a manuscript music book, *Cantus Diversi*, written in 1750, of which copies are in Clongowes Wood College, Stonyhurst College, and the Manchester Free Library. No sooner, however, had a small measure of relief been accorded to the Catholics, than an Irishman, John P. Coghlan, brought out an excellent Tune Book, entitled *Essay on the Church Plain Chant*, in 1782, the notation being Gregorian.

W. H. GRATTAN FLOOD.

ARDPATRICK—II

THE COARB OR CORBE OF THE CHURCH OF ARDPATRICK

THREE of our Limerick historians—Ferrar, Fitzgerald, and Mr. Johnston Westropp—refer to the corbe of Ardpatrik. Ferrar and Fitzgerald, in a footnote, following Usher, and led astray by him, give as an explanation of what was meant by the corbe of Ardpatrik that the term was equivalent to *chorepiscopus* or *archpriest*, and that the comhurba of St. Patrick meant the then Archbishop of Armagh. Their interpretation is incorrect and insufficient. It is incorrect to say that the corbes were *chorepiscopi*; for the latter were Bishops without territorial jurisdiction or a diocese, very many of whom at least were undoubtedly invested with episcopal powers, though being subordinate to the regular Bishop of the diocese in which they were stationed. Neither is it correct to take corbes for archpriests, for, as we read in Dr. Lanigan's *Ecclesiastical History of Ireland*,¹ archpriests were only the heads of rural deaneries, and, as we shall see later on, corbes were entirely different from these. As to the second reason, taken from Usher, that the then living Archbishop of Armagh was called comhurba of St. Patrick, anyone will easily observe that this is an insufficient elucidation of the meaning of a corbe of Ardpatrik. It does not make the position or status of a corbe in the diocese of Limerick clearer to our intelligence by being informed that the actual Archbishop of Armagh was called comhurba of St. Patrick.

Besides corbe or coarb, three other different forms of the word—comharba, comorba, and comorban—are found in Irish ecclesiastical history. The term² was applied to the successor in an ecclesiastical dignity. The name was used originally for Bishops and abbots. In the course of time it

¹ Vol. iv., p. 322.

² Ware (after Colgan), *Antiq.*, cap. 17.

was extended to those who held minor dignities or positions in the Church.

About the eleventh and twelfth centuries the practice of laymen taking possession of lands belonging to the Church became rather prevalent. According to Giraldus Cambrensis there were many lay abbots in Ireland and Wales. His description of them is worth relating in his own words, which are as follow :—

But it is to be noted that this church [of which he was speaking], as also several others through Ireland and Wales, has a lay abbot. For the practice and corrupt custom, according to which men of influence in a parish, at first constituted by the clergy as economists, or rather as patrons and defenders of the churches, afterwards in the course of time, their cupidity having increased, would usurp the whole right to themselves, and would impudently appropriate to themselves all lands and external possession, leaving to the clergy only the altars with tithes and dues, and assigning these same things to their sons who were clerics and to kinsmen. Accordingly such defenders, or rather destroyers, of churches presumed to make themselves to be called abbots, and to have assigned to themselves as well a name that was not due, as the thing itself also.¹

We thus learn on the authority of Cambrensis that whilst those lay abbots retained to themselves the lands and other properties of the Church, they left the clergy nothing but the altar and church, with tithes and dues. When he speaks of tithes, his statement must be restricted to Wales ; for up to his time tithes were not paid in Ireland. Later down in the ages the system of laymen taking possession of Church lands and properties became very general in Ireland ; and this was particularly the case in Ulster. It is in this system that we are to find the origin of that strange class who were called *corbes*, once so numerous in this land, but now little known, if at all, by name to the general public. Usher, in his younger days, wrote a dissertation, in which he erroneously stated that the *corbes* were the same originally as the chorepiscopi, and that the former was a corruption of the

¹ *Itiner. Cambr., L.C. 4.*

latter term. Ware, however, guarded himself against this mistake, and, following Colgan, observes that *corba* or *comorba* means a successor in an ecclesiastical dignity. Usher says that 'some of the Irish have detorted the name in Latin to *converbius*, or *confurbach* in Irish, which importeth as much as *conterraneous*' ; but he was mistaken in taking for detortion a Latin word that was founded on the true meaning of the name. The original word is *comhorba*. It is a compound word, derived from *comh* (with) and *forba* (a landed estate, a district, or a patrimony). The term by usage came to be applied to the successors of persons in ecclesiastical positions, as if the former were joint-partners with the latter. In explanation of the term, Colgan says :—

The Irish word *comhorba*, if you attend to the original of the word, denotes the same as *compraedianus*, or possessor of the same farm, patrimony, or land. For it is derived from *comh*, which means the same as *con* (with) in Latin, and *forba*, i.e., farm, land, or patrimony. It is assumed everywhere by our ancient writers for a successor in an ecclesiastical prelacy or dignity. Hence, even to-day we behold those called *comhorbas*, though *they be for the most part seculars*, who hold the government of lands and farms which formerly belonged to the rights of rich abbacies ; whether that may have sprung up because the ancestors of families, from whom those *comorbans* are taken, may have voluntarily consecrated themselves and their farms to the protection and jurisdiction of these abbacies and monasteries, as some are of opinion ; or from this, that matters ecclesiastical declining by degrees, some laymen have at first usurped the title of abbot or prelate in such monasteries, and afterwards transmitted it to their posterity.¹

Colgan makes these observations in reference to the successors of St. Fiech of Sletty, who were called his *comhorbans*. Besides the frequent mention of the Archbishops of Armagh as *comorbans* of St. Patrick, one often finds in Irish ecclesiastical history such phrases as *comorbans* of Columbkil, St. Barr of Cork, St. Finnian of Clonard, and of several others. *Comorban* is often translated into the

¹ *Tr. Th.*, p. 8.

Latin word *heres*, which not only means an heir but also an owner or possessor ; in fact, the latter appears to be the original meaning of *heres*. Hence, whilst the Four Masters mention Forrannanus and Dermotius as *comorbans* of St. Patrick, Usher, following the *Annals of Ulster*, writes : ' Two heirs of St. Patrick, namely, Forrannanus and Dermotius, went to rest.' The term *comorban*, is usually found in connexion with the name of the founder of a church. In this sense we read of the *comorbans* of St. Patrick, of St. Columbkille, of St. Jarlath of Tuam, of Adamnan as founder of the church of Raphoe, but nowhere as abbot of Hy. Sometimes, however, the term occurs in union with the name of a church. Thus, for example, we find the *comorban of the church of St. Brigid of Armagh*, the *comorban of Inniscathy*. Hence, the name, at first applied to Bishops and abbots, became extended by degrees so as to include the holders of ecclesiastical dignities of minor rank.

Colgan says that the *comorbans* of his time were for the most part laymen. After the episcopal sees were defined in the Synod of Kells, which was presided over by Cardinal Paparo, as legate of Pope Eugene III, in 1152, there are very few instances in which Bishops were called *comorbans*. Regular abbots also were no longer known by this title. Thenceforward the laymen who usurped the old ecclesiastical properties that had been in the enjoyment of neglected or decayed churches and monasteries, appropriated the title to themselves. In later times, as can be learned from the inquisitions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a great number of *comorbans*, or, as they were corruptly styled, *corbas* or *corbes*, were to be found, especially in Ulster. Several of these *corbes* held possession even of lands that belonged to episcopal sees. These lands were not held by the Bishops in demesne, or in their immediate possession. In these cases the *corbes* paid some trifling mensal dues to the Bishops. Of such description were the lands possessed by the *corbe* of Ardpatrik ; for, as we shall see later on, he paid a few shillings thereout to the Bishop of Limerick. Before the time of St. Malachy, in the twelfth century, this system had partly begun.

In Colgan's time some of the comorbas or corbes were in holy orders. According to Sir John Davies,¹ who gives as his authority an Irish scholar, they were provosts of collegiate churches, and called *plebani*. This title corresponded to that of *piêvano* in Northern Italy. The corbes of this description are thought by some writers to have been the heads of churches which had been formerly small bishoprics. They were distinguished by that particular name, as they could no longer be called Bishops. There were other corbes who were not priests, or in any holy orders, but were usually married men. When Davies would lead us to believe that all the corbes had some order, he is supposed to have meant that they had tonsure. We cannot admit, however, that they had even this. Colgan, who is a vastly better and more reliable authority on such a matter, states positively that the greatest part of the corbes were mere laymen—a statement he would not, and could not, have made if they had received the first tonsure. It is a matter of certainty also, no matter what Usher and some others may insinuate, that the corbes were not generally substitutes for chorepiscopi. The corbes were persons occupying church lands which had formerly belonged to ecclesiastical dignitaries of various grades.

Corbeships seem to have originated and consisted primarily in usurpations of Church property by laymen. The corbes, in accordance with the ancient Irish laws regulating succession and inheritance, transmitted the Church lands to their descendants, or at least to their sept. On the death of a corbe the sept elected from among themselves a successor to him. If they did not agree, or failed in electing one, the Bishop and clergy were authorized to intervene and select one out of the sept for the vacant office. In the case of the extinction of a whole sept, it would be necessary to appoint another, to which the corbeship should be transferred. This latter sept would be vested with the right of electing the corbe subject to the same charges and conditions under which the former corbe held.

¹ Letter to the Earl of Salisbury in *Collectan.*, vol. i.

The corbes differed from another and more numerous description of persons, who were called *erenachs*. These were never priests; they received no orders. They were, however, tonsured, on which account they took rank among the clerics, or clerks. They were inferior in rank, power, and influence, sometimes subject to the corbes, and their lands were less extensive. Many corbes held, as it appears, independently of the Bishops, lands that were formerly in the possession of abbeys; whilst *erenachs* were perpetual tenants of the Bishops, and held their lands under them. Another distinction, or perhaps I should say difference, between them was that, as has been observed above, some corbes were in holy orders, and were even the heads or principals of collegiate churches; the *erenachs* had no order that was higher than tonsure.

Some of the holdings of corbes, as well as of *erenachs*, were often called *termon lands*. Usher thinks that the Gaelic word *tearmuin*, meaning a sanctuary or asylum, was derived from the Latin *terminus*, a bound or limit, because such privileged places were marked out by special bounds. Against his interpretation it has been observed that in ecclesiastical style the original and primary meaning of *terminus* is a territory or district. It is in this sense that Pope John VIII calls the patrimony of the Roman Church the '*terminus* of SS. Peter and Paul.' The idea of a sanctuary is only a secondary meaning of the Latin word. There is no need, then, of deriving *termon* from *terra immunis*, or free land, although it is quite true that, at least sometimes, the lands of the Church were free from tribute or tax to the secular power in Ireland, and some of them enjoyed the right of asylum. In accordance with this, the lands of the corbe of Ardpatrik must have been, sometimes at least, free from tribute to the temporal ruler of the day; but there is no evidence, as far as I know, and no presumption in favour of their having ever enjoyed the right of asylum for criminals.

According to an inquisition taken at the town of Kilmallock in the Co. Limerick, on March 14, in the thirty-fourth year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, Maurice

Oge Fitzgibbon, the White Knight, was seized, amongst other places of Ballingwosig, containing a carucate (usually about 100 acres) of land which he gave in pure and perpetual alms to the coarb of Ardpatrik and his successors, not to be put in mortmain.

By two inquisitions of August 11, in the thirty-ninth year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, it was found

that the hill named Ardpatrik, containing three acres of great measure, and making twenty-one acres of small measure, was in former times granted to the corbeship, founded in the church of Ardpatrik, and that the rent of 6s. 6d. was payable annually thereout to the Bishop of Limerick ; that the said office had continued by succession, from time immemorial, in the sept of the Langanes, and that Maurice Langane, who in right thereof enjoyed the said lands, was at that time the possessor.

The name of Langane is to be sought in vain among the inhabitants of Ardpatrik at the present time. The small annual tribute of 6s. 6d. payable to the Bishop of Limerick out of the lands held by the corbe is sufficient evidence that these were in more remote times in the possession of that see.

OTHER NOTABLE EVENTS IN CONNEXION WITH ARDPATRICK

According to the *Annals of the Four Masters* Ardpatrik was burned in 1114. Seven other places shared the same fate with it in that year. These were Fore, Feichin, Clonard, Kilbannin, Cong, Kilcullon, and Kilkenny. It was not unusual to find places burned in the Middle Ages. Let me instance Kells, which, as recorded, was burned fifteen times from 1016 to 1170; in fact, it was burned three times in one year (1144). Kildare, Clonmacnoise, Clonfert, and various other places were destroyed by fire.

In A.D. 1127 Ardpatrik, along with other parts of Munster, was plundered and laid waste, and doubtless some of its inhabitants were slain, in the invasion of Torlogh O'Connor, King of Connacht. Regarding this devastating and, for the country at large, suicidal incursion of O'Connor

into the fair fields of the southern province, the *Chronicon Scotorum* says :—

A large fleet, amounting to the number of one hundred and ninety-four ships, was brought by Torlogh O'Connor to plunder and devastate Munster, which province he overran as far as Sliabh Caoin, Ardpatrick, and Hy-Conaill Gabhra, so that he drove off numerous herds, and slew many people on the occasion.

It was internecine strife of this kind, in which one independent kingdom or principality fought against another, that wasted the energies of the country, placed her at the mercy of her enemies, and prepared the way for her downfall. This ruinous policy, whereby one section of Irishmen exhausted their strength against another, in all probability against the free choice of both, was the result of the political conditions of the country, according to which numerous Irish kings and chieftains exercised a power independent or quasi-independent.

There seems to have been a castle at Ardpatrick, which was erected in the end of the twelfth century. This information comes to us on the authority of Smith's Miscellaneous Papers in MS. and of Sir James Ware. The statement, positive and precise, is as follows at A.D. 1198: 'The English this year built the Castle of Ardpatrick in Munster.' Mr. Thomas O'Connor, who put in form the notes on Ballingaddy parish, taken by Mr. A. O'Curry during the progress of the Ordnance Survey, says: 'I am not able to determine at present whether the Ardpatrick of which I have spoken above be the place mentioned at this year (1198) or not.' One can see no reason for raising this question. Ardpatrick, in the County of Limerick, must be the place above spoken of; for I believe there is no other Ardpatrick in the southern province. If there were, it was a place of no importance compared to the former; and since Ware and Smith speak without particularization, we are to infer that their reference was to the well-known Ardpatrick, which is situate in the fringe of the Golden Vein, and within the southern confines of Limerick. There is no vestige of that castle to be found now, and not even

the tittle of a tradition regarding it has come down to the inhabitants of the present day. This is a negative argument; and as such it cannot displace the positive assertion of Ware and Smith that a castle was erected in this place by the English in 1198. Hence we see that Ardpatrik was a place of such importance that the English deemed well to erect a castle there soon after their invasion of the country, in order to secure the footing they had gained. It must arrest the attention of every student of Irish history that the verdant and fertile plains of Limerick have very soon attracted to them all our invaders, whether they were Norsemen, Normans, or Cromwellians. In this fact, as well as in the determination and perseverance of Limerick-men in maintaining their own, is to be found the reason for the assertion sometimes made that Irish history hangs or circles around Limerick, so that whoever knows the history of Limerick has a knowledge of that history in the main.

In the year 1199 William de Burgh received a grant of Ardpatrik, which was then a part of Fontimel. In the *Calendar of Documents* we read at the above date:—

Grant in fee to William de Burgh of Ardpatric, with the residue of the cantred of Fontimel, which remained in the K(ing)'s hand when the K(ing) enfeofed Thomas Fitz Maurice and Maurice Fitz Philip in 5 knights' fees each in that cantred; to hold to the said William of the K(ing) in fee by the service of 3 knights' fees.

The witnesses of this document were W. Archbishop of Rouen, Geoffrey Archbishop of York, and William Marshall Earl of Pembroke.

About 1248, though the date is not quite certain, the restoration of the church of Ardpatrik was made to the Bishop of Limerick by the Prior of St. Mary's, Provost of the church of Cashel. It is not stated how this church came into the hands of the Prior of Cashel, or how long it had been in them. The actual deed of restoration, directed to all whom it may concern, is found in the *Black Book of Limerick*, at No. xxxviii.

In 1299 we find a Vicar of Ardpatrik who bore a distinctly Danish patronymic. The name of this priest was Philip Harold.¹ The Danish influence, or rather the influence of those of Danish extraction, was very strong in Limerick in those times. There was often a spirit of rivalry between the Danes and the native Irish. This often proceeded so far as to create mutual jealousy.

In the early part of the thirteenth or of the fourteenth century, which ever it was, we find a Rector of Ardpatrik whose name was Malachy. The sole event recorded of him is the notable one of his having rendered canonical obedience to his Bishop. The *Black Book of Limerick* (at No. lxvii.) hands down to us the deed of that act of obedience in the following terms:—

Malachy rector of the church of Ardpatrik, to all the faithful who may see these deeds health in the lord. Let all whom it may concern know that I have sworn canonical obedience to the church of saint Mary of Lymeric, as my mother church, and to the lord E. bishop of Lymeric, and his successors as my diocesan bishop, regarding Ardpatrik with its appurtenances. Moreover in testimony of this affair I have confirmed the present document with the impression of my seal these being witnesses M. archdeacon of Lymeric, P. dean of the same place, Walter Ketyng, master E. and others.

There seems to be a difference of opinion as to the date in which Malachy paid this canonical homage to his Bishop. Some think that it was done in the time of Edmund, who was Bishop of Limerick from 1216 to 1223; whilst others are of opinion that it occurred during the term of Eustace de L'Eau as Bishop, which extended from 1311 to 1336. Dr. MacCaffrey, in the Notes² to his edition of the *Black Book*, observes that the initial letters correspond with the initials of the names of those who were dean and archdeacon in the time of Edmund. In the above event related of Malachy, Rector of Ardpatrik, we are reminded that the spirit

¹ 'Plea. R. Cal.' as given in *A Survey of the Ancient Churches in the County of Limerick*, by Mr. Johnston Westropp, p. 426.

² He refers to Cotton's *Fasti, Limerick*.

of obedience, which is one of the springs whence proceeded its cohesion and resultant power, was observed in the Church seven centuries ago as well as to-day. In fact, those Middle Ages appear to present some of the brightest pages of civilization and Christianity. It might suit the book or purpose of some parties to represent them as dark ages who would want to formulate a pretext for the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century, instead of looking upon it as having been stirred up by licentious men for the gratification of greed and lust. When they style those Middle Ages dark ones, they merely call up a phantom before their minds. They forget altogether that those were the ages that produced the Subtle Doctor and the Angelic Doctor, the distinguished Irishman and the celebrated Italian, John Duns Scotus and St. Thomas of Aquin. They forget, too, that in those times arose a Dante and a Michael Angelo; that knights and kings displayed themselves as the very souls of chivalry. In those ages appeared a Gregory VII and a Joan of Arc, a Cœur de Lion and a Bayard. Kings shared the dangers of the battlefield with their subjects. Judged by every standard, whether by that of literature, the fine arts, or arms, those ages, that have been sometimes called dark, can hold their own against these that have come after Luther, Melancthon, and Calvin. But all this is said by way of digression, and has arisen out of the religious act of homage performed by Malachy, Rector of Ardpatrik, in the early part of the thirteenth or fourteenth century, though the exact date is not known.

We learn what the revenues of Ardpatrik were, in 1291, from the taxation of Pope Nicholas IV. The curious document containing this taxation was found among the records in the Exchequer at Westminster. According to Stubbs' *Constitutional History*, upon Edward I undertaking to send out a crusade for the redemption of the Holy Land, the Pope promised him the tenth part of the ecclesiastical revenues in his kingdoms. The rescuing of the Holy Land from the sway of the infidel, which had been for many centuries a cause of anxiety and a source of ardent desire to

the Christian heart, was the object of the tax. Hence it was that the Pope gave one-tenth of the ecclesiastical revenues in furtherance of the crusade. The document, which was brought to light from the Westminster Exchequer, contains the taxation of only five Irish dioceses. These are given in the following order: Limerick, Emly, Cashel, Cork, and Waterford. Among the various benefices of Limerick are given the revenues and taxation of Ardpatrik. The revenues of the church of Ardpatrik at the time were four marks and a half (=£3), and the taxation on this sum was six shillings. We are here incidentally reminded that the mark was once in use as a coin in these realms.

Another taxation of Ardpatrik is found in the *Calendar of State Papers*, 1302 to 1307. In the taxation of 1302, Donaghmore, Killeely, and a *portion* of Ardpatrik were conjointly valued at five pounds six shillings and eight pence, the tax or tenth of which was ten shillings and eight pence. In the same list the *church* of Ardpatrik is valued at ten marks, the tenth of which was thirteen shillings and four pence.

In White's MSS. a further, and probably a later, taxation of Ardpatrik is given. This taxation has been said¹ to be generally ascribed to the time of Cornelius O'Dea, who was Bishop of Limerick from 1400 to 1426. The tax laid down for the 'chapel' of Ardpatrik this time was nine shillings.

An interesting incident occurred in 1302, which shows the relations existing between the pastor of Ardpatrik at that time and the English king. John le Joefne was pastor of Ardpatrik, and Edward I was reigning King of England. During a vacancy in the bishopric the King sought to intrude into the vicarage of Ardpatrik a cleric, of whose fitness for any ecclesiastical appointment he could not be supposed to be a proper judge. The Norman pastor of Ardpatrik was not compliant to the Plantagenet King of England. John le Joefne clearly had his doubts about the

¹ See Mr. Lenihan's *History of Limerick*, p. 557.

qualifications of a person who would be considered fit for a vicarage by the English king, his adherents in this country, or any secular parties. He was a priest of some force of character and determination, and as he did not see what right any civil power or bodies had to be twisting ecclesiastical jurisdiction from its legitimate depositories, he resisted this encroachment on ecclesiastical authority, and declined to admit the presentee of the King, John Kempe, to the vicarage of his church. On the refusal of John to accept the nominee of the King, he was summoned to appear in court, and render an account of his non-compliance with the royal will. John took no notice of the King's citation, and did not enter an appearance in his court. The documentary evidence of this episode is found in the following style :—

The sheriff was commanded to command master John le Joefne, parson of the church of Ardpatrik, that he permit the lord the King to present a fit person to the vicarage of the church of Ardpatrik, vacant and belonging to the gift of the King by reason of the vacancy of the Bishopric of Limerick now being in the hand of the King, and wherefrom the said John unjustly hinders the King. And if he do not, then to summon said John to be before the Justiciar of Ireland, to show cause why he has not. And John came not, and he had a day here on this day of essoin.¹

Further on we read :—

The King by Will. de Berdefeld who prosecutes for him, appeared on the fourth day against master John le Joefne, parson of the church of Ardpatrik, of a plea that he permit the King to present a fit person to the vicarage of the church of Ardpatrik, vacant and belonging to the gift of the King by reason of the vacancy in the Bishopric of Limerick. And he comes not. Therefore the sheriff was commanded to take pledges of said John that he be before the Justiciar of Ireland, on the Morrow of S. Martin wherever he shall then be in Ireland, to answer the King.²

¹ *Calendar Justiciary Rolls, Ireland, 1295 to 1303*, p. 441 (date 1302).

² *Ibid.*, p. 445.

Regarding this dispute between the pastor of Ardpatrick and the King, we find another passage :—

(Anno 1302.)

[Maurice de Rupeforti.] He also sent a bill to the custos of the Spiritualities of the Bishopric of Lymerick (*recte* to the Chancellor of Ireland) as follows :—Let letters patent of the King be made to the custos of the Spiritualities of the Bishopric of Lymerick, that the King presents John Kempe, chaplain, to the vicarage of the church of Ardpatrick, vacant and in the King's gift by reason of the vacancy in said bishopric now in the King's hand. Dated as above (11th August).¹

The issue of the King's interference in this ecclesiastical appointment, and of his pursuance of the parson of Ardpatrick, has not come down to us. One may suppose that all the English forces in Munster, horse and foot, were despatched to storm this then southern Limerick town, and to strike with consternation its bold and dauntless pastor.

It may be permissible to digress so far as to advert incidentally to the difference in nomenclature adopted in different ages in this country to designate the occupant of the pastoral office. In the beginning of the fourteenth century, as we saw above, and in the Middle Ages, he was called 'parson.' Later on, and into the seventeenth century, he was styled 'rector,' which was the term universally applied to him at the time that the Papal Legate, Mgr. Rinuccini, was in Ireland. In latter ages, and since the persecutions, he is known by the name of 'parish priest.'

In the year 1318 the church of Ardpatrick was robbed. The name of the person who perpetrated this act of sacrilegious robbery was Robert Fitz Henry. The crime and the name of its perpetrator are related in the 'Plea. R. Calendar.'² As the name indicates, he was a Norman, and not a Gael. We have here, as on so many other occasions since the invasion, an object-lesson of the spirit in which

¹ Ibid., p. 428.

² See *A Survey of the Ancient Churches in the County of Limerick*, by Mr. Westropp, M.A.

the English came over here to correct abuses and reform the Irish people.

There is mention made of seven Bishops of Ardpatrik. This is found in an ancient Irish Litany, wherein the 'Seven Sainly Bishops of Ardpatrik' are invoked. These were probably chorepiscopi, or regularly consecrated Bishops, but without the territorial jurisdiction of a Bishop; for there is no evidence that Ardpatrik was ever the see or centre of a Bishop's jurisdiction.

The inquisition of May 20, in the twenty-first year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, finds

that Ml. Brian of the country of Ogonagh in ye county of Limerick being seized in fee of ye townland of Tultyle alias Tylgyles in this county containing 60 acres of arable with ye appurtenances, did 20th June 1 K. Henry VIII, grant ye said lands to Bernard O'Kerny then one of ye clerks of St. Patrick, commonly called St. Patrick's Clerks, and to his successors, Clerks of St. Patrick, for ever, contrary to the statute of mortmain; ye said premises are of ye annual value of 16*d.* Irish money; and are still in ye occupation of the said Clerks of St. Patrick.

By the term *clerks* we are to understand the *clergy*. In the statute of mortmain, the inquisition recalls an Act of Parliament restricting the giving of property to religious houses. This statute was one of those aggressive laws which have been enacted from time to time by the secular power as an encroachment on ecclesiastical rights. As it was opposed to the inborn liberty of the Church, as established by her Divine Founder, it was an unjust law, and, consequently, of no binding force in conscience.

FIANTS OF ELIZABETH

The following fiants of Elizabeth have connexion with Ardpatrik, and throw some side-lights upon Irish history during her cruel, pernicious, and disastrous reign:—

(Anno 1567.)

(No. 1056). Pardon to John Fitz William of Clenconoghor, of Ardpatryk, horseman (and Dermot riegh O'Molkiery, of Athlakath [Athlacca] co. Limerick, husbandman).

(No. 2873). Lease under commission (6. Aug., xvii.) to Edm. fitz John oge Gibbon fitz Gerald, Gent., out of John Langan's lands and others of Ardpatricke, in Cloughnodfoyle [Clonodfoy], 40s. (Anno 1576.)

(No. 2179). Grant to Richard and Alexander Phitton of [certain townlands, and among them] Ardpattrick, containing 4½ ploughlands and 26 acres. (Anno 1588.)

(No. 5179) in the year 1588 : Grant to Richard and Alexander Phitton of [along with several other townlands] Ardpattrick, containing 4½ ploughlands and 26 acres. To hold for ever by the name of Phitton's Fortune in fee farm by fealty in common sockage.

(No. 5612). Pardon to John O'Longan, of Ardpattrick. Anno 1591.

(No. 6465). (Anno 1600-1.) Pardon to Gillpatrick O'Longan, of Ardpattrick.

(No. 6505). (Anno 1601.) Pardon amongst many others [beginning with John Bourke, of Brittas, Co. Limerick, Gent., and including Morish O'Rahill of Dromuyn (Dromin), yeoman] to Conoghor O'Garve, of Ardpattrick.

Fiants of Elizabeth regarding comarb and clergy of Ardpattrick :—

(No. 4481). (Anno 1584.) Pardon to Morris oge O'Longan, corbne [corb] of Ardpatricke.

(No. 5517). (Anno 1590.) Grant to Edmund Fitzgibbon, Esqr., called the White Knight; 106s. 8d. ster. out of Cloghenodfaile [Clonodfoy], in the tenure of John Langan and other clerks of Ardpattrick.

(No. 1791). (Anno 1570.) Patent of presentation of Sollo M'Keegan, clerk, to the rectory and vicarage of Ardpattrick co. and diocese of Limerick.

In the *Calendar of Patent Rolls* (page 283) is the following entry : ' Grant of English liberty to John Langan of Ardpattrick, Maurice Langan, brother of Patrick, and Maurice Langan, his son, Feb. 28, 6d. (Date 1552).'

In the *Calendar of State Papers*, Carew, 1575 to 1588, date 1587, is the following : ' A [Parti]cular (date lost by mutilation) of the lands allotted by the Undertakers to Richard Fitton and Alexander Phitton,' and their associates. Among those lands was Ardpattrick. Richard and Alexander

received 4,000 acres apiece as their share of the spoils that were going in such profusion then, and for ages afterwards.

At an inquisition taken in the town of Kilmallock on May 23, 1608, before John Meade, Esq., it was sworn that Edmund Fitz Gibbon was 'seized with the town of Ardpatrik containing a moiety of one carucate of land, which he holds from his majesty the King in free and common socage.'

From the foregoing records it is seen that the rulers of Ireland had their time largely engaged between tendering 'grants of English liberty' to some, extending 'pardon' to others, breaking the titles of legitimate owners of land, and transferring these to their own followers and adventurers. They sowed the wind: they have been reaping the whirlwind. Whosoever would desire to comprehend the social and political situation of our times should study the history of Ireland for the last four centuries. There he would find, deeply rooted in wholesale and heartless confiscations, in acts of settlements, in fiants and inquisitions, in restrictive and prohibitive enactments, the origin of modern events, of industrial and commercial stagnation, of unsettlement, of agitation, of social upheaval, and the consequent land and labour laws of the present times. Irishmen have long memories, as well as fixed and firm resolutions.

In A.D. 1592 to 1596¹ we find a 'note of such rents as are found by verdict to be the inheritance of the Earl of Kildare, and issuing out of the undertakers' lands, whose names are mentioned, viz. [among others], Sir Edward Futton. Rent certain, Ardpatrik, 3*d*.' Sir Edward Futton is named as among the *efficient* undertakers. The undertakers were hungry adventurers from across the channel, who, under a government of brute force, without any title capable of conveying a right, unjustly squatted on the confiscated lands of Ireland, from which the rightful owners had been unscrupulously driven.

¹ *Calendar of State Papers*, p. 58.

O'SULLIVAN BEARE AT ARDPATRICK

To Ardpatrik belongs the credit of having afforded shelter to that brave and dauntless chieftain, O'Sullivan Beare, in his march to Ulster. We read in the *Annals of the Four Masters*, at A.D. 1602 :—

When O'Sullivan lost the Castle (Dun-baoi) he retired with his cows, herds and people, and all his movables behind his rough headed hills into the wilds and fastnesses of his county. The Earl [Thomond] and his army and O'Sullivan and his forces continued their attacks and contests until Christmas,

In describing the retreat of O'Sullivan, the Four Masters say : ' On the third night he arrived at Ardpatrik.' After the Spanish general, Don Juan, surrendered Kinsale and other strongholds to the English, for which on his return to his own country he was imprisoned, and died of grief, O'Sullivan Beare's castle of Dunboy, which was garrisoned by 143 men under the command of Richard Mac Geoghegan, was besieged by Carew with 4,000 men. The little garrison offered to surrender if they were allowed to march out with their arms, which condition was refused them. Thirty of them who attempted to escape by swimming were killed. Some of those brave and faithful defenders were forced to take refuge in the cellars. The few survivors surrendered unconditionally. Carew himself tells the fate of the garrison in his own callous words : ' No one man escaped ; all were either slain, executed, or buried in the ruins.' After such reverses, and his subsequent contests with the Earl of Thomond, seeing he could no longer hold out in his own western fastnesses, O'Sullivan Beare determined to seek refuge in Ulster, and to join his forces with those of the northern chieftains. Accordingly he commenced his march in mid-winter at the head of 400 soldiers and 600 women, children, and servants. It was to such a brave if unhappy chieftain and his followers that Ardpatrik, as stated above, afforded shelter on the third night of their long, difficult, and perilous venture, and continued to afford them hospitality for three days and three nights. In every county through which they passed, except Limerick, they were harassed and

opposed from the time they left their mountain homes until they arrived in Brefny, the territory of O'Rourke. After defeating Malby, the Governor of Connacht, at Aughrim, and reaching the end of his journey, O'Sullivan Beare found his number reduced to 18 men, 1 woman, and 36 servants, nearly all the rest having perished of hardship, hunger, and wounds. It was to such a chieftain, of ancient lineage, and in such circumstances, that Ardpatrik afforded refuge and hospitality, as he was leaving behind him for ever the territory of his ancestors, fated to die an exile in Spain.

The ancient town of Ardpatick lay on a sort of plateau or flat ground on the hill, at the distance of about one hundred yards to the south of the ruins of the church and round tower. The foundations of the boundaries or barriers of the town plots or gardens are distinctly discernible at the present time. The town was burned about 1640-1642, by the Earl of Inchiquin, as the writer has been locally informed, and has never since been rebuilt. Thus it was amid arson, such as merited for that deceitful and treacherous earl the title of 'Murrough of the Burnings,' that the time-honoured town of Ardpatrik disappeared for ever.

CIVIL SURVEY, 1640

Sir Edward Fitz Harris, of Clonodfoy, Baronet, Irish Papist, is returned as proprietor of the lands of Ballingarry, Moorstown, etc. Clonodfoy, the place of residence of Sir Edward Fitz Harris, is in the present parish of Ardpatrik, whilst Ballingarry is in the parish of Knocklong, and Moorstown in that of Kilfinane.

According to the Civil Survey, Sir Edward Fitz Harris of Clonodfoy, described as an Irish Papist, was an extensive proprietor in the united parishes of Kilfinane, Darragh, and Particles. He seems to have been the owner of all, or nearly all, the lands in the three united parishes. Because he remained a Catholic, and preferred conscience to worldly goods, he was despoiled of his property, and the Commissioners of Settlements planted in his inheritance Robert Oliver, a lieutenant of foot in the King's army.

Ardpatrik is given as having been in the ownership of

Nicholas Haly of Tworyne in 1640. The description of Irish Papist is bestowed upon him by the compilers of the Survey.

John Gould, another Irish Papist, was at the same time the proprietor of Ballingaddy, and some adjacent townlands in the barony of Coshma. It is stated that he was owing 'Chiefrie and Service to the Earl of Kildare.'

We may remark incidentally that in 1640 there were twenty-four landed proprietors in the barony of Coshlea, which embraces Ardpatrik. Of these only three are returned as English proprietors, all the rest, twenty-one in number, receiving the designation of Irish Papists. From this we can imagine the stiff work the reformers and puritans of England had in expropriating the Catholic and legitimate proprietors. In the first half of the seventeenth century the lands of the country were still practically in the hands of Catholic owners; for we might look upon the case of the barony of Coshlea as typical of what was happening throughout the country in this matter at the time. The innovating spirits and adventurers must have strained all their powers of invention to grasp this very fertile barony and oust the lawful owners of it. In spite of penal and flagitious laws, and in the teeth of all the ingenuity of the reformers, and all the resources of an unscrupulous and profligate government, the old proprietors for the most part kept their lands. We see above the small measure of success that attended the efforts of the persecutors during the reign of Elizabeth and the first half of the seventeenth century. It was only after arson and massacre, after unspeakable cruelties, that, during the latter half of that century, they were able to effect their purposes.

In an inquisition taken at Limerick, October 2, in the fifth year of King Charles II, before Francis Marsh, Protestant Bishop of Limerick, it is stated that the Vicar (Protestant) of Ardpatrik, the Vicars (also Protestants) of Kilfinan and Kilmallock, were accustomed to allocate 5s. for keeping a chorister in the church of St. Mary in Limerick.

The *Liber Regalis Visitationis* says in reference to Ardpatrik: 'It belongs to Donoughmore, a prebend. The

vicarage is vacant.' At page 174 of 'Extracts' from *Lib. Reg. Visitationis*, July, 1615, Ardpatrick is mentioned as one of the benefices of the deanery of Kilmallock. In the Civil Survey of 1640 Ardpatrick is placed as being in the parish of Ballingaddy. Hence it must have been united to the latter parish at some time anterior to that date.

Though no oral tradition of it may now remain there can be no doubt that Ardpatrick was united to Ballingaddy. In addition to the proof of this given in the preceding paragraph, among fragments pasted in White's MS. History of Limerick, is found the following: 'The chapel of Ardphaidrig (Ardpatrick), in the parish of Ballyhadding (Ballingaddy). It belongs to the college of Kilmallock. Dedicated.' Then Ardpatrick was united to Ballingaddy, and seems to have been a chapel-of-ease to the latter at the time that the fragment just quoted was written.

The fragment is taken from the *taxation* of the MS. History of the Rev. James White, pastor of the then existing parish of St. Nicholas in the city of Limerick, who died on February 7, 1768. James White states that he copied from an old MS., which was written by Dr. Jasper White, pastor of St. John's, and which was in the custody of the Rev. John Lehy, a succeeding pastor of that parish.

According to a note in Mr. Lenihan's *History of Limerick* (p. 577) the Rev. Dr. Jasper White was a priest in Limerick in 1688. Hence we may place the union of Ardpatrick with Ballingaddy at some date prior to the Civil Survey of 1640. There can be no doubt as to the union, for the fragment, and consequently the MS. from which it was taken, expressly says that Ardpatrick was in the parish of Ballingaddy. Furthermore, when speaking of the places of divine service in the deanery, James White calls the one at Ardpatrick a *chapel*, whilst he designates that of Ballingaddy as a *church*. In looking through his list of such places I find that he gives the secondary ones as *chapels*, and the principal parochial ones as *churches*; as an instance, he writes the '*chapel* . . . of St. Laurence in Ahaillaca' (Athlacca), and the

'parish church of Ahaleacagh [Athlacca] . . . dedicated to St. John the Baptist.'

The Ordnance Survey and some other modern authorities likewise place Ardpatrik as having been in the parish of Ballingaddy.

At a later period we find the parish of Ardpatrik united to Kilfinane. I am unable to say when this union took place, but it was when the persecutions were hot and fierce, or some time before 1704, in which year John Rahilly, described as then fifty years of age, and residing at Kilfinane, is given as rector of Kilfinane, Particles and part of Ballingaddy. The part of Ballingaddy to which reference is made included Ardpatrik. The union of Ardpatrik with Kilfinane lasted for more than a century and a half, and was dissolved only in 1861, when it was erected as a separate parish by the late Most Rev. John Ryan, Bishop of Limerick.

M. CANTY.

SOME SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS IN THE CATECHISM

IN many schools in Germany, and in a limited number in the United States,¹ the method of object-lessons, in such general favour at present in the case of secular subjects, has been adopted for the imparting of elementary religious knowledge. A story either from the Bible or from the lives of the Saints, or one that is purely fictitious and which has a religious signification more or less concealed, is told to the children, and they are expected, with the aid of occasional leading questions, to deduce from it the truth of faith or morality that it is intended to illustrate; or it may be that it is a religious picture or some point of liturgy to which their attention is directed with the same object in view. And in the schools in question the old catechetical method has fallen into abeyance in a greater or less degree.

Now, this Psychological method (as it is called) has not only the example of our Divine Lord, who so much favoured the parable, to recommend it, but also the analogous handling of secular subjects by the most capable and experienced teachers. But, on the other hand, it may truthfully be said that the reasons requiring the adoption of this somewhat indirect method in ordinary subjects do not apply with such cogency in the domain of religious knowledge, where the development of the pupil's intelligence is a secondary consideration, and the acquisition by him of a fixed amount of positive knowledge within a limited time is essential. For if the pupil be allowed to deduce the information for himself, it cannot be expected that he will amass as much of it in a given time as if it were presented in the more concentrated form of question and answer, much more beneficial though the former method may be

¹ Vide *Ecclesiastical Review*, March and April, 1908.

for the expansion of his nascent intelligence. The great disparity between the training in religion and that in other subjects is that a certain minimum of religious knowledge is necessary, whereas any specified quantity of secular knowledge is not, or should not be required. In ordinary subjects of the curriculum, the standard of mental development that the child has attained should form the sole criterion of his proficiency and of the success and adequacy of the education he is receiving. I am afraid, also, that if that acquaintance with religion which is necessary even for children had to be acquired through the medium of examples, many of those selected would be inapt and improbable, and many of the deductions forced and artificial. I suppose that if the teacher had more than the average share of ability and sufficient time at his disposal, a judicious blending of the old catechetical method with the object-lessons would be the ideal system.

But in Ireland, at any rate, the old method is almost exclusively adhered to, and it is my present object to suggest some improvements of which I think it is susceptible. The Catechism that I will have in view throughout is the Maynooth Catechism;¹ but this so closely corresponds with Dr. Butler's, that what is said of the one is almost equally pertinent in the case of the other. Both of these in one or another of their editions are extensively used by our children, who are seldom required to commit the words of any other to memory.²

Now, in dealing with a book whose words and phrases have become canonized, and which has served so well the spiritual interests of generations of children, it is of great importance that the fewest possible alterations should be introduced into its matter or wording. And considering the congested state of our school programmes, it is equally desirable that no additional burden should be imposed

¹ Ordered by the (first) National Synod of Maynooth, and approved of by the Cardinal, the Archbishops and Bishops of Ireland for general use throughout the Irish Church.

² The issue of a new Catechism was favourably considered by the last Synod of Maynooth, but owing to lack of time for full consideration the project was not proceeded with.

either on the teachers or the pupils. In the few tentative remarks I am about to make I promise to keep these two indispensable canons of criticism steadily in view.

The more important and necessary improvements may, I think, roughly be reduced to three categories: (a) the inclusion of some religious truths and duties which development of doctrine or change of discipline in modern times has shown to be of paramount importance, and which are often not emphasized, and sometimes not even mentioned in the Catechism; (b) the excision of unnecessary information and impracticable advice; (c) some corrections of verbal inaccuracies which are calculated in a few instances to leave an erroneous or misleading impression on the pupil's mind.

In regard to the first class of cases, it will occur to every one that attendance at Benediction of the Most Holy Sacrament, visiting the Blessed Sacrament, and devotion to the Sacred Heart are commonly practised by the faithful, and with the greatest utility, and yet are quite ignored in the Catechism. These religious exercises were not at one time, perhaps, so prominent in the Church's ritual. But nowadays, at any rate, they are not merely the luxuries of the pious and devout, such as attendance at Vespers as a means of sanctifying the Sunday, but form part of the staple spiritual sustenance of the ordinary Catholic, and are of untold help and consolation to him. It does not seem, accordingly, that school-children at least should be considered fit for Confirmation, the reception of which marks for most of them the end of the systematic study of the Catechism, unless they have some knowledge of the character and value of the devotions in question. And the more so as this knowledge can be imparted very easily, without taking them into the higher reaches of the theological atmosphere; in the case of devotion to the Sacred Heart, for instance, by explaining that the human heart is generally regarded as the seat of love and generosity.

I think a very suitable place for those simple explanations could be found in the chapter on the Blessed Eucharist, by eliminating the present questions and answers conver-

sant with 'a lively faith, a firm hope, and an ardent charity,' as dispositions for the reception of the Eucharist. The possession of these three spiritual endowments is of course of the greatest importance, but the reference to them could be very easily construed in an obligatory sense which would conflict with the recent decree of the Holy Father on frequent and daily Communion; and in any case the exposition of them in the Catechism is of too elevated and metaphysical a character to be within the comprehension of the generality of children.

It would be well also if the answer to the question about the desirability of frequent Communion were recast, conformably to the decree I have mentioned, into this shape : Frequent and even daily Communion is advisable for all that are in the state of grace and have an honest intention of improving their lives, even though they have not passed the age of childhood.

Again, though the subject of the Real Presence itself is admirably treated in the Catechism, the effect of Holy Communion on the soul is only referred to parenthetically and accidentally. The point should be brought out prominently and explicitly that It is the food and nourishment of the soul, just as bread is the food of the body. This can be explained in a short supplementary answer as meaning that the Blessed Eucharist helps the soul to get strong, keeps it strong, helps it to grow, and may give it a taste or liking for spiritual things.

In the chapter on the Precepts of the Church, new legislation has made obsolete the two answers dealing with a clandestine marriage. Keeping as closely as possible to the words of the Catechism, the first of these should be made to read, at least for advanced children : Every marriage of two Catholics, or of a Catholic and a non-Catholic, is clandestine, at which the parish priest of the place where the marriage is being celebrated is not present, or another priest by his leave or the leave of the Bishop or Vicar-General, together with two or three witnesses.

This answer is somewhat longer than the old one, but it is desirable that the children should be told that the law

applies even if only one of the parties is a Catholic, and also that the Vicar-General, who is often more accessible than the Bishop, can give the requisite permission. In the case of younger children, it is quite enough to tell them that the parish priest of the place and two witnesses must be present. The succeeding answer in the Catechism can now be bridged into the statement that a clandestine marriage is always null.

I do not know how far it may be necessary to state in this connexion that, to have the marriage lawful, the matter should be arranged with the parish priest of the girl, although it would be valid if celebrated before any parish priest in his own parish.

In the chapter on Prayer the family Rosary every night ought surely to be enumerated among the prayers most recommended to us.

Furthermore, no one will deny, I think, that the treatment of the fundamental question of grace leaves the pupils with an entire absence of any definite idea, no matter how inadequate, as to the nature of this gift of God. Now, while I am not insensible to the difficulties of this subject, even for trained theologians, I believe that it could be elucidated so as to be to a certain extent within the grasp even of children, by explaining that sanctifying grace makes the soul holy and pleasing to God and gives us a right to heaven, because it unites us with God and brings the Holy Ghost to dwell in the soul ; and that actual grace helps us to avoid evil and do good, precisely because it consists of the good thoughts and good wishes which God puts into our minds from time to time.

Again, seeing how extensively some of the sacramentals, e.g., Holy Water and the Scapulars, are venerated, a question as to their nature and efficacy should be given a place. A simple answer and one conducive to their intelligent use would be, that the Church, when her ministers bless these objects, makes them her own, and promises to exert her great influence with God in favour of those who piously make use of them.

The same principle that dictates the changes I have so

far suggested also makes it urgent that the malice of certain vices that are debasing and demoralizing to the individual, and deleterious to our national character, should be emphasized as strongly as possible. For instance, a question dealing with the occasions of drunkenness and the means of avoiding it should be inserted ; unfortunately, the prevalence of this vice in the country is too great to warrant the summary way in which it is dismissed in the Catechism.

Again, under the Seventh Commandment the danger of betting ought to be adverted to. And the answer as to what else is forbidden by this Commandment should be supplemented so as to conclude: 'Or any other injury done to our neighbour in his person, property, or character.' For many people are unaware that offences against the person and character of others are often violations of the Seventh Commandment, and so entail the obligation of restitution.

These additions may seem extensive, but I think they could be inserted without increasing the total length of the catechetical programme by careful attention to the second set of modifications, viz., the elimination of matter that is comparatively unimportant, or that is beyond the apprehension of children.

I have already referred to some desirable omissions in the lesson on the Holy Eucharist. And in the next lesson, the recommendations as to how we should prepare for confession are not only contained in answers that are too long and involved for children to commit to memory, or at any rate to assimilate in thought, but they are besides quite impracticable. The very detailed examination of Conscience on the Commandments of God and of His Church, on the seven deadly sins, on our predominant passions, etc., would, if it were to be faithfully adhered to, deter the average Christian from frequent confession.

I would suggest the following as an alternative covering the two questions dealing with the preparation in the Catechism : First, to ask the help of God ; secondly, to try and find out our sins ; and thirdly, to think over the reasons why we should be sorry for them.

I doubt if a protracted survey of the different Commandments is either useful or necessary for the purpose of ascertaining one's state of guilt. For in most cases the sins stand out clearly enough, and a prolonged examination of conscience will mean, no doubt, a correspondingly abridged period devoted to contrition.

Again, in the definition of prayer, the ideas are too exalted and too mystical to meet the requirements or desires of the ordinary faithful, and especially of children. 'An elevation of the soul to God' was no doubt intelligible and feasible enough to St. Teresa, but for readers of the Catechism it would, perhaps, be more satisfactory to tell them that prayer is a reverent speaking with God; and then, in the case of the more forward children, the different kinds of prayer could be readily explained by reference to the probable subjects of conversation between a beggar and a charitable person who is in a position to relieve his wants.

Furthermore, much of the section on the First Commandment, dealing with superstition, may be almost entirely omitted. For nowadays very few in this country are tempted to give credit to dreams or fortune-tellers, etc.; and though wakes are objectionable for many reasons, I do not think that religion is ever travestied at them nor sacred objects ridiculed; it would be much more useful to denounce them as a potent cause of intemperance rather than as likely to cause a breach of the First Commandment.

In the same category may be included some of the explanations that are given; for instance, the one as to why the Mass was not offered in the Old Law. The reason is stated to be the necessity of fulfilling the figures of the Old Law and of giving to religion its full perfection. Surely it would be shorter, less bewildering to a child, and more adequate to say that the Mass was not offered in the Old Law because our Lord had not then become man; though it seems scarcely necessary to tell even children such an obvious fact at all.

Again, the part of the lesson on the Church, treating of the efficacy of faith and works, can, in my opinion, be entirely

passed over. For there is very little danger, thank God, that our children will ever become infected with the old Protestant notion that faith is indispensable, and good works only more or less desirable ; nor is there much probability of their being attracted to the creed of Indifferentism, viz., that it is works alone that count. At any rate, personally I have found that these notions are altogether beyond the capacity of ordinary children to grasp, and that they scarcely ever penetrate beyond the maze of words in question to the ideas they enshrine.

And much the same, I think, may be said of the attempted explanation as to why God revealed mysteries of religion.

In regard to the third class of alterations, the corrections that I wish to suggest are confined exclusively to those cases where a mistaken notion is likely to be conveyed, and I do not intend to refer to any merely literary defects, such as the one contained in the expression *wilful* murder.

And in the first place, the statement that we came into the power of the devil by the disobedience of our first parents could be usefully supplemented by the words : And by our own sins. For it must be confusing to the intelligent child to be told at one stage of his instruction that those dying with original sin only on their souls will not go to the hell of the damned, and to be told at another stage that this same sin places us in the power of the devil.

One of the most faulty statements in the Catechism, I think, is that explaining the necessity of Church membership. Bellarmine's famous definition of the true Church is adopted, and this, as is plain, only embraces the body, i.e., all professing Catholics ; and in an answer immediately subsequent it is laid down that no one can be saved outside the true Church—presumably the one whose definition has just been given. In order to avoid a misapprehension it is clearly necessary to add to this answer : If he be outside it through his own fault.

For if Protestants keep the Commandments and believe their own Church to be the true one, it is authoritative

Catholic doctrine, definitely formulated by Pius IX, that they may be saved; though, of course, it is true that their prospects are not very roseate, seeing that they have only prayer and two Sacraments as channels of grace to assist their endeavours. So that in order to save our children from a wrong idea as to the hopes of Heaven that may be entertained for outsiders and the doctrine of exclusive salvation in the true fold, it is necessary either to extend the definition of the Church so as to embrace all who belong to the soul of it, that is, all who are in the state of grace, when the necessity of membership will be absolute; or alternatively, to make it plain that union with the body, that is, to be a Catholic, is not, strictly speaking, indispensable to those who are in invincible ignorance.

The next correction, I think, that should be made is in the definition of a fast day. This would more appropriately read: A fast day is a day on which we are allowed but one full meal and two collations. No doubt, by the common law, as unmodified, one meal only was allowed on such a day, and flesh meat was forbidden, moreover. But in face of the invariable modern practice of allowing eight ounces additional of solid food in the morning, and two at night, it is useless, if not worse, to teach the children what was of obligation in the discipline that is now quite obsolete. The retention of the prohibition of flesh meat on a fast day is not much more justifiable, seeing that meat is allowed to all on practically four fast days of every week in Lent—on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and every Saturday, except that of Quarter Tense, and in some places Easter Saturday. It is true that it is by dispensation it is allowed on these days, but our object in catechising children should be to teach them the facts as to what is of obligation and what is not; we are in no way bound to take cognizance of the existence of a law, from the observance of which we are freed by a standing and universal dispensation. And the facts are, unquestionably, that on no fast day are we limited to one full meal, and that on the greater number of such days meat is allowed at least once.

As regards the next answer, I have found some children

under the impression that on a day of abstinence a person is restricted to his usual number of meals, and may not exceed that number without infringing the law. Such a misapprehension, doubtless, is not common, but if it were, the ambiguity would be removed by substituting the words: Any number of meals, for 'the usual number of meals.'

It sometimes gives a wrong impression, too, to state that the special graces given by Confirmation are the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. Speaking for myself, I thought for a long time that these graces were not conferred by any of the Sacraments usually received before Confirmation. The correct doctrine is that though all the Sacraments confer these gifts, we get a *great increase* of them when we are made soldiers of Christ.

Similarly, if the child's assent to the answer in Butler's Catechism as to why Sacraments of the dead are so called, be real and not merely notional, he must be convinced of the futility of going to confession unless on the occasions when, unfortunately, his soul is dead in sin; for he is told that it is the function of these two Sacraments to 'raise the soul from the death of sin to the life of grace,' without any mention being made of the fact that they can be profitably received even when the soul is already enjoying a strong and vigorous life. Every priest who has heard confessions knows that penance is as often administered to those whose souls already possess the vital principle of sanctifying grace as to those who have lost it. Consequently, it would be more true to say that Baptism and Penance are called Sacraments of the dead because the soul *may be* dead in sin when we receive them.

In the same way, if the child really understands and believes the answer given in the lesson on Indulgences as to the requirements for gaining one, he will feel that they are entirely out of his reach, except when he receives Confession and Holy Communion. For he is told that the reception of these Sacraments is a necessary condition; whereas they are never required for the numerous partial indulgences which are granted to all who have the intention of gaining

them, are in the state of grace and recite the specified prayers.

It may be mentioned, too, that the giving of alms, another one of the conditions enumerated in the same chapter, is now, so far as I know, never required for a plenary indulgence, and fasting, instead of being a usual condition, is only required on the rare occasions when a jubilee occurs.

Finally, the reasons given for the existence of unhappy marriages are not, I think, in accordance with the facts; the explanation given is neither a sound nor a plausible one. The unhappiness of some marriages no doubt is attributable to the fact that the parties contracted them 'from unworthy motives and with guilty consciences.' But everyone, I think, will admit that domestic infelicity is due in a far larger number of cases to such causes as drunkenness on the part of the husband, and the neglect of both parties to make sufficient allowance for their mutual sins and shortcomings.

I do not pretend that the examples I have given are at all exhaustive of the improvements that might easily be effected in the Catechism; nor may I hope that the suggestions will commend themselves as improvements to everyone. But they will serve to emphasize the fact that a child may have a very accurate knowledge of the words of the Catechism, without having in all cases accurate ideas to correspond. They will also call attention to the necessity of the judicious intervention of the teacher, and of an attitude of reserve on his part at least towards the words that are occasionally used.¹

DAVID BARRY.

¹ It should be impressed on children in connexion with the Third Commandment that races and political meetings tend very much to profane Sundays and Holidays.

THE BENEDICTINES IN IRELAND

THE present writer some years ago gave a short account in this Review of the 'Return of the Benedictines to Ireland.' This account was afterwards copied into the *Tablet*, and the *Downside Review* of March, 1908, had the following paragraph with reference to it :—

In the February number of the I. E. RECORD there appeared an article entitled 'The Return of the Benedictines to Ireland,' written by 'A Layman.' It consisted of an interesting and, on the whole, correct account of the circumstances that led to the founding of our Irish House at Mount St. Benedict, near Gorey, Co. Wexford. The writer took care to explain that he himself was entirely responsible for the article, lest anyone should be inclined to think that it had been inspired by the authorities at Gorey, but it was evident that he was one who had been conversant with the movement from its very inception. Father Abbot visited the house in February, and according to all accounts it seems to be progressing in a most satisfactory and hopeful manner.

The above paragraph gives an endorsement from Downside of the general correctness of the account. Since that time the undertaking has survived many and great difficulties.

The present Superior of Mount St. Benedict is the Rev. J. F. Sweetman, O.S.B., who is a nephew of the late General Sir William Butler. Father Sweetman it was who was inspired to induce the English Benedictines to start the Irish House, and he it is whose untiring efforts, amidst endless difficulties, have brought Mount St. Benedict to its present hopeful condition. When a religious Order is introduced into a country the devil seems to be allowed special powers to endeavour to stop its progress, but God prevails in the end. In the July number of the *Irish Monthly* there is an account of some of the difficulties encountered by the Cistercians, eighty years ago, in the

establishment of Mount Melleray Abbey. The time has not arrived to publish the difficulties which up to this have met the establishment of Mount St. Benedict—they have been such, however, as to prove that a special Providence must be watching over the work, or it could not be still in existence.

Nearly three years ago the present writer stated : ‘ The success of the undertaking is now assured, if enough Irishmen with the Benedictine spirit join this new Benedictine foundation.’ Since that time the scheme has been in some ways marvellously successful, notwithstanding the great difficulties it has met with during the last six years, but men are still urgently required who wish to become Irish Benedictines. The English Benedictines, under Abbot Ford of Downside Abbey, started the Irish House, but it cannot be expected that Englishmen will give up their own country to work for the good of another nation ; and there is no doubt that Downside Abbey itself is in need of more monks owing to the number of its monks who are carrying out parish work throughout England ; and therefore on Irishmen must fall the duty of manning an Irish Benedictine monastery. All we can expect of the English Benedictines is that they should carry on the establishment in Mount St. Benedict for a few years until Irish novices can take their place. French Benedictines might have been induced to come over, if the place had been given to them, but Frenchmen will not make Irish Benedictines. Ireland must depend on herself.

On last Corpus Christi, Abbot Butler, the present Abbot of Downside Abbey, came over from England to Gorey for the great outdoor procession of the Blessed Sacrament, which is now an annual religious celebration at Mount St. Benedict. Thousands of the inhabitants for many miles distant flock to these celebrations, on foot, on cars, and on motors. Last year the well-known orator, Father Keane, of the Dominican Order, preached in the open air to the assembled thousands ; this year it was one of the Passionist Fathers from Mount Argus who preached. Abbot Butler carried the Blessed Sacrament through the grounds to the

out of door altars, where Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament was given. The canopy-bearers were the Earl of Fingall, Judge Brereton Barry, Mr. John Dillon, M.P., who all have sons at the school, and Mr. James Talbot Power, who has been a great friend to Mount St. Benedict.

The aim of the school is to provide for boys whose parents would otherwise send them to England. Amongst the boys at the school all political parties are represented, which will have the effect of softening political feelings towards each other in the future. We have the Unionist Earl of Fingall, Judge Barry, and many other Unionists sending their sons to Mount St. Benedict. Then we have the Liberal Attorney-General, Mr. Redmond Barry, M.P., and the Home Rule Member of Parliament, Mr. John Dillon, sending their sons. It is a remarkable fact that there are two boys from England at the school. Last term there were thirty boys ranging from nine years of age to sixteen. The teaching staff include a number of lay masters, graduates of Universities. Mr. Shane Leslie, who was a brilliant member of Cambridge University, spent a good deal of time during the last year as a volunteer giving lectures to the students.

The education of the upper classes of a nation is, in some ways, of more importance than even the education of the lower classes, as they will have more influence in after life. On this account the advent of the Benedictines, who will devote themselves to this work, is most important for the religion of Ireland. At present, of course, the Jesuits do much in this way, but their greatest friends will acknowledge that there is plenty of room for the Benedictines; and now that a National University is established there is extra work for the teaching Orders.

A vigorous, self-reliant, and prosperous nation cannot be created unless the individuals who form the nation be vigorous and self-reliant. For this they must have individuality. The education which the Benedictine spirit gives to boys helps the formation of this individuality. Their policy is to endeavour to draw out what is in the boy, and not to make him an entirely different individual from what God has created him. The Procrustian system of

education is that which stunts the growth of the individual, and makes us inclined to shout the same cries, just because they are the cries of the majority.

There is another most important consideration with regard to the spirit of St. Benedict ; it is that, besides being a spirit of liberty and toleration, it is one which enjoins hard work, both manual and mental, and this spirit is very necessary for us in Ireland. We have a very absurd theory that manual labour is derogatory to one's self-respect. The sight of priests and monks labouring in the fields helps to cure us of this ridiculous theory, which has been so much the cause of our want of prosperity as a nation.

The present writer does not want to make little of the spirit of other religious Orders of the Church, whose principal aim is that of preaching. 'Let every spirit praise the Lord' is his motto, but it seems to him that there is a special opportunity of spreading the spirit of St. Benedict at the present time in Ireland, and that that spirit would be a decided advantage to our nation.

It has been often remarked that the Benedictines were never very strong in Ireland, and from that fact it has been argued that it is useless to try to reintroduce them. It seems, however, to the present writer that we need not deduce from this fact that the Irish character is not suited to the Benedictine spirit, nor that St. Patrick and St. Benedict are at variance in heaven. The explanation is quite different and very simple : it is owing to the history of the country. The Benedictine motto is *Pax*. It is essentially an Order for peaceful times. During the centuries of penal laws it was, of course, impossible to have Benedictine monasteries. All that could be done by monks had to be done by preaching Orders, whose members travelled alone in disguise, preaching to the people and giving the sacraments in hiding. Before the Reformation, from the time the English came to Ireland in the twelfth century, the country was in a constant state of turmoil, fighting with the invader, and with those Irishmen who supported the invader ; and although there were then some Benedictine monasteries, the condition of the country was not

as suitable to them as was England ; hence the Benedictines were far stronger in England than in Ireland at that time. Even before the English invasion the state of the country did not suit the peaceful spirit of St. Benedict, as there was constant fighting going on with the Danes, and, unfortunately, between the different clans. Happily now a spirit of peace seems to be gaining ground in our country—the very Orangemen seem inclined to be more friendly with their Catholic fellow-countrymen, and therefore the Benedictine Order has now a great chance of establishing itself in Ireland. We hear every day of Irishmen evangelizing foreign countries ; there must be, however, even still, enough young men in Ireland to man an Irish Benedictine monastery.

A LAYMAN.

DOCUMENTS

LETTER OF HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS X TO HIS GRACE
THE ARCHBISHOP OF DUBLIN, ON THE OCCASION OF
THE SILVER JUBILEE OF HIS EPISCOPATE

SEGRETERIA DI STATO DI SUA SANTITÀ'
DAL VATICANO,

29 Iulii, 1910.

Ill^me ac Rev^me Domine,

Dum inter plausus et gaudium cleri populique universi istius Archidioeceseos, fauste feliciterque celebrabit Amplitudo Tua quintum et vicesimum anniversarium ex quo episcopali dignitate insignita et aucta fuit, Beatissimus Pater, tum ad augendam fidelium tuorum laetitiam, tum ad exhibendum tibi singulare existimationis et benevolentiae Tuae testimonium, litteras autographas tibi mittere, eodemque tempore inter Episcopos Pontificio Solio adsistentes Amplitudinem Tuam adsciscere dignatus est.

Quam ob rem laeto libentique animo supradictas litteras Augusti Pontificis, hic adnexas, tibi remittere propero, simulque Breve Apostolicum quo praedicta celsissima honorificentia tibi confertur.

Hanc occasionem nactus, omnia et vota, quae pro tua prosperitate et salute ex corde suscipio, tibi exprimere gaudeo, dum sensus existimationis maximae in te meae confirmo et me profiteor.

Amplitudini Tuae, Addictissimum,

R. CARD. MERRY DEL VAL.

R^mo. D^{ño}. Gulielmo Walsh,
Archiepiscopo Dublinensi,
Eblanam.

LETTER OF HIS HOLINESS

VENERABILI FRATRI, GULIELMO ARCHIEPISCOPO DUBLINENSI
EBLANAM

PIUS PP. X

Venerabilis Frater, Salutem et Apostolicam Benedictionem,

Communis laetitiae causam Hibernis tuis mox faustus dies afferet, cum viginti quinque complebis episcopatus annos; nec

tu, pro tua modestia, impedire potes quominus incensa bonorum omnium in te studia appareant, quae magnis ipse promeritis excitasti.

Consentaneum est, non solum dioecesim, quam sancte sapienterque gubernas, quamque optimis praesidiis vel ad religionis cultum vel ad incrementum puerilis institutionis ornasti, sed omnem Hiberniam hoc tempore velle ostendere quanti te faciat et quam diligit: nemo enim ignorat, tua praesertim opera, Deo adiuvante, factum esse, ut et res agraria tuorum popularium publice ad aequitatis normam componeretur, et diuturnae expectationi gentis satisfaceret, Athenaeo constituto, ubi adolescentes catholici, sine ulla offensione, doctrinarum cursum conficerent.

Nec vero deesse sibi volent, quin gratis te significationibus prosequantur catholici homines ex Anglia, quando, te in primis suasore, nostri, quotquot sunt ex legumlatorum ordine, ad tuenda catholicae professionis iura eum consensionis globum effecere, cuius iam satis constant praeclarae utilitates.

In hoc autem quasi concentu gratulantium vocem desiderari Nostram non tuae patiuntur tantae laudes, non caritas sinit benevolentiae qua erga te sumus. Quare hanc epistolam habe, testem paterni animi, omnia tibi a Deo precantis bona, eandemque nuntiam apostolicae benedictionis, quam tibi, Venerabilis Frater, et gregi tuo universo amantissime impertimus.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum die XXVIII Iulii MCMX, Pontificatus Nostri anno septimo.

PIUS PP. X.

CASE OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

SACRA ROMANA ROTA

BALTIMOREN.

NULLITATIS MATRIMONII (REID-PARKHUST)

Pio PP. X feliciter regnante, Pontificatus Dominationis suae anno septimo, die 30 Iunii 1910, RR. PP. DD. Auditores M. Lega, Decanus, Ponens, Gustavus Persiani, Guilelmus Sebastianelli, Seraphinus Many, Franciscus Heiner, Ioannes Prior, Aloisius Sincero, Ioseph Mori, Fridericus Cattani, Antonius Perathoner, Ioseph Alberti, videntes, per commissionem cum clausula 'videntibus omnibus' in hac Causa Baltimoren.—Nullitatis Matrimonii, inter Dñam Mariam Reid, repraesentatam per legitimos procuratores Santucci et Astorri, Advocatos, et Fridericum Parkhust,

Interveniente et disceptante in causa Vinculi Defensore ex officio, sequentem tulerunt sententiam.

Die 21 Sept. anno 1887, Maria Reid catholica, matrimonium inivit cum Friderico Parkhust, acatholico non baptizato, in urbe Washington, coram Rev. Dño Chapelle, rectore paroeciae S. Matthaei illius civitatis, legitime servata Tridentina forma. Vita communis duravit ad 11 annos et inde nati sunt quatuor filii. Sensim enatae sunt discordiae inter coniuges et eousque creverunt ut vir divortium, ita dictum civile, petierit et obtinuerit. Anno 1901 domina Maria Reid mense Iulio Romam se contulit ac mense Augusto anno 1901 matrimonium quod dicunt civile, cum quodam viro principe romano contraxit. Cupiens vero cum eodem viro matrimonium etiam religiosum inire, matrimonium cum Domino Parkhust initum accusare coepit, contendens hoc invalidum fuisse vel quia nulla intercessit dispensatio ab impedimento disparitatis cultus, aut si concessa fuit, irrita dicenda est, utpote a se non expetita, atque concessa, praetermissis necessariis *cautionibus*; eo magis quia eius persuasio et intentio fuit contrahendi cum baptizato, minime vero cum infideli.

Causa haec antea cognita fuit a S. Congregatione Propagandae Fidei, quae censuit non constare de nullitate matrimonii, anno 1905, mense Maio. Instante Maria Reid haec caussa ex commissione Beatissimi Patris delata fuit ad Hunc S. O. definienda, *videntibus omnibus*, et in hodierna actione quaestio proponitur sub dubio: '*An constet de matrimonii nullitate in casu?*'

In solutionem quaestionis in primis considerarunt RR. DD. matrimonium, quamvis dubium et controversum, frui beneficio possessionis in casu: unde in partem negantem refunditur onus probandi quod eadem contendit. Ad rem Card. D'Annibale haec habet. (P. III, n. 478): '*. . . si certo non appareat matrimonium irritum fuisse, pro matrimonio (quod possidet) regulariter respondendum est: ideoque tametsi pro valore matrimonii nulla, pro nullitate probabilis tantum ratio subsit.*'

Et S. Officii Instructio 18 Decembr. 1872, a Patronis citata, docet: '*in dubium standum est pro valore matrimonii . . . licet autem ab hoc principio recedere aequum sit, quando nimirum . . . quaestio agitur de facto, utrum scilicet fuerit, numquam contractum, necne.*' Hac de caussa Card. D'Annibale apponit limitationem *regulariter*, innuens casum exceptionis ab Instruktionem positae, quando scilicet dubium est utrum matrimonium contractum fuerit, necne. In themate autem nullam quaesti-

onem subesse patet, utrum nempe matrimonium fuerit contractum, necne in facie Ecclesiae, servata Tridentina forma : sed dubium est utrum fuerit valide contractum, praevia dispensatione impediendi disparitatis cultus. Ipsam autem dispensationem frui hac praesumptione, et hinc, esse in *possessione* evincitur *ex iuris principiiis in genere et ex facto*.

In primis deducitur *ex facto* quod referatur in libris Curiae Baltimoren. Solemne est in H. S. O. ut libri, etsi non subscripti, qui detinentur in Archiviis, plenam fidem faciant de actis ibi relatis : '*idem esse scripturam esse publicam, sive quod illa sit sumpta ex publico Archivio*' (dec. 3, n. 18, p. 8, *Recent.*)—Et in dec. 766, n. 2, p. 3. Domini firmarunt libros '*uti detentos ex necessitate officii et a personis auctoritate publica deputatis, fidem mereri*' et in dec. 252, n. 3, p. 3 : '*Liber . . . factus ab Officiali ex necessitate officii sui probat*' et in dec. 91, n. 1, p. 14, librorum pro usu Reipublicae conscriptorum '*fides et auctoritas magna esse debet.*' Neque in adnotationibus in libris protocollaribus ad fidem faciendam requiri subscriptionem, tradit De Luca, *de iudic. disc.* 27, n. 27, et firmatum est in dec. 628, n. 1, sq., p. 2, *Recent.* Deinde considerarunt RR. DD. adnotationes in libris Curiae aequivalere *Protocollo*, quod Reiffenstuel,—*de fid. instrument.*—definit '*esse primam et originalem scripturam, in qua breviter a Tabellione adnotatur substantia actus gesti.*' Item tradit cum communi Schmalzgrueber,—*de fid. instrument.*, n. 25,—*Protocollo*, *quamvis non subscriptum, eandem vim habere quam ipsum originale seu solemne instrumentum.*

Praeterea *l. c.*, n. 47, docet idem Schmalzg. : Quaeritur IV, quid probent libri officialium publicorum ? Si scriptus sit talis liber ab officiali publico ad hoc deputato, et de iis quae ad officium illius pertinent plene probant factum ibi relatum, non minus quam instrumentum confectum a Notario.' Libros autem Curiae Baltimoren. confici a Cancellario refert Rev. Dñus Marchetti : '*Il Cancelliere infatti teneva e tiene conto del numero delle dispense.*' Magnam vero auctoritatem habere eiusmodi scripturas, utpote asservatas in publico Archivio, probat idem Schmalz., *l. c.*, n. 40, et asserit : '*Licet talis scriptura secundum se publica non sit, prout est illa quae per publicum notarium confecta est, vim tamen publici instrumenti habet, tum ratione loci quod in Archivio recondita fuerit ; tum ratione personae, quod per publicum et iuratum officialem, seu ministrum, sit registrata*' et confirmat Rota in dec. 379, *La seconda* n. 6 et 7, p. 13, *Recent.* : '*. . . Archivium Episcopi . . . publicum reputatur, et ideo regulariter*

scripturis in eo retentis integra fides quoad omnia praestari debet ad text. in c. 2, ibique Gloss., in verb. sigillum. *De fid. instrument. . . . Rota c. Merlino, decis. 264, num. 3.*

Considerarunt insuper Domini de sequuta dispensatione fidem fieri debuisse a Curia Baltimoren., quae uti videtur, eamdem concessit *in forma gratiosa*, producentem suum effectum a *momento* concessionis, adeo ut parochus coniunxerit sponso, iam coniugio idoneos, seu *dispensatos*. Eo magis haec valent, quia Patroni absolute nec negare audent dispensationem concessam fuisse, sed super eius authenticitate et genuinitate dubia movent, quia in quatuor diversis exemplaribus relatum fuerit authographum, seu Protocollum, dispensationis conservatum in Curia Baltimoren. Quum vero *ex facto*, quod referatur in libris Curiae Baltimoren., *possessionem* nanciscatur dispensatio, consequitur quod, si aliquod moveatur dubium circa eius valorem, invocandum est principium '*in dubium standum est pro valore actus*' et quidem, sive dubitetur an dispensatio rite petita, sive quaeratur an rationabiliter aut legitime concessa vel partibus significata fuerit. Quae valent etsi agatur de Delegato aut de exequutore dispensationis, uti animadvertit De Iustis (*de dispens. matrim. l. III, c. 1, n. 84*): tanto magis quando quaestio est de matrimonio iam inito. Ait S. Alphonsus: 'Non potest matrimonium contrahi si impedimentum sit certum et dubitatur num obtenta sit dispensatio: tunc enim possidet impedimentum. *Secus esset, si constet de dispensatione et dubitetur de eius valore: quia tunc possessio stat pro valore dispensationis*' (*Theol. mor., l. VI, n. 902*).

Sed antea quam ad examen revocentur singulae oppositae exceptiones, iuvat firmare Regulam ab H. S. O. solemniter enunciata in una Romana, 2 maii 1727, c. Ratto, n. 1. 'Omnis praesumptio militare debet pro validitate matrimonii, nullaque ratio habenda est de oppositis exceptionibus quando illae non sunt adeo perstringentes et efficaces, ut incontinenti et concludentissime evincant praetensam nullitatem, sive ex defectu liberi consensus, sive ex alia irritanti causa promanantem.' Maxime notabilis visa est RR. DD. regula quae firmatur in dec. 406, n. 1, p. 1, *Recent*; scilicet '*Responsum est, tempus decennii esse necessarium ad praesumendum matrimonium legitimum quando de eo aliter non constat.*' Sane heic agitur de simplici praesumptione quae quamcumque admittit contrariam probationem; siquidem in re matrimoniali introduci non poterat praescriptio, constituta in re patrimoniali '*ne rerum dominia semper incerta*

manerent.—Ast praesumptiones pro valore matrimonii eo graviores et fortiores habendae sunt, quum maxime expediat Reipublicae Catholicae ne matrimonia in facie Ecclesiae inita, facile in dubitationem adducantur, neque facile praevalere possint exceptiones adversum matrimonii valorem adductae. Nam, praecipue post longi temporis lapsum a celebratione, si facilius et commodius dubia excitantur adversus actus valorem, difficilius dilui possunt. Huc spectat sententia Innocentii III, in *cap. 47, De testibus*: ‘tolerabilius est, aliquos contra statuta hominum dimittere copulatos quam coniunctos legitime contra statuta Domini separare.’

In meritum autem factarum exceptionum *ad factum* controversum quod attinet, RR. DD. haec considerarunt: 1°. hodie ne in controversiam quidem adducitur, Fridericum non fuisse baptizatum, ut hinc revera impedimentum obstitisse disparitatis cultus.

2°. Ab omnibus admittitur Dñum Parkhust esse virum fidedignum; actrix absque ambagibus fatetur. ‘Era ritenuto per uomo rispettabilissimo’ ita etiam eius mater; et Dñus Sweeny: ‘Io lo considero tale di stima generale.’

3°. Certum est Mariam actricem parum aut nihil sollicitam fuisse de cognoscenda veritate circa sectam religiosam cui addictus erat Fridericus; et utrum baptismum susceperat, interrogata enim: ‘à l’époque où vous avez consenti à épouser Frideric Hale Parkhust, avez vous jamais demandé s’il avait été baptisé ou non; ou avez vous autorisé d’autres à le lui demander?’ reponit: ‘No giammai.’ Haec responsio vero pro intentione actricis profluere videtur a persuasionem quam ipsa praesefert, suum sponsum fuisse baptizatum: sed in praesentiarum certum est, Mariam suam intimam hanc persuasionem numquam intendisse ponere uti conditionem *sine qua non* seu, se refundentem in errorem personae; nam, interrogata: ‘Avez-vous posé au moment même de votre mariage soit oralement, soit mentalement la condition suivante: Je te marie, Frideric Hale Parkhust parceque je te crois baptisé, et si tu n’es pas baptisé, je ne te prende pas pour mon époux?’ reponit: ‘No, non mi entrò mai per la testa.’

4°. Item in probatis existit tractatus habitos fuisse cum Parocho Chapelle circa dispensationem necessariam pro matrimonio ineundo: hoc affirmat ipse Dñus Chapelle, actricis Mater et Parkhust, et confirmat Dñus Sweeny: Actrix vero negat se in his aliquam partem habuisse; ast contradicit Dñus Chapelle et Dñus Parkhust. Actrix vero non inficiatur eius matrem huic

negotio incubuisse : ait enim : ' Io ritenevo che tutte le pratiche necessarie venivano fatte dal parroco Chapelle e da mia madre, siccome non fui richiesta di nulla in quest'affare.' ' Nessuno mi fece da agente, ma siccome il Dott. Chapelle doveva eseguire la cerimonia nuziale, ritenevo ch' egli avesse sistemata ogni cosa regolarmente.'

Mater vero ad interrogationem : ' Era detto allora qualche cosa intorno alla dispensa ? ' R. ' Sì, signore.' Item interrogata : ' Voi e vostra figlia parlaste col Prete intorno alla dispensa ? ' R. ' Io faceva.' ' Sapevate se il Prete scrisse o disse ch' egli scriverebbe per la necessaria dispensa ? ' R. ' Il Prete disse, egli attenderebbe a quello.' Item mater apprime edocta erat de dispensatione quae obtinenda erat pro validitate matrimonii initi a catholico cum viro infideli, et in casu percontata est parochum loci Bangor Dñum Sweeny de conditione religiosa Dñi Parkhust ; at certe rescire non potuit, utrum hic fuerit baptizatus : refert enim parochus : ' Io scrissi a lui a tale scopo che io capiva che egli apparteneva ad una famiglia metodista : il fatto è che io ricevetti una lettera da lei, riguardante lui, e dava informazioni che la famiglia apparteneva alla denominazione metodista. . . . Io non ho alcuna prova di questa idea al di là di una chiacchiera generale.' Quae autem hac de re mater scivit aut scire certo non potuit, omni procul dubio et filiam non latebant. Fluit autem ex tenore attestationum et sponsam eiusque matrem non admodum fuisse sollicitas de conditione religiosa sponsi : hoc Parkhust diserte testatur, aiens : ' La questione non era trattata come di grande importanza, e per quanto io adesse possa ricordare, fu soltanto il soggetto di una singola conversazione.'

5°. Item certum est dispensationem non fuisse lectam in actu celebrationis nuptiarum ; prouti dubitare non licet, cautiones ex parte viri non scriptis sed dumtaxat oretenus datas fuisse et significatas fuisse, saltem coram parcho.

6°. Nullum serium dubium moveri potest adversus authenticitatem actus dispensationis deductum ex quadruplici exemplari, nam si demas exemplar a Rño Dño Marchetti exhibitum, alia exemplaria non erant de verbo ad verbum exscripta ab authographo sed simplices erant attestationes de sequuta dispensatione, et animadversum fuit ex ratione qua obtentum est primum exemplar, excludi penitus et absolute sive quod authographum corrumpi potuerit aut voluerit, sive quod non fideliter, data opera, exscriptum fuerit. Nam inopinato a Curia Baltimoren., seu nulla praevia notitia de negotio controverso, tele-

grammate Consulis Statuum Foederatorum, Romae degentis, exquiritur exemplar dispensationis et prima responsio fuit die 31 Iulii 1901: 'Cancelliere assente, Archivio chiuso a chiave, segue lettera.' Interim Vice-cancellarius totius rei ignarus, regesta exquisivit Ecclesiae Cathedralis quaerens an ibi adnotaretur matrimonium de quo inquirendum erat: ast illico sciscitatus urgentiore telegrammate die 1 Augusti insequenti, per telegramma reponit: 'Dispensa disparitatis cultus, registra Chapelle, segue lettera': 'Et in litteris refertur dispensatio in suis elementis necessariis, apprime respondens exemplari ad verbum exscriptum a Rev^{mo} D^{ño} Marchetti. Refertur autem in litteris, Archivium reseratum fuisse per vim, inscio et forsan invito cancellario'; 'forzando la serratura dell'Archivio col grimaldello potemmo avere i registri delle dispense matrimoniali; da essi risulta che il 17 Settembre 1887 il Dott. Chapelle . . . avanzò domanda ed ottenne dispensa *disparitatis cultus* per Mary Reid cattolica e Frideric Parkhust.' Ita se habet exemplar a Rev^{mo} D^{ño} Marchetti confectum, ubi Parkhust neque catholicus, neque *non baptizatus* adnotatur.

7°. Obiectum fuit, ad minuendam librorum fidem, Regestum Curiae incoatum fuisse *die 2 Ianuarii* 1873, sed primam dispensationem super impedimento disparitatis cultus inscriptam fuisse tantummodo *die 4 Aprilis* 1885; ideoque per undecim annos nulla fuit adnotata dispensatio, dum spatio triginta mensium inscribuntur 120: nulla notatur per undecim annos dispensatio ab impedimento *mixtae religionis*, dum ab anno ineunte 1885 usque ad mensem Septembris 1887 inscribuntur 642 huiusmodi dispensationes. Animadverterunt vero RR. PP., obiectionem parvi esse momenti, quia Rev^{mus} Marchetti libros inspexit et eosdem retulit esse legitime confectos.—Ast facilis et probabilissima occurrit explicatio quae persuadet, obiectionem niti falso supposito: nempe seriem numerorum de qua loquitur Rev. D. Marchetti, comprehendere omnes dispensationes in eodem libro conscriptas. E contra visum est RR. DD. duplicem seriem numerorum, in qua respective notantur dispensationes disparitatis cultus et mixtae religionis, in Regesto esse positas ut impleatur mandatum Apostolicae Sedis impositum in formula *D 'facultatum'* quo iubentur Ordinarii eidem Apostolicae Sedis rationem reddere sub fine cuiusque triennii de numero casuum super quibus dispensaverunt. Ita in formula relata a Putzer '*Comment. in Facult. Apost.*' editum Neo-eboraci a. 1898. Tum facultates concedi solebant ad *decennium*, sed singulo quoque triennio,

referendum erat quot in casibus dispensatum fuerit. Deinceps ad quinquennium facultates concedere solitum fuit, et singulo quinquennio de dispensationum concessarum numero referendum erat. Proinde, concluso triennio vel quinquennio, concludebatur series numerorum et ratio reddebatur Sanctae Sedi. In libris autem nova series numerorum instituebatur. Unde si supponatur incoeptum triennium mense Ianuario 1873 cum initio regesti in casu, quartum triennium esset conclusum in fine anni 1884, et quintum inciperet mense Ianuario 1885 et de facto prima dispensatio huius seriei concessa fuit die 2 Februarii 1885; dispensationes igitur omnes per 12 primos annos concessas, in regesto inscriptas fuisse dicendum est, licet sub aliis numerorum seriebus istae contineantur.

Hisce in facto adnotatis, ad ius quod attinet haec animadversa sunt.

Quamvis Maria et eius mater affirmant, contradicentibus Dominis Chapelle et Parkhurst, ipsas non cognovisse defectum baptismatis in sponso, tamen si concedatur hunc adfuisse in Maria errorem, hic error non refunditur in *errorem personae, seu in substantiam actus*, cum fassa sit Maria de hoc se ne cogitasse quidem. 'No, non mi entrò mai per la testa.'

Propositum vero quod manifestat Maria: 'Io sposai Federico Parkhurst come protestante battezzato,' 'no, io lo sposai coll'idea che fosse un protestante battezzato' aequivalet voluntati interpretativae. Ergo in casu agitur de errore concomitante, seu de voluntate interpretativa, et omnes Doctores unanimi sententia asserunt, huiusmodi errores nec contractus in genere nec matrimonium in specie irritare; *arg. c. 18, De sponsal.* Si quidem ex tali errore qui de iure naturali non vitiat actum, ius canonicum impedimentum instituere noluit, ne innumera coniugia evaderent dubia et litibus exposita. Qui enim ducit uxorem vult sanam, honestam, bonae indolis foeminam sibi coniugem unire; sed non vacillat matrimonium in suo valore, si uxore hisce dotibus non praestet. Ita Card. D'Annibale, *III*, 444; Card. Gasparri, *De matr.*, n. 786; Wernz, *De matr.*, n. 227. Quo, circa, ex hoc capite et si certo constaret, Mariam non scivisse Fridericum non fuisse baptizatum, decerni non valeret matrimonium esse nullum; quod caput accusationis revera patroni in hodierna actione praetermiserunt.

Praeterea exquisierunt domini, an fuerit legitime concessa dispensatio ab impedimento disparitatis cultus, et utrum valide iuxta regulas iuris exquutioni fuerit demandata.

Positum est extra dubitationis aleam, Curiam Baltimoren. facultatibus praeditam fuisse concessis a S. C. de Propaganda Fide, iuxta consuetam formulam *D*, quae de impedimento disparitatis cultus ita se habet: 'Dispensandi cum suis subditis super impedimento disparitatis cultus, quatenus sine contumelia Creatoris fieri possit et dummodo cautum omnino sit conditionibus ab Ecclesia praescriptis praesertim de amovendo acatholico coniuge perversionis periculo, deque conversione coniugis infidelis pro viribus curanda, ac de universa prole utriusque sexus in catholicae religionis sanctitate omnino educanda, servatis in reliquis adiecta instructione typis impressa . . . etc.' Hac freta potestate Curia Baltimoren. dispensationem concessit quam in forma *pure gratiosa* impertiisse non esse ambigendum videtur: legitur enim in forma concessionis, Dñus Chapelle simpliciter *petiisse* dispensationem, sponso vero exinde fuisse *dispensatos*; seu, nullo medio exequutore eisdem concessam fuisse dispensationem. In casu autem dispensatio concedi non poterat nisi *in forma gratiosa*: 'siquidem ex textu concessionis, limitata est facultas subdelegandi.' Ita 'subdelegandi praesentes facultates suo Vicario Gen. quoties absit a residentia vel legitime sit impeditus, atque duobus vel tribus presbyteris, sibi benevisis, in locis remotioribus propriae dioecesis pro aliquo tamen numero casuum urgentiorum in quibus recursus ad ipsum haberi non possit.' Si dispensatio vero concedatur in forma *pure commissoria*, ita ut gratia sit facienda ab exequutore, continetur aliqua subdelegatio quae in themate concedi non poterat, ob terminos quibus conceditur ex relatis verbis potestas subdelegandi.

Sane in *comment. in has facultates*, Putzer, pag. 402, ita interpretatur praefatam clausulam *subdelegandi*. 'Alii proinde quam hi (duo vel tres) recensiti sacerdotes subdelegari valide non possunt ut dispensent; sed tantum ut de precum veritate inquirent (casu quo haec inquisito non facta sit ante dispensationis relationem) ac datam dispensationem partibus intiment. Iamvero, hisce tribus sacerdotibus subdelegatio fieri nequit nisi sub sequentibus conditionibus: (a) Ut ipsi in locis remotioribus dioecesis existant vel operentur, etc. . . : 'Commissa autem exequutori ut gratiam exequatur, antea inspecta precum veritate, gratia in stylo Curiae Romanae, dicitur facta in forma mixta, et tunc revera gratia est iam facta, quamvis ab exequutore praemittenda sit inquisitio de veritate precum. Ita S. Sedes hodie impertitur dispensationes matrimoniales, uti testatur Card. Gasparri, *op.*

cit., n. 363, et Wernz, *op. cit.*, n. 638, quare Curiam Baltimorem. controversam dispensationem concedere non potuit in forma *pure commissoria*, sed tantum *in forma gratiosa* vel *pura* vel *mixta*, adeo ut gratia facta fuerit in actu concessionis. Forma autem qua significata est in regestis Curiae gratiae concessio, videtur non dubie exprimere, gratiam concessam fuisse in forma *pure gratiosa*. Aliam perpenderunt difficultatem RR. DD. quoad ipsam dispensationis concessionem, scilicet nullam habitam esse mentionem de caussis dispensandi in actu dispensationis : attenta vero facti specie non videtur extitisse in nupturientibus aliqua ex iis caussis requisitis iuxta stylum Curiae Romanae pro valida concessione dispensationis.

Sane docet Card. Gasparri, *l. c.*, n. 423. 'Delegatus nequit valide dispensare, nisi propter causam canonicam quae in praxi S. Sedis motiva est, et habere debet tamquam impulsivam tantum, vel prorsus inefficacem eam causam quae talis est in praxi Romanae Curiae ; secus non solum illicite, sed et invalide dispensat.' Nec minus clara est praescriptio quae continetur in tenore facultatum delegatarum quae ita concluduntur : 'Voluit tamen S. Sua, et omnino praecipit ut praedictus Episcopus superioribus facultatibus iussis dumtaxat gravibusque accedentibus caussis uteretur' : ad rem animadverterunt RR. DD. AA., iuris praesumptionem quae iubet omnem actum praesumi recte factum, donec evidenter contrarium evincatur, extendi etiam ad causas dispensandi quae adfuisse praesumuntur morali modo consideratae, nisi contrarium probetur.

Succurrit auctoritas Card. D'Annibale, *I*, n. 233, docentis : 'Sufficit causa probabiliter iusta ut dispensatio nedum licite peti, sed (quia publice expedit haec eximi scrupulis) licite ac valide dari possit. Et in dubio an concessa fuerit ex iusta causa, stat ; nec revocatur si postea haec minus iusta apparuerit. Equidem sive dubitetur an dispensatio rite petita, vel rationabiliter aut legitime concessa vel partibus significata fuerit. Quae valent etsi agatur de delegato aut de exequutore dispensationis, ut animadvertit De Iustis, *Dispens. matr.*, I, 3, c. I, n. 84 ; item S. Alphonsus, *Theol. mor.*, I, 6, n. 902 ; Sanchez, *De matr.*, I, 8, *Disp.* 21, n. 25. Causae vero considerari solitae uti sufficientes in Curia Romana perpendi debent morali modo, seu non taxative, et potissimum quoad dissitas regiones, ita diffformes a nostris moribus, ubi applicari debent iuxta prudentem aestimationem Ordinariorum.'

Sane in Statibus Foederatis Americae Catholici non solum

vivunt permixti acatholicis, sive baptizatis sive non, sed hi longe numero maiores sunt : unde difficile matrimonia mixta evitari possunt. In instructione iam mentionata die 15 Novembris 1858, adnexa facultatibus dispensandi, cavetur has dispensationes 'gravibus dumtaxat de causis' esse concedendas. Porro in casu non defuit huiusmodi caussa : praeter enim alias caussas de quibus sponsi agere potuerunt cum Domino Chapelle et de quarum aequitate hic iudex fuit, certe adfuit etiam illa quam memorant communiter Doctores pro his regionibus scribentes, nimirum timor gravioris mali, seu timor ne sponsi, denegata dispensatione, matrimonium coram magistratu civili vel ministro haeretico ineant ; quae caussa plerumque adest in regionibus Statuum Foederatorum, ut notat Putzer, *l. c.*, *n.* 219, *pag.* 382.

Eo magis, uti animadverterunt patres Concilii plenarii Baltimoren. II, quia in his locis sacerdos aditur pro contrahendis nuptiis, quum res iam eousque processerunt, ut vix sperandum sit matrimonium per Ecclesiae monita abrumpi posse. (Conc. Baltimoren. II, *n.* 335, *Collect. Lacen.*, *t. III*, *collect.* 488) ; atque huiusmodi probabilis timor procul dubio gravibus caussis, in casu nostro, sufficientibus accensendus est, uti eruitur ex Instruct. S. C. de Prop. Fide, diei 9 Maii 1877, ad II ; nec non ex dictis patrum Plenarii Concilii Baltimoren. II, ubi sic aiunt : 'Insuper iusta gravisque caussa canonica omnino requiritur, sine qua permitti prorsus nequit ut fideles gravibus fidei et moribus periculis, etiam sub opportunis cautionibus, sese opponant. Hac in re attendenda etiam sunt locorum, rerum et personarum adiuncta, praesertim ubi periculum est gravioris mali, ne, videlicet, denegata dispensatione, matrimonia mixta nihilo minus idque sine cautionibus, clandestine contrahantur.' Et Card. Gasparri ad rem notat : 'Responsum absolute certum in abstracto dari non posse, cum semper considerandae sint cuiusque casus circumstantiae,' *l. c.*, *n.* 454.

In themate animadversum praeterea fuit, ipsum Dñm Chapelle apprime perspectas habuisse conditiones familiares sponsae, ait enim : 'Addo quod ipsam Mariam Reid a pueritia cognovi, eiusque familiam, erga quam pastorem curam totam adhibui, ut concordiam inter coniuges separatos restituerem et duo fratres Mariae Reid christiana vita instituerentur.' Omnibus vero attentis, et in primis, discordiis familiaribus, excludi nequit matrimonium Mariae cum Friderico non spernendum commodum Mariae attulisse quae non praediviti dote pollebat : Fridericum autem bonis moribus praeditus erat et de se optimam

dabat spem. Hic nedum religioni non erat infensus, sed uti facilem et docilem se praebebat ad recipiendum baptismum, si opportunum Dño Chapelle videretur; ita aequum erat coniicere in posterum posse fieri virum fidelem et catholicum per mulierum fidelem et catholicam. Etenim si coniugium exitum non habuisset infelicem, consideranti respectum et venerationem Friderici adversus catholicam religionem, eius doctrinam et Ecclesiae Praelatos, animo subiit persuasio, quod difficile non erat eundem perducere ad amplectendam religionem catholicam, eo facilius quod nulli sectae ex corde adhaerebat.

Denique animadversum fuit, Fridericum maximo amore captum fuisse erga Mariam, cuius adhuc, post tot discrimina rerum, oblivisci plane nequit: quod cognoscens Dñus Chapelle, perpensa quoque iuvenili aetate nupturientium, Maria enim 17 aetatis annum vix expleverat, Fridericus vigesimum secundum annum agebat, studiorum curriculo nondum emenso, iudicare prudenter potuit, impedimentum disparitatis cultus certe maiorem vim non habiturum ad disiungendas voluntates, quam amoris impetus habebat ad animos copulandos.

Cautiones autem quod attinet, consideratum est in rescripto concessionis facultatum, necessitatem cautionum poni diserte uti conditionem necessariam pro valida dispensatione: in adnexa instructione iam citata, haec caventur: 'Hinc porro evenit ut haec Apostolicas Sede, ad quam unice spectat potestas dispensandi super huiusmodi mixtae religionis impedimento, si de canonum severitate aliquid remittens, mixta haec coniugia quandoque permiserit, id gravibus dumtaxat de causis aegre admodum fecit, et nonnisi sub expressa semper conditione de praemittendis necessariis opportunisque cautionibus, ut scilicet non solum catholicus coniux ab acatholico perverti non posset, quin imo catholicus ipse coniux teneri se sciret, ad acatholicum pro viribus ab errore retrahendum, verum etiam ut universa utriusque sexus proles et mixtis hisce matrimoniis procreanda, in sanctitate catholicae religionis educari omnino deberet. Quae quidem cautiones remitti seu dispensari numquam possunt, cum in ipsa naturali et Divina lege fundentur quam Ecclesia et S. Sedes sartam tectamque tueri omni studio contendit, contra quam sine ullo dubio gravissime peccant qui promiscuis hisce nuptiis temere contrahendis, seu prolem exinde suscipiendam perversionis periculo committunt.' Hae cautiones sane remitti et praetermitti non possunt, quia fundantur in iure naturali Divino et quoad promissionem ex parte acatholici non pervertendi catholicum et

prolem susceptam in catholica religione educandam, nullum potest esse dubium, uti considerat Card. Gasparri, *l. c.*, n. 452, et Card. D'Annibale, *III*, n. 437, qui asserit 'verum quia haec conditio (nempe duo praefatae conditiones) impediendi naturam non mutat, ea non servata perinde est ac si dispensatio data non esset.' Tertia promissio vero quod nempe catholicus ipse coniux teneatur ad acatholicum pro viribus ab errore retrahendum, haec magis videtur pertinere ad praeceptum charitatis: quare potest ab Ecclesia non expresse exigì seu remitti, uti considerat Card. Gasparri in *l. c.*, n. c., et D'Annibale *l. et n. cit.*

Quod formam autem in qua praestitae sunt in casu cautiones, viva voce factae sunt et sine scriptis, uti testatur Dñus Chapelle in suis interrogatoriis: Nam percontatus an datae fuerint cautiones et quomodo, respondit: 'Utique, sed verbotenus. Et revera, quoad scio, vir promissis suis stetit.' Et Parkhurst interrogatus de hisce cautionibus, respondit se referens ad factum quod ita explicat: 'Durante gli anni che Maria Reid era con me, come mia moglie, essa godeva intiera libertà riguardo alla pratica della sua religione. Io attendeva alla Chiesa Cattolica con lei frequentemente ed urgeva la di lei dipendenza su essa. I due figli adesso viventi che erano nati da quel matrimonio . . . erano battezzati colla mia approvazione, durante il periodo tra la loro nascita e la mia separazione dalla loro madre, essi attendevano alla Chiesa costantemente colla mia approvazione e sotto la mia direzione, ed io ho atteso alla Chiesa con loro; dacchè io divorziava dalla loro madre, essi hanno continuato nella pratica della loro religione cattolica con la mia approvazione e sotto la mia direzione.'

Et interrogatus Sacerdos Sweeny: 'Domandaste a lui la ragione perchè egli educava i suoi figli cattolici e che cosa egli diceva in risposta a ciò?—R. Sì, in conversazione egli riferiva al fatto che egli educava i suoi figli nella fede cattolica in adempimento di una promessa fatta quando egli era sposato.'

Cautiones praestitas fuisse oretenus nihil officit ad validitatem dispensationis: nihil enim de forma cautionum iure communi aut tenore indulti praescriptum est: unde sufficit promissio verbalis, modo sit seria. Quod mandat S. C. Inquisitionis Epist. 17 Febr. 1875 in Collect. S. C. de Prop. Fide (n. 1433, *Tom. II*) . . . 'Per farsi luogo alla dispensa dei matrimonii misti, è essenziale solamente la promessa delle solite cauzioni, la quale deve essere così seria, che il Vescovo riesca a formarsi la certezza morale che sarà dal coniuge eterodosso osservata ed adempita fedelmente' Vernz, *Ius. matr.*, n. 510, not. 41; Putzer, *l. c.* p. 380.

Nec ius particulare illarum regionum aliquid aliud requirit praeter seriam promissionem: immo patres plenarii Concilii Baltimoren. II, n. 335 sic pastores monitos volunt: 'moneantur tamen pastores ut in hisce promissionibus exigendis, fortiter quidem in re, in modo tamen suaviter se gerant, ne . . . utrumque sponsum exasperent, indeque mala oriantur graviora.'

Quoad vero promissionem a parte catholica faciendam, ex processu id eruitur. Interrogata actrix, an huiusmodi cautiones spoponderit?—R. No.—Nihilominus postea asserit se huic scopo adlaborasse, narrans: 'Sì, in tutte le maniere possibili e mediante relazioni coi sacerdoti più distinti ove io dimorava.' At etiam in hoc actrix discrepat a reo convento qui refert: 'Mary Reid non ha fatto in qualunque modo uno sforzo per indurmi a unire alla Chiesa Cattolica.' Quidquid sit de hoc, mulieris catholicae promissio seu cautio, ut iam animadversum est non est absolute necessaria ad substantiam dispensationis, prouti necessario praestandae sunt cautiones a parte infideli. Quae cum de facto observatae sint, post contractum coniugium, supervacaneum est quaerere an promissae fuerint cautiones ante contractum: eo magis quia pars infidelis has nescivisset et hinc observare non potuisset nisi si antea denunciatae essent et intimatae.

Sed alia occurrit diluenda exceptio oratricis, nempe non sibi seu actrici potuisse applicari dispensationem disparitatis cultus cum eam non petiisset, nec cognovisset tempore initi coniugii. Hoc affirmat actrix in supplici libello: 'se per assurda ipotesi volesse sostenersi che la dispensa si fosse potuta concedere ad insaputa dell'oratrice . . . etc.,' iamvero in casu animadverterunt DD. AA., rem versari in dubio *iuris* et in dubio *facti*. Nam in primis est valde dubium in *facto*, utrum actrix revera nesciverit aut saltem serio dubitaverit Fridericum non fuisse baptizatum, quum eius mater de hoc quaesierit a Sac. Sweeny, parochus loci Bangor, et responsionem omne dubium excludentem non obtinuit: ipsa actrix vero sciebat certo aliquam dispensationem necessariam esse, et se remiserat Dño Chapelle in ea persuasionem. 'Siccome il Dott. Chapelle doveva sistemare la cerimonia nuziale ritenevo che egli avrebbe sistemata ogni cosa regolarmente.' Aliunde actrix, et fassa est, se validum voluisse inire matrimonium itemque aperte affirmavit, defectum baptismatis non apposisse contractui uti conditionem substantialem: ergo saltem implicite exquirebat necessariam dispensationem ut actus valeret.

Nec praetermittenda est attestatio Friderici Parkhust et Dñi

Chapelle unde constat, Dñam Mariam Reid ante matrimonium optime scivisse Dñum Parkhust non esse baptizatum eandemque a Dño Chapelle petivisse dispensationem casui necessariam. Sufficere autem petitionem dispensationis etiam implicitam, nemo est qui nesciat. Card. Gasparri. *De Matr.*, n. 428 docet: 'petitio dispensationis ab ipsis partibus facta etiam implicite vel facta a tertia persona de earum mandato etiam emplicite, ex. g. faciendi omnia necessaria pro matrimonii celebratione, implicitam continet acceptationem dispensationis.' Denique in facto animadversum fuit, quod si vera esset assertio actricis, se nimirum dumtaxat occasione nativitatis primi filii, defectum baptismi in Friderico detexisse et se numquam contracturam fore si hoc scivisset, non intelligitur quomodo cum ipso, nihilominus, per decem annos vitam conjugalem egerit, quin tentaverit eundem, iam ad baptismum suscipiendum dispositum, ad hoc perducere vel matrimonii nullitatem accusaverit. Quocirca sufficeret hoc dubium *facti* ut respondendum esset pro valore actus. Sed accedit etiam dubium *iuris* cum quaerant Doctores, an valeat dispensatio concessa inscio. Et D'Annibale de sententia negante et de eius contraria haec scribit: 'haec (negans) recepta hodie sententia videtur; sed non caret controversia, eaque gravi. Quamobrem si quis nec ipse eam (gratiam) petiit, nec scit ab alio concessam fuisse, eaque nihilominus forte usus fuerit, standum est pro valore actus.' Idem opinatur Eñus Gasparri, qui concludit: 'In dubio autem favendum est matrimonio.' *De matr.*, n. 398 et Vernz, *l. c.*, n. 641, not. 215. Quare neque haec exceptio actricis evincit intentionem.

Denique opponitur silentium librorum parochialium, quod Patroni aiunt ostendere vel dispensationem non fuisse concessam vel non fuisse exequutam. Sed visum est RR. DD. neque hanc exceptionem prodesse caussae actricis, nam dispensationem concessam fuisse probant, ut supra demonstratum est, libri Curiae Baltimoren., satis aperte testantes dispensationem uti par erat. concessam fuisse in forma *gratiosa*. Monet vero et instructio S. Officii diei 20 Ian. 1883, et S. C. de Prop. Fide, *vol. II*, n. 587, *Par.* 45, quoad probationem sequutae dispensationis hoc observandum esse: 'ad probandum vero utrum interpellatio vel eius dispensatio intercesserit, consulendi erunt libri matrimoniorum vel etiam regesta Curiae in quibus haec accurate erunt recensenda.' Quare idem fons probationis habetur vel liber parochialis, vel regestum seu protocollum Curiae; unde etiam eruitur, nullo iure cautum esse ad validitatem saltem dispensationum has deberi recenseri in libris parochialibus.

Quamvis vero admittatur Dñus Chapelle aliquantulum fuisse negligentem, uti notat Dñus Marchetti in sua relatione, certum est Dñum Chapelle hunc defectum supplevisse in suo iurato interrogatorio. Quod vero attestatio parochi efficaciter suppleat defectus et omissiones priorum librorum matrimonialium indubitati iuris est : Hoc pluries H. S. O. firmavit, uti in *Decis.* 127, n. 39, p. 12, *Recent*, scilicet : ‘ Defectus descriptionis in libro non tollere probationem resultantem ex eiusdem parochi attestatione neque negligentiam parochi debere parti praeiudicium afferre.’ Ast actrix impugnat ipsum testimonium parochi, utpote sibi non coerentis in suis responsionibus, circa baptismum Dñi Parkhust, nimirum dubius apparet in affirmando num defectus baptismi notus fuerit actrici ante matrimonii celebrationem. Sane in primo interrogatorio respondit : ‘ Io non ricordo,’ dum in secundo expresse affirmat tum actricem tum eius matrem optime novisse Dñum Parkhust baptismo carere. Confirmatur ex relatione Dñi Adv. Lombardi et Rñi Praesulis Stonor.—Sed ex adverso nullam dari contradictionem de rebus assertis animadverterunt RR. DD. in praefatis interrogatoriis ; siquidem ipse non affirmat in uno quod negat in alio, cum in primo interrogatorio asserat se non recordari, in altero vero affirmet tum actricem tum eius matrem novisse ante matrimonium Dñum Parkhust non fuisse baptizatum. Graviora apparent quae refert praefatus Patronus de colloquio, Romae habito, cum Rño Chapelle.

At etiam haec haud difficulter explicantur si animadvertatur post multos annos (a. 14) a celebratione controversi matrimonii verisimilem fuisse oblivionem eorum quae matrimonium praecesserunt, praesertim in parcho qui non uni vel alteri sed pluribus et variis adstiterat matrimoniis, nec non in viro qui iam ad fastigium sacerdotalis ordinis electus amplissimam dioecesim administrandam susceperat. Addendum est, Dominum Chapelle inopinato, et proinde imparatum, a Domino Lombardi fuisse interrogatum, quapropter in secundo colloquio, habito cum eodem sacerdote Lombardi, extemplo fassus est : ‘ Ora sono certo che il matrimonio è valido ed ho avuto informazioni.’

De qua sua oblivione testatus est ipse Rev. Chapelle qui Domino Lombardi, in eodem contextu, fassus est : ‘ Ripete che egli non ricordava nulla delle circostanze del matrimonio, se non che questo che cioè la Signora Reid si fece aspettare ’ : Attamen non obstante hac oblivione, fuit semper constans in affirmanda matrimonii validitate. In hac vero lucta vagarum attesta-

tionum recolare praestat iuridicum principium quo firmatur status quaestionis, prouti factum est in *Decr.* 434, n. 7, p. I, *Recent*, c. Calcagnin. ubi advertitur : ' Quando aliquid est factum semper praesumitur legitime factum potius quam illegitime, praesertim ad tollendum delictum in Parocho, viro probo et literato.' De eius diligentia in hisce negotiis testatur Dñus Mackin, olim coadiutor Parochi Chapelle : ' Era il Dr. Chapelle molto accurato nell' esaminare le parti contraenti, e egli era *molto diligente* nel vedere che la propria dispensa, se necessaria, fosse richiesta.' Idem testatur alter Coadiutor Kervich. Quia in aliis casibus idem Chapelle adnotavit in litteris matrimonialibus nupturientes obtinuisse dispensationes disparitatis cultus vel mixtae religionis, placet potius quam negligentiae eundem arguere, fingere hypothesim, nimirum revera Parkhust vulgo tunc haberi uti baptizatum, vel saltem aliquod dubium extitisse, ad minus in communi opinione, utrum fuisset baptizatus vel non : revera refert Rev. Sweeny : ' Io scrissi a lei (matri Mariae) a tale scopo che io capiva che egli apparteneva ad una famiglia metodista.'

' Io non ho alcuna prova di questa idea, al di là di chiacchiera generale.' Inde non est mira memoriae oscillatio in parocho Chapelle multo post tempore, hac de re interrogato, qui tamen tempore, coniugii sequutus est, uti debebat, partem tutiorem, obtenta dispensatione disparitatis cultus ; sed noluit in libris parochialibus illam adnotare, seu, affirmare carentiam baptismatis, uti non satis certam et ne haec uni vel alteri parti, et praesertim sponso, qui vulgo habebatur uti baptizatus, forte displiceret, securus quod exinde nullum fieret praeiudicium validitati actus, cum dispensatio adnotaretur in registis Curiae. Haec confirmat ipse Rñus Dñus Chapelle, fassus : ' Mentionem non feci in actu redacto dicti matrimonii . . . de dispensatione obtenta in casu, quia hoc non reputabam necessarium, cum lege cautum sit ut haec omnia notarentur in libro Curiae Archiepiscopalis Baltimoren. a qua obtenta fuit dispensatio.'

Postremo loco animadverterunt Domini Patres Auditores, argumenta a parte actrice deducta, cuius erat invicte probare, solido fundamento haud inniti, et ex actis et deductis in casu, matrimonium nullimode fuisse exturbatum a sua possessione : quare omnia iura clamant, respondendum esse pro eius valore.

Hisce omnibus attente consideratis et perpensis, Christi

nomine invocato, Nos infrascripti Auditores pro Tribunali sedentes, et solum Deum prae oculis habentes, decernimus, declaramus et definitive sententiamus: *Non constare de matrimonii nullitate in casu*, seu: *Negative* proposito dubio respondemus.

In expensis iudicialibus partem actricem condemnamus. Ita pronunciamus, mandantes Ordinariis locorum et ministris Tribunalium ad quos spectat ut exequutioni mandent hanc nostram definitivam sententiam et adversus reluctantes procedant ad formam Sacrorum Canonum, et praesertim C. 3, Sess. 25. *De Reform. Conc. Trid.* iis adhibitis executivis et coercitivis mediis quae magis efficacia et opportuna pro rerum adiunctis extitura sunt.

Romae e Sede Tribunalis, die 30 Iunii 1910.

Signati: M. LEGA, Decanus, *Ponens*.

GUSTAVUS PERSIANI.

GUILELMUS SEBASTIANELLI.

SERAPHINUS MANY.

FRANCISCUS HEINER.

L. ✠ S.

IOANNES PRIOR.

ALOISIUS SINCERO.

IOSEPH MORI.

FRIDERICUS CATTANI.

ANTONIUS PERATHONER.

IOSEPH ALBERTI.

SAC. TANCREDES TANI, *Notarius*.

BULL OF THE 'CRUSADES' IN SPAIN

S. CONGREGATIO CONCILII

Cum haec S. C. ad dubium propositum a R. P. D. Episcopo Gerundensi, in plenario coetu, diei 22 Ianuarii currentis anni reposuerit: 'Pauperes (in Hispania) ut fruuntur indulto quadragesimali non teneri ad eleemosynam elargiendam: teneri autem si frui velint aliis privilegiis Bullae Cruciatæ'; postea quaesitum etiam fuit utrum iidem pauperes tenerentur, erogata eleemosyna, Summaium Bullae accipere ut gaudere possint indulto ibidem expresso, quo 'tam quadragesimalibus quam ceteris anni diebus ovis et lacticiniis uti et vesci libere et licite valeant.' Re autem relata SS. D. N. Pio Papae X ab infrascripto S. C. Cardinali

Praefecto in audientia diei 28 Iunii nuper elapsi, Sanctitas Sua declarare dignata est: Pauperes in Hispania, non soluta eleemosyna pro Bulla Cruciatæ adsignata, posse frui indulto quoad ova et lacticinia, quod in memorata Bulla continetur; et hanc declarationem ab hac S. C. edi mandavit. Contrariis quibuscumque, etiam speciali mentione dignis, minime obstantibus.

Datum in S. C. Concilii, die 4 Iulii 1910.

L. ✠ S.

C. CARD. GENNARI, *Praefectus*.
BASILIUS POMPILI, *Secretarius*.

THE CENTENARY OF MEXICAN LIBERTY

RECURRENTE CENTENARIO ADEPTAE LIBERTATIS ANNIVERSARIO
CONCEDUNTUR FIDELIBUS REIPUBLICAE MEXICANAE INDUL-
GENTIAE PLENARIAE ET PARTIALES HOC ANNO TANTUM

PIUS PP. X

Gratiae, quae sunt auctori Deo pro omnibus bonis assidue persolvendae, iure meritoque Mexicanam gentem impellunt ad memoriam fausti suae nationis eventus religiosis auspiciis celebrandam. Primum enim iam volvitur saeculum, a quo populus ille se in libertatem vindicare coepit; et felicem hanc nacta occasionem patria Sodalitas, a catholicis diurnis commentariis, Sacrorum Antistitum votis ac suffragiis innixa, proposuit, ut a Mexico iusiurandum renovaretur, quo inde ab anno MDCCXXXVII se suaeque Deiparae Virginis *a Guadalupe* Patrocinio respublica credidit atque commisit.

Cum vero huiusmodi religionem fel. rec. Benedictus XIV Decessor Noster anno MDCCCLIV auctoritate sua confirmaverit, cumque Nos semel atque iterum propensam voluntatem Nostram erga illam nobilem regionem ostenderimus, hoc potissimum gaudio affecti, quod ibi cuncti civium ordines se tantae Patronae beneficiis devinctos profiteantur, eamque eximia veneratione colant, precibus Mexicani Archiepiscopi ceterorumque eius Reipublicae Praesulum benigne exceptis, sollemne hoc fidei futurum testimonium caelestibus Ecclesiae thesauris libentes locupletamus. Quare quum secundo dominico die, proximi mensis Octobris, Beatae Virgini Mariae, divae Matri, sacro, in Mexici templis, pia praehabita in novem continuos dies supplicatione, sanctum, quod supra memoravimus, iusiurandum denuo dari constitutum

sit ; Nos, quo hoc fidei et pietatis opus in uberius animarum emolumentum cedat, omnibus ac singulis utriusque sexus Christi-fidelibus vere poenitentibus et confessis ac S. Communione reffectis, quoties quamlibet ex Ecclesiis Cathedralibus, Basilicis, Conle-giatis, Parochialibus et Vicariis Reipublicae Mexicanae, secunda, uti diximus dominica Octobris huius vertentis anni, a primis ves-peris ad occasum solis diei huiusmodi devote visitaverint, ibique pro Christianorum Principum concordia, haeresum extirpatione, peccatorum conversione ac S. Matris Ecclesiae exaltatione pias ad Deum preces effuderint, toties plenariam omnium peccatorum suorum indulgentiam et remissionem misericorditer in Domino concedimus. Iis vero fidelibus, qui corde saltem contrito, quo-cumque die novendiali praedictae supplicationi in quavis Ecclesia vel publico oratorio eiusdem Mexicanae ditionis adstiterint, septem annos totidemque quadragenas de iniunctis eis seu alias quomo-dolibet debitis poenitentiis in forma Ecclesiae consueta relaxamus. Quas omnes indulgentias, peccatorum remissiones ac poeniten-tiarum relaxationes etiam animabus Christifidelium in Purgatorio igne detentis per modum suffragii applicari posse misericorditer in Domino concedimus et largimur. In contrarium facientibus non obstantibus quibuscumque. Volumus autem ut praesentium litterarum transumptis, seu exemplis etiam impressis, manu ali-cuius notarii publici subscriptis et sigillo personae in ecclesiastica dignitate constitutae munitis, eadem prorsus fides adhibeatur, quae adhiberetur ipsis praesentibus si forent exhibitae vel ostensae.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum, sub annulo Piscatoris, die XVI Iunii MCMX, Pontificatus Nostri anno septimo.

R. CARD. MERRY DEL VAL, *a Secretis Status*.

L. ✠ S.

THE HOLY OFFICE ON INDULGENCES

S. CONGREGATIO S. OFFICII

(SECTIO DE INDULGENTIIS)

DUBIA CIRCA INTERPRETATIONEM MOTUS PROPRII 'CUM PER APOSTOLICAS,' DIEI 7 APRILIS 1910

Feria IV, die 13 Iulii 1910

Circa interpretationem Motus Proprii 'Cum per Apostolicas' diei 7 Aprilis currentis anni 1910 Supremae huic Sacrae Congregationi S. Officii sequentia dubia proposita sunt :

1°. Utrum Sacrae Congregationi S. Officii recognoscendae exhiberi debeant concessiones Indulgentiarum et facultatum Indulgentias respicientium, quae ante diem 1^{am} Novembris 1908 a S. Congregatione de Propaganda Fide factae fuerunt suis subditis.

2°. Utrum exhiberi debeant recognitioni Congregationis S. Officii concessiones Indulgentiarum et facultatum Indulgentias respicientium factae ab eadem Congregatione de Propaganda Fide post diem 1^{am} Novembris 1908 et in posterum ab eadem faciendae suis subditis.

Quibus mature perpensis, Eñi ac Rñi DD. Cardinales Inquisitores Generales in plenario conventu habito feria IV, die 13 curr. mensis Iulii, respondendum decreverunt :

Ad 1^{um}. Negative.

Ad 2^{um}. Negative.

Et ad mentem. Mens est ut firma et observanda maneat lata lex per Decretum S. Congregationis Indulgentiarum ac SS. Reliquiarum a Benedicto XIV approbatum die 28 Ianuarii 1756, confirmatum a Pio PP. IX, die 14 Aprilis 1856, iterumque confirmatum a SSmo Dño Nostro Pio PP. X, die 29 Septembris 1908 (*Ordo servandus in Romana Curia, Normae peculiares cap. VII, art. 2, n. 81*) hoc est :

‘Impetrantes posthac generales Indulgentiarum concessionem teneri sub poena nullitatis gratiae obtentae exemplar earundem concessionum ad Secretariam S. Congregationis deferre.’ Idest ad Secretariam S. Officii.

Sequenti vero feria V, die 14 eiusdem mensis, SSñus D. N. D. Pius divina providentia Papa X, in solita audientia R. P. D. Adessori S. Officii impertita, Eñorum Patrum resolutiones adprobare et confirmare dignatus est.

Romae, ex Aedibus S. Officii, die 15 Iulii 1910.

ALOISIUS GIAMBENE, *Substitutus pro Indulgentiis*.

L. ✠ S.

DECREE OF THE CONSISTORIAL CONGREGATION REGARDING ST. JOHN'S, NEWFOUNDLAND

S. CONGREGATIO CONSISTORIALIS

DECRETUM

Postulante Archiepiscopo S. Ioannis Terraenovae quatenus methodus posthac servanda esset in providendis episcopalibus

sedibus illius provinciae quae nonnullos ante annos erecta est, SS^mus Dominus Noster Pius PP. X, de consulto S. Congregationis Consistorialis iuxta votum Delegati apostolici Canadensis dominii et Terranova, statuit et decrevit ut in provisione sedium episcoporum memoratae provinciae ecclesiasticae eadem servantur normae quae vigent in provinciis dominii Canadensis, contrariis quibusvis non obstantibus.

Datum Romae, ex aedibus S. Congregationis Consistorialis, die 18 Iulii 1910.

L. ✠ S.

C. CARD. DE LAI, *Secretarius*.
S. TECCHI, *Adsessor*.

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COMMENTARIUS IN LIBRUM GENESIS. Hetzenauer, O.S.F.C.
Graz and Vienna : Verlagsbuchhandlung ' Styria.' 1910.

To all readers that keep abreast of the remarkable exegetical movement of the present day, it is a truism to say that the book of Genesis is being studied as it never was before. It could not have been so studied. The questions of cosmogony, geography, ethnology, etc., that arise out of it are almost innumerable. Some of them are known only to specialists; yet these precisely are the questions the discussion of which yields the most surprising results. Considered even in its human aspect, Genesis is one of the most mysterious as well as one of the most fascinating books of the Old Testament. Problems, the very existence of which was not dreamt of seventy or eighty years ago, have been proposed; and to many of them a satisfactory answer has been given. Others await solution, and there is every prospect of their getting it. The East is not exhausted yet. All those wonderful discoveries in Assyria, Babylonia, Egypt, Persia, and Palestine are considered to be the forerunners of equally great contributions to our store of knowledge. The rocks and the buried cities have only begun to yield up their commentary on the first book of Scripture. To a Catholic the result is eminently satisfactory. He rejoices to know more about the Word of God, and in the day of battle he is glad to see its truth vindicated. Those who would not listen to the Church have had to hear the voice of antiquity. Not the least among the benefits received from these discoveries is the decisive refutation they afford of the attempts made by rationalists and higher critics to deprive Scripture of its claim to credibility. The futility of their efforts, and also the folly of certain Catholics who imbibed part of their theories, is daily becoming more manifest.

Among the ablest and the most uncompromising defenders of Scripture Father Hetzenauer holds a prominent place. He is thoroughly acquainted with the vagaries just alluded to, and in his numerous works he has not only supplied students with an adequate account of them, but with what is of immeasurably greater importance—a reliable exposition of the Church's doctrine. Here it is enough to refer to his *Wesen und Prinzipien*

der Bibelkritik and *Theologia Biblica*. Everywhere he is guided by the Encyclical *Providentissimus Deus*, and by the decisions of the Biblical Commission. We do not know a short work on Genesis that can be more safely recommended to students than his commentary of seven hundred pages. It is far superior to two or three which are in use. As regards the views held by the learned author, we may mention that he is in favour of the anthropological (but not the geographical) universality of the Deluge, and that he distinguishes between Amraphel and Hammurabi.

R. W.

MANUEL BIBLIQUE. Vigouroux, Bacuez et Brassac. Paris : Roger et Chernoviz.

WE speak only of its third and fourth volumes, which treat of the New Testament. This work continues to maintain its place as the best we have on the subject. Commendation of what is known to a multitude of readers would be superfluous (more than sixty thousand copies of the volumes having been issued). The only reason for mentioning the *Manual* here is that in their new edition both volumes have been completely revised. Nothing, even in the notes, appears to have been forgotten : the most recent accessions to our knowledge are found in their respective places. For instance, whoever desires a reliable and brief exposition of the synoptic problem or the state of the case regarding the 'comma Johanneum' will find it here ; also an excellent account of the origin of each gospel, its scope, authorship, etc. It is true that the method of treatment followed here is not that of Zahn or Belser, but this very difference may not be without its advantage in the case of certain students, and Brassac appeals to a wider circle of readers than does the Catholic Professor of Exegesis in Tübingen. Belser's notes assume rather the appearance of a commentary, whereas the second part of Brassac's third volume is more or less a Gospel history. The chapters on the miracles and on the parables are admirably suited to the needs of preachers. And the numerous illustrations (eighty-five), the plan of the temple, and the maps enhance the utility of the third volume. We could, however, wish that the facsimiles of MSS. were better printed, or rather that the paper in the two volumes were of a finer quality.

The fourth volume is equally valuable. The doings of the Apostles, of St. Paul especially, are carefully studied. The

local and chronological setting of each epistle are carefully explained, and its contents are minutely analysed. Perhaps in the next edition the theology of St. Paul will have a larger section, but even in its present dimensions there is quite enough for the beginner. Those who have used the *Manual* know that the learning, and still more the Catholic spirit, which pervades the entire work render it almost indispensable to students in college and to priests on the mission.

H. L.

GESCHICHTE DER KATHOLIKENVERFOLGUNG IN ENGLAND.

J. Spillmann, S.J. Five Vols. Freiburg : Herder. 1910.

THIS excellent little work on the persecution (1535-1681) and on the martyrs in England has now reached its third edition. It has been greatly enlarged since parts of it appeared in the *Stimmen aus Maria Laach*, where the present writer first read it many years ago. And it is also very much improved. It describes what took place during the sad period that began with Henry VIII.'s separation from Rome, and ended with the Titus Oates plot. It would be hard to find in any foreign language a more succinct narrative. The English martyrs had the advantage of being tried in court, and the official record of the proceedings are as invaluable to their historian as they were to the Postulators of the Cause. Besides this judicial account, a great deal was written about them either by contemporaries or by those who learned from still recent tradition. Thanks to the researches of Father Bridgett, Father Morris, Dom Gasquet, Father Pollen, Dom Bede Camm, and others, the history of the English martyrs is now much better known to us than it was to Challoner. The late Father Spillmann and his continuator deserve great credit for having, with true German perseverance and skill, brought materials gathered from all available sources into scientific whole. The footnotes bear evidence to wide and careful reading. Every statement is tested; no one can accuse the authors of want of critical acumen. Details about families and about places in England, etc., which naturally are most interesting to English readers, and which form part of the charm of Dom Bede Camm's work, are omitted here; but, as if to indemnify for the omission, the background of contemporary events is fully described for the benefit of those who are supposed not to be already well acquainted with it. We do not miss a single document that could be quoted as evidence for the

martyrs, with one exception, namely, the letter of a Dominican missionary testifying to the death for the faith of the Rev. William Ward in London, 1641, of which a copy is now being sent to the Postulator of the Cause. Sixty-three of those presented to the Congregation of Rites have been declared martyrs, and we hope that many more, if not all of the total (two hundred and sixty-four), will receive equal honour.

R. W.

EINLEITUNG ZU DEN HEILIGEN SCHRIFTEN DES NEUEN TESTAMENTES. Graz and Vienna: Verlagsbuchhandlung 'Styria.' 1910.


THIS short and clear Introduction to the New Testament will be welcome to many. It is better suited for private use than for class-work. It is designed to give students of theology such knowledge as may serve as a basis for their own investigations afterwards. The information it contains is quite sufficient for this purpose, and in proof of numerous statements reference is given to the best and latest authorities. The book will also serve to recall a great deal of what has been learned in class, if persons that like Scripture take up the questions connected with it.

B. F.

DES APOSTELS PAULUS BRIEF AN DIE EPHESEER. Dr. K. J. Müller. Graz and Vienna: Verlagsbuchhandlung 'Styria.' 1909.

THOSE who know how seldom commentators on the other epistles of St. Paul illustrated his meaning by passages taken from this epistle, and how little they do on the other hand to throw light on this epistle, will be glad to get even this short exposition of it. The style of the epistle is rather obscure, but the ideas which it contains are magnificent. 'Nulla Epistola Pauli,' says St. Jerome, 'tanta habet mysteria, tam reconditis sensibus involuta.' As regards its genuineness, the question has been so discussed and the proofs for the affirmative are so strong that little remains for anyone to say. But the meaning of certain parts is carefully explained by Dr. Müller.

J. N.



CAUSALITY, HYPOTHESIS AND LAW

THE Inductive sciences are mainly concerned with the discovery of the *causes* which bring about the phenomena that constitute our experience, and of the *laws* according to which these causes act. It is important, therefore, to have a clear understanding about what scientists, logicians and philosophers mean by 'cause' and by 'law.'

What we may call the common and traditional notion of 'cause' is that of 'anything which contributes in any positive way to the existence or happening of something else.' Aristotle distinguished between two *intrinsic* causes, the 'formal' and the 'material,' which constituted that 'something,' and two other causes, the 'efficient' and the 'final,' *extrinsic* to the 'something,' and in regard to which the latter is properly called an 'effect.' The notions of 'formal' and 'final' causes are closely connected with the Aristotelian view of Nature as revealing *Purpose* and *Design*. We shall see that modern science and philosophy are not the better for discarding these notions.¹ Inductive logicians confine their attention almost exclusively to the study of efficient causality; and of this many have perverted or rather abandoned the traditional notion.

The popular idea of 'efficient cause' is that of an *agent* or *agency*—something which by means of perceptible

¹ Cf. Venn, *Empirical Logic*, pp. 47-62, as a specimen of the attitude of the Empirical school of logicians towards them; also below, pp. 358-59.

action, motion or change, produces some new state or condition of things. Thus understood, a cause is clearly distinguished from a *condition*; the latter being anything which, though *necessary* for the happening of the effect, does not contribute *positively* thereto: windows, for instance, being the condition, not the cause, of the daylight in a room. Most logicians of Induction, however, ignore the distinction: the reason being that so far as *physical science* is concerned it is of no importance. Nor indeed is it, provided we assume that the duty of the physical scientist as such is merely to discover all the antecedents, positive and negative, of whatsoever sort, which are *sufficient* and *indispensable* for the happening of any given phenomenon, without troubling himself about the manner in which they contribute thereto. But not all are willing to set such limits to the scope of physical science; and of course philosophers of the Positivist school claim that when physical science has discovered the invariable antecedents of a phenomenon nothing further remains for investigation. Moreover, the logician of Induction should not confine his investigations to the data of the physical sciences alone. Hence arise misunderstandings and confusion in the treatment of Causality in Inductive Logic.

Again, inasmuch as all scientific knowledge of the universe is a knowledge of things through their causes, there is a self-evident principle or axiom at the basis of all inductive inquiry—the *Principle of Causality*. It may be stated thus: 'Whatever happens (occurs, takes place, begins to be) has a cause.' The axiom '*Ex nihilo nihil fit*' is a negative statement of the same principle. And another statement of it, 'Whatever is *contingent* (i.e., whatever does not contain in itself, in its own essence, the sufficient reason of its actual existence) has a cause'—shows the connexion of the Principle of Causality with the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Being that is *necessary* and *self-existent* has no cause. It is itself the reason of its own existence; whereas all contingent being is caused. The Principle of Causality is evidently a *necessary* principle, i.e., it is essentially involved in our very concept of contingent

being. Nothing can happen without a cause: whatever happens has *necessarily* a cause, i.e., something which brings it about, which makes it happen, whether this cause be free (i.e., self-determining) or not in its mode of action.

But this is a very different statement from the assertion that 'whatever happens has a *necessary* cause'—meaning by '*necessary* cause' one which is not free, not self-determining like the human will, but which, whenever and wherever certain conditions are present throughout time and space, does act, nay *must* act, in the same way and produce the same effect. Thus understood, the assertion that 'whatever happens has a necessary cause' is not only not self-evident, but is not even true—unless free-will be an illusion. And nevertheless there are, curiously enough, many modern writers on Inductive Logic who insinuate—perhaps unconsciously—in their whole doctrine of causality that the only concept of cause which is at all intelligible or amenable to scientific treatment is the concept of a *necessary* or *necessitating* cause. Thus Dr. Mellone refers to the self-evident Principle of Causality under the title of the *Law of Universal Causation*, and rightly remarking that it refers to 'cause' in the widest sense: every event must have some sort of cause, either a 'necessary' (or 'uniformly acting') cause, or a 'capricious' cause, or—he might add—a cause which, though free, is not 'capricious,' and about the operation of which we can consequently generalize with some degree of safety.¹

This principle [he writes] may be shown to be implied in all thinking. Even children and the lower races of men, though they do not think *of* it, think *according to* it. If the savage were content to leave any event unexplained, he would not imagine that all events are controlled by spirits, malevolent or benevolent. It is in fact IMPOSSIBLE TO THINK OF AN EVENT WITHOUT REFERRING IT TO A CAUSE, known or unknown. Even if we had a state of affairs where the past gave scarcely any assurance as to the future, our way of conceiving it would not be contrary to the principle of the Universality of Causation. We should think that some capricious power had added itself to the conditions, turning them now this way and now that.²

¹ Cf. I. E. RECORD, September, pp. 228-9.

² Mellone, *Introductory Text-book of Logic*, pp. 280-281.

All that is quite true ; for the word ' cause ' is clearly taken to include conditions, agencies, influences and powers of whatsoever kind, capricious and free no less than regular and necessary : on no other supposition indeed would the statement that ' every event has a cause ' be a self-evident axiom.

But Dr. Mellone goes on immediately to say that the Principle of the *Uniformity of Nature*, or '*Uniformity of Causation*,' as he prefers to call it—that ' the same cause must have the same effect '—a principle which has been shown to refer properly only to *necessitating* causes,¹—is *included in* the previous principle of the Universality of Causation, that ' every event has a cause.' Surely this is not so. The *universality* of the Law of Causation throughout all contingent being, does not in itself imply that this causality is necessarily uniform. The self-evident Principle of Causality—that nothing can happen without a cause, *ex nihilo nihil fit*—understands ' cause ' in the widest conceivable sense of any real principle, whether free or mechanical, capricious or regular, which brings about the event : it has nothing to do with the question of repetition or regularity at all. Whereas *Uniformity of Causation*, even understood in the hypothetical sense in which Dr. Mellone takes it,² bears exclusively upon regularity of repetition and is self-evident *only in regard to non-free, or necessary* causes—causes which are by nature so constituted and so endowed with one fixed tendency that in similar circumstances they will always produce similar effects. And yet Dr. Mellone continues :—

The student will see on reflection that this principle is *included in* the principle of Universal Causation ; for by cause is at least meant a condition on which the effect *always* follows. If it sometimes followed and sometimes did not, there would be no object in trying to discover it ; you would simply not have a cause at all.³

No doubt we are free to define a cause as ' a condition [or group of conditions, agencies, influences] on which the effect *always* follows,' and indeed this is the narrower sense

¹Cf. I. E. RECORD, Sept., p. 228. ²Ibid., pp. 229-33. ³Mellone, *ibid.*

in which the word is usually understood when we speak of the non-free causes that operate in External Nature—the causes to which the Principle of Uniformity properly applies. But it is certainly not identical with the wider sense in which Dr. Mellone had rightly used the word when formulating the self-evident Law of Universal Causation, that ‘every event has a cause,’ for in this latter context the term ‘cause’ included free and even ‘capricious’ causes.

His final statement, that if the effect ‘sometimes followed and sometimes did not, . . . you would simply not have a cause at all,’ is too sweeping. What is true, of course, is this, that we can infer or generalize about the operation beyond experience, of any cause, only in so far as we are warranted in assuming its operation to be regular, not capricious. But if Dr. Mellone’s statement were true, it would follow that man is not the *cause* of what he does *freely* and that no *science* of human conduct is possible.¹ This is one unsatisfactory result of discarding the traditional notion of physical efficient causes as agencies or powers inherent in physical phenomena and productive of physical change, for the empiricist notion of such causes as ‘invariable and unconditional antecedents,’ i.e., phenomena or groups of phenomena ‘sufficient [or *necessitating*] and indispensable’ for the appearance of other [consequent] phenomena.

The ‘efficiency’ of causation is quite a distinct concept from the ‘necessity’ of causation. Yet these are sometimes confounded. Professor Welton, for example, criticizing Mill’s account of causality, writes ² that the latter ‘finds cause in a set of conditions whose existence necessitates that of the effect,’ and he adds immediately that ‘greater efficiency than this no one would wish to establish.’ But efficiency is not necessity. A cause may be *efficient* and yet not be *necessitating* but *free*. In fact it is from our consciousness of our own free volitional activity that we derive the notion of efficiency in the first instance. Efficiency we conceive as positive influence in the production of changes or effects by the exertion of power or force. The earliest efficient causality of which we become aware is

¹ Cf. I. E. RECORD, Sept., p. 229.

² Welton, *Logic*, ii., p. 19.

our own *free* efficient causality. Then we come to conceive External Nature as also endowed with powers or forces, as *efficient* in the production of changes or effects. Of course there have been and are philosophers who maintain that belief in real efficiency in Nature is an illusion; and some have extended their denial even to the domain of Mind as well. Occasionalists take up this attitude on the ground that efficient causality is essentially an attribute of the Creator, incommunicable to the creature. This view does not concern us here. The attitude of Mill and the Phenomenist school generally is quite different. These writers contend that it is a mere waste of time and a hindrance to real scientific progress to refer the various phenomena of Mind and of External Nature to corresponding 'faculties' or 'powers' or 'forces' in either domain. And no doubt such reference of individual effects, or classes of effects, to corresponding efficient principles, whether these be called 'faculties' or 'forces,' would be calculated to retard further investigation, if such reference were taken *as an ultimate rational explanation* of those effects; if, for instance, men were so foolish as to think they had said the last word as to why opium induces sleep by declaring opium to have a *vis dormativa*—to use the old familiar example.

It is true that in the Renaissance period some of the decadent camp-followers of the great medieval scholastics left themselves open to this reproach by taking refuge in such verbal explanations of natural phenomena.¹ But up to quite recent times it was the fashion with modern philosophers and scientists, in their boasted ignorance of medieval thought, to impute this and all manner of absurdities to scholasticism generally, and with the inevitable result that the ridicule they heaped upon their predecessors is now seen in the light of history to recoil upon their own heads. The thirteenth-century scholastics, no less than their later critics, realized the importance of observation and experiment, the necessity of noting analogies between phenomena, of endeavouring by an analysis of these analogies

¹ Cf. De Wulf, *Scholasticism, Old and New* (2nd edition), pp. 147 sqq.; *History of Medieval Philosophy*, p. 503.

to reduce gradually, as far as possible, the number of distinct 'forces,' or 'powers' postulated for the explanation of phenomena. They were never content to refer each separate phenomenon in Nature to a distinct and corresponding cause supposed to be capable of producing that effect alone—to be *sui generis*, so to speak. They pushed investigation as far as the conditions of their time permitted. And those who, in modern times, have inherited the best traditions of scholasticism, have always welcomed every careful attempt of the positive and experimental sciences to unify our experience of External Nature by tracing large and varied and apparently unconnected fields of phenomena to the operation of some one or some few common 'agencies.' They have nothing but approval for the methods whereby scientists have formulated and tested hypotheses for the exploration of hitherto unsuspected natural 'forces,' or for the explanation of phenomena by referring these to already known 'causes' with which such phenomena were previously thought to have no connexion. They themselves adopt these methods in physical science. They are not content to say that the varied phenomena of External Nature must have causes, must be due to the operation—and co-operation—of Nature's forces and agencies. They endeavour to discover in what groups of phenomenal antecedents the agencies productive of a given effect are operative. They try to bring to light 'the sum-total of the [phenomenal, perceptible] conditions, positive and negative taken together, the whole of the contingencies of every description, which being realized the consequent [effect or phenomenon] invariably follows'—which is Mill's own conception of the discovery of a 'cause.'¹ And it is only when the inductive methods fail for want of analogies on which to base hypotheses, i.e., in investigating the remoter causes of wider fields of phenomena, and the Ultimate Cause of the whole phenomenal universe, that they use the simple *a posteriori* argument to prove that such remoter causes—and such Ultimate Cause—must exist, and to

¹ *Logic*, III., v., § 3.

discover about the nature of these just as much as the effects will warrant them in attributing to the latter.

But scholastics have held to the doctrine that while the senses stop at phenomena, intellect or reason can discover in these phenomena 'substances,' 'causes,' 'faculties,' 'forces,' which constitute and permeate the world of sense-experience, and which reveal themselves to intellect by acting in and through the phenomena of sense. And they have held to this doctrine in obedience to such self-evident dictates of reason as that 'every event must have a cause,' 'every change must be a change of some state' and 'every state must be a state of some subject or substance.' Of course such principles will not of themselves unlock the secrets of science by telling us whether this and that event, or change, or state, have any underlying agencies, or causes, or substances *in common*, or how many of the latter there are in the world of sense-experience altogether. Yet positivists and phenomenists appear to think that something like this should be expected from those principles. For, not finding in the latter the key to any new *positive* information about Nature, they proclaim that 'substance,' 'power,' 'force,' 'efficiency,' 'purpose,' etc.—in a word, all such objects of thought as lie beyond the ken of the senses—are 'occult' and 'unknowable,' and should therefore be discarded.¹ But as a matter of fact they are not 'occult' to the *intellect*—of positivists any more than of scholastics. The former, despite their disclaimer of agnosticism, know just as much and as little about such objects of thought as the latter: they discourse about 'substances' and 'causes' and 'forces' and 'faculties' no less than the latter: and we are all alike guided in our ascent to such thought-objects from the data of sense by the scholastic principle that from the *operations* of things we judge of their *natures*: *operari sequitur esse; qualis est operatio talis est natura*.

But positivists pretend to be able to 'explain' the universe without calling in the aid of any 'hyperphysical'

¹ Cf. I. E. RECORD, April: 'Some Current Phases of Physical Theories,' p. 403; January: 'The New Knowledge and its Limitations,' p. 27.

entity¹—we shall see presently with what effect,—and blame scholastics for not discarding the ‘antiquated’ metaphysics of ‘substance’ and ‘accident,’ of ‘faculty,’ ‘power’ and ‘force,’ in the philosophy of External Nature. They have tried—unsuccessfully, of course—to deliver human reason from the supposed bondage of theology and metaphysics by eliminating from their system of thought all such ‘scholastic’ notions. We may be pardoned if we hesitate to exchange the ‘antiquated’ system for the teaching of those later philosophers who resolve all reality into ‘relations’ while denying that there is any ‘subject’ to ‘refer’ or any ‘term’ to which to ‘refer’ it²; or into ‘states’ or ‘phases’ or ‘processes,’ while denying that there is any substance or agent of which these are the states, phases or processes; or into a transient ‘flow’ of sensations in the individual’s consciousness while denying that there is any permanent mind other than the flow of sensations, or any abiding, substantial *ego* or individual to experience and interpret these sensations and thus to remember past experience and to expect and anticipate future experience.

The fact is that this Phenomenist philosophy, whether it take the form of Idealism and be described as ‘spiritualist,’ or the form of Positivism and be described as ‘materialist,’ has made itself unintelligible by ‘divesting the human mind of its most fundamental conceptions’³—or rather by pretending to accomplish such a hopeless task: for it really smuggles into its explanations at every turn, under the mask of a new terminology of course, the very conceptions it pretends to dispense with.

In opposition to the traditional philosophy of so-called ‘occult’ causes, Mill boldly proclaimed that he would deal only with causes which were themselves ‘phenomena,’ i.e., entities which would be in themselves perceptible by the senses: ‘I premise,’ he wrote, ‘that when . . . I speak of the cause of any phenomenon, I do not mean a cause which

¹ Cf. I. E. RECORD, April, pp. 402, 403.

² Ibid., August, pp. 137, 145.

³ Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, p. 65. Cf. I. E. RECORD, April, p. 400.

is not itself a phenomenon ; I make no research into the ultimate or ontological cause of anything.' ¹ The trammels he thus sought to impose upon human thought were soon deemed too irksome not only by philosophers, but even by the scientists who professed a general sympathy with the Positivist Philosophy. It is indeed conceivable that *scientists* might agree to confine their efforts exclusively to the discovery of co-existences and sequences between *phenomena*, and to eschew all thought and all mention of *non-phenomenal* or *imperceptible* entities, even as mere aids to investigation. But of course they have refused—and rightly—thus to debar themselves from using their *imagination* at all events in addition to their senses. They have given a very wide interpretation indeed to the term 'phenomenon,' if the 'causes' which they contemplate nowadays in their hypotheses are to be regarded as phenomena. Not only are some of the objects of current scientific hypotheses—i.e., some hypothetical *causes* of the phenomena of Nature—not perceptible themselves by the senses, but they are not even in any true sense positively picturable by the imagination. We are very far removed indeed from the 'phenomenal antecedents' of Mill when we are introduced into the domain of 'ethers,' 'vortices,' 'corpuscles,' 'ions' and 'electrons' by the physicist, or into the domain of 'ids' and 'biophors' and 'biotic energies' by the physiologist. Indeed it is not so clear that we have not returned to the 'occult' entities of the 'antiquated' metaphysics ² and merely re-baptized in a more mechanical terminology the '*materia prima*' and 'powers' and 'efficiencies' and 'vital forces' of Aristotle and the scholastics. As a matter of fact it is now beginning to be recognized by scientists that all attempts to explain Nature, whether organic or inorganic, by collocations and motions of material masses in space and time, i.e., by purely *perceptible* or *picturable* factors,

¹ *Logic*, III., v., § 2.

² See article, 'Weismann and the Germ-Plasm Theory,' in the *Dublin Review*, April, 1906, where Professor Windle suggests a comparison of some of Weismann's hypotheses with the '*vis formativa*' and other such '*virtutes occultae*' of the older philosophy. Cf., also, *What is Life?* by the same author (Sands & Co., 1908); and *I. E. RECORD*, April, pp. 398 sqq.

and without the aid of purely *conceptual* or *intelligible* factors such as force, power, efficiency, purpose and design—have proved futile¹; and that concepts of hyperphysical entities and influences, however ‘occult’ to sense or imagination, are indispensable for a rational explanation of Nature’s processes.

The controversy as to what kind or concept of cause it is legitimate for us to employ in our hypotheses about the phenomena of Nature, is one of very long standing. No supposition of ours as to what is the cause of a phenomenon will be of any use unless it be *verifiable*. And what kind of cause must we suppose to be operative if our supposition is to be verifiable? Newton insisted that the object of our hypothesis must be a *vera causa*, a real cause—meaning thereby to exclude arbitrary, fanciful, *a priori* suppositions and prejudices not suggested by facts of experience. This, of course, is obviously right and proper. Must the cause, however, be supposed to be itself a *phenomenon* of some sort, i.e., something itself perceptible to the senses, so that the only valid verification of such hypothesis would be actual discovery by sense-perception, of the supposed cause? Such a requirement is rightly repudiated by scientists, though it is only such a sort of cause that answers to Mill’s definition. It must, however, be such an agency, or group of agencies, that, though not directly perceptible itself, it is perceptible *in its effects*: it must be supposed to dwell *in phenomena*, to become operative in certain *combinations of phenomena*, and to produce therein directly perceptible effects. This indirect perceptibility of the supposed causes *in their effects* is necessary and sufficient for the object of a scientific hypothesis. In this way *alone* are ‘atoms,’ ‘electrons,’ ‘ions,’ ‘sub-atomic motions,’ ‘biophors’ and all the infinitesimally minute ‘causes’ of modern scientific hypotheses, perceptible or ‘phenomenal’: in their *effects*, in the phenomena which they are supposed to actuate or constitute; and in this they differ *in no way* from the ‘*materia prima*,’ ‘*forma substantialis*,’ ‘qualities,’ ‘forces,’

¹ Cf. *infra*, pp. 348, 359.

'faculties,' 'natures,' 'properties,' etc., of scholasticism : for these too are perceptible indirectly, in their effects.

Properly speaking, all such explanatory factors of our experience are 'intelligible' or 'noumenal' rather than 'sensible' or 'phenomenal.' The need that impels us to look for an explanation of sense-experience obliges us to conjecture or suppose the real existence and operation of such—really *supra*-sensible—agencies. The whole process of conceiving the latter and reasoning from such conceptions is a process of the faculty which transcends the faculties of sense—the intellect. It makes comparatively little difference whether these conceptions, these hypothetical 'causes,' are more or less immersed in, and supported by, concrete imagination-pictures.¹ The visible, measurable phenomena in which they are supposed to be operative, are equally amenable to observation and experiment, whether the hypothetical 'causes' be conceived as 'properties,' 'forces,' 'affinities,' 'qualities,' or as 'atoms,' 'electrons,' 'vortices,' 'undulations,' etc. Quantitative values may be assigned to such factors, by whatever names we call the latter. Since they are supposed to be factors operative *in material phenomena*, there must be a quantitative aspect in their *modus operandi* ; only we must not forget that this is not their sole aspect, and that we have not 'explained' the facts fully by 'calculating' the measurable aspects of these factors.

¹ It might, perhaps, be argued that hypotheses having for their objects abstract 'powers,' 'forces,' 'natures,' etc., in phenomena, cannot be so accurately verifiable, nor, therefore, so fruitful to science as hypotheses which contemplate only such directly calculable factors as 'atoms,' 'electrons,' 'undulations,' etc. This is scarcely true, for mathematical values may be assigned to the former as easily as to the latter. It cannot be said that British scientists have in any striking way excelled the French in their contributions to science ; yet the former have been always far more addicted than the latter to *concrete, picturable, mechanical* conceptions. Professor Duhem in his *Evolution de la mécanique rationnelle* (Paris, 1903, pp. 193-4) quotes the following characteristic passage from Lord Kelvin's *Lectures on Molecular Dynamics* (p. 132) : 'The true meaning of the question : Do we or do we not understand a given subject in Physics ?—seems to me to be the following : Can we make a mechanical model corresponding to it ? . . . I am never satisfied until I can make a mechanical model of the thing ; as long as I am unable to do this, I do not understand the thing.' Cf. Professor Windle's article in the *Dublin Review*, already mentioned ; also art. on 'The Contrast of English and French Concepts of Physical Theories,' by the Rev. P. de Vregille in the *Month*, April, 1907, pp. 350 sqq.

The 'cause' which forms the object of a scientific hypothesis need not, then, be itself a phenomenon. Further, it need not be an agency which is *already known* as such to be operative elsewhere in Nature: otherwise no *new* natural agency could be discovered by way of hypothesis. But it must be conceived to bear *some analogy or resemblance* to some such known agency. The reason of this requirement is not difficult to find. It is only in so far as we conceive our supposed cause to be analogous in its *modus operandi* to some known cause or other, that we can infer anything as to the conduct of the former in this or that particular set of circumstances. And it is only by observing such conduct—experimentally, if necessary and possible—in varied circumstances, and by seeing whether this tallies with what we should expect, that we can hope to *verify* our hypothesis. The only means we have of going beyond the general assertion we can make in virtue of the Principle of Causality—that the phenomenon (C) has a determining cause,—the only means of *discovering* the latter, of *detecting its whereabouts* and *bringing it to light*, is by supposing it to be some definite cause of a certain kind (say X), and then trying to verify that supposition by the employment of some processes that may lead with certainty to X as the *only possible* cause of the phenomenon in question, the only possible element, amongst all the surroundings of the phenomenon, which can be the determining cause of the latter. When we have established that the supposed cause X is the *only possible* cause of the phenomenon, then and then only can we infer from the reality of C that the supposed cause X is its real cause; for X is an antecedent of which C is the consequent, and from the reality of C we can infer the reality of X only when the latter is not merely the sufficient or *necessitating*, but the *only possible* cause of the former.

But it is obvious that we cannot bring any such independent experimental processes to bear upon X, to determine if it be real, unless we suppose it to be of a nature *at least partially known*, i.e., to have some analogy with known causes, to be of such a kind that we can deduce from it

something else besides the bare phenomenon for whose explanation it was postulated. If we cannot draw any other inference from it except *this*; if it is so unique, so unknown to us otherwise that all we can say about it is that 'it is a something which is the determining cause of this phenomenon'; if we cannot study it in various sets of conditions, and conceive what its effects would be and how its influence would be manifested therein, and see whether these inferences tally with the phenomena that are observed to occur in these conditions: if we cannot do all this, manifestly we cannot hope to be able to *rigorously verify our hypothesis*; for it is only by doing all this we can sift the surroundings of the phenomenon in question and prove that the supposed cause *X* is the *real* one, by proving that it is not only a sufficient (necessitating) cause, but the *only possible* cause that could *determine* or bring about the phenomenon. Unless, for example, we supposed the so-called luminiferous *ether* to resemble matter so far at least as to be subject to the laws of motion, unless we supposed it to have some analogy with the elastic medium—air—which propagates sound, we could infer nothing at all about it in explanation of the propagation of radiant heat and light. If it 'were wholly different from anything else known to us, we should in vain try to reason about it.'¹

But now, granting all this; granting that if the hypothesis is to be *verifiable in this sense*, the supposed cause must have some analogy with known causes; the question at once arises: Is it always possible to make a hypothesis of this sort, or must we not be sometimes satisfied with supposing, as the real cause of the phenomena under observation, some cause for the detection of whose nature we have *no analogy* to aid us, and about whose nature therefore we cannot hope to learn anything further than what we can attribute to it *as cause of the phenomena to be explained*? The answer is that certainly we must be sometimes satisfied with this latter sort of supposition. In searching for the immediate causes of the smaller sections

¹ Jevons, *Principles of Science*, p. 512.

of reality examined in the various special sciences analogies are more abundant. But according as we seek the remoter and wider causes of more extended regions of reality, our sources of analogy must of necessity become fewer and fewer, and we must of necessity fall back upon the supposition of causes about whose nature we can get practically no other information than what the study of the effect itself—the larger field of phenomena in question—will yield us.

This is the case with all those wider and more fundamental speculations or 'systematic conceptions' about the ultimate nature and properties of the phenomenal universe, about the constitution of matter, the cause of gravitation, the arrangement and motions of the heavenly bodies. Our hypothesis may account sufficiently for all the facts that suggested it, but who will say that it is the *only* one that can account for them? Yet we can pass from the affirmation of consequent to the affirmation of antecedent only when we know that the latter is the *only possible* antecedent of the consequent in question. For centuries the Ptolemaic system of astronomy was accepted as being the only one that could account for the facts. It was only a man of the rare penetration of Aquinas who could point out that perhaps on some other hypothesis these could be as well or better explained: '*forte secundum aliquem alium modum nondum ab hominibus comprehensum apparentia circa stellas salvantur*'¹: the substitution of the Copernican system three hundred years afterwards justified his suspicions.

When, finally, we contemplate the phenomenal universe as a whole, when we are brought face to face with what Mill has called 'the ultimate laws of nature (whatever they may be),'² and 'the co-existences between the ultimate properties of things—those properties which are the causes of all phenomena, but are not themselves caused by any phenomenon, and a cause for which could only be sought

¹ In Lib. II. de Cælo et Mundo, lect. xvii. Cf. *Summa Theol.* I^a, P. Q. 32, a. 1, ad 2.—De Wulf, *Scholasticism Old and New*, p. 332.

² *Logic*, III., v., § 6, n. 1.

by ascending to the origin of all things,'¹ we are forced to infer, not by any inductive process of hypothesis and verification, but by *a posteriori* reasoning from effect to cause, that the whole phenomenal universe, being contingent, not self-explaining, must have an Originating First Cause, and that this Cause must be distinct from all phenomena, Self-Existent and, as regards perfection, adequate to the production of all phenomenal reality *ex nihilo*—Creator, Conserver and Ruler of the universe.

But at this point phenomenists would have us abdicate the use of our reason : asking us to believe that we cannot and must not ascend 'to the origin of all things' because such source of all phenomenal reality cannot be itself a 'phenomenon.' Of course it cannot ; but is this any reason why we should doubt about its reality ? The things which 'are not themselves caused by any *phenomenon*' must be caused by *something*. And since we can know about their Cause whatever we are able to infer from themselves, the contention of Agnosticism, that this Cause is unknowable, must be rejected as erroneous.

Mill's narrow conception of 'cause'—as being necessarily a 'phenomenon'—which has led to this agnosticism, is deserving of some further analysis. For it has deprived him of all rational ground even for physical certitude about the generalizations of the positive sciences themselves. The characteristic failure of his teaching to account for the element of *necessity* in the 'Laws of Nature' is due to his phenomenist conception of causality as mere 'invariable sequence.' After he had defined 'cause' as 'the sum-total of the conditions positive and negative taken together, . . . which, being realized, the consequent invariably follows,'² he was met by the difficulty that not all invariable sequences are considered as cases of causality—the sequence of day and night, for instance ;—and so he was obliged to qualify the adjective 'invariable' by the adverb 'unconditionally.' Invariable sequence is not causality, he tells us, unless the invariability arises wholly and

¹ Ibid., xxii., § 2.

² Ibid., v., § 3.

entirely from the nature of the phenomena themselves, is unconditioned by anything extrinsic to the latter, is altogether independent of 'whatever supposition we may make with regard to other things,' and will therefore obtain 'under all imaginable circumstances': that is, of course, 'as long as the present constitution of things'¹ endures. Such kind of invariable sequence he terms 'unconditional';² and he then goes on to give his final and scientifically exact definition of 'the cause of a phenomenon' as 'the antecedent or concurrence of antecedents on which it [the phenomenon] is invariably and *unconditionally* consequent.'

By thus defining causation as sequence which is invariable not by reason of any extrinsic conditions, but *unconditionally* and *by reason of the nature of the phenomena themselves* which constitute the sequence, Mill evidently intended to convey that an antecedent, in order to be a 'cause' must have a 'necessary' connexion with its consequent. This conception of the 'cause' of a phenomenon—as something which of itself, of its own nature, and not by reason of any extrinsic conditions, is *invariably* followed by that phenomenon—is precisely what has suggested the traditional notion of a *necessary* as opposed to a *free* cause: we are prompted to regard a cause as *necessarily* productive of an effect, by observing it to be *always* and *in all circumstances* followed by that effect. By making the invariability of the connexion *independent of all other conditions*, and thus, as the only alternative, dependent on the nature of the connected phenomena themselves, Mill believed that he was giving intelligible expression to

what writers mean when they say that the notion of cause involves the idea of necessity. If there be any meaning which confessedly belongs to the term necessity, it is *unconditionality*. That which is necessary, that which *must* be, means that which will be, whatever supposition we may make in regard to all

¹ By this expression Mill tells us that he means 'the ultimate laws of nature (whatever they may be) as distinguished from the derivative laws and from the collocations.'—Op. cit., III., v., § 6.

² Notwithstanding the *condition* just set down about the permanence of the 'present constitution of things.'

other things. The succession of day and night evidently is not necessary in this sense. It is conditional on the occurrence of other antecedents. That which will be followed by a given consequent when, and only when, some third circumstance also exists, is not the cause, even though no case should ever have occurred in which the phenomenon took place without it. . . . Let me add that the antecedent which is only conditionally invariable, is not the invariable antecedent [in the full sense of *absolutely* invariable—in future as in past?]. Though a fact may in experience have always been followed by another fact, yet if the remainder of our experience teaches us that it might not always be so followed, or if the experience itself is such as leaves room for a possibility that the known cases may not correctly represent all possible cases, the hitherto invariable antecedent is not accounted the cause; but why? Because we are not sure that it *is* the [really, absolutely, unconditionally] invariable antecedent.¹

But the idea of 'necessity' is not the idea of *actually uniform and unvaried* sequence, though it is derived from our experience of the latter; nor of *invariable* sequence except we take *invariable* to mean not only that which has not varied and does not and will not vary, but that which *cannot* vary. And this invariability in this latter sense need not be at all *unconditional* in order to be described as 'necessity,' for the 'necessity' itself may conceivably be *conditional*: we can quite conceive a sequence which *must* remain unaltered *so long as certain conditions are fulfilled*. This in fact is the only necessity experience warrants us in attributing to the sequences of Nature; and, as we shall presently see, Mill's so-called 'unconditional' invariability remained always 'conditional.' We have therefore the right and the duty to ask how, from actual, limited, experience of *unvaried* sequence in the past, we can get the idea of a sequence that is *invariable*—i.e., which '*cannot*' vary, which is '*necessary*'? Let us first recall the traditional scholastic account of 'physical necessity,' which is simple and intelligible.

'Necessity' may be either *intellectual, hypothetical,*

¹ Ibid., § 6.

abstract, connecting possible essences together in thought, or it may be *volitional, categorical, concrete*, connecting actual things or occurrences together in reality. With this latter we are concerned here. When we speak of 'that which *must be*' in reference to *things* or *events*, when we say that one thing *must* follow another, we can only mean that they are so constituted and circumstanced that by their very nature or constitution and collocation they *cannot help* following each other.¹ Whatever Mill may say, no mere addition or multiplication of '*was*' and '*is*' and '*will be*' can ever generate an *absolute* or *unconditional* '*must be*.' What is there, then, in the observed *unvaried* uniformity of Nature, to warrant us in thinking either that it will or that it must continue *unvaried*? There is this: there is abundant evidence (of which the fact of *observed uniformity* itself forms a part) to warrant us in concluding with certitude that Nature is the work of an All-Wise Creator and Ruler, Who has so constituted and arranged its agencies that they will and must continue to exist and act each in its own fixed, uniform way, as long as He chooses in His wisdom to preserve and sustain it in existence. Such is the uniformity, invariability, necessity, we ascribe to physical agencies: *conditional* on the Will of an All-Wise, All-Ruling Providence. There is the ultimate rational basis which analysis reveals for our *physical, conditional* certitude about the general laws of physical science.

Now let us observe and contrast the alternative offered by the empiricist philosophy of Mill and his school. The physical cause of a phenomenon, he writes, is that which has always 'been followed by' that phenomenon in past experience, provided this experience does not leave any 'room for a possibility that the known cases may not correctly represent all possible cases.' But if, as Mill's own

¹ We abstract here, for the sake of simplicity, from the conditional necessity, called *moral obligation*, to which the conduct of free, responsible agents is subject. To these the Creator has given the power to act as they choose; but He imposes on them a *necessity* by which they *must* (freely choose to) act in a certain way *if they are to attain their end*. But every non-free cause in animal, vegetable and inorganic creation He has endowed with such a nature and constitution as *categorically* directs it to attain the end He has freely intended it to reach.

philosophy teaches, we have no faculties of knowledge beyond our external and internal senses, whose only objects are *sense-phenomena*, associated, compounded and otherwise modified in consciousness, how can the combination of past and present sense-experience give us any degree or kind of certitude, anything beyond a mere *feeling of expectation* about the 'possibility' that 'all possible cases' will resemble the observed cases? And even for this feeling of expectation Mill can offer us no rational ground whatsoever. He states that our actual experience enables us somehow to make up our minds that a given observed antecedent of a phenomenon *will continue to be* the antecedent of the latter *unconditionally*: which means 'whatever supposition we may make about other things,' or 'under all imaginable circumstances.' But this he immediately limits and qualifies by saying that *the antecedent will continue so only 'as long as the present constitution of things endures'* or *as long as*, and *on condition that 'the ultimate laws of nature (whatever that may be)' do not vary*. So after all, the '*unconditional*' *invariability* turns out to be *conditional*! Our sense-experience of an unvaried sequence only enables us, therefore, to believe that the latter will continue unvaried, if and *as long as* 'the present constitution of things,' 'the ultimate laws of nature,' will remain unaltered. And *what rational ground* have we, according to Mill, for believing that the 'constitution of things' *will* continue stable, and their 'ultimate laws' unaltered? He does not tell us; and for a good reason: *his philosophy affords none*. It limits our knowledge to phenomena of sense; it is *agnostic*: it informs us that we can know facts, but nothing about the inner nature and ultimate causes of those facts. And thus the Empirical theory of Induction, as of Knowledge generally, destroys all certitude by rearing the whole edifice of physical science on the basis of an underlying confession of helpless and hopeless ignorance.¹

But while positivists thus profess that a knowledge of the ultimate origin, nature and destiny of the universe is unattainable, and all attempts to reach such knowledge

¹ Cf. I, E. RECORD, September, p. 241.

futile, they contend that a *scientific* knowledge of the *laws* of phenomena—which they hold to be the only knowledge worth having—is attainable according to their principles and methods. Here, too, however, they are inconsistent: because, firstly, even if the term ‘law’ be taken in the superficial sense of a mere general statement that some observed uniformity holds good *beyond the limits of actual experience*, we have seen that their theory of knowledge can assign no rational ground for certitude as to the validity of such a generalization; and, secondly, if we interpret the term ‘law’ in the deeper sense in which it signifies some real *principle* or *cause* or *source* of such uniformity, their exclusion of *final causes* from their study of Nature, their refusal to recognize rational *purpose* in the universe, debars them from attaining to a knowledge of laws in this fuller and richer sense.

The term ‘law’ primarily signifies a mandate or precept, imposed by the reason and will of a superior upon rational subjects in order to secure their uniform co-operation for the attainment of some end. The law as known to these, as abiding in their minds and hearts, becomes the principle or source of a certain *uniformity* in their conduct: this uniformity of action is the effect and outward manifestation of the guiding principle within. Order, regularity, uniformity, thus becomes the index of law. Next, by a very natural extension of meaning, the term ‘law’ came to signify this outward manifestation itself—the *uniform series of similar acts*. It was transferred in this sense from ethics to physics, and the uniformities observed in the processes of External Nature came to be called ‘laws.’ And why? Because these uniformities were regarded, by analogy with human activities, as necessarily revealing *guiding principles* or *laws* impressed by *intelligence* and for a *purpose* on the forces to which the processes of External Nature are due. This conception of Nature as *teleological*, as revealing *design* and ruled by *purposive intelligence*, is the only conception which gives its real significance to the commonplace formula, ‘Laws of Nature.’ Nor is the extension of this concept of *purpose* from the domain of

rational agents to the animal, vegetable and inorganic kingdoms of Nature, by Aristotelian and scholastic philosophers, a mere linguistic metaphor. There is a true and proper sense, these philosophers contend, in which *all* created agencies act in fulfilment of purpose; in which '*OMNE agens agit propter finem*': the rational agent by deliberate choice ('*electivé*'), the sentient agent by conscious, instinctive appetite ('*apprehensivé*'); while agents that are devoid of all cognition, whether they be merely vital or inorganic, act for a purpose *effectively* or *equivalently* ('*executivé*'), i.e., in virtue of a stable tendency impressed upon their very nature by some Ruling Intelligence, and in virtue of which they are directed or *oriented* towards definite ends in fulfilment of a definite purpose or plan. This immanent principle, formative and directive, entering into their very constitution, is in fact their *nature*: acting in accordance with it they act according to *the law of their nature*.¹

Thus we see that 'laws' in the sense of mere formulas *descriptive* of uniform connexions between phenomena, do not *explain* these uniformities. It is when we discover the sources and principles whence these uniformities spring—proximately in the natures and properties of the efficient agencies themselves, and ultimately in the Ruling and Purposive Intelligence to which these natures point—that we reach the more fundamental conception of *causal* 'laws,' and that we begin to see the inseparable connexion between *law* and *cause*, more especially between law and *final* cause or purpose.

But the Positivist philosophy regards all consideration of final causes in Nature as 'unscientific.' It would have us merely observe and catalogue the uniform co-existences and sequences of phenomena that come under our observation. And if it allows us to generalize beyond experience it does so in opposition to its own sensist theory of cognition.

¹ St. Thomas conceived it as a tendency expressive of the divine, directive plan, in the created agency: '*Stabilis inclinatio vel appetitus finis rebus a Deo indita*'; or, again: '*Ars quaedam Divina indita rebus per quam ad fines proprios non solum ducuntur sed quodammodo vadunt*.'—*De Veritate*, Q. xxii.; *Summa Theol.*, Ia., II^{ae}., Q. i., art. 2.

Attempting to analyse all experience of External Nature into the perception of matter and motion, it offers us the *mechanical* conception of the universe as the only 'scientific' conception. And since this mechanical conception offers us only a partial explanation of a single aspect—the quantitative aspect—of phenomena, the positivist is forced to contend that whatever surpasses the mechanical in Nature surpasses our powers of cognition as well. Thus we see in Agnosticism a confession of the break down of the Mechanical Theory of the Universe and the consequent failure of the Phenomenist or Positivist Philosophy: 'The mechanical theory of the Universe'—to use the words in which Professor Welton sums up his criticism—'is simple, but inadequate *even in inorganic nature*; in organic nature it must be supplemented by the principle of development, and finally *by the conception of rational purpose.*'¹

P. COFFEY.

¹ Welton, *Logic*, ii., pp. 209, 210.

MODERN DEVELOPMENT IN MORAL THEOLOGY

THE recent examinations held all over Ireland among the clergy bring back to many of them the memory of the strenuous but happy days of their college life. Then, 'when life and hope were young,' the classic halls of Maynooth resounded with the emphatic dicta of a Healy and the rounded periods of a venerated Gargan. The 'rough ways of Scripture were made plain' in the stately accents of a Macaulay, and the secret ways of eloquence were unfolded in the measured and melodious sentences of a Carr. The 'seconds' drank in with greedy ear the enthusiastic exposition of a M'Donald, while the scion of princely Tyrconnell ruled with gentle sway the serried ranks of the 'thirds.' Since those far-off days much has happened. Many gaps are in the ranks and many a well-known face is missing, but the remnant have foregathered to wrestle once again with the knotty problems of 'twenty golden years ago.' It is, perhaps, a moot point whether the Fathers of Trent legislated in this matter for senior curates as we know them. History conjures up an assembly of earnest and kindly prelates full of the knowledge of human weakness and ready to pour the 'oil and wine' into the wounds of the weary traveller. Ascetic they must have been, but the true ascetic is indulgent to others, severe towards himself. Stern they may have been, but they must have realized in the midst of the thrilling experiences of those stormy days that it is not easy to transplant an oak at fifty. No less edifying than pathetic is it to see the veteran ecclesiastic whose once raven locks are streaked with the snows of many winters settle down to the once familiar books after the labours of a missionary day. The programme of studies is ample and varied, but the work of a year has to be crowded into the space of a couple of months. From the foundation of the Church to the latest vagaries of Modernism, from the *loci theologici* to the most up-to-date phases of Kantian

philosophy, from the golden eloquence of Chrysostom to the clear-cut logic of Newman : such is the field before him. He surveys it without dismay, and with the conscious pride of a soldier of the Church buckles on his intellectual armour and enters the lists. To the survivors we extend our congratulations, and with them enjoyment of the well-earned benefice when it comes. Such a consummation for some is certain, for others not so ; while for many, in view of the elastic step and alert carriage of his modern octogenarian Irish pastor, it is hardly *tenuiter probabilis*.

But if he has not, *hic et nunc*, won a benefice he has at least won additional knowledge in the schools of theology. In the great and practical domain of Morals especially his intellectual outlook will be broadened. In the midst of many old acquaintances he will find new faces to attract and rivet his attention—and his new-found friends mayhap will wean him from the old. When he paced long ago the ample corridors of his *alma mater* every arm enfolded a Ratisbon Gury. The Roman editor was just commencing to creep in, and a few enterprising students produced to curious eyes the new and much-annotated edition of the great Frenchman. But now, *nons avez changé tout cela*. The Ratisbon Gury is as extinct as the Dodo, and the great Ballerini even has given place to Lehmkuhl, Genicot, and Noldin. We doubt if for the average student the change is for the better. If so, the average student has improved since our time. The *principia* at the opening of each chapter of Gury contained not a useless word, while the catechetical style and the questions that followed gripped the intellect and the memory, and stumped themselves thereon. Gury followed the method of all the great authors since Aquinas, but the issue of Lehmkuhl's work marked a new departure. His system is more scientific, his treatment of all questions, while full and illuminating, is severely logical, and one feels in reading his book that, in this department at all events, one is in touch with a master mind. The volumes show on every page evidences of the patient and deep research, the sound judgment, the careful weighing of opinions, and the solid piety of the true priest and

scholar. His teaching throughout may be styled cautious probabilism.

Genicot, on the contrary, speaks with no uncertain sound. His writing is bold, terse, and to the point, and while he clinches his argument in few words he conveys to his reader an impression of rugged strength and firm decision. It is pre-eminently a book for the missionary priest, where his doubts will be set at rest by the short and sharp conclusions of a bold probabilism.

The book for the student is Noldin. Clear and orderly to the verge of nicety, abounding in divisions and subdivisions, he treats his subject in smooth and easy-flowing Latin, '*et nihil tetigit quod non ornavit.*' Sufficiently copious, and yet concise, embodying the pith of the learning of his predecessors, he even handles the most modern and up-to-date questions under the searchlight of a luminous mind and a sound probabilism.

Such are the guides of the modern student, and it is no wonder that in such able hands moral theology has developed and unfolded, preserving, of course, the same immutable fundamental principles, but applying and adapting itself to the new problems of our complex modern civilization. It would be interesting to speculate how we should get on at the present day without probabilism. Had we now to fall back on any more rigid system we should find it very hard, if not impossible, to escape from many an intricate and awkward position. But the promise of the Divine Founder is there: '*I am with you all days,*' enlightening, developing, and fitting His Church to cope with all the doubts and dangers of succeeding centuries. And the same divine assistance will raise up teachers in the ages to come able and willing to solve the difficulties that surely lie hidden in the dim future.

To this now firmly established system of probabilism we owe the notable development and advance of moral theology during the last few decades. In this development Ballerini has been a pioneer. To his originality, his great powers of research, his self-reliance and independence of thought and opinion, may be ascribed the more lenient

teaching that marks the work of all the latest theologians. He may be said to have founded a new school, standing for liberty within the law, and conducing much to peace of conscience. And with it has come a revival of religious zeal and religious practice among the children of the Church, who thus repay the indulgent smiles of their *pia mater*.

The new ground broken by the Roman editor has been cultivated by his fellow-Jesuit theologians with conspicuous success. They have elaborated a system of their own, highly scientific and calculated to exercise and improve the reasoning powers of the student. No one is likely to forget a conclusion laboriously deducted from an all-embracing principle at the head of the chapter, while it may be added in parenthesis that one is not likely to lose sight of an opinion slowly but surely unwrapped from the involved latinity of the famous German author. In striking contrast is the limpid style and easy latinity of Noldin, whose work perhaps on that account, in addition to its exhaustive learning, is, I understand, rapidly becoming a favourite in the schools. One advantage common to all is that they give to a large extent in disputed questions the names of the authors who support each side, and thus enable the ordinary reader to arrive with accuracy at the extrinsic probability of an opinion. Many of those opinions are new to the old-timer, and it may serve a useful purpose to give some of them here, especially such as are of practical moment to the hard-worked missionary.

Confessio in genere has been always a much-disputed question in theology. Its *validity* in cases of necessity has been always admitted. Even without necessity the weight of authority is in its favour. But the modern controversy circles round its lawfulness.

Is a generic confession of venial sins, outside a case of necessity, lawful? For example, can a confessor give absolution to a penitent who confesses thus: 'I accuse myself of all the venial sins of my life'? The old writers held the negative opinion, as such a method of confession is against the practice of the Church. Noldin and Lehmkuhl, amongst the moderns, also take this side, but the affirmative

is held by Gury-Ballerini, Eschbach, Bucceroni, Apicella, and Genicot, and thus becomes safe in practice.¹ The same applies to a confession of sins *in genere* without specifying whether they are mortal or venial according to Genicot;² for example, 'I confess all the sins of my life.' Few confessors, however, will care to act on this opinion, but it will occasionally be found useful when it is difficult to elicit *materia* and continued interrogations would tend to render the confession *odiosa*. It may be added that the latter accusation is both valid and licit according to all when the confessor knows from the past confessions of his penitent a *certain sin*.

Again, there is a new theory with regard to death. Physiologists are now satisfied that the separation of soul and body does not take place for some time after apparent death. In sudden cases some hold life is not extinct for a day, some three days. In ordinary cases the opinions vary from half an hour to a whole day. In sudden calls to such cases, according to Noldin, *necessary* sacraments, i.e., Penance and Extreme Unction, when not already given, should be administered *sub conditione* up to half an hour after apparent death which follows ordinary sickness, and several hours after a sudden death from disease or accident, as the patient is *probably* still alive. If the sacraments have been already conferred conditional absolution can be given again. It may be added here that Genicot quotes St. Alphonsus as saying that a dying person lying unconscious may be absolved '*pluries*, v.g., three or four times a day.'

The highly practical question of *occasionarii* and *recidivi* comes in for somewhat new treatment. In the class-book of our college days certain well-defined rules, founded on the teaching of St. Alphonsus, were laid down with almost mathematical precision for the guidance of priests. The new authors are more elastic. They leave more to the judgment of the confessor. They act more in the spirit of the phrase *sacramenta propter homines*, and, like our present Holy Father, they trust more to the restoration and vivi-

¹ Page 274.

² Page 277.

fying power of Penance and the Blessed Eucharist. They seem to have analysed more minutely the workings of the human mind, and to recognize that a sincere resolution can co-exist with the apprehension of another fall. They discourage the deferring of absolution where it is at all possible safely to give it, and they see no necessity for the once familiar *signa extraordinaria doloris* of St. Alphonsus. Genicot recommends a return to the simpler doctrine of the old theologians, to whom these more minute rules were unknown; and seems to attach chief importance to the prudent judgment of the priest and his knowledge of the manners and circumstances of the people amongst whom his lot is cast. The old rule of St. Alphonsus forbidding absolution, even the first time, to one who is in the free occasion of sin *in esse* is not insisted on, and Noldin holds¹ that when the penitent has ordinary dispositions and is sincere in his promise to give up the occasion he can be absolved *sacpius*, whether the occasion is *in esse* or *non in esse*. He holds the confessor has no right to insist on the refusal or deferring of absolution, as it is a remedy not absolutely necessary as a rule, for a relapse can be prevented by the reception of the sacraments. However, he admits that in certain cases prudence will dictate the more drastic method of dealing with such a case. Their definition of *occasio proxima* is wider than that of St. Alphonsus, and is well expressed in the words of Genicot² as that in which there is no solid probability that the person will avoid a fall. Moral certainty, therefore, of falling into sin is necessary to constitute an occasion. In the well-known case of the *necessary* occasion of sin which is such a crux to confessors they take also a more lenient view. A necessary occasion is usually defined as that which is physically or morally impossible to remove. Noldin³ does not require moral impossibility, but is satisfied with something less. In the case of a *recidivus* who is in the habit of falling into a necessary occasion, St. Alphonsus says that he must give up the occasion at any cost, even of life itself; but

¹ Page 480.² Page 398.³ Page 481.

they recommend a longer trial of the means of emendation, such as prayer and the sacraments, and assume that these if persevered in will ultimately be successful. If in a rare case it should happen that they are unavailing then the words of the Gospel must be fulfilled: 'If thy right eye scandalize thee, pluck it out.' In all such cases, troublesome and perplexing as they often are, they take the mild and lenient view, especially as regards large towns and cities, where religious faith is not so vivid and religious practice is not so flourishing as in country districts and amongst simple people. With regard to habitual and public drunkards Noldin¹ recommends frequent confession, but in certain cases they should not be allowed too easily to approach the Holy Communion, in order that scandal given may be repaired, and the danger of probable scandal, which would follow an immediate relapse, be averted. There is hardly any young confessor that has not found the irksomeness of the rules governing this matter of the occasion of sin and *recedivi* laid down in Gury, and it will be a relief to know that in the light of modern teaching a more liberal interpretation may be placed on them as suits different circumstances, keeping always steadily in view the aim and object of all, namely, the good of the penitent's soul. Finally, while there will be much necessity on the confessor's part to seek light from Heaven in difficult cases the words of the Bull *Caritate Christi*, quoted by Genicot,² may be aptly set down: 'Sacerdos, indutus viscera misericordiae Christi Jesu, qui non venit vocare justos sed peccatores, sciat *studiose, patienter et mansuete* cum ipsis agere.'

Another matter which we do not remember to have seen treated in our class-books is the absolution of heretics. The case might easily occur in our workhouses, hospitals, or public institutions. Genicot says³ that if such a one is probably *bona fide* and would freely receive the help of the priest, if he knew it was necessary he can, if lying unconscious, be licitly absolved *sub conditione*. If conscious he should if possible be got to make an act of perfect contrition,

¹ Page 477.² Page 404.³ Page 316.

and then absolution be given. This supposes that he has been validly baptized, which can be presumed with probability in many instances.

The question of doubtful jurisdiction is admirably treated in Noldin. He distinguishes doubtful jurisdiction from that which is probable. It is doubtful (*dubium facti*) when, v.g., a confessor does not know whether a certain sin is numbered amongst the reserved cases of the diocese, or whether the date of his faculties has expired. In such circumstances he cannot absolve except in the usual cases of necessity. Probable jurisdiction (*dubium juris*) exists where there is good reason for believing that the law of reservation does not extend to a certain case. Here he can absolve, as the Church certainly supplies, and even without any necessity further than that the penitent presents himself for absolution. This is an advance on the teaching both of St. Alphonsus and Gury, and will tend to simplify the practice in this important matter.

Does ignorance excuse from reservation? Reservation *without censure* is of course meant. This much-discussed question, which in our college days was a bone of contention and elicited much heated controversy, has been for some time practically settled. St. Alphonsus strongly held the negative side, which was followed by Gury; but Ballerini in his edition of the latter was considered to hold a startling opinion when he championed the affirmative. His opinion is now followed by modern writers generally, and has settled down into solid probability. The matter, however, is scarcely practical, as Bishops generally declare in giving faculties that they withhold jurisdiction even in cases where the penitent is ignorant of the reservation. Where, however, the Bishop has not expressly declared his mind, and there is no means of finding out, the confessor can absolve the first time, but must warn the penitent of the reservation.¹ The chief reason advanced for the negative opinion as given by Genicot² is that reservation was meant not merely as a *pœna* but also that penitents might be sent

¹ Nolden, p. 429.

² Page 369.

to superiors to receive admonitions and remedies suitable for such a grave case. However, as in modern times the widespread custom is to write for or obtain faculties from the Bishop, and the exception is to send the penitent to a superior, this reason loses much of its force, and the negative opinion which holds that this reservation is merely a *pœna* or punishment is in so far strengthened.

A very practical question, and one about which there is considerable diversity of opinion and practice among priests, is that of the *obligation* of giving absolution when only venial sins are confessed. Gury does not treat the question expressly, and, strange to say, neither does Genicot. The principle is laid down by the former that a confessor is bound *sub gravi* and *ex justitia* to give absolution to a penitent who has rightly confessed and is legitimately disposed. Does this apply to one who confesses only venial sins? The words of Lehmkuhl¹ are worth quoting :—

Imo poenitenti certo disposito absolutio danda est, etsi de solis venialibus peccatis accusatio fit, si modo de his verum dolorem verumque propositum se habere ostendat. Attamen eam non semper impertiri, sed aliquando solam benedictionem dare, ex se non est gravis injuria ; accedente rationabili causa, nullum peccatum est.

And Noldin² says :—

Licet etiam penitens, qui sola venialia accusavit, *jus* habeat accipiendi absolutionem, modo sit rite dispositus ; si tamen aliquoties tantum sine absolutione cum sola benedictione dimittatur, gravis injuria ei non irrogatur ; ideoque ex rationabili causa quandoque sine peccato id fieri posset.

It seems certain, therefore, that such persons have a *right* to absolution, arising from the implied contract between confessor and penitent, unless there is reasonable cause for dismissing them with merely a blessing.

The question of confessing *doubtful* sins is exhaustively treated in the new authors. On the recognized principles of probabilism there is no obligation to confess a sin which

¹ Page 310.

² Page 469.

Paris, entitled *Conclusions de la Nation d'Allemagne dans l'ancienne Université*, Registry No. 26, fol. 337, A.D. 1613-1660. For sake of clearness let me premise that the official title of the *Nation d'Allemagne* in the Faculty of Arts was, *Natio Constantissima*, and that it was composed of two sections, *Insulares* (Masters from Ireland and Scotland) and *Continentes* (Masters from provinces bordering on the Rhine). The Irish were the most numerous. In December, 1645, the Right Rev. Bartholomew Archer of Kilkenny, Apostolic Prothonotary, officer of the household of the Queen of Great Britain, and chaplain in ordinary of Anna Maria, eldest daughter of Louis Duke of Orleans, was elected Proctor of the Nation.

At a meeting of the Masters held on 7th February, 1646, the following resolution was adopted. I translate from the Latin text :—

‘At the same meeting, a little before this discussion began, moved not only by personal affection, but also by the request of others, I proposed to the most Constant Heads, to have a funeral service celebrated for the soul of the most illustrious and Most Reverend Malachy Queely. Archbishop of Tuam, an Irishman, doctor, and fellow of Navarre, and sometime master in the most Constant Nation, who a few months ago in defence of the Catholic faith fell by the swords of impious men. To this proposal of mine all assented. All the Continentals, and two Islanders, viz., M. Pendric and M. Fraser, expressed a wish to pay this tribute to the memory of so great a man without prejudice to the martyr (*sine injuria martyris*), (as we piously believe him to be) in proof of the singular affection of the most Constant Nation for the Most Illustrious Queely, without however any obligation, present or future, of celebrating a service for other doctors of the other Faculties of the Academy of Paris. The other Islanders, though more numerous, unanimously voted without any such restriction, that this office be celebrated by the most Constant Nation as due to a doctor, as well as to the other Masters, and I ruled with all, without prejudice to either side.

‘BARTHOLOMEW ARCHER, *Procurator*.’

On 3rd March, the same Proctor made the following entry :—

‘A funeral office was celebrated for the happy repose of the Most Rev. Malachy Queely, Archbishop of Tuam in Ireland.’

In Lynch's *MS. De Praesulibus Hiberniae*, p. 939 (Mazarin

large, who should be carefully instructed in this important matter, which is often fraught with momentous consequences.

The well-known controversy as to whether the Church supplies jurisdiction to a confessor who has no *titulus coloratus*, but by a 'common error' is believed to have faculties, is not so satisfactorily treated in the new books. Lehmkuhl touches the question very sparingly, and merely says 'it is doubtful.' Genicot holds it is *probable*, as the same reason, the good of the faithful, holds in this case also. Noldin admits that on the authority of St. Liguori it is probable, but says the reasons advanced do not produce intrinsic probability. He furthermore quotes the decision of the Sacred Congregation of Council, 1683, in which such confessions were declared illicit and invalid. It has been said that St. Alphonsus, if his attention had been called to this question before his death, would have changed his opinion; but however this may be, we have the decision of the Holy See given long after the above date that it is lawful to follow the opinions held by him in moral theology. Until, therefore, Rome decides otherwise, it seems safe to act on the opinion of St. Liguori, especially as in the decision of 1683 it was added: '*inquietari non debeant qui bona fide confessi sunt.*' A case of this kind might easily occur, for instance, if, on the occasion of a mission or retreat, through some mistake faculties had not been really received, etc. It may be added that Noldin holds that a confessor should have heard confessions for some time, *per aliquod tempus*, not merely once, in order to have an *error communis* among the faithful of the place where he so ministers.

It sometimes occurs that a penitent will admit that he culpably omitted a grave sin in one of his past confessions, thereby making a bad confession, and that he afterwards confessed the sin and continued to go to confession in *bona fide*, not adverting to, or being ignorant of, the obligation of repeating the confession wholly. He may in this way sometimes be guilty of several invalid confessions, and then tell the sin and go on *bona fide* again. I do not remember

to have seen this case mentioned in Gury, but Noldin¹ states that the intermediate *bona fide* confessions need not be repeated. This decision is of course grounded on the universality of the contrition of the penitent, which therefore extends to the sins omitted through good faith or ignorance.

The very practical matter of '*peregrini* and reserved cases,' which was so jejune treated by Gury, comes in for fuller exposition in the new authors. The source of jurisdiction in cases of *peregrini* was the occasion of the memorable controversy between Ballerini and the *Vindiciae Alphonsianae*, which controversy, as far as I know, it was the custom of students of Gury in bygone days to let severely alone, merely taking note of the hard knocks the warring authors succeeded in administering to each other. It is interesting to note that the well-known writers are much divided in opinion. Ballerini, Lehmkuhl, and Noldin hold that jurisdiction comes from the Bishop of the penitent, tacitly and indirectly delegated to the confessor of another diocese. St. Alphonsus, Gury, Genicot, Bucceroni, and most other authors hold it comes from the will of the Church, i.e., from the Supreme Pontiff either immediately or given to the Bishop of the place where the confession is made. For all practical purposes, however, the question is now decided thus: Both secular and regular clergy can absolve *peregrini* unless the sin is reserved in both dioceses, or unless the penitent comes *in fraudem legis*. Even if the sin is reserved in both dioceses the confessor, if he has faculties from his own Bishop for such a reserved case, can absolve.

The powers of priests travelling by sea have been also much enlarged. If a priest has faculties from his own Bishop or the Bishop of the port from which he sets sail he can hear any penitent on board, or even those who board the ship during the journey, and if he land at any place in passing he can hear all who present themselves. This includes faculties over cases reserved to their Bishops, while on board, and on land also for his fellow-travellers, but if

¹ Page 341.

the penitent is an inhabitant of the place where he lands the case must be sent to the Ordinary, if possible.

In periculo mortis cessat reservatis.—Gury taught that a *simplex sacerdos* could absolve a penitent in danger of death, if no approved confessor could be had. The teaching now is that even if such can be had, a *simplex sacerdos* has faculties: and this by a decree of the Holy Office, 1891.¹ Gury also taught that a penitent in danger of death absolved from censure by a *simplex sacerdos* was bound on recovery to present himself to a superior having faculties, under pain of falling again under the same censure if he neglected to do so. This obligation and remindance is now restricted to censures reserved in *modo speciali* to the Supreme Pontiff.²

These cases, taken from the Penance Tract alone, and which might be supplemented largely from other tracts, serve to show how rapidly opinion has developed in moral theology since our college days. Even where positive legislation has not interfered, the evolution of broader and more liberal views has been most marked. From the nature of the case this is inevitable. Moral theology deals with the *mores hominum*, the thoughts, words, and deeds of men, and therefore must of necessity touch subjects as complex and varied as is human life. And since human life in its many phases, and human experience in its many acts, is continually advancing, so the work of authors in *re morali* must keep pace with every step of science and civilization. Moral theology is, therefore, a progressive science, and is a standing refutation of those critics of the Catholic Church who contend that within the walls of its doctrine there is no room for the play of intellect and the development of genius. Those who speak disparagingly of the Schoolmen must know little about their works. The giant labours of Aquinas, Suarez, De Lugo, and others seem to us, in this age of hurry and bustle, impossible of performance; but they stand as a monument of the genius and industry of some of the greatest intellects the world has seen. They moulded to a great extent the manners of the

¹ Genicot, page 355.

² Noldin, page 435.

age in which they lived, and have stamped the impress of their influence on the teaching of every generation to the present day. It is consoling to know that there is no lack of distinguished authors ready and able to take up their work where it was left off, to develop and adopt it to the new problems of the twentieth century, and thus to preserve and extend the influence of the Catholic Church as a purifying agent in the midst of the lax morality of our time. And while we wonder at their ability and immense learning, and their self-sacrifice in the cause of truth, we cannot withhold the tribute of our admiration for the moral system of the Church as they have made it, a structure of many parts, admirably proportioned, partitioned, polished, scintillating in the light of the countenance of the Divine Founder from whose holy hands it came.

T. DUNNE.

GLIMPSES OF THE PENAL TIMES—X

IN any narrative of the fiendish attempt that was made for nearly three centuries to deprive Ireland of her greatest treasure—the Catholic religion—a prominent place should be given to a summary or an account of the laws passed against education. They occupy an ominously large space in the Statute Book. Even a passing glance would enable us to perceive that no other part of the penal system was devised with greater ingenuity. To it in particular we may justly apply what Edmund Burke said of the system to which it belonged: ‘It was a machine of wise and elaborate contrivance, and as well fitted for the oppression, impoverishment, and degradation of a people, and the debasement in them of human nature itself, as ever proceeded from the perverted ingenuity of man.’ When it was found that the firm resolve of the parents could not be overcome, it was fondly hoped that if the children could be prevented from acquiring knowledge the days of the Catholics in Ireland were numbered. No means that seemed effectual for the attainment of this object was left untried. From 1580, when this inhuman legislation began, till 1778 and 1782, when the obviousness of its futility and the danger of its continuance induced the Irish Parliament to pass Relief Bills which partially repealed it, the Statute Book was disfigured all over by its barbarous enactments. They formed part of what was a disgrace to humanity. As O’Connell said of it: ‘This code enforced ignorance by Statute Law and punished the acquisition of knowledge as a felony.’ The pages of the I. E. RECORD are not a suitable place for a complete list of these edicts, but there can be no objection to a partial enumeration. And for our purpose the following samples of a legislation directed against knowledge, whether religious or secular, will be amply sufficient.

Anyone that for the sake of educating his child supports

a teacher who does not attend the Protestant service and has not permission to keep a school, shall forfeit ten pounds a month (23 Elizabeth 1; 29 Elizabeth 6). To support or to assist in any way a person living in a college or a seminary beyond seas is a case of *Praemunire* (27 Elizabeth 2). The fine to which those are liable who send persons to be educated in such places is £100. On October 18, 1591, Queen Elizabeth issued a proclamation against all seminary priests, those, namely, who had made their studies at Rome, or in Spain, or in other countries on the Continent. In the next reign an enormous addition was made to the fine just mentioned. Both the recusant Popish schoolmaster and the Papist who supported him were condemned to pay two pounds a day (1 James 4). He also issued a proclamation in which these sections occur: 'II. No one henceforth shall send his children or relations beyond seas for education. III. No papist shall dare to exercise the office of schoolmaster in this kingdom' (Ireland, 1611). Afterwards Charles I developed to the full the laws of Elizabeth against foreign education. He commanded that all property was to be confiscated, both of the person sending and of the person sent (3 Charles I 2). When Cromwell and his fanatical soldiery were laying the country waste with fire and sword, when the lives of Catholics were not worth a minute's purchase, it was superfluous to forbid education. Nevertheless, the cynical Puritans could not be happy till they prohibited it:—

No Irish boy or girl to learn reading, writing, or arithmetic. No one to send his son abroad to be educated, under penalty of confiscation of property and of loss of all civil rights. No one whose parents were born in Ireland to be apprenticed to any trade or profession, etc.

The state of things was little better in the reign of Charles II.¹ As we have already sufficiently described the

¹ Though there appears to have been no legislation made against Catholic education during this reign, there was, as we must bear in mind, not the slightest need of it. The existing laws were amply sufficient. And

legislation of William III¹ in the last article,² we may pass on to what have been aptly called the ferocious Acts of Anne. It is said that they were passed out of spite and revenge in order to punish the Catholics for not presenting a loyal address to the Queen on her accession to the throne. The preamble of the first law (2 Anne, chap. 6), 'An Act to prevent the further growth of Popery,' states that its purpose is to prevent Catholics from sending their children to foreign countries for their education, and to induce such children to become Protestants. We quote a few passages :—

I. Any papist who shall, after March 24th, 1703, send or willingly suffer to be sent any child under the age of 21 years into France or any other parts beyond the seas, without the special license of her Majesty or of her Chief Governor of the kingdom, and four of her Privy Council, he so sending, and such child, shall incur the penalties prescribed by 7 William III, c. 4.

to whet the zeal of informers proclamations were issued. The original of this one may be seen in the Record Office, Dublin :—

'By the Lord Lieutenant and Council, 16 October, 1678.

ORMONDE.

'Whereas by two several Proclamations, the one bearing date the 27th of October in the year 1673; and the other bearing date the 27th day of April in the year 1674, both issued from this Board according to His Majesty's special commands, etc. . . . And it was thereby also required and commanded that all convents, seminaries, Fryeries, Nunneries, and Popish schools in this Kingdom should be forthwith dissolved and suppressed.

'And whereas we are informed, that notwithstanding the said several proclamations . . . that several Popish societies, convents, seminaries, Fryeries, Nunneries, and Popish schools are still kept up in this kingdom in contempt of His Majesties authority and of the laws of this realm, etc., etc.

¹ The following extract will suffice to show its spirit :—

'And whereas it is found by experience that tolerating and conniving at Papists' keeping School or instructing youths in literature, is one great reason of many of the natives of this kingdom continuing ignorant of the principles of true religion and strangers to the Scriptures, and of neglecting to conform themselves to the laws and statutes of this realm, and of their not using the English habit and language to the great prejudice of the public weal thereof.

'Be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That no person whatsoever of the Popish religion, shall publicly teach school, or instruct youth in learning, or in private houses teach or instruct youth in learning within this realm, except only the children or others under the guardianship of the Master or Mistress of such private house or family, upon pain of twenty pounds, and also of being committed to prison, without bail or mainprize, for the space of three months for every such offence.'

'In virtue of the last clause many persons may have taught children with impunity during the reign of King William, but it appears to have been tacitly revoked in the reign of Queen Anne.

² I. E. RECORD, June, 1910.

II. When any of the judges of her Majesty's Courts or any two justices of the peace shall have reasonable grounds to suspect that any such child has been sent into foreign parts, they shall convene the father or mother or guardian of the child and require them to produce him within two months, and if he is not produced within such time, or by showing reasonable cause till the next quarter sessions of the county, and shall not give good proof that the child is resident somewhere within the three kingdoms, and not in parts beyond the seas, such child shall be deemed to be educated in foreign parts, and shall incur all the penalties prescribed by such Act.

IV. No person of the popish religion may be guardian of any child under 21 ; but the same, when the person entitled to the guardianship of such child is a papist, shall be disposed of by the Court of Chancery to some near relation of such child, being protestant, who is required to use his utmost care to bring up such child in the protestant religion till the age of 21 ; and if any papist shall take upon him the guardianship of any such child, he shall forfeit the sum of £500, to be given to the Blue Coat Hospital in Dublin.

In the last article we had proofs of the perfidy of the Irish Parliament, and also of the mendaciousness of William III's ministers. The spirit from which it sprung is only too evident. Nothing but a settled resolve not to do justice to their Catholic fellow-countrymen, not to keep the articles of the Treaty of Limerick, could have been the motive of their actions. It was the source also of the Acts of Parliament passed in the reign of Queen Anne. The second of these to which reference must be made here was entitled (8 Anne, c. 3) : 'An Act for explaining and amending an Act entitled An Act to prevent the further growth of Popery.' Some of its provisions are :—

XVI. Whatever person of the popish religion shall publicly teach school or instruct youth in learning in any private house within this realm, or be entertained to instruct youth as usher by any protestant schoolmaster, he shall be esteemed a popish regular clergyman and prosecuted as such . . . and no person after November 1st, 1709, shall be qualified to teach or keep school publicly or instruct youth in any private house, or as usher or assistant to any protestant schoolmaster, who shall not

first at the next general assizes or quarter sessions of the place where he resides take the oath of abjuration, under a penalty of £10. And anyone entertaining one not qualified as aforesaid as tutor, etc., shall forfeit £10 for every such offence, a moiety to go to the informer.¹

Such was the diabolical means employed to render education impossible to Catholics. Now and again there may have been indications of a better spirit. But it is so rare to find recorded in the annals of those evil days an instance of fair 'treatment that the following one deserves to be mentioned. It refers to the Jesuits in Drogheda. As we learn from a letter of his to Cardinal Francesco Barberini, May 30, 1671,² the illustrious Oliver Plunket founded a house for the Society in his province of Armagh. The Jesuits' grammar school was frequented by a hundred and fifty boys, and their class of moral theology by twenty-five secular priests. The school was an inestimable blessing,

¹ The oath of abjuration was the following:—

'I do solemnly and sincerely, in the presence of God, profess, testify, and declare that I do believe that in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper there is not any transubstantiation of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ at or after the Consecration thereof, by any person whatsoever; and that the invocation or adoration of the Virgin Mary or any other saint, and the sacrifice of the Mass, as they are now used in the Church of Rome, are superstitious and idolatrous.

² 'D'una sol cosa mi consolo à maggior segno, che quando ne tempi passati la gioventù Cattolica era necessitata di frequentare le scuole pubbliche dei Protestanti con pericolo di perversione; hora mi è riuscito prosperamente di fondare una residenza per i Padri Gesuiti nella mia Provincia, dove si tiene scuola pubblica anche con connivenza del nostro moderatissimo Vice Rè Conte Barkley e d'altri Ministri Regii; e si trovano cento e cinquanta Giovani applicati allo studio di Grammatica et Humanità, e Vinti cinque Sacerdoti secolari applicati allo studio dei casi di coscienza, e molti vengono d'altri parti del Regno dove non vi è questa tolleranza, et alcuni Heretici ancora mandano i loro figliuoli. Per questa novità contra le leggi pennali io fui accusato quatro volte ai Tribunali del Vice Rè e del Pseudoprimate; ma questo moderatissimo Vice Rè rigettò sempre la calunnia, con dire che la buona eddicatione della gioventù era non solamente beneficio del Paese massimamente in quella Provincia Armacana, ove i nativi sono per lo piu rozzi e di natura piu disposti alle sollevationi. Mi è stato sempre di buon appoggio per mia difesa anche il Dottore Dudleo Lofte Vicario Generale del Pseudoprimate e suo supremo Giudice in spiritalibus et temporalibus, et è il piu dotto tra i Protestanti massimamente per la peritia dei Cannoni, e scorgo in lui qualche particolar veneratione alla Sede Apostolica. Questo Galanthomo non ammise mai accusa di Vescovi Protestanti o di loro ministri contra me o contra il mio clero dicendo che il Primate Romano si portava bene, e che faceva il servitio della Patria senza disturbo del governo publico.' (Vatican Archives, Barberini MSS., Lat. 8626.)

for before its establishment boys had to go to Protestant schools, where their faith was exposed to considerable danger. Its existence was connived at by the Lord Lieutenant (Earl Berkley), and though for this violation of the Penal Laws Oliver Plunket was accused four times in courts both ecclesiastical and civil, the Lord Lieutenant would not listen to the accusation, and even defended the Primate's action. Oliver Plunket found another friend and protector in the learned Dudley Loftus, who at the time was the chief judge in the court of the Protestant Primate (James Margetson). Such toleration was exceptional.

But even though, owing to the goodness and kindness of individuals, there were several similar instances, it must be acknowledged that the specimens of legislation quoted above make it quite certain that the object of the government was to prevent all acquisition of knowledge on the part of Catholics. Nevertheless, these Penal Laws were passed in vain, for loss of property and even of liberty were regarded by the people as less evils than the loss of learning. In the history either of religion or of civilization there is no more glorious page than the one which records the heroic devotion of Catholic Ireland to the cause of supernatural enlightenment and human culture. It affords a complete refutation of that calumny which has been so persistently repeated by the enemies of religious and of secular instruction. Those who proscribed learning and who did their utmost to render it unattainable, when defeated in their attempt, tried to conceal their ignominious failure by representing themselves as the friends and the Catholic Church as the foe of education. Those who threw down the school-house and banished the schoolmaster had the unblushing hypocrisy to taunt the Irish with remissness in the pursuit of knowledge. But their own Statute Book bears witness against them, and history vindicates the fame of the persecuted Irish Catholics.

Notwithstanding the barbarous laws of Queen Elizabeth and James I, one of the exiles, namely, O'Sullivan Beare, who wrote in 1621, was able to mention no fewer than ten Irish seminaries existing in the following cities : Salamanca,

Compostella, Seville, Lisbon, Antwerp, Douay, Tournai, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Paris, besides the Franciscan convent in Louvain.

Of these Colleges, Salamanca was the oldest. It was founded in 1592 by Philip II, at the instance of Father Thomas White, S.J., who gathered into it students whom he had found living separately in Valladolid. (We may observe, in passing, that this College, 'des Nobles Irlandeses,' still exists, and continues to supply priests to Ireland.)

Just as there were individual Irish students in Valladolid before Father Thomas White opened Salamanca, so were there in Compostella before 1605, when Philip III endowed a College for them there. A secular priest, the Rev. Eugene Carter, was its Rector till 1613, when the King handed it over to the three Irish Jesuits, Father Thomas and Father William White, and Father Richard Conway. The students learned philosophy in Compostella and theology in Salamanca.

The College of the Immaculate Conception in Seville dated from 1612, its first Superiors being Rev. James Kearney and Rev. Maurice Egan. In 1819 it was endowed and entrusted to the care of the Jesuits by Philip III. In 1637 it contained twenty-four students, and was accustomed to send home two priests a year. This College appears to have been better off than the one in Compostella, the annual grant from the King being twice as large. It was also generously helped by the Irish wine merchants residing in Seville and Cadiz. Many a time the vessel that had taken a cargo of wine to Galway or Dublin returned with a group of students.

In Lisbon, as early as 1573, some Irish priests had established a house in order to supply missionaries to their native island. But the priest who made it a success was Father John Holing, S.J., one of the most distinguished men of his time. He brought thirty youths that had escaped from the hands of their persecutors, and on St. Brigid's Day (February 1), 1593, St. Patrick's College was opened. (It may be mentioned, in passing, that Father Holing's narrative of several contemporaries of his that died for the faith,

‘Perbreve compendium in quo continentur nonnulli eorum qui in Hybernia, regnante Elizabeth, vincula, exilium, martyrium perpassi sunt,’ etc., will cause him to be remembered for ever.) In 1720 the Irish College, Lisbon, contained twelve students; in 1736, ten; at the time of the great earthquake, in 1755, seven or eight.

Antwerp, on which it is best to refer to the learned article by Father Boye, C.M.,¹ was founded about the beginning of the seventeenth century. In 1607 it gave a splendid reception to the fugitive Earls of Tyrone and Tyrconnel. It usually educated twelve priests. In 1744 the Rev. Daniel O’Reilly, of the diocese of Kilmore, was its president.

Douay owed its origin to the Rev. Christopher Cusacke, who, in 1594, brought together the Irish students whom he found in the town. For a long time this College flourished, but its fortunes changed when the town fell into the hands of the French. A letter written in 1613 states that within a short period seventeen Capuchins, twenty-seven Franciscans, and sixty-seven secular priests had left Douay for Ireland. Before the French Revolution put an end to its existence in 1795, Douay had given countless priests to Ireland, and twenty Bishops, including the great Dr. Rothe, of Ossory.

Tournai supported eight Irish priests.

Bordeaux was one of the largest and most celebrated of these seminaries. It was begun about 1603 by the Cardinal Archbishop François de Sourdis. It contained twenty students. From a list which was published among the State Papers² it appears that within the short space of sixteen years this College had educated two hundred and forty students, belonging to many Irish dioceses, and to many religious Orders. The President was the Rev. Eugene Carty, who for ten years previously had held the same office in Compostella. This College of Bordeaux is highly spoken of in the Bulls it received from Paul V and Urban VIII. In 1659 it got letters patent and an endowment from Anne of Austria (the daughter of Philip III of Spain and the queen

¹ I. E. RECORD, March, 1910.

² Vol. v., p. 318-322.

of Louis XIV of France). The letters state that the College shall have all the privileges of a royal foundation, that its income is to be 1,700 livres until the queen can afford to give more, and that there are to be twenty students, of whom ten are to be priests; finally, that her motives for founding the College were, first, her gratitude to God for delivering France from troubles; secondly, 'pour marquer son contentement de la fidelité des troupes irlandaises.'

Toulouse was called 'St. Anne's Royal College,' for, like that in Bordeaux, it was also founded by Anne of Austria and Louis XIV in 1659. Its rules were confirmed in 1744 by Benedict XIV, at the petition of the Rector, Rev. Francis O'Hea.

Paris, which is still in vigorous existence, was of all these Continental colleges the largest and most important, and it has the happiness of possessing a competent historian in its present Rector, Father Boyle, C.M., who has contributed several learned articles to the I. E. RECORD. Paris was not formally established when O'Sullivan Beare wrote, any more than Bordeaux, as the editor, Rev. M. Kelly, of Maynooth, remarks in his reissue. But Paris sent legions of missionaries to Ireland. A 'Memoire pour les Prêtres Irlandeis du College des Lombards,' which was presented in 1733 to Cardinal Imperiali, the Protector of Ireland, contains the following passage:—

Les établissemens que nous avons en Italie, en Espagne, en Portugal, et en Flandres fournissent si peu de sujets que nous les comptons pour rien, et qu'il n'y a que la France seule et principalement Paris qui a fourni depuis plus de deux siècles le nombre necessaire des missionaires doctes et capables non seulement de conserver mais aussi d'augmenter le nombre des Catholiques, comme nous le voyons par les frequentes conversions des Protestants à la religion Catholique.

In proof of this the memorial adds:—

En effet depuis 1707 il est retourné plus de six cent doctes prêtres ordonnés en Irlande de la Communauté des Lombards parmi lesquels il y a plusieurs docteurs et licentiés de la faculté de la Theologie de Paris, et les autres pour la plus grande partie, tres versés dans la controverse et la Theologie Morale.

A letter sent in 1732 to the same Cardinal mentions the number of students at the time:—

Ce college dans lequel il y a environ cent soixante prêtres et alumnes n'a aucune fondation et ne subsiste que par la charité des citoyens de Paris, et par les retributions que l'on donne aux prêtres pour leurs Messes.

Some readers may be surprised at the mention of priests as inmates of this and other Colleges, as well as by the distinction made between them and students which is here referred to. The explanation is that during the penal times it was thought advisable by the Bishops to ordain straight off many of those who had a vocation, and then to send them to the Continent to make their ecclesiastical studies. Hence the origin of the term 'Mass-priests.' A glance at the lists of registered parish priests in 1704 will show that, as the places of their ordination respectively, towns in Ireland alternate with towns on the Continent, or are perhaps more numerous. This custom would be a strange anomaly now, but it did not cease for some time even after the opening of Maynooth College. And it is said to have worked well. According to the memorial alluded to above, which was signed by seventy priests residing in the Irish College, Paris, for several years after its foundation in 1677 only priests ordained in Ireland had been allowed to enter it:—

Lors de l'introduction des Irlandois dans le College des Lombards il n'y avoit que des prêtres ordonnés en Irlande qui etudioient en Philosophie et en Theologie, et qui prenoient des Degres dans l'Université de Paris, et perfectionnez dans les études ils retournoient en Irlande.

Then it was thought well to admit non-ordained students also; but, according to the same memorial, the results of this change of rule were the reverse of satisfactory:—

Des ecoliers du college des Lombards il n'en est pas retourné en Irlande de vingt en qualité du prêtres missionnaires depuis 1707 qui sont entrés au dit college, les uns ne prennent point les ordres, et après leurs basses classes et Philosophie quittent le College après avoir si longtemps profité du pain destiné pour des

Missionnaires et s'appliquent a d'autres vocations dont il y a son nombre a Paris aujourdhy, ceux qui embrassent l'état ecclesiastique trouvent le sejour en France plus agréable, familiarité avec la langue françoise par une longue demeure ils oublient leur langue naturelle, ce qui les met hors d'état d'exercer les fonctions les plus essentiels de la mission d'Irlande.

Les Souverains Pontifs ont ete si convaincus de la necessité d'ordonner des jeunes prêtres en Irlande, pour la dit Mission, que depuis le commencement de la revolution jusqu'a present, ils donnent a chacun evêque d'Irlande un pouvoir special pour ordonner leurs prêtres a l'age de vingt quatre ans commencé, en faveur de leurs études après.

The last of the Irish houses on the Continent of which O'Sullivan Beare makes mention is the famous Franciscan convent of St. Antony in Louvain.¹ It was founded in 1607 by Philip III of Spain, at the instance of Father Florence Conry (afterwards Archbishop of Tuam), its first guardian being Father Hugh M'Caughwell (afterwards Primate of All Ireland). This house has a glorious history. By the year 1630 it had given to the Church in Ireland another Archbishop, two Bishops, eighteen doctors of divinity, twenty-five professors of philosophy, and sixty-three missionaries. Here, too, Ward, O'Cleary, Colgan, and many others lived and laboured. More was done here for Irish history, literature, etc., than in any other place. In the cloister of the convent, which is still standing, many of the Irish exiles found their last resting-place, for instance, Lady Rosa, the second wife of Owen Roe O'Neill.

Another focus of Irish and ecclesiastical life was and is St. Isidore's, Rome, which was obtained by the immortal Wadding in 1625. Here he did all for Ireland that man could do, and was ably seconded by Fleming, Ponce, and others. Before 1645 twenty priests had gone to Ireland from St. Isidore's, which ranks next to St. Antony's, Louvain, as regards literary productions.

A third celebrated Irish Franciscan house (still standing

¹ An account of this College was published in the I. E. RECORD (vii., 31-43). Accounts of several other of the colleges mentioned in the present list may be found in Vols. vii., viii., ix., etc.

though now employed for a different purpose) was that of the Immaculate Conception, in Prague. It was founded in 1639 by Father Malachy Fallon, its first Guardian being the famous Father Patrick Fleming, author of the *Collectanea Sacra*, etc. It became the home of Bruodin and several other distinguished Irishmen. In her interesting work, *The Making of Ireland*, page 454, Mrs. Green gives a long list of them, entitled, 'Irish Scholars in Prague.' Besides these well-known establishments the Irish Franciscans had a fourth, at Vialuni, about ten miles from Cracow, the ruins of which are still visible, and a fifth at Boulay in Lorraine. It is said that up to the year 1750 the average number in St. Antony's and in St. Isidore's was forty, and in Prague was thirty.

Wadding's zeal was not satisfied with obtaining a house in Rome for his own brethren. No man in his time saw the wants of Ireland more clearly. In 1627 he induced Cardinal Ludovisi to found the Irish College, for which he himself drew up the statutes. To the present day this college continues its noble work. The college which existed in Rouen as early as 1613, though it sent many priests to the Irish mission, did not last long. Another was opened in Caen in 1640, and in Nantes there was a third, which lasted till the French Revolution. The Irish College in Madrid, which began in 1629, and supported fifteen students, continued for about a century. In 1659 a seminary was erected in Alcalá, but it came to an end in 1778. The Irish College in Louvain owed its origin to the zeal and munificence of Archbishop Matthews, of Dublin. He began it in 1621, and three years afterwards his successor, Archbishop Fleming, O.S.F., was able to say that the college, which was entrusted to the care of the Irish Franciscans, contained six students. In 1636 the Internuncio at Brussels removed the Franciscans and appointed two bursars, and in 1638 a secular priest was made president. There were ten burses in this college. Besides these institutions, we find that in 1687 two Irish priests living in Brussels—Canon Joyce and Dr. Hugonic—supported in their own house eight poor students who were preparing for the Irish mission.

And it is probable that individual students were to be met with in several other towns and cities of the Continent.

As regards the various regular Orders represented in Ireland, it would seem that for some decades after the destruction of the houses at home their students were distributed among other houses in France, Spain, etc. Then the Irish got houses of their own on the Continent. For instance, the Augustinians received from Alexander VII, in 1659, the church and convent of St. Matteo in Merulana, Rome, where the Redemptorist house of St. Alphonsus now stands. The grant to the Irish Augustinians for the purpose of their mission was confirmed by Clement XII in 1739. After his return to Rome Pius VII, in 1819, gave the Irish community St. Maria in Posterula, where it resided till the church of St. Patrick (now rapidly approaching completion) was begun. And though the Capuchins under Father Edmund Ling, of Cashel, founded their first Irish house in Dublin in 1623, nevertheless a few years afterwards they had Irish houses at Charleville and Sedan in Belgium, instead of which Louis XIV subsequently gave them houses at Barsur-Aube and Vassy in Champagne. And they had a college at Lille for twenty students, and one at Antwerp.

The Carmelites (Calced) had no fewer than twenty-five houses; after the suppression their students were perforce educated in various houses of the Spanish, French, and German Provinces. One of the French Provinces (Tours) distinguished itself in this respect. It had a missionary college in which ever so many of the Irish were trained. It also possessed at Paris the famous Convent of the Blessed Sacrament, where Irish students lived while taking out their degrees in the Sorbonne. Others who had read their course in some house of the German-Belgian Province took their degrees in Louvain. And thus the succession of learned and zealous men was kept up all through the Penal Times. From 1653 to 1663 one of the most distinguished professors in Louvain was Father Edmund Butler, who then returned to Ireland as superior of the mission. Many other Irish Carmelites, as appears from a document dated 1638, studied in Douay, which also belonged to the German-

Belgian Province. A letter of the Carmelite General, written in 1777, states that at the time there were fourteen Irish students in Spain, three in Naples, besides many more in France and Flanders. A few years before (c. 1750) a Father Eugene Sweeney had been sent to the King of Spain for the purpose of getting a house for the Irish Carmelites in his dominions; the project was, however, not carried into execution. But Father Matthew Lion, who was made Provincial of Ireland by Clement XII in 1738, had already worked wonders for the preservation of his Order, and to him the large number of students was in great measure due. And even before 1701, as a letter written in that year states, several of the Irish that had studied in France were labouring in the English mission (as Fathers Fitzmorris, Finn, etc.), while others were evangelizing at home, exposed to even greater danger.

So, too, the Irish Discalced Carmelites, who first established themselves in Dublin in 1626, with Father Patrick Donovan, of Youghal, as Prior, soon found the necessity of having a house of studies outside Ireland. Their missionary college at Louvain (founded in 1621) had already begun to provide for Ireland, England, and Holland, and Father Donovan himself had been its Superior from 1623 to 1625, when he returned to Ireland. In 1629 the Irish fathers endeavoured to found a college at Louvain; and later on, with greater promise of success, at La Rochelle. Circumstances, however, prevented them from availing themselves of the opportunity afforded; neither were they successful in another effort made to establish themselves in the same place.¹ Finally they obtained permission to open a novitiate at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1667; but in this case, likewise, unfavourable circumstances intervened. The sufferings which an Irish Carmelite had to endure about this time (1662) are graphically described in a letter to Propaganda.²

¹ De Burgo observes (*Hibernia Dominicana*, p. 752) that for some time during the seventeenth century they had, in Louvain, their own College of St. Placid. In his *relatio* presented to Innocent X, Invernuti, who accompanied Scarampi to Ireland in 1613, when enumerating the regular clergy, says: 'Carmelitae discalceati, ut ipsi vocant, quadraginta vel quinquaginta, calceati viginti vel triginta.'

² See *Spicil. Ossorien.*, ii., 204.

At this period, too (c. 1670), an Irishman, Father Laurence of St. Teresa, author of the *Eleucidarium Thomisticum*, and the *Spicilegium Theologicum*, was Superior of San Pancrazio, the Missionary (Eastern) College, in Rome, where, also, Irish students were preparing for the priesthood as early as 1635. And lists of a later date show that San Pancrazio was one of the colleges to which the Irish Vicars-Provincial were accustomed to send their young subjects. Throughout this period the Discalced Carmelites were distributed among various colleges in Italy and France. The Cistercians, who had no less than forty-two monasteries up to the time of the suppression, also did what they could to save themselves. As appears from the subjoined letter¹ they tried to obtain houses in France and Flanders, but the present writer does not know whether the effort was successful.

The Dominicans in Ireland suffered grievously during the long era of persecution. For instance, whole communities were put to the sword in the reign of Queen Elizabeth; when she ascended the throne there were eight hundred Irish sons of St. Dominic; at her death only four remained. Certainly towards the end of her life, if not long before her decease, by an instinct of self-preservation, the Irish Province had at least some of its students educated on the Continent. We cannot say when this necessity arose—it may have arisen even in the time of Henry VIII—nor can we tell to how many countries the students may have gone: but this we know, in 1597 there were some in various parts of the Continent. In that year the General of the Order, P. Ippolito Beccaria, while making the visitation of the houses in Spain, met at Seville the Dominican Bishop of Clonfert, Thaddaeus O'Ferrall, and at his request allowed him to take to Ireland as his confessor an Irish Dominican

¹ The following was sent to Mgr. Bentivoglio at Brussels:—

'Al Nuntio in Fiandra. Vien fatto sapere a Nostro Signore che in Ibernia la Religione Cattolica è già ridotta a mal termine, ma che sarebbe un gran riparo, operando che i Padri dell' Ordine Cisterciense erigessero in Francia et in Fiandra Seminarii per educare et insegnare la gioventù. Il che non possono però fare detti Padri senza aiuto et liberalità de Principi, onde hanno supplicato a Nostro Signore di Ordinare a V. S. che dia loro mano col suo favore. Sua Santità dice, che V. S. in ciò faccia con l'Arciduca gli offitii che le paranno opportuni, et me le raccomando. Di Roma li 16 Gennaro 1610 (Laemmer, *Meletemata*, p. 271).

then in Seville, and also some others, 'ideoneos ad praedicandum Evangelium sanctum' wherever he could find them. At the time such was the violence of the persecution that the General says he does not know whether the Provincial or Vicar-Provincial is in Ireland.¹ That some Dominicans did return either then or at some other time is evident from the letter of a spy, which is still to be seen in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin (MS. No. E.3.15). It begins thus:—

The names of sundrie priests and freirs within some dioces and counties of Ireland. That you may see what number of priests were come over, and whether yt were not tyme to look to their seducinge of Chr. subjects.

In the countie of Kierie: Thomas Cuirck Doctor of Divinitie of the order of St Dominicke. *In the countie of Limerick*: Dominicke White of ye order of St Dominicke. Eogan FitzDavid preacher of ye order of St Dominicke. *In the county of Galway*: Anthony Lynch, a preacher of the order of St Dominicke. Manus Mc an ard [*Ward*], a Dominican friar. Rowland Boorck, Provincial of ye order of St Dominicke.

The note is not dated, but the last entry enables us to know approximately when it was written. It must be in the period 1608-1615, for during it Rolandus de Burgo, as he is called in the *Hibernia Dominica*, p. 521, was Provincial. The next reference which is known to be extant belongs to the year 1627. It contains the names of fifty Irish Dominicans who were then studying in Spain.² But the Irish Dominicans had already taken steps to get a house on the Continent for their students. The beginnings of Corpo Santo, Lisbon, go back as far as 1615. In that year the Portuguese Dominicans gave the site of a house to their exiled Irish brethren. But a small house dedicated to the Queen of the Rosary was not taken possession of till 1634, nor the building of Corpo Santo College commenced till 1659. Both works were due to the energy of the famous Dominic O'Daly (*Dominicus de Rosario*). Before 1655, when he published his history of the Geraldines, several of his students had returned as missionaries to Ireland, and six of those who

¹ Archives, Gen. O.P., iv., 46, Reg. I.; Beccaria, fol. 1920.

² Archives of Propaganda.

had once belonged to his house in Lisbon had gained the crown of martyrdom. All through the Penal Times Corpo Santo¹ supplied a large number of priests to Ireland; and though O'Daly's edifice perished in the earthquake of 1755, another stands on its site. (Until the year 1848 it continued to send priests to Ireland; this part of its work is transferred to St. Mary's, Tallaght, Dublin, but the Irish priests now residing in it devote themselves to the needs of Lisbon.)

Another house granted to the Irish Province for the education of its novices is St. Clement's, Rome. Here the work, which was begun in 1677, continues to the present day. A third house, which, however, ceased to exist in 1795, in consequence of the French occupation of Belgium, was that of Holy Cross, Louvain. In 1624 the Irish Provincial, Roche MacGeoghegan, afterwards Bishop of Kildare, and Father Richard Bermingham, opened this house. In 1658 the community removed to a better house, which was erected by the munificence of the three brothers: Gregory Joyce, Canon Regular (Lateran), Abbot of Annaghdown on Lough Corrib and Warden of Galway, Canon of St. Gudule in Brussels; Henry Canon Joyce, Parish Priest of St. Nicholas, Galway, and Chaplain-General to the regiments of Charles II in Belgium;² and Captain Walter Joyce of the Spanish army in Belgium.

De Burgo estimates the average number of students in these houses approximately thus: Lisbon twenty, Rome twenty, Louvain twenty. Besides these groups, there were, as is evident from the *Hibernia Dominicana*, many

¹ A letter written by Father Charles O'Kelly, O.P., who rebuilt Corpo Santo, contains the following reference to its work: 'Essendo l'istituto del Collegio educare ed istruire giovani Missionarii di tutti tre li Regni di Gran Brettagna, nelle quali non solamente li alunni di questo Collegio si sono segnalati in far le missioni, ma ancora hanno avuto la gloria d'aver dato al cielo venti otto martiri come costa dalla Cronica Domenicano di Portogallo' (Archives of St. Clement's). The names of seven only of these martyrs is known at present.

² One of these Canons Joyce probably was also one of the two good Irish priests residing in Brussels thirty years afterwards who supported in their own house eight students that were preparing for the Irish mission. (See *Spicilegium Ossoriense*, ii., 285, the source of the statement made above, p. 385). The Dominican house in Louvain, like the Franciscan, was well known to the Irish exiles. Its church was consecrated by Dr. French, of Ferns, in 1668, and in it the remains of Lord Clare and Major John O'Carroll, who were mortally wounded at Ramillies, were interred.

individuals scattered in French, Italian, Belgian, and Spanish houses of the Order.¹

This rapid sketch, though far from complete, of the Irish Colleges on the Continent for the education of the secular and regular clergy will assist us to form some idea of what our forefathers did for the faith. All through the penal centuries the succession of priests and Bishops was kept up. Irish fathers and mothers gladly parted with their sons; and back from the seminaries abroad came the young priests to danger and often to death. Acts of Parliament were made in vain: all that Queen Elizabeth and Oliver Cromwell and King William and Queen Anne could do was powerless against the ecclesiastical students. Penal Laws had no terrors for them; on the contrary, their numbers increased instead of diminished. What O'Sullivan Beare said of them, viz., 'Quo crebrius e regno discedere jubentur, eo libentius manent, et etiam confluunt,' was verified to the letter.

REGINALD WALSH, O.P.

¹ A memorial presented on behalf of Holy Cross College, Louvain, by Father Clement O'Brullaghan to Propaganda in 1750 contains, in reference to the Henrician and Elizabethan persecution, the following significant passage: 'La Provincia Dominicana d'Ibernia prevedendo sino dal principio della rivoluzione, il pericolo grande della fede nella Patria, e che i suoi alunni studiando tra nazioni estere non farebbero il frutto desiderato, cercarono di fondare diversi conventi fuori (lo stesso fecero i Francescani, gli altri Regolari che in Ibernia erano per mancanza di conventi in altri paesi Cattolici, furono quasi tutti estinti. I Gesuiti, Carmelitani scalzi e Capucini non vi erano) per istruire la gioventù, ciò che fecero a Lovanio, Roma, e Lisbona.' And speaking of what had been suffered by ex-students of the Louvain house, the writer observes: 'È dovere di mostrare all' EE. VV. il frutto grande che fecero gli allievi del Convento della Missione, de' quali più di sessanta furono dagli eretici per la fede uccisi.' As regards the number of its martyrs, Louvain comes next to Lisbon (Corpo Santo), about which we read that in one year a hundred of its ex-students gave their lives for the Gospel.

According to another memorial for Louvain presented to Propaganda in June, 1746: 'Nel 1654 i Religiosi Domenicani del convento di Lovanio esposero i gravi patimenti della Provincia d'Ibernia che soffrivano in quelle Missioni; e che non ostante gl'editti di quel Regno contro i Missionarii Cattolici, ed esser stati poco prima trucidati venticinque di egli dagli eretici continuarono di mandarvi de Missionarii (*Relazione del Cardinale Trivulzio*). These twenty five martyrs suffered presumably at the hands of the Cromwellians. The documents from which these extracts have been taken are in the Archives of St. Clement's, Rome. This memorial contains a list of the writer's contemporaries who had gone from Louvain to the Irish mission, e.g., 'P. Fr. Jacobus Murry missus in carcerem anno 1745 et transmissus in exilium 1746. P. Fr. Dominicus Colgan per aliquot annos missionarius in Hibernia et postea in Scotia ex qua compulsus fuit fugere cum principe, 1746.'

Notes and Queries

THEOLOGY

CONFESSION AND COMMUNION OF CHILDREN

A NEW decree of the S. Congregation of the Discipline of the Sacraments¹ concerning first Confession and first Communion of children is published in the present number of the I. E. RECORD. This decree is of extreme importance since it changes the practice which for centuries has prevailed in the Western Church. In explanation of its provisions I shall give the substance of the decree, as far as possible in the words of the Sacred Congregation.

Mindful of the words of Christ : ' Suffer the little children to come unto Me, and forbid them not ; for of such is the kingdom of heaven,'² the Church in early times sanctioned the custom of administering the Blessed Eucharist to children who had not yet reached the use of reason. In nearly all the ancient Rituals it was prescribed that at the time of receiving Baptism children should also receive Holy Communion. In the Western Church this custom continued down to the thirteenth century, and is still observed in the Greek and Oriental Churches. To prevent danger of profanation arising from the rejection of the Sacred Species children received the Blessed Eucharist under the species of wine.

Nor was it merely at the time of Baptism that the children were permitted to receive Holy Communion : frequently the Blessed Eucharist was administered to them either immediately after the clergy, or, as happened in some places, after the Communion of adults when any fragments that remained were administered to the children.

This custom gradually died out in the Western Church,

¹ Cf. *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, August 15, 1910, p. 577.

² Mark x. 14.

and children began to approach the Sacred Table only when they had arrived at the use of reason and had acquired some knowledge of the nature of the Sacrament of the Altar. This new discipline was sanctioned by many particular synods, and finally received the approbation of the Fourth Lateran Council, which, in 1215, prescribed annual Confession and Communion to all the faithful who had reached the age of discretion.

The Council of Trent, while not condemning the early custom of administering the Blessed Sacrament to children who had not arrived at the use of reason, confirmed the decree of the Lateran Council, and declared anathema against anyone who denied the obligation of going to Confession and of receiving the Blessed Eucharist at least once a year. Hence the discipline of the Lateran Council and of the Council of Trent remains in force that the faithful, as soon as they reach the age of discretion, are bound to go to Confession and Communion once a year.

In determining the meaning of the age of discretion many errors and abuses arose. Some assigned a different age in the case of Confession and in the case of Holy Communion, saying that children are bound by the precept of annual Confession as soon as they are capable of losing grace, while they are subject to the law of annual Communion only at the later period of life when they are capable of having fuller knowledge of the Blessed Eucharist and more devotion at its reception. In many places this view led to the custom of permitting children to approach the altar rails only at the advanced age of ten, or twelve, or even fourteen. The result of this over-scrupulous care for the reverence due to the Blessed Eucharist was that in their tender years they were excluded from the nourishment of the soul which the Blessed Eucharist afforded for the preservation of innocence.

In regard to Confession, in some places the lamentable custom also arose of not allowing children to go to Confession, or of not giving them sacramental absolution until they had arrived at the age when they were permitted to receive Holy Communion, with the result that sometimes

they were in danger of long continuing in a state of mortal sin.

It was customary also in some localities not to give the Holy Viaticum to children who were in danger of death, and who were not yet admitted to their first Communion. They were even buried with the rites for infants. Thus they were unduly deprived of the suffrages of the Church.

This unfortunate state of affairs arose from the anxiety of those who demanded unnecessary conditions for the reception of the Blessed Eucharist. They did not advert to the fact that the strictness which exacted these extraordinary preparations was an outcome of Jansenistic errors, which looked on the Blessed Eucharist rather as a reward for merit than as a remedy for human frailty. This teaching was in opposition to the words of Trent, which proclaimed the Blessed Eucharist to be 'an antidote by which we are liberated from daily faults and preserved from mortal sins.' It was also out of harmony with the recent decree of the S. Congregation of the Council, which encouraged all, both old and young, who are in the state of grace and who have the right intention, to receive the Blessed Eucharist daily.

These various abuses were the outcome of an inaccurate interpretation of the 'age of discretion' of which the Lateran Council and the Council of Trent spoke. The Lateran Council required the same age of discretion in the case of Confession and in the case of Holy Communion, and the principal commentators of its decrees agreed in this. Thus St. Thomas¹ said: '*Quando jam pueri incipiunt aliqualem usum rationis habere, ut possint devotionem concipere hujus Sacramenti (Eucharistiae), tunc potest eis hoc Sacramentum conferri.*' Explaining this point Ledesma said: '*Dico ex omnium consensu, quod omnibus habentibus usum rationis danda est Eucharistia, quantumcumque cito habeant illum usum rationis; esto quod adhuc confuse cognoscat ille puer quid faciat.*'² Vasquez³ and St. Antoninus⁴ spoke

¹ S. Thom., P. III., q. 80, a. 9, ad 3.

² In S. Thom., P. III., q. 80, a. 9, dub. 6.

³ In S. Thom., P. III., disp. 214, c. 4, n. 43.

⁴ P. III., tit. 14, c. 2, § 5.

in similar terms of the admission of children to Holy Communion.

The Council of Trent also understood by the age of discretion the age at which the use of reason was acquired ; since its sole reason for the teaching that children, not having the use of reason, were under no obligation to receive the Blessed Eucharist was their inability to commit sin : ‘ Siquidem adeptam filiorum Dei gratiam in illa aetate amittere non possunt ’¹ The Council of Rome, held under Benedict XIII, taught the same doctrine when it said that the obligation to receive the Blessed Eucharist began : ‘ postquam pueruli ac puellae ad annum discretionis pervenerit, ad illam videlicet aetatem in qua sunt apti ad discernendum hunc sacramentalem cibum, qui alius non est quam verum Jesu Christi corpus, a pane communi et profano, et sciunt accedere cum debita pietate ac religione.’ The Roman Catechism indicates the same view in its treatment of the Blessed Eucharist.²

From these sources it is clear that the age of discretion in reference to the reception of the Blessed Eucharist is the age at which a child can distinguish the Blessed Eucharist from ordinary bread so that it can approach the altar rails with devotion. Some knowledge of faith is required, but not a complete knowledge ; nor is the full use of reason necessary since its incipient use suffices. Hence the custom of deferring to a later age the reception of the Blessed Eucharist merits disapproval.

To remove abuses and to insure that children receive Holy Communion as soon as possible, the S. Congregation of the Discipline of the Sacraments now makes the following practical regulations :—

I. The age of discretion both for Confession and for Holy Communion is the time when a child begins to have the use of reason, which is about the age of seven. At this age the two-fold obligation of going to Confession and of receiving the Blessed Eucharist begins.

II. For first Confession and first Communion a full and

¹ Sess. xxi., c. 4.

² *De Sacra. Euchar.*, p. II, n. 63.

perfect knowledge of Christian Doctrine is not necessary. The child, however, must subsequently for its capacity gradually learn the Catechism.

III. The knowledge of religion which children require for the reception of first Communion is that which enables them to know the mysteries of religion, knowledge of which is a necessary means of salvation, and to distinguish the Eucharistic bread from ordinary food, so that they can receive the Blessed Sacrament with a devotion suitable to their age.

IV. The obligation of receiving the Sacraments of Penance and Eucharist which is imposed on children redounds especially on those who have charge of the children, namely, on parents, confessors, teachers, and parish priests. To the father, or the person who takes his place, and to the confessor belongs the duty of admitting the child to first Communion.

V. Parish priests are to take care that once or several times a year there is a general Communion for children, and that not merely first communicants be permitted to approach the rails, but also those who, with the consent of parents or the confessor, have already received their first Communion. For both classes some days of instruction and preparation should be arranged.

VI. Guardians should use their best efforts towards inducing children under their care frequently, even daily, to receive the Blessed Eucharist when once they have been admitted to their first Communion. They should also remember that they are under a most serious obligation to see that these children continue to be present at the public instructions in the catechism, or at least that they receive religious teaching in some other suitable way.

VII. The custom of not admitting to Confession or of not absolving children who have arrived at the use of reason deserves condemnation. Ordinaries must use their authority completely to eradicate such an abuse.

VIII. The custom of not administering Viaticum and Extreme Unction to children who have arrived at the age of reason, and of burying them with the rite for infants, is

deplorable. Ordinaries should severely admonish those who do not give up this practice.

These regulations received the sanction of the Holy Father on August 7, 1910. Ordinaries are commanded to make this decree known, not only to parish priests and the clergy, but also to the people, to whom the Holy Father wishes the decree to be read in the vernacular every year at the Paschal time. Ordinaries are bound, at the end of each quinquennial period, to give the Holy See an account of the observance of this decree.

FACULTY OF DISPENSING FROM MATRIMONIAL IMPEDIMENTS IN IMMINENT DANGER OF DEATH

IN May, 1909, the S. Congregation of the Sacraments gave faculties whereby priests assisting at marriages in accordance with the provisions of Art. VII of the decree *Ne Temere* could dispense from all matrimonial diriment impediments of the ecclesiastical law except priesthood and affinity in the direct line arising from lawful intercourse.¹ The assistance at marriage which is mentioned in the aforesaid article of the decree *Ne Temere* is an exception to the general rule, which demands the presence of the Ordinary, the parish priest, or a delegate of either, for the validity of the marriage. If the Ordinary, the parish priest, or a delegate of either cannot be found, then any priest, together with two witnesses, can assist validly and lawfully at a marriage of persons of whom at least one is in imminent danger of death, and whose marriage is necessary for conscience's sake or for the legitimation of children.

So far as the mere words of the decree of May, 1909, went, no dispensing power was granted to an Ordinary, a parish priest, or a delegate of either when he assists at a marriage of a dying person in accordance with the ordinary rules of the decree *Ne Temere*, no matter how ill the person is, and no matter how necessary the marriage is for the

¹ Cf. I. E. RECORD, October, 1909, p. 410.

sake of conscience or the legitimation of children. This was an anomalous state of affairs which was sure to be remedied by a subsequent authoritative interpretation.

That interpretation has now come : ' An *praefato decreto* [14 Maii, 1909] *comprehendantur etiam parochi, etsi non fuerint ad normam declarationis S. Officii diei 9 Januarii 1889, habitualiter subdelegati a propriis Ordinariis ? Affirmative.*' Hence, in future parish priests and Ordinaries, who are pre-eminently parish priests, have the full plenitude of power which the decree of May, 1909, so far as its terminology went, conceded only to priests who assist at marriages by the exceptional provisions of the decree *Ne Temere*.

It is well to remember that this dispensing faculty is more extensive than that granted to Ordinaries by the decree of the Holy Office published in 1888. The latter authority extended only to cases in which the parties were actually living in concubinage, or in an invalid civil marriage, but the former, which now prevails, extends to all cases where the marriage is necessary for conscience' sake or for the legitimation of children. Consequently the power extends to people who formerly lived in concubinage, or between whom there were improper relations which did not amount to concubinage.

MATRIMONIAL LETTERS OF FREEDOM

REV. DEAR SIR,—In No. 167 of the Maynooth Statutes of 1900 it is stated that parish priests, before celebrating a marriage, are bound to make themselves certain that no impediment exists. In order to gain this knowledge they are obliged to have recourse to witnesses who are conversant with the *statum liberum nupturientium*. In regard to these 'witnesses,' I should like to have your opinion on the following questions :—

(1) Where the *nupturientes* are from different parishes or dioceses, does the law above quoted refer to the *parochus* of each, or merely to the *parochus* of the parish where the marriage is celebrated ; in other words, is the latter mainly responsible for the validity and lawfulness of the marriage ?

(2) As regards the *status liber* it would appear that the *onus probandi* falls immediately on the *nupturientes* themselves. Now, can a *parochus* lawfully exclude the testimony of any trustworthy witness, whether such is testified *viva voce* or *in scriptis*? Suppose a young man produces a letter from his employer, who is well known and *fide dignus*, should such be admitted as a *testis*? We suppose the letter is a certificate stating that this young man did not get married during the time of his employment. Or, secondly, which is a very practical case, a soldier had been absent many years; his colonel, who is a Protestant, testifies that to his knowledge this soldier did not get married since he joined the regiment. Or, again, a clergyman, who is not the *parochus loci* and does not even belong to the place where the postulant resided, but who was intimately acquainted with him and knew he was free to marry, gives his testimony; would each of these be accepted as *testes* in the sense of the decree No. 167?

(3) Is a curate at liberty to give a letter of freedom to one who was a member of the parish, but is gone away, say to America? Does he infringe on the rights of his parish priest by so doing?

(4) Is a *parochus* bound to have trustworthy witnesses from every parish where the *sponsus* or *sponsa* resided, say, for six months? The writer is of opinion that not merely a *parochus* is a *testis* in the sense of the decree, but any clergyman, who is sufficiently certain of the freedom of the parties, and, in addition, any lay persons whether Catholic or Protestant, provided they are *fide digni*. Others maintain that a *parochus* should not accept any testimony from outside his parish except that of a brother *parochus*.

(5) If a person is bound to get a testimony of freedom from a certain place, is such a person bound to have the banns published there also, or to get, instead, a dispensation?

(6) A commercial traveller, who is intimately acquainted with a certain clergyman, who does not minister in the gentleman's parish, makes it known that he intends getting married to a certain young lady, say in England, and asks this clergyman for a letter of reference, including a testimony of freedom. The clergyman gives the letter, at the same time informing the gentleman that before getting married he must have with him a dispensation in banns. The clergyman writes out the application in the usual way, the gentleman copies it, and gets the necessary dispensation from an official of the diocese. Has the

gentleman's *parochus* any grievance against the clergyman for so doing? The supposition is, there is certainly no impediment except the banns.

SACERDOS PERPLEXUS.

The parish priest who assists at the marriage is primarily bound to see that the marriage is valid, and in many ways he can make the necessary inquiries. There are certain official ways of conducting the investigation which have been instituted by Canon Law, and there are unofficial means of inquiry which ordinary prudence suggests. Amongst the official means of investigation the publication of the banns, with its consequent inquiry, holds a foremost place.¹ The banns are to be published not only in the place where the parties now reside, but also in the places in which they had previously resided and which they recently deserted. The contracting parties must present to the assisting parish priest letters of freedom from all the parishes, besides his own, in which the banns were proclaimed. The parties themselves naturally apply for these letters, but the parish priest may not assist at the marriage until they are presented to him. These letters of freedom must be given by the parish priest of the place where the banns were proclaimed or by his delegate.²

Amongst the unofficial means by which the state of freedom of the contracting parties can be discovered, every authentic information, no matter from what source it comes, must be included. Hence the testimony to which my correspondent refers is to be taken into account.

There is this difference between the official and unofficial means of investigation, that the latter can usually be omitted when the former exist for any parish, but the former are of obligation no matter how strong the unofficial testimony may be. Of course a dispensation can be obtained for just reasons from the proclamation of the banns, but such a dispensation does not free a parish priest from the obli-

¹ Cf. Maynooth Statutes, n. 166.

² Cf. Gasparri, *De Matrimonio*, i., n. 191.

gation of not celebrating the marriage without the official letters of freedom when it is possible to obtain them.

Having said so much by way of preamble we are now able to discuss the various questions proposed for solution.

(1) The Maynooth Statute,¹ as its terminology shows, directly refers to the obligations incumbent on the parish priest who assists at the marriage. Similar obligations, however, burden the conscience of every parish priest who gives letters of freedom.

(2) The unofficial testimonies to which this question refers come within the ambit of the statute. The contracting parties are bound to prove their freedom, and the parish priest, who is the judge in the case, cannot discard any authentic testimony. As already stated, no amount of unofficial testimony will free him from the obligation of not assisting at the marriage, unless the official letters of freedom, when they can be obtained, are presented to him.

(3) The right and duty of giving the official letter of freedom belongs to the parish priest. Without delegation from the parish priest or the Ordinary, a curate has no right to issue the official letters of freedom. A curate, however, like any other individual, can give unofficial testimony as to the freedom of the contracting parties.

(4) A parish priest is bound to obtain the official letters of freedom from every parish priest in whose parish the parties have a domicile or a quasi-domicile, or recently (within six months) had a domicile or quasi-domicile. At the same time he cannot conscientiously discard any unofficial testimony which helps to throw light on the state of the parties. Usually, however, the official letter of freedom, issued by the parish priest, will be sufficient to give evidence of freedom so far as at least his knowledge is concerned.

(5) The official letters of freedom and the proclamation of the banns are correlative, so that the same parish priest must give the letters of freedom, and publish the banns unless a dispensation has been obtained.

¹ Cf. Maynooth Statutes, n. 167.

(6) The parish priest of the gentleman's parish has undoubtedly a grievance, since the matrimonial affairs of his parishioners are managed by an outsider without reference to him. He is the person through whom the dispensation should be sought, and he is the person from whom the necessary official letter of freedom must be obtained. This holds good even if an impediment certainly does not exist in the case.

J. M. HARTY.

LITURGY

DATE OF 'QUATUOR TEMPORA'

REV. DEAR SIR,—Will you kindly say in the next issue of the I. E. RECORD why the Ordo differs from the Missal as to Quatre-temps week? The Ordo says Quatre-temps week will be the week which begins on the eighteenth Sunday after Pentecost; the Missal says Quatre-temps will be in the week which begins with the seventeenth Sunday after Pentecost. Will you be pleased to explain why the Ordo and Missal differ in this? and oblige,—Yours faithfully,

SACERDOS.

Our correspondent does not state where the Missal assigns the seventeenth week after Pentecost as that in which the Autumn *Quarter Tense* occurs. In point of fact we read the following direction in the Rubrics given at the beginning of the Roman Missal: 'Quatuor tempora celebrantur Feria quarta et sexta Feria ac Sabbato post primam Domenicam Adventus, post Domenicam Quadragesimae, post Domenicam Pentecostes, post Festum Exaltationis Sanctae Crucis.'¹ From this it is clear that the incidence of the *Quarter Tense* of the last quarter of the Ecclesiastical year is regulated not by the Sundays after Pentecost, which are moveable, but by the Feast of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross. They are the Wednesday, Friday, and Saturday occurring after this Feast or, what comes to the same thing, falling after the third Sunday of September. It should be remembered that, liturgically considered, the first Sunday of the month is that which is nearest to the Kalends, and does not

¹ De Anno Ejusque Partibus.

always agree with what is usually called the first Sunday, since it may not virtually occur within the month. For instance, if a month begins on Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday then the *previous* Sunday is the first Sunday for liturgical purposes, though it really belongs to the preceding month.

Possibly it may be an oversight in regard to this technical matter that led to the discrepancy of which the query seeks some explanation.

OCTOBER DEVOTIONS

REV. DEAR SIR,—I notice a difference in the manner of carrying out the devotions of October. In some churches the Litany and Rosary are recited in presence of the Blessed Sacrament exposed. In others the Rosary is recited only, and the Litany is sung by the Choir during Exposition. Are we safe in adopting either method?

ROMANUS.

Some observations on this subject were made in the November issue of the I. E. RECORD for the year 1908. A Decree which is cited there clearly states that the prayers—that is, the Rosary and Litany—should be said during Mass if the Devotions take place in the morning and during solemn Exposition of the Blessed Sacrament if the Devotions are held in the evening. When there is Benediction, the Rosary ought to be said and the Litany *sung* by the Choir *coram Sanctissimo*. It is hard to conceive a case where the *singing* of the Litany might be dispensed with in the presence of the Blessed Sacrament, but if such a case really existed, then it probably would be sufficient to recite the Litany merely.

GOSPEL TONES IN 'REQUIEM' MASSES

REV. DEAR SIR,—Would you kindly answer the following in the next issue of the I. E. RECORD. Are there any special laws governing the singing of the Gospel in *Requiem Masses*, or are the variations, etc., exactly similar to those used in singing the Gospel of other Masses?

SACERDOS.

The Gospel tones are practically invariable, that is to

say, they are not altered with the quality of the Mass. This is not true of the tones for the other parts of the Mass, such as the Prayers, the Preface, and the *Ite Missa Est*. For these there are at least solemn or festive tones and simple or ferial tones. Hence in *Requiem* Masses the Gospel is sung according to the rules that govern its singing in festive Masses. The rules for the voice inflections or modulations to be employed in these occasions will be found in the ordinary liturgical manuals.¹

**LIGHTS ON SIDE-ALTARS AT BENEDICTION OF THE
MOST HOLY SACRAMENT**

REV. DEAR SIR,—Would you kindly say in next number of the I. E. RECORD if it is allowable to have candles burning on side-altars, e.g., May altars, during Benediction of the Most Blessed Sacrament? In England there is a very general practice to the contrary, but custom does not seem to be uniform in this country. Is there any legislation on the subject?

INQUIRER.

Since Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament is not a strictly liturgical function it is natural to expect that customs, varying with the spirit of each locality, should creep into existence in connexion with its celebration. At the Solemn Exposition of the Forty Hours, for which most precise regulations have been enacted, it is forbidden to have what is contemplated in the query, or in fact anything that could distract the devotion of the worshippers from dwelling upon the great central truth of the Real Presence. The same rigid rules are not enforced in regard to the less solemn Expositions, and thus we have sometimes practices that it is not quite easy to understand or to reconcile with what seems to be the correct course.

The answer to the question before us, therefore, must be given after a consideration of some principles that should assist in arriving at a safe judgment. In the first instance, it is lawful to have lights burning upon the Altar of the Blessed Virgin and before her Images to give tangible ex-

¹ Cf. Van Der Stappen, *Sacra Liturgia*, V, v., Ap. ii, *et* *et*

pression to the cult to which she is entitled. Next, care should be taken in externating these sentiments to avoid whatever would lead to a confusion in the minds of the faithful between the adoration that is due to the Living Person of the Word really present under the Sacramental veils and the relative worship that is to be paid to the Divine Mother. The Church clearly differentiates between these two things in her ceremonial and liturgical ordinances. For instance, Statues of the Blessed Virgin are not to be borne under the Baldachino that is used for Processions of the Blessed Sacrament,¹ nor placed on the Tabernacle that serves as a throne for the Monstrance,² nor incensed with more than two double swings.³ Now these principles of rubrical propriety would seem to be violated if—as one can sometimes see—during Benediction of the Most Holy Sacrament the Altar of Exposition is thrown into comparative dimness by the number and brilliancy of the lights that adorn the adjacent Altar either of the Blessed Virgin or some other Saint.

Hence, then, while little, if any, exception can be taken to the practice of having a few lights on a neighbouring side-altar during Benediction (as long as none of the inconveniences mentioned arise) it would appear proper for the reasons referred to that moderation be exercised in regard to the number of the candles employed in the circumstances.

NEW REGULATION ABOUT AUTHENTICATION OF FACULTIES FOR BLESSING ROSARIES, ETC.

REV. DEAR SIR,—In the June number of the I. E. RECORD appears a very important *Motu Proprio* of Pius X ordering that indulgences should be authenticated by the Holy Office. The same is also ordered for faculties granted ‘*benedicendi pia objecta eisque adnectendi indulgentias.*’ My difficulty is with regard to faculties *already* received, say for a considerable time. Must the pagella of these faculties be sent to the Holy Office

¹ Decr. S. R. C., nn. 2379, 2647, etc.

² Nn. 2613, 2906.

³ N. 4044.

to be recognized (a) in the case of faculties *already* granted by any Congregation other than the Holy Office? (b) in case of faculties granted by the Heads of Religious Orders? Is this necessary 'sub poena nullifatis'?

An answer in the I. E. RECORD will oblige.

DUBIUS.

The intervention of the holidays made it impossible to attend more promptly to this very practical query, and to direct earlier attention to the important regulation, made by the *Motu Proprio* referred to, in regard to the necessity of having authenticated by the Congregation of the Holy Office indulgences not obtained from the Congregation itself. Now that the entire control of all matters connected with indulgences has devolved upon the Congregation mentioned, the rule introduced by the recent legislation will only be in harmony with the fitness of things. It is well, then, to ask (a) What indulgences need this authentication? (b) How far is the new regulation retrospective? (c) What steps must be taken to fall into line with it for the future?

To answer the first question, indulgences may be divided into three kinds, namely, *universal* or those affecting the whole Church, *particular* or those affecting sections of the faithful, and *personal* or those given to individuals for their own special benefit. It was formerly necessary to have the first kind duly authenticated by the Congregation of Indulgences, and in the Apostolic Letter, *Sapienti Consilio*, provision was made to have the recognition of these from the Congregation of the Council. This rule was very strict, and applied to indulgences obtained even by Brief-Apostolic. The second class of indulgences were not affected by this regulation, but they now come under it in virtue of the recent enactment. Merely personal indulgences granted to individuals are still valid from whatever source obtained. Now, as the power of blessing rosaries, crosses, and medals, and attaching indulgences to them, affects sections of the faithful, and since it is, moreover, equivalent to a *delegated* concession of indulgences, it comes under the new rule.

(b) What of faculties already obtained? If procured

from the Congregation of Indulgences, or from the Secretaries of Briefs and Memorials, *before* November 1, 1908 (the date of the recent reform of the Roman Curia), they are not affected by the *Motu Proprio* under consideration; but if obtained since this date from the two Offices mentioned or, *at any time*, from other channels, they must be *visied* or authenticated by the Holy Office within six months from the publication of the Decree, that is, before October 16, 1910.¹

(c) How are priests affected by the new regulation? In the case of faculties obtained directly from Bishops, it is to be assumed that these faculties will be duly authenticated, wherever necessary, and that, this being done, the delegation will be renewed as in the Quinquennial powers. It is unnecessary to say that where episcopal faculties are obtained from the Holy Office direct, there is no need of authentication. In regard to faculties obtained from Religious Orders, though the *Motu Proprio* at first sight seems to comprehend them, it is decided by the Decree, dated June 17, 1910, that faculties conceded by special favour of the Holy See to Religious Orders as peculiar and proper to themselves—such as those granted the Friars Minor for Stations of the Cross, the Dominicans for the Rosary, the Carmelites for the Brown Scapular, etc.—remain unaffected. In this Decree it is also stated that the faculty for the *Benedictio Apostolica in Articulo Mortis* is not included among those requiring recognition.

Finally, a further interpretative Decree, dated July 13, 1910, states that in regard to countries still under Propaganda the new rule does not operate. But the old regulation about the authentication of *general* concessions of indulgences still obtains.

When sending the *pagella* for authentication it is sufficient to enclose a copy or duplicate. The envelope may be addressed to 'His Eminence, The Cardinal Secretary of the Holy Office, Via del San Uffizio, Roma.'

P. MORRISROE.

¹Cf. Decr. Cong. Sti. Off., June 17, 1910.

DOCUMENTS

'MOTU PROPRIO' OF POPE PIUS X. ON THE ERRORS OF
MODERNISM

MOTU PROPRIO

QUO QUAEDAM STATUUNTUR LEGES AD MODERNISMI PERICULUM
PROPULSANDUM

Sacrorum antistitum neminem latere arbitramur, vaferrium hominum genus, modernistas, persona quam induerant illis detracta per encyclicas Litteras *Pascendi dominici gregis*,¹ consilia pacis in Ecclesia turbandae non abiecisce. Haud enim intermiserunt novos aucupari et in clandestinum foedus ascire socios, cum iisque in christianae reipublicae venas opinionum suarum virus inserere, editis libris commentariisque suppresso aut mentito scriptorum nomine. Haec audaciae maturitas, per quam tantus Nobis inustus est dolor, si perlectis iterum memoratis Litteris Nostris, consideretur attentius, facile apparebit, eius moris homines haud alios esse quam quos ibi descripsimus, adversarios eo magis timendos, quo propiores; ministerio suo abutentes ut venenatam hamis escam imponant ad intercipiendos incautos, doctrinae speciem circumferentes, in qua errorum omnium summa continetur.

Hac lue diffluente per agri Domini partem, unde laetiores essent exspectandi fructus, quum omnium Antistitum est in catholicae fidei defensione laborare, summâque diligentia cavere, ne integritas divini depositi quidquam detrimenti capiat, tum ad Nos maxime pertinet Christi Servatoris imperata facere, qui Petro, cuius principatum, licet indigni, obtinemus, dixit: *Confirma fratres tuos*. Hac nempe de causa, hoc est, ut in praesenti dimicatione subeunda confirmentur bonorum animi, opportunum duximus memorati Nostri documenti sententias et praescripta referre hisce verbis expressa:

‘Vos oramus et obsecramus, ne in re tam gravi vigilantiam, diligentiam, fortitudinem vestram desiderari vel minimum patiamini. Quod vero a vobis petimus et expectamus, idipsum et petimus aequè et expectamus a ceteris animarum pastoribus, ab

¹ Dat. d. viii Septembr. MCMVII.

educatoribus et magistris sacrae iuventutis, imprimis autem a summis religiosarum familiarum magistris.

‘I. Ad studia quod attinet, volumus probeque mandamus ut philosophia scholastica studiorum sacrorum fundamentum ponatur.—Utique, *si quid a doctoribus scholasticis vel nimia subtilitate quaesitum, vel parum considerate traditum; si quid cum exploratis posterioris aevi doctrinis minus cohaerens, vel denique quoquo modo non probabile; id nullo pacto in animo est aetati nostrae ad imitandum proponi.*¹ Quod rei caput est, philosophiam scholasticam quum sequendam praescribimus, eam praecipue intelligimus quae a sancto Thoma Aquinate est tradita: de qua quidquid a Decessore Nostro sancitum est, id omne vigere volumus, et qua sit opus instauramus et confirmamus, stricteque ab universis servari iubemus. Episcoporum erit, sicubi in Seminariis neglecta haec fuerint, ea ut in posterum custodiantur urgere atque exigere. Eadem religiosorum Ordinum moderatoribus praecipimus. Magistros autem monemus ut rite hoc teneant, Aquinatem vel parum deserere, praesertim in re metaphysica, non sine magno detrimento esse. *Parvus error in principio, sic verbis ipsius Aquinatis licet uti, est magnus in fine.*²

‘Hoc ita posito philosophiae fundamento, theologicum aedificium extruatur diligentissime.—Theologiae studium, Venerabiles Fratres, quanta potestis ope provehite, ut clerici e seminariis egredientes praecleara illius existimatione magnoque amore imbuantur, illudque semper pro deliciis habeant. Nam *in magna et multiplici disciplinarum copia quae menti veritatis cupidae obiicitur, neminem latet sacram Theologiam ita principem sibi locum vindicare, ut vetus sapientum effatum sit, ceteris scientiis et artibus officium incumbere, ut ei inserviant ac velut ancillarum more famulentur.*³—Addimus heic, eos etiam Nobis laude dignos videri, qui, incolumi reverentia erga Traditionem et Patres et ecclesiasticum magisterium, sapienti iudicio catholicisque usi normis (quod non aequè omnibus accidit) theologiam positivam, mutuato ab historia lumine, collustrare studeant. Maior profecto quam antehac positivae theologiae ratio est habenda: id tamen sic fiat, ut nihil scholastica detrimenti capiat, iique reprehendantur utpote qui modernistarum rem gerunt, quicumque positivam sic extollunt ut scholasticam theologiam despiciere videantur.

‘De profanis vero disciplinis satis sit revocare quae Decessor

¹ Leo XIII, Encycl. *Aeterni Patris*.

² *De Ente et Essentia*, proöm.

³ Leo XIII, Litt. ap., x Dec. MDCCCLXXXIX.

Noster sapientissime dixit : *In rerum etiam naturalium consideratione strenue adlaboretis : quo in genere nostrorum temporum ingeniose inventa et utiliter ausa, sicut iure admirantur aequales, sic posteri perpetua commendatione et laude celebrabunt.*¹ Id tamen nullo sacrorum studiorum damno ; quod idem Decessor Noster gravissimis hisce verbis monuit : *Quorum causam errorum, si quis diligentius investigaverit, in eo potissimum sitam esse intellet, quod nostris hisce temporibus, quanto rerum naturalium studia vehementius fervent, tanto magis severiores altioresque disciplinae deflorucint : quaedam enim fere in oblivione hominum conticescunt ; quaedam remisse leviterque tractantur, et quod indignius est, splendore pristinae dignitatis deleta, pravitate sententiarum et immanibus opinionum portentis inficiuntur.*² Ad hanc igitur legem naturalium disciplinarum studia in sacris seminariis temperari volumus.

‘ II. His omnibus praeceptionibus tum Nostris tum Decessoris Nostri oculos adiici oportet, quum de Seminariorum vel Universitatum catholicarum moderatoribus et magistris eligendis agendum erit. Quicumque modo quopiam modernismo imbuti fuerint, ii, nullo habito rei cuiusvis respectu, tum a regundi tum a docendi munere arceantur ; eo si iam funguntur, removeantur : item qui modernismo clam aperteve favent, aut modernistas laudando eorumque culpam excusando, aut Scholasticam et Patres et Magisterium ecclesiasticum carpendo, aut ecclesiasticae potestati, in quocumque ea demum sit, obedientiam detrectando : item qui in historica re, vel archeologica, vel biblica, nova student : item qui sacras negligunt disciplinas, aut profanas anteponeere videntur.—Hoc in negotio, Venerabiles Fratres, praesertim in magistrorum delectu, nimia nunquam erit animadversio et constantia ; ad doctorum enim exemplum pierumque componuntur discipuli. Quare, officii conscientia freti, prudenter hac in re et fortiter agitate.

‘ Pari vigilantia et severitate ii sunt cognoscendi ac deligendi, qui sacris initiari postulent. Procul, procul esto a sacro ordine novitatum amor : superbos et contumaces animos odit Deus !—Theologiae laurea nullus in posterum donetur, qui statum curriculum in scholastica philosophia antea non elaboraverit. Quod si donetur, inaniter donatus esto.—Quae de celebrandis Universitatibus Sacrum Consilium Episcoporum et Religiosorum negotiis praepositum clericis Italiae tum saecularibus tum regularibus

¹ Alloc., *Pergratus Nobis*, ad scientiar. cultores, vii Martii MDCCCLXXX.

² Alloc., ut supra.

praecepit anno MDCCCXCVI; ea ad nationes omnes posthac pertinere decernimus.—Clerici et sacerdotes qui catholicae cuiuspiam Universitati vel Instituto item catholico nomen dederint, disciplinas, de quibus magisteria in his fuerint, in civili Universitate ne ediscant. Sicubi id permissum, in posterum ut ne fiat edicimus.—Episcopi, qui huiusmodi Universitatibus vel Institutis moderandis praesunt, curent diligentissime, ut quae hactenus imperavimus, ea constanter serventur.

‘III. Episcoporum pariter officium est modernistarum scripta quaeve modernismum olent provehuntque, si in lucem edita, ne legantur cavere; si nondum edita, ne edantur prohibere.—Item libri omnes, ephemerides, commentaria quaevis huius generis neve adolescentibus in seminariis neve auditoribus in Universitatibus permittantur: non enim minus haec nocitura, quam quae contra mores conscripta; immo etiam magis, quod christianae vitae initia vitiant.—Nec secus iudicandum est de quorundam catholicorum scriptionibus, hominum ceteroque non malae mentis, sed qui theologicae disciplinae expertes ac recentiori philosophia imbuti, hanc cum fide componere nituntur et ad fidei, ut inquiunt, utilitates transferre. Hac, quia nullo metu versantur ob auctorum nomen bonamque existimationem, plus periculi afferunt ut sensim ad modernismum quis vergat.

‘Generatim vero, Venerabiles Fratres, ut in re tam gravi praecipiamus, quicumque in vestra uniuscuiusque dioecesi prosunt libri ad legendum perniciosi, ii ut exulent fortiter contendite, solemni etiam interdictione usi. Etsi enim Apostolica Sedes ad huiusmodi scripta e medio tollenda omnem operam impendat; adeo tamen iam numero crevere, ut vix notandis omnibus pares sint vires. Ex quo fit, ut serior quandoque paretur medicina, quum per longiores moras malum invaluit. Volumus igitur ut sacrorum Antistites, omni metu abiecto, prudentia carnis deposita, malorum clamoribus posthabitis, suaviter quidem sed constanter suas quisque partes suscipiant; memores quae Leo XIII in Constitutione apostolica *Officiorum ac munerum*¹ praescribebat: *Ordinarii, etiam tamquam Delegati Sedis Apostolicae, libros aliaque scripta noxia in sua dioecesi edita vel diffusa proscribere et e manibus fidelium auferre studeant*. Ius quidem his verbis tribuitur sed etiam officium mandatur. Nec quispiam hoc munus officii implevisse autumet, si unum alterumve librum ad Nos detulerit, dum alii bene multi dividi passim ac pervulgari sinuntur.—Nihil autem vos teneat, Venerabiles Fratres,

¹ xxv Ian. MDCCCXCVII.

quod forte libri alicuius auctor ea sit alibi facultate donatus, quam vulgo *Imprimatur* appellant: tum quia simulata esse possit, tum quia vel negligentius data vel benignitate nimia nimiave fiducia de auctore concepta, quod forte postremum in Religiosorum ordinibus aliquando evenit. Accedit quod, sicut non idem omnibus convenit cibus, ita libri qui altero in loco sint innocentes, nocentes in altero ob rerum complexus esse queunt. Si igitur Episcopus, audita prudentum sententia, horum etiam librorum aliquem in sua dioecesi notandum censuerit, potestatem ultro facimus immo et officium mandamus. Res utique decenter fiat, prohibitionem, si sufficiat, ad clerum unum coërcendo; integro tamen bibliopolarum catholicorum officio libros ab Episcopo notatos minime venales habendi.—Et quoniam de his sermo incidit, vigilant Episcopi ne, lucri cupiditate, malam librarii mercentur mercem: certe in aliquorum indicibus modernistarum libri abunde nec parva cum laude proponuntur. Hos, si obedientiam detrectent, Episcopi, monitione praemissa, bibliopolarum catholicorum titulo privare ne dubitent; item potioreque iure si episcopales audiant: qui vero pontificio titulo ornantur, eos ad Sedem Apostolicam deferant.—Universis demum in memoriam revocamus, quae memorata apostolica Constitutio *Officiorum* habet, articulo XXVI: *Omnes, qui facultatem apostolicam consecuti sunt legendi et retinendi libros prohibitos, nequeunt ideo legere et retinere libros quoslibet aut ephemerides ab Ordinariis locorum proscriptas, nisi eis in apostolico indulto expressa facta fuerit potestas legendi ac retinendi libros a quibuscumque damnatos.*

‘IV. Nec tamen pravorum librorum satis est lectionem impedire ac venditionem; editionem etiam prohiberi oportet. Ideo edendi facultatem Episcopi severitate summa impertiant.—Quoniam vero magno numero ea sunt ex Constitutione *Officiorum*, quae Ordinarii permissionem ut edantur postulent, nec ipse per se Episcopus praecognoscere universa potest; in quibusdam dioecesibus ad cognitionem faciendam censores ex officio sufficienti numero destinantur. Huiusmodi censorum institutum laudamus quam maxime: illudque ut ad omnes dioeceses propagetur non hortamur modo sed omnino praescribimus. In universis igitur curiis episcopalibus censores ex officio adsint, qui edenda cognoscant: hi autem e gemino clero eligantur, aetate, eruditione, prudentia commendati, quique in doctrinis probandis improbandisque medio tutoque itinere eant. Ad illos scriptorum cognitio deferatur, quae ex articulis XLI et XLII memoratae Constitutionis praevio subsunt examini. Censor sententiam scripto dabit. Ea si faverit, Episcopus potestatem

edendi faciet per verbum *Imprimatur*, cui tamen proponetur formula *Nihil obstat*, adscripto censoris nomine.—In Curia romana, non secus ac in ceteris omnibus, censores ex officio instituantur. Eos, audito prius Cardinali in Urbe Pontificis Vicario, tum vero annuente ac probante ipso Pontifice Maximo, Magister sacri Palatii apostolici designabit. Huius erit ad scripta singula cognoscenda censorem destinare. Editionis facultas ab eodem Magistro dabitur necnon a Cardinali Vicario Pontificis vel Antistite eius vices gerente, praemissa, prout supra diximus, approbationis formula adiectoque nomine censoris.—Extraordinariis tantum in adiunctis ac per quam raro, prudenti Episcopi arbitrio, censoris mentio intermitteri poterit.—Auctoribus censoris nomen patebit nunquam, antequam hic faventem sententiam ediderit; ne quid molestiae censori exhibeatur vel dum scripta cognoscit, vel si editionem non probarit.—Censores e religiosorum familiis nunquam eligantur, nisi prius moderatoris provinciae secreto sententia audiatur: is autem de eligendi moribus, scientia et doctrinae integritate pro officii conscientia testabitur.—Religiosorum moderatores de gravissimo officio monemus numquam sinendi aliquid a suis subditis typis edi, nisi prius ipsorum et Ordinarii facultas intercesserit.—Postremum edicimus et declaramus, censoris titulum, quo quis ornatur, nihil valere prorsus nec unquam posse afferri ad privatas eiusdem opiniones firmandas.

‘His universe dictis, nominatim servari diligentius praecipimus, quae articulo XLII Constitutionis *Officiorum* in haec verba edicuntur: *Viri e clero saeculari prohibentur quominus, absque praevia Ordinariorum venia, diaria vel folia periodica moderanda suscipiant*. Qua si qui venia perniciose utantur, eâ, moniti primum, priventur.—Ad sacerdotes quod attinet, qui *correspondentium* vel *collaboratorum* nomine vulgo veniunt, quoniam frequentius evenit eos in ephemeridibus vel commentariis scripta edere modernismi labe infecta; videant Episcopi ne quid hi, contra quam siverint, moliantur, datamque potestatem, si oportet retractent. Idipsum ut religiosorum moderatores praestent gravissime admonemus: qui si negligentius agant, Ordinarii auctoritate Pontificis Maximi provideant.—Ephemerides et commentaria, quae a catholicis scribuntur, quoad fieri possit, censorem designatum habeant. Huius officium erit folia singula vel libellos, postquam sint edita, integre attenteque perlegere: si quid dictum periculose fuerit, id in sequenti folio vel libello corrigendum iniungat. Eadem porro Episcopis facultas esto, etsi censor forte faverit.

‘ V. Congressus publicosque coetus iam supra memoravimus, utpote in quibus suas modernistae opiniones tueri palam ac propagare student.—Sacerdotum conventus Episcopi in posterum haberi ne siverint, nisi rarissime. Quod si siverint, ea tantum lege sinent, ut nulla fiat rerum tractatio quae ad Episcopos Sedemve Apostolicam pertinent; ut nihil proponatur vel postuletur, quod sacrae potestatis occupationem inferat; ut quidquid modernismum sapit quidquid presbyterianismum vel laicismum, de eo penitus sermo conticescat.—Coetibus eiusmodi, quos singulatim, scripto, aptaque tempestate permitti oportet, nullus ex alia dioecesi sacerdos intersit, nisi litteris sui Episcopi commendatus.—Omnibus autem sacerdotibus animo ne excidant, quae Leo XIII gravissime commendavit: *Sancta sit apud sacerdotes Antistitum suorum auctoritas: pro certo habeant sacerdotale munus nisi sub magisterio Episcoporum exerceatur, neque sanctum, nec satis utile, neque honestum futurum.*¹

‘ VI. Sed enim, Venerabiles Fratres, quid iuverit iussa a Nobis praeceptionesque dari, si non haec rite constanterque servantur? Id ut feliciter pro votis cedat, visum est ad universas dioeceses proferre, quod Umbrorum Episcopi,² ante annos plures, pro suis prudentissime decreverunt. *Ad errores, sic illi, iam diffusos expellendos atque ad impediendum quominus ulterius divulgentur, aut adhuc extent impietatis magistri per quos perniciosi perpetuentur effectus, qui ex illa divulgatione manarunt; sacer Conventus, sancti Caroli Borromaei vestigiis inhaerens, institui in unaquaque dioecesi decernit probatorum utriusque cleri consilium, cuius sit pervigilare an et quibus artibus novi errores serpent aut disseminentur atque Episcopum de hisce docere, ut collatis consiliis remedia capiat, quibus id mali ipso suo initio extinguí possit, ne ad animarum perniciem magis magisque diffundatur, vel quod peius est in dies confirmetur et crescat.*—Tale igitur consilium, quod a vigilantia dici placet, in singulis dioecesibus institui quamprimum decernimus. Viri, qui in illud adsciscantur, eo fere modo cooptabuntur, quo supra de censoribus statuimus. Altero quoque mense statoque die cum Episcopo convenient: quae tractarint decreverint, ea arcani lege custodiunto. Officii munere haec sibi demandata habeant. Modernismi indicia ac vestigia tam in libris quam in magisteriis pervestigant vigilanter; pro cleri iuventaeque incolumitate, prudenter

¹ Litt. Encycl., *Nobilissima*, VIII Febr. MDCCCLXXXIV.

² Act. Consess. Epp. Umbriae, Novembri MDCCCXLIX, tit. II, art. 6.

sed prompte et efficaciter praescribant.—Vocum novitatem caveant, meminerintque Leonis XIII monita: *Probari non posse in catholicorum scriptis eam dicendi rationem quae, pravae novitati studens, pietatem fidelium videre videatur, loquaturque novum christianae vitae ordinem, novas Ecclesiae praeceptiones, nova moderni animi desideria, novam socialem cleri vocationem, novam christianam humanitatem, aliaque id genus multa.*¹ Haec in libris praelectionibusque ne patiantur.—Libros ne negligent, in quibus piaе cuiusque loci traditiones aut sacrae Reliquiae tractantur. Neu sinant eiusmodi quaestiones agitari in ephemeridibus vel in commentariis fovendae pietati destinatis, nec verbis ludibrium aut despectum sapientibus, nec stabilibus sentiis, praesertim, ut fere accidit, si quae affirmantur probabilitatis fines non excedunt vel praeiudicatis nituntur opinionibus.—De sacris Reliquiis haec teneantur. Si Episcopi, qui uni in hac re possunt, certo norint Reliquiam esse subditiçiam, fidelium cultu removeant. Si Reliquiae cuiuspiam auctoritates, ob civiles forte perturbationes vel alio quovis casu, interierint; ne publice ea proponatur nisi rite ab Episcopo recognita. Praescriptionis argumentum vel fundatae praesumptionis tunc tantum valebit, si cultus antiquitate commendetur; nimirum pro decreto anno MDCCCXCVI a sacro Consilio indulgentiis sacrisque Reliquiis cognoscendis edito, quo edicitur: *Reliquias antiquas conservandas esse in ea veneratione in qua hactenus fuerunt, nisi in casu particulari certa adsint argumenta eas falsas vel supposititias esse.*—Quum autem de piis traditionibus iudicium fuerit, illud meminisse oportet: Ecclesiam tanta in hac re uti prudentia, ut traditiones eiusmodi ne scripto narrari permittat nisi cautione multa adhibita praemissaque declaratione ab Urbano VIII sancita; quod etsi rite fiat, non tamen facti veritatem adserit, sed, nisi humana ad credendum argumenta desint, credi modo non prohibet. Sic plane sacrum Consilium legitimis ritibus tuendis, abhinc annis triginta, edicebat: *Eiusmodi apparitiones seu revelationes neque approbatas neque damnatas ab Apostolica Sede fuisse, sed tantum permissas tamquam pie credendas fide solum humana, iuxta traditionem quam fuerunt, idoneis etiam testimoniis ac monumentis confirmatam.*² Hoc qui teneat, metu omni vacabit. Nam Apparationis cuiusvis religio, prout factum ipsum spectat et *relativa* dicitur, conditionem semper habet implicitam de veritate facti: prout vero *absoluta* est, semper in

¹ Instruct. S. C. NN. EE. EE., xxvii Ian. mcmii.

² Decr. ii Maii mdccclxxvii.

veritate nititur, fertur enim in personas ipsas Sanctorum qui honorantur. Similiter de Reliquiis affirmandum.—Illud demum Consilio vigilantiae demandamus, ut ad socialia instituta itemque ad scripta quaevis de re sociali assidue ac diligenter adiiciant oculos, ne quid in illis modernismi lateat, sed Romanorum Pontificum praeceptionibus respondeant.

‘VII. Haec quae praecepimus ne forte oblivioni dentur, volumus et mandamus ut singularum diocesum Episcopi, anno exacto ab editione praesentium litterarum, postea vero tertio quoque anno, diligenti ac iurata enarratione referant ad Sedem Apostolicam de his quae hac Nostra Epistola decernuntur, itemque de doctrinis quae in clero vigent, praesertim autem in Seminariis ceterisque catholicis Institutis, iis non exceptis quae Ordinarii auctoritati non subsunt. Idipsum Moderatoribus generalibus ordinum religiosorum pro suis alumni iniungimus.’

His, quae plane confirmamus omnia sub poena temeratae conscientiae adversus eos, qui dicto audientes esse renuerint, peculiaribus quaedam adiicimus, quae ad sacrorum alumnos in Seminariis degentes et ad instituti religiosi tirones referuntur.—In Seminariis quidem oportet partes omnes institutionis eo tandem aliquando conspirent ut dignus tali nomine formetur sacerdos. Nec enim existimare licet, eiusmodi contubernia studiis dumtaxat aut pietati patere. Utrâque re institutio tota coalescit, suntque ipsa tamquam palaestrae ad sacram Christi militiam diuturna praeparatione fingendam. Ex iis igitur ut acies optime instructa prodeat, omnino sunt duae res necessariae, doctrina ad cultum mentis, virtus ad perfectionem animi. Altera postulat ut alumna sacrorum iuventus iis artibus apprime erudiatur quae cum studiis rerum divinarum arctiorem habent cognationem; altera singularem exigit virtutis constantiaeque praestantiam. Videant ergo moderatores disciplinae ac pietatis, quam de se quisque spem iniiciant alumni, introspeciantque singulorum quae sit indoles; utrum suo ingenio plus aequo indulgeant, aut spiritus profanos videantur sumere; sintne ad parendum dociles, in pietatem prони, de se non alte sentientes, disciplinae retinentes; rectione sibi fine proposito, an humanis ducti rationibus ad sacerdotii dignitatem contendant; utrum denique convenienti vitae sanctimonia doctrinaque polleant; aut certe, si quid horum desit, sincero promptoque animo conentur acquirere. Nec nimium difficultatis habet investigatio; siquidem virtutem, quas diximus, defectum cito produnt et religionis officia ficto animo persoluta, et servata metus causâ, non conscientiae voce, disciplina. Quam qui servili timore retineat,

aut animi levitate contemptuve frangat, is a spe sacerdotii sancte fungendi abest quam longissime. Haud enim facile creditur, domesticæ disciplinæ contemptorem a publicis Ecclesiæ legibus minime discessurum. Hoc animo comparatum si quem deprehenderit sacri ephæbei moderator, et si semel iterumque præmonitum, experimento facto per annum, intellexerit a consuetudine sua non recedere, eum sic expellat, ut neque a se neque ab ullo episcopo sit in posterum recipiendus.

Duo igitur hæc ad promovendos clericos omnino requirantur ; innocentia vitæ cum doctrinæ sanitate coniuncta : Neve illud prætereat, præcepta ac monita, quibus episcopi sacris ordinibus initiandos compellant, non minus ad hos quam ad candidatos esse conversa, prout ubi dicitur : 'Providendum, ut cælestis sapientia, probi mores et diuturna iustitiæ observatio ad id electos commendet. . . . Sint probi et maturi in scientia simul et opere . . . eluceat in eis totius forma iustitiæ.'

Ac de vitæ quidem probitate satis dictum esset, si hæc a doctrina et opinionibus, quas quisque sibi tuendas assumpserit, posset facili negotio sciungi. Sed, ut est in proverbiorum libro : *Doctrina sua noscitur vir* ;¹ utque docet Apostolus : *Qui . . . non permanet in doctrina Christi, Deum non habet*.² Quantum operæ vero dandum sit addiscendis rebus multis equidem et variis, vel ipsa huius ætatis conditio docet, nihil gloriosius efferentis quam lucem progredientis humanitatis. Quotquot igitur sunt ex ordine cleri si convenienter temporibus velint in suis versari muneribus ; si cum fructu *exhortari in doctrina sana, et eos, qui contradicunt, arguere* ;³ si opes ingenii in Ecclesiæ utilitatem transferre, oportet cognitionem rerum assequantur, eamque minime vulgarem, et ad excellentiam doctrinæ propriis accedant. Luctandum est enim cum hostibus non imperitis, qui ad elegantiam studiorum scientiam sæpe dolis consutam adiungant, quorum speciosæ vibrantesque sententiæ magno verborum cursu sonituque feruntur, ut in iis videatur quasi quid peregrinum instrepere. Quapropter expedienda mature sunt arma, hoc est, opima doctrinæ seges comparanda omnibus, quicumque sanctissimis perarduisque muneribus in umbratili vita se accingunt.

Verum, quia vita hominis iis est circumscripta limitibus ut ex uberrimo cognoscendarum rerum fonte vix detur aliquid summis labiis attingere, discendi quoque temperandus est ardor et retinenda Pauli sententia : *non plus sapere quam oportet sapere,*

¹ Prov. xii. 8.² 2 Ioan. 9.³ Tit. i. 9.

*sed sapere ad sobrietatem.*¹ Quare, quum clericis multa iam satis eaque gravia sint imposita studia, sive quae pertinent ad sacras litteras, ad Fidei capita, ad mores, ad scientiam pietatis et officiorum, quam *asceticam* vocant, sive quae ad historiam Ecclesiae, ad ius canonicum, ad sacram eloquentiam referuntur ; ne iuvenes aliis quaestionibus consecrandis tempus terant et a studio praecipuo distrahantur, omnino vetamus diaria quaevis aut commentaria, quantumvis optima, ab iisdem legi, onerata moderatorum conscientia, qui ne id accadat religiose non caverint.

Ut autem suspicio segregetur omnis clanculum se inferentis modernismi, non solum omnino servari volumus quae sub numero secundo superius praescripta sunt, sed praeterea praecipimus ut singuli doctores, ante auspicandas ineunte anno praelectiones. Antistiti suo textum exhibeant, quem sibi quisque in docendo proposuerit, vel tractandas quaestiones, sive *theses* ; deinde ut per annum ipsum exploretur sua cuiusque magisterii ratio ; quae si videatur a sana doctrina discedere, causa erit quamobrem doctor illico amoveatur. Denique, ut, praeter fidei professionem, iusiurandum det Antistiti suo, secundum adiectam infra formulam, et subscripto nomine.

Iusiurandum hoc, praemissa Fidei professione per formulam a sa. me. Decessore Nostro Pio IV praescriptam, cum adiectis definitionibus Concilii Vaticani, suo antistiti item dabunt :

I. Clerici maioribus ordinibus initiandi ; quorum singulis antea tradatur exemplar tum professionis fidei, tum formulae edendi iurisiurandi ut eas accurate praenoscant, adiecta violati iurisiurandi, ut infra, sanctione.

II. Sacerdotes confessionibus excipiendis destinati et sacri concionatores, antequam facultate donentur ea munia exercendi.

III. Parochi, Canonici, Beneficarii ante ineundam beneficii possessionem.

IV. Officiales in curiis episcopalibus et ecclesiasticis tribunaliis, haud exceptis Vicario generali et iudicibus.

V. Adlecti concionibus habendis per quadragesimae tempus.

VI. Officiales omnes in Romanis Congregationibus vel tribunaliis coram Cardinali Praefecto vel Secretario eiusdem sive Congregationis sive tribunalis.

VII. Religiosarum familiarum Congregationumque Moderatores et Doctores antequam ineant officium.

Professionis fidei, quam diximus, editique iurisiurandi documenta, peculiaribus in tabulis penes Curias episcopales adser-

¹ Rom. xii. 3.

ventur, itemque penes Romanarum Congregationum sua quaeque officia. Si quis autem, quod Deus avertat, iusiurandum violare ausus fuerit, ad Sancti Officii tribunal illico deferatur.

IVRISIVRANDI FORMVLA.

‘Ego . . . firmiter amplector ac recipio omnia et singula, quae ab inerranti Ecclesiae magisterio definita, adserta ac declarata sunt, praesertim ea doctrinae capita, quae huius temporis erroribus directo adversantur. Ac primum quidem Deum, rerum omnium principium et finem, naturali rationis lumine per ea quae facta sunt, hoc est per *visibilia* creationis opera, tamquam causam per effectus, certo cognosci, adeoque demonstrari etiam posse, profiteor. Secundo, externa revelationis argumenta, hoc est facta divina, in primisque miracula et prophetias admitto et agnosco tamquam signa certissima divinitus ortae christianae Religionis, eademque teneo aetatum omnium atque hominum, etiam huius temporis, intelligentiae esse maxime accommodata. Tertio: Firma pariter fide credo, Ecclesiam, verbi revelati custodem et magistram, per ipsum verum atque historicum Christum, quum apud nos degeret, proxime ac directo institutam, eandemque super Petrum, apostolicae hierarchiae principem eiusque in aevum successores aedificatam. Quarto: Fidei doctrinam ab Apostolis per orthodoxos Patres eodem sensu eademque semper sententia ad nos usque transmissam, sincere recipio; ideoque prorsus reiicio haereticum commentum evolutionis dogmatum, ab uno in alium sensum transeuntium, diversum ab eo, quem prius habuit Ecclesia; pariterque damno errorem omnem, quo, divino deposito, Christi Sponsae tradito ab Eaque fideliter custodiendo, sufficitur philosophicum inventum, vel creatio humanae conscientiae, hominum conatu sensim efformatae et in posterum indefinito progressu perficiendae. Quinto: certissime teneo ac sincere profiteor, Fidem non esse coecum sensum religionis e latebris *subconscientiae* erumpentem, sub pressione cordis et inflexionis voluntatis moraliter informatae, sed verum assensum intellectus veritati extrinsecus acceptae ex auditu, quo nempe, quae a Deo personali, creatore ac domino nostro dicta, testata et revelata sunt, vera esse credimus, propter Dei auctoritatem summe veracis.

‘Me etiam, qua par est, reverentia, subiicio totoque animo adhaereo damnationibus, declarationibus, praescriptis omnibus, quae in Encyclicis litteris ‘*Pascendi*’ et in Decreto ‘*Lamentabili*’ continentur, praesertim circa eam quam historiam dogmatum

vocant.—Idem reprobō errorem affirmantium, propositam ab Ecclesia fidem posse historiae repugnare, et catholica dogmata, quo sensu nunc intelliguntur, cum verioribus christianae religionis originibus componi non posse.—Damno quoque ac reiicio eorum sententiam, qui dicunt, christianum hominem eruditorem induere personam duplicem, aliam credentis, aliam historici, quasi liceret historico ea retinere quae credentis fidei contradicant, aut praemissas adstruere, ex quibus consequatur dogmata esse aut falsa aut dubia, modo haec directo non denegetur.—Reprobō pariter eam Scripturae Sanctae diiudicandae atque interpretandae rationem, quae, Ecclesiae traditione, analogia Fidei, et Apostolicae Sedis normis posthabitis, *rationalistarum* commentis inhaeret, et critice textus velut unicam supremamque regulam, haud minus licenter quam temere amplectitur.—Sententiam praeterea illorum reiicio qui tenent, doctori disciplinae historicae theologicae tradendae, aut iis de rebus scribenti seponendam prius esse opinionem ante conceptam sive de supernaturali origine catholicae traditionis, sive de promissa divinitus ope ad perennem conservationem uniuscuiusque revelati veri; deinde scripta Patrum singulorum interpretanda solis scientiae principiis, sacra qualibet auctoritate seclusa, eaque iudicii libertate, qua profana quaevis monumenta solent investigari.—In universum denique me alienissimum ab errore profiteor, quo *modernistae* tenent in sacra traditione nihil inesse divini; aut, quod longe deterius, pantheistico sensu illud admittunt; ita ut nihil iam restet nisi nudum factum et simplex, communibus historiae factis aequandum; hominum nempe sua industria, solertia, ingenio scholam a Christo eiusque apostolis inchoatam per subsequentes aetates continuantium. Proinde fidem Patrum firmissime retineo et ad extremum vitae spiritum retinebo, de charismate *veritatis certo*, quod est, fuit eritque semper in *episcopatus ab Apostolis successione*,¹ non ut id teneatur quod melius et aptius videri possit secundum suam cuiusque aetatis culturam, sed ut *nunquam aliter credatur, nunquam aliter intelligatur absoluta et immutabilis veritas ab initio per Apostolos praedicata*.²

‘Haec omnia spondeo me fideliter, integre sincereque servaturum et inviolabiliter custoditurum, nusquam ab iis sive in docendo sive quomodolibet verbis scriptisque deflectendo. Sic spondeo, sic iuro, sic me Deus, etc.’

¹ Iren. 4, c. 26.

² Praeser. c. 28.

DE SACRA PRAEDICATIONE.

Quandoquidem praeterea diuturna observatione sit cognitum Nobis, episcoporum curis ut annuntietur divinum Verbum pares non respondere fructus, idque, non tam audientium desidia, quam oratorum iactantiaetribuendum putemus, qui hominis verbum exhibent magis quam Dei, opportunum censuimus, latine verum evulgare atque Ordinariis commendare documentum, iussu Decessoris Nostri fel. rec. Leonis XIII a Sacra Congregatione episcoporum et regularium editum die XXXI mensis Iulii anno MDCCCXCIV et ad Ordinarios Italiae atque ad religiosas Familias Congregationumque moderatores transmissum.

I^o. 'Et in primis quod ad ea pertinet virtutum ornamenta quibus sacri oratores emineant potissimum oportet, caveant ipsi Ordinarii ac religiosas familiarum Moderatores ne unquam sanctum hoc et salutare divini verbi ministerium iis credant qui nec pietate in Deum nec in Christum Filium eius Dominum nostrum caritate ornentur ac redundant. Istae enim si in catholicae doctrinae praeconibus desiderentur animi dotes, quavis tandem ii polleant dicendi facultate, aliud nihil profecto praestabunt quam *aes sonans, aut cymbalum tinniens*:¹ neque unquam id ipsis suppetet a quo evangelicae praedicationis vis omnis ac virtus derivatur, studium videlicet divinae gloriae aeternaeque animorum salutis. Quae quidem oratoribus sacris apprime necessaria pietas, cluceat oportet etiam in externa vitae eorundem ratione: ne sermone celebratis praeceptis institutisque christianis disserentium mores refragentur: neve iidem opere destruant quod aedificant verbo. Ne quid praeterea profani pietas eiusmodi redoleat: verum ea sit praedita gravitate, ut probet eos esse revera *ministros Christi, et dispensatores mysteriorum Dei*.² Secus enim, ut scite animadvertit Angelicus, *si doctrina est bona et praedicator malus, ipse est occasio blasphemiae doctrinae Dei*.³— At vero pietati ceterisque christianis virtutibus comes ne desit scientia: quum et per se pateat, et diuturna experientia comprobetur, nec sapiens, nec compositum, nec frugiferum dicendi genus posse ab iis atferri, qui doctrina, praesertim sacra, non affluant, quique ingenita quadam freti celeritate verborum, suggestum temere adscendunt ac ferme imparati. Hi profecto aerem verberant, et inscii divina eloquia contemptui obiciunt ac derisioni; plane digni quibus aptetur divina illa sententia: *Quia tu scientiam repulisti, repellam te, ne sacerdotio fungaris mihi*.⁴

¹ I Cor. xiii. 1.² I Cor. iv. 1.³ Comm. in Matth. v.⁴ Os. iv. 6.

2°. ‘Igitur episcopi et religiosarum familiarum antistites divini verbi ministerium ne cui sacerdoti committant, nisi ante constiterit, ipsum esse pietatis doctrinaeque copia rite instructum. Idem sedulo advigilent ut ea tantum pertractanda sumantur, quae sacrae praedicationis sunt propria. Quae vero eiusmodi sint Christus Dominus tunc aperuit quum ait : *Praedicate evangelium*. . . .¹ *Docentes eos servare omnia quaecumque mandavi vobis.*² Ad quae verba apte S. Thomas : *Praedicatores debent illuminare in credendis, dirigere in operandis, vitanda manifestare, et modo comminando, modo exhortando, hominibus praedicare.*³ Et sacrosanctum Concilium Tridentinum : *Annuntiantes eis vitia, quae eos declinare, et virtutes quas sectari oportet, ut poenam aeternam evadere et caelestem gloriam consequi valeant.*⁴ Quae omnia fusiore calamo persequutus f. r. Pius IX, haec scripsit : *Non semetipsos, sed Christum crucifixum praedicantes, sanctissimae religionis nostrae dogmata et praecepta, iuxta catholicae Ecclesiae et Patrum doctrinam, gravi ac splendido orationis genere, populo clare aperteque annuncient ; peculiaribus singulorum officia accurate explicent, omnesque a flagitiis deterreant, ad pietatem inflamment, quo fideles, Dei verbo salubriter refectioni, vitia omnia declinent, virtutes sectentur, atque ita aeternas poenas evadere et caelestem gloriam consequi valeant.*⁵ Ex quibus omnibus perspicuum fit. symbolum Apostolorum, divinum decalogum, Ecclesiae praecepta, Sacramenta, virtutes ac vitia, sua cuiusque conditionis officia, novissima hominis et cetera id genus aeterna vera, haec esse propria argumenta de quibus oporteat concionari.’

3°. ‘Sed rerum talium copiam et uberrimam et gravissimam recentiores divini verbi ministri haud raro nil pensi habent ; uti obsoletum quid et inane negligunt ac paene abiiciunt. Hi nimirum quum probe compertum habeant recensita rerum momenta captandae populari gratiae, cui tantum inhiant, minus esse idoneo ; quae sua sunt quaerentes, non quae Iesu Christi,⁶ eadem plane seponunt ; idque vel ipsis quadragesimae diebus ac reliquis solemniioribus anni tempestatibus. Una vero cum rebus immutantes nomina, antiquis concionibus recens quoddam ac minus recte intellectum alloquendi sufficiunt genus, quod CONFERENCE dicunt, menti cogitationique alliciendae magis aptum quam impellendae voluntati atque instaurandis moribus. Hi profecto haud secum reputant conciones morales omnibus, *conferentias* vix paucis prodesse ; quorum si moribus diligentius

¹ Marc. xvi. 15.

² Matth. xxviii. 20.

³ Loc. cit.

⁴ Sess. V, cap. 2, *De Reform.*

⁵ Litt. Enc. ix Nov. MDCCCLXVI.

⁶ Philip. ii. 21.

perspectum foret per inculcatam saepe castitatem, animi demissionem, obsequium in Ecclesiae auctoritatem, hoc ipso praeiudicatas de fide opiniones exuerent lucemque veritatis promptiore animo exciperent. Quod enim complures de religione prave sentiunt, maxime inter catholicas gentes, id effrenatis animi cupiditatibus potius est tribuendum, quam vitio aberrantis intelligentiae, secundum divinam sententiam : *De corde exeunt cogitationes malae . . . blasphemiae.*¹ Hinc Augustinus Psalmistae referens verba : *Dixit insipiens in corde suo : non est Deus,*² commentatur : *in corde suo, non in mente sua.*

4^o. 'Haec tamen non ita sunt accipienda quasi sermones id genus per se omnino sint improbandi, quum contra, si apte tractentur, peritiles possint esse aut etiam necessarij ad refellendos errores, quibus religio impetitur. Sed amovenda omnino est a suggestu pompa illa dicendi, quae in quadam rerum contemplatione magis quam in actione versatur; quae civitatem spectat proprius quam religionem; quae denique specie nitet melius quam fructuum ubertate. Ea nempe omnia commentariis et academiis magis accommodata, dignitati atque amplitudini domus Dei minime congruunt. Sermones autem, seu *conferentiae*, quae propositam habent religionis tuitionem contra hostiles impugnationes, etsi quandoque necessarij, non omnium tamen humeris apti sunt, sed validioribus. Atque ipsis quidem oratoribus eximiis magna est adhibenda cautela, quod eiusmodi defensiones haberi non decet nisi ubi tempus aut locus aut audientium conditio eas necessario postulent, spesque adsit non fore fructu vacuas : cuius rei iudicium legitimum penes Ordinarios esse ambiget nemo. Oportet praeterea in sermonibus id genus probandi vis sacris doctrinis multo plus quam humanae sapientiae verbis innitatur, omniaque nervose dicantur ac dilucide, ne forte mentibus auditorum haereant altius impressae falsae opiniones quam opposita vera, neve obiecta magis quam responsa percellant. Ante omnia vero illud cavendum, ne talium sermonum frequentia moralium concionum dignitatem deminuat ab usuve removeat, quasi hae inferioris ordinis essent ac minoris faciendae prae pugnaci illo dicendi genere, adeoque concionatorum et auditorum vulgo relinquendae; quum contra verissimum sit conciones de moribus plerisque fidelibus esse maxime necessarias; dignitate vero contentiosis disceptationibus minime cedere; ita ut vel a praestantissimis oratoribus, coram quovis elegantiori frequentiorque coetu, saltem identidem summo cum studio essent

¹ Matth. xv. 19.

² Psal. xlii. 1.

habendae. Quod nisi fiat, multitudo fidelium cogetur audire semper loquentem de erroribus, a quibus plerique ipsorum abhorrent; nunquam de vitiis ac noxis, quibus eiusmodi auditoria prae ceteris inficiuntur.'

§ 5°. 'Quod si vitiis haud vacat argumenti delectus, alia, eaque graviora etiam, querenda occurrunt si animum quis referat ad orationis speciem ac formam. Quae, prout egregie edisserit Aquinas, ut reapse sit *lux mundi*, tria debet habere *praedicator verbi divini*: *primum est stabilitas, ut non deviet a veritate*: *secundum est claritas, ut non doceat cum obscuritate*: *tertium est utilitas, ut quaerat Dei laudem et non suam*.¹ At vero forma hodierna dicendi saepenumero, non modo longe abest ab illa evangelica perspicuitate ac simplicitate quae iisdem deberet esse propria, sed tota posita est in verborum anfractibus atque abditis rebus, quae communem populi captum excedunt. Dolenda sane res ac prophetae deflenda verbis: *Parvuli petierunt panem, et non erat qui frangeret eis*.² Sed illud etiam miserius, quod saepe his concionibus deest illa species religionis, afflatus ille christianae pietatis, illa denique vis divina ac Sancti Spiritus virtus interius loquentis et ad bonum pie permoventis animos: qua sane vi ac virtute sacris praeconibus semper essent usurpanda Apostoli verba: *Sermo meus, et praedicatio mea, non in persuasibilibus humanae sapientiae verbis, sed in ostensione spiritus et virtutis*.³ Iidem contra freti *persuasibilibus* humanae sapientiae verbis, vix aut ne vix quidem animum ad divina eloquia intendunt et ad Scripturas Sanctas, quae sacrae praedicationi potiores uberioresque recludunt latices, uti diserte docebat nuper Sanctissimus Dominus Leo XIII hisce verbis gravissimis: "Haec propria et singularis Scripturarum virtus, a divino afflatu Spiritus Sancti profecta, ea est quae oratori sacro auctoritatem addit, apostolicam praebet dicendi libertatem, nervosam victricemque tribuit eloquentiam. Quisquis enim divini verbi spiritum et robur eloquendo refert, ille non loquitur *in sermone tantum, sed et in virtute, et in Spiritu Sancto, et in plenitudine multa*.⁴ Quamobrem ii dicendi sunt praepostere improvideque facere, qui ita conciones de religione habent et praecepta divina enunciant, nihil ut fere afferant nisi humanae scientiae et prudentiae verba, suis magis argumentis quam divinis innixi. Istorum scilicet orationem, quantumvis nitentem luminibus, languescere et frigere necesse est, utpote quae igne careat sermonis Dei, eandemque longe abesse ab illa, qua divinus sermo pollet virtute: *Vivus*

¹ Loc. cit.² Thren. iv. 4.³ 1 Cor. ii. 4.⁴ 1 Thess. i. 5.

*est enim sermo Dei, et efficax, et penetrabilior omni gladio ancipiti : et pertingens usque ad divisionem animae ac spiritus.*¹ Quamquam hoc etiam prudentioribus assentiendum est, inesse in sacris Litteris mire variam et uberem magnisque dignam rebus eloquentiam ; id quod Augustinus pervidit diserteque arguit,² atque res ipsa confirmat praestantissimorum in oratoribus sacris, qui nomen suum assiduae Bibliorum consuetudini piaequae meditationi se praecipue debere, grati Deo, affirmarunt.”³

‘En igitur eloquentiae sacrae fons facile princeps, Biblia. Sed qui ad nova exempla componuntur praecones, dicendi copiam non *e fonte* hauriunt *aquae vivae*, sed abusu haud sane ferendo, se ad *humanae sapientiae cisternas dissipatas* convertunt, et seposita doctrinâ divinitus inspirita, vel Ecclesiae Patrum et Conciliorum, toti sunt in profanorum recentiorumque atque adeo viventium scriptorum nominibus sententiisque proferendis : quae sane sententiae saepe interpretationibus ansam praebent, aut ambiguis aut valde periculosi. “Alterum offensionis caput iniiciunt qui ita de rebus religionis disserunt, quasi omnia caducae huius vitae emolumentis commodisque metiantur, futurae ac sempiternae pene obliti : qui fructus quidem a christiana religione illatos hominum societati praeclare persequuntur, officia vero ab iisdem servanda dissimulant ; Christi Servatoris unam efferunt caritatem ; iustitiam silent. Inde istius praedicationis exiguus fructus qua audita profanus homo persuasionem secumfert, etiam non mutatis moribus se fore christianum, dum dicat : Credo in Christum Iesum.”⁴ Verum, quid ipsorum interest fructus colligere ? Non id sane propositum habent, sed illud maxime, ut auditorum *prurientes aures* iisdem assententur ; dumque templa referta videant, vacuos animos remanere patiuntur. Hac nempe de causa mentionem iniiciunt nullam de peccato, de novissimis, aliisque maximi momenti rebus, sed in eo toti sunt ut *verba placentia* effundant, tribunicia magis et profana eloquentia quam apostolica et sacra, ut clamores plaususque aucupentur ; contra quos ita Hieronymus : *Docente in Ecclesia te, non clamor populi, sed gemitus suscitetur : auditorum lacrimae laudes tuae sint.*⁵ Quo fit ut istorum conciones, quum in sacris aedibus tum extra, scenicum quendam apparatus exhibeant, omnemque speciem sanctitatis et efficaciam adimant. Hinc ab auribus populi et plurium etiam e clero migravit voluptas

¹ Hebr. iv. 12.

² *De Doctr. christ.* iv. 6, 7.

³ Litt. Encycl., *De Studiis Script. Sacr.*, xviii Nov. MDCCCXCIII.

⁴ Card. Bausa, Archiep. Florentin., *ad iuniorem clerum*, 1892.

⁵ *Ad Nepotian.*

omnis quae a divino verbo hauritur ; hinc bonis omnibus iniectae offensiones ; hinc vel admodum exiguus, vel plane nullus aberrantium profectus, qui, etiamsi interdum concurrant audituri verba placentia, praesertim si magnificis illis illecti centies resonantibus *humanitatis adscensum, patriam, scientiam recentius invectam*, postquam dicendi peritum effuso prosequuti sunt plausu, templo iidem qui antea discedunt, haud eorum absimiles, qui *mirabantur, sed non convertebantur*.¹

‘ Volens igitur haec Sacra Congregatio, ex mandato Sanctissimi Domini Nostri, tot ac tam improbandos abusus cohibere, Episcopos omnes et eos, qui religiosis Familiis institutisve ecclesiasticis praesunt tamquam supremi moderatores, compellat, ut apostolico pectore sese iisdem opponant omnique studio extirpandos curent. Memores igitur eorum, quae a SS. Concilio Tridentino praescripto sunt.² *Viros idoneos ad huiusmodi praedicationis officium assumere tenentur*, in hoc negotia perquam diligenter cauteque se gerant. Si de sacerdotibus agatur suae dioecesis impense caveant Ordinarii ne unquam iidem ad id muneris admittantur, quin *prius de vita et scientia et moribus probati fuerint*³ hoc est nisi facto periculo aut alia opportuna ratione illos idoneos esse consisterit. Si vero de sacerdotibus res sit alienae dioecesis, neminem suggestum adscendere sinant, idque solemnioribus praesertim diebus, nisi prius ex testimonio scripto proprii Ordinarii vel religiosi Antistitis constiterit eosdem bonis moribus esse praeditos eique muneri pares. Moderatores vero sui cuiusque Ordinis, Societatis vel Congregationis religiosae neminem prorsus ex propriae disciplinae alumni obire sinant concionatoris munus, eoque minus litterarum testimonio commendent locorum Ordinariis, nisi eiusdem perspectam habeant et morum probitatem et facultatem concionandi uti decet. Si quem vero commendatum sibi litteris oratorem exceperint ac subinde experti cognoverint, eum in concionando a normis praesentium Litterarum discedere, cito in obsequium adigant. Quod si non audierit, a suggestu prohibeant, iis etiam, si opus fuerit, adhibitis canonicis poenis, quas res videatur postulare.’

Haec praescribenda censuimus aut recolenda, mandantes ut religiose observentur, gravitate permoti succrescentis in dies mali, cui serius occurri non potest sine summo periculo. Neque enim iam res est, quemadmodum ab initio, cum disputatoribus prodeuntibus *in vestimentis ovium*, sed cum apertis infensisque

¹ Ex Aug. in Matth. xix. 25.

² Sess. V., c. 2, *De Reform.*

³ Conc. Trid., Sess. V., c. 2, *De Reform.*

inimicis, iisque domesticis, qui facto foedere cum Ecclesiae capitalibus hostibus, propositam habent fidei eversionem. Sunt hi nempe, quorum audacia adversus deductam caelo sapientiam quotidie consurgit, cuius corrigendae sibi ius arrogat, quasi esset corrupta ; renovandae, quasi esset senio confecta ; augendae aptandaeque saeculi placitis, progressionibus, commodis, quasi eadem, non levitati paucorum, sed bono societatis esset adversa.

Hisce ausibus contra evangelicam doctrinam et ecclesiasticam traditionem nunquam satis opponetur vigilantiae aut severitatis nimium ab iis quibus commissa est sacri huius depositi custodia fidelis.

Quae igitur monita et salutaria mandata Motu hoc proprio ac certa scientia ediximus, ab universis catholici orbis quum Ordinariis tum etiam regularium Ordinum institutorumque ecclesiasticorum supremis Magistris religiosissime servanda, rata et firma consistere auctoritate Nostra volumus et iubemus, contrariis quibuslibet non obstantibus.

Datum Romae, apud Sanctum Petrum, die 1 mensis Septembris, anno MDCCCXC, Pontificatus Nostri octavo.

PIUS PP. X.

CAUSES AND RULES FOR REMOVAL OF PARISH PRIESTS FROM OFFICE AND BENEFICE

SACRA CONGREGATIO CONSISTORIALIS

DE AMOTIONE ADMINISTRATIVA AB OFFICIO ET BENEFICIO CURATO.

DECRETUM

Maxima cura semper Ecclesiae fuit, ut christiano populo praecessent et animarum saluti prospicerent selecti e sacerdotum numero viri, qui vitae integritate niterent et cum fructu suis muniis fungerentur.

Quamvis autem, ut hi rectores quae paroeciae utilia aut necessaria esse iudicarent alacriore possent animo suscipere soluti metu ne ab Ordinario amoverentur pro lubitu, praescriptum generatim fuerit, ut stabiles in suo officio permanerent ; nihilominus, quia stabilitas haec in salutem est inducta fidelium, idcirco sapienti consilio cautum est, ut eadem non sic urgeatur, ut in perniciem potius ipsorum cedat.

Quapropter, si quis scelestus creditum sibi gregem destruat magis quam aedificet, is debet, iuxta antiquissimum et constantem Ecclesiae morem, quantum fas est, instituto iudicio de crimine, beneficio privari, hoc est a parochiali munere abduci.

Quod si, vi canonici iuris, criminali iudicio ac poenali destitutioni non sit locus; parochus autem hac illâve de causa, etiam culpa semota, utile ministerium in paroecia non gerat, vel gerere nequeat, aut forte sua ibi praesentia noxius evadat; alia suppetunt remedia ad animarum saluti consulendum. In his potissimum est parochi amotio, quae oeconomica seu disciplinaris vulgo dicitur, et nullo iudiciali apparatu, sed administrativo modo decernitur, nec parochi poenam propositam habet, sed utilitatem fidelium. Salus enim populi suprema lex est: et parochi ministerium fuit in Ecclesia institutum, non in commodum eius cui committitur, sed in eorum salutem pro quibus confertur.

Verum, quum de hac amotione canonicae leges haud plane certae perspicuaeque viderentur, coetus Consultorum et Emorum Patrum ecclesiastico codici conficiendo praepositus, rem seorsim ac repetito studio tractandam suscepit; collatisque consiliis, censuit formam quandam accuratorem esse statuendam, qua gravis haec ecclesiasticae disciplinae pars regeretur. Quae studia quum SS^{mus} D. N. Pius PP. X. et vidisset et probasset, quo tutius in re tanti momenti procederet, sententiam quoque sacrae huius Congregationis Consistorialis exquirendam duxit. Qua excepta et probata, ut Ecclesia posset, nulla interiecta mora, novae huius disciplinae beneficio frui, decretum per hanc S. Congregationem edi iussit, quo novae normae de amotione administrativa ab officio vel beneficio curato statutae promulgarentur, eademque canonicam legem pro universa Ecclesia constituerent, omnibus ad quos spectat rite religioseque servandam.

Hae autem normae hisce qui sequuntur canonibus continentur.

I.—DE CAUSIS AD AMOTIONEM REQUISITIS.

CAN. I

Causae ob quas parochus administrativo modo amoveri potest hae sunt:

1°. Insania, a qua ex peritorum sententia perfecte et sine relabendi periculo sanus fieri non posse videatur; aut ob quam parochi existimatio et auctoritas, etiamsi convaluerit, eam penes populum fecerit iacturam, ut noxium iudicetur eundem in officio retinere.

2°. Imperitia et ignorantia quae paroeciae rectorem imparem reddat suis sacris officiis.

3°. Surditas, caecitas et alia quaelibet animae et corporis infirmitas, quae necessariis curae animarum officiis imparem in

perpetuum vel etiam per diuturnum tempus sacerdotem reddant, nisi huic incommodo per coadiutorem vel vicarium occurri congrue possit.

4°. Odium plebis, quamvis iniustum et non universale, dummodo tale sit quod utile parochi ministerium impediat, et prudenter praevideatur brevi non esse cessaturum.

5°. Bonae aestimationis amissio penes probos et graves viros, sive haec procedat ex inhonesta aut suspecta vivendi ratione parochi, vel ex alia eius noxia, vel etiam ex antiquo eiusdem crimine, quod nuper detectum ob praescriptionem poena plecti amplius non possit; sive procedat ex facto et culpa familiarum et consanguineorum quibuscum parochus vivit, nisi per eorum discessum bonae parochi famae sit satis provisum.

6°. Crimen quod, quamvis actu occultum, mox publicum cum magna populi offensione fieri posse prudenti Ordinarii iudicio praevideatur.

7°. Noxia rerum temporalium administratio cum gravi ecclesiae aut beneficii damno; quoties huic malo remedium afferri nequeat auferendo administrationem parochi aut alio modo, et aliunde parochus spirituale ministerium utiliter exerceat.

8°. Neglectio officiorum parochialium post unam et alteram monitionem perseverans et in re gravis momenti, ut in sacramentorum administratione, in necessaria infirmorum adsistentia, in catechismi et evangelii explicatione, in residentiae observantia.

9°. Inobedientia praeceptis Ordinarii post unam et alteram monitionem et in re gravis momenti, ceu cavendi a familiaritate cum aliqua persona vel familia, curandi debitam custodiam et munditiam domus Dei, modum adhibendi in taxarum parochialium exactione et similibus.

Monitio de qua superius sub extremo duplici numero, ut peremptoria sit ex proximae amotionis praenuntia, fieri ab Ordinario debet, non paterno dumtaxat more, verbotenus et clam omnibus; sed ita ut de eadem in actis Curiae legitime constet.

II.—DE MODO PROCEDENDI IN GENERALI

CAN. 2

§ 1. Modus deveniendi ad amotionem administrativam hic est: ut ante omnia parochus invitetur ad renunciandum: si renuat, gradus fiat ad amotionis decretum: si recursum contra amotionis decretum interponat, procedatur ad revisionem actorum et ad praecedentis decreti confirmationem.

§ 2. In quo procedendi gradu regulae infra statutae ita ser-

vandae sunt, ut, si violentur in iis quae substantiam attingunt, amotio ipsa nulla et irrita evadat.

III.—DE PERSONIS AD MOTIONEM DECERNENDAM NECESSARIIS

CAN. 3

§ 1. In *invitatione* parochi facienda ut renunciaret, et in *amotionis decreto* ferendo, Ordinarius ut legitime agat, non potest ipse solus procedere; sed debet inter examinatores, de quibus statuit Sacra Tridentina Synodus, cap. XVIII, sess. XXIV, *de reform.*, duos sibi sociare et eorum consensum requirere in omnibus actibus pro quibus hic expresse exigitur: in ceteris vero consilium.

§ 2. In *revisione autem decreti amotionis*, quoties haec necessaria evadat, duos parochos, consultores assumat, quorum consensum vel consilium requiret, eodem modo ac in § superiore de examinatribus dictum est.

CAN. 4

Examinatoribus et parochis consultoribus eligendis lex in posterum ubilibet servanda haec esto:

§ 1. Si synodus habeatur, in ea, iuxta receptas normas, eligendi erunt tot numero quot Ordinarius prudenti suo iudicio necessarios iudicaverit.

§ 2. Examinatoribus et parochis consultoribus medio tempore inter unam et aliam synodum demortuis, vel alia ratione a munere cessantibus, alios *prosynodales* Ordinarius substituet de consensu Capituli Cathedralis, et, hoc deficiente, de consensu Consultorum dioecesanorum.

§ 3. Quae regula servetur quoque in examinatribus et parochis consultoribus eligendis, quoties synodus non habeatur.

§ 4. Examinatores et consultores sive in synodo, sive extra synodum electi, post quinquennium a sua nominatione, vel etiam prius, adveniente nova synodo, officio cadunt. Possunt tamen, servatis de iure servandis, denuo eligi.

§ 5. Removeri ab Ordinario durante quinquennio nequeunt, nisi ex gravi causa et de consensu capituli cathedralis, vel consultorum dioecesanorum.

CAN. 5

§ 1. Examinatores et parochi consultores ab Ordinario in causa amotionis assumendi, non quilibet erunt, sed duo seniores ratione electionis, et in pari electione seniores ratione sacerdotii, vel, hac deficiente, ratione aetatis.

§ 2. Qui inter eos ob causam in iure recognitam suspecti evidenter appareant, possunt ab Ordinario, antequam rem tractandam suscipiat, excludi. Ob eandem causam parochus potest contra ipsos excipere, cum primum in causa veniat.

§ 3. Alterutro vel utroque ex duobus prioribus examinаторibus vel consultoribus impedito vel excluso, tertius vel quartus eodem ordine assumetur.

CAN. 6

§ 1. Quoties in canonibus qui sequuntur expresse dicitur, Ordinario procedendum esse de examinаторum vel consultorum consensu, ipse debet per secreta suffragia rem dirimere, et ea sententia probata erit quae duo saltem suffragia favorabilia tulerit.

§ 2. Quoties vero Ordinarius de consilio examinаторum vel consultorum procedere potest, satis est ut eos audiat, nec ulla obligatione tenetur ad eorum votum, quamvis concors, accedendi.

§ 3. In utroque casu de consequentibus ex scrutinio scripta relatio fiat, et ab omnibus subsignetur.

CAN. 7

§ 1. Examinatores et consultores debent sub gravi, dato iureiurando, servare secretum officii circa omnia quae ratione sui muneris noverint, et maxime circa documenta secreta, disceptationes in consilio habitas, suffragiorum numerum et rationes.

§ 2. Si contra fecerint, non solum a munere examinаторis et consultoris amovendi erunt, sed alia etiam condigna poena ab Ordinario pro culpae gravitate, servatis servandis, multari poterunt: ac praeterea obligatione tenentur sarcienti damna, si quae fuerint inde sequuta.

IV.—DE INVITATIONE AD RENUNCIANDUM

CAN. 8

Quoties itaque, pro prudenti Ordinarii iudicio, videatur parochus incidisse in unam ex causis superius in *can.* 1, recensitis, ipse Ordinarius duos examinatores a iure statutos convocabit, omnia eis patefaciet, de veritate et gravitate causae cum eis disceptabit, ut statuatur sitne locus formali invitationi parochi ad renunciandum.

CAN. 9

§ 1. Formalis haec invitatio semper praemittenda est antequam ad amotionis decretum deveniatur, nisi agatur de insania, vel quoties invitandi modus non suppetat, ut si parochus lateat.

§ 2. Decernenda autem est de examinаторum consensu.

CAN. 10

§ 1. Invitatio scripto facienda generatim est. Potest tamen aliquando si tutius et expeditius videatur, verbis fieri ab ipso Ordinario, vel ab eius delegato, adsistente aliquo sacerdote, qui actuarii munere fungatur, ac de ipsa invitatione documentum redigat in actis curiae servandum.

§ 2. Una cum invitatione ad renunciandum debent vel scripto vel verbis, ut supra, parochus patefieri causae seu ratio ob quam invitatio fit, argumenta quibus ratio ipsa innititur, servatis tamen debitis cautelis de quibus in *can. 11*, examinerum suffragium postulatum et impetratu.

§ 3. Si agatur de occulto delicto, et invitatio ad renunciandum scripto fiat, causa aliqua dumtaxat generalis nuncianda est; ratio autem in specie cum argumentis quibus delicti veritas comprobatur, ab Ordinario verbis dumtaxat est explicanda, adsistente uno examinerum qui actuarii munere fungatur, et cum cautelis ut supra.

§ 4. Denique sive scripto sive voce invitatio fiat, admonendus parochus est, nisi intra decem dies ab accepta invitatione aut renunciationem exhibuerit, aut efficacibus argumentis causas ad amotionem invocatas falsas esse demonstraverit, ad amotionis decretum esse deveniendum.

CAN. 11

§ 1. In communicandis argumentis quibus comprobatur veritas causae ad renunciationem obtinendam adductae, caveatur ne nomina patefiant recurrentium vel testium, si ii secretum petierint, aut, etiamsi secretum non petierint, si ex adiunctis praevideatur eos vexationibus facile expositum iri.

§ 2. Item relationes ac documenta quae sine periculo magnae populi offensionis, rixarum vel querelarum palam proferri non possunt, scripto ne patefiant; imo ne verbis quidem, nisi cauto omnino ne memorata incommoda eveniant.

CAN. 12

Fas autem parochus est, invitatione cum assignato temporis limite accepta, dilationem ad deliberandum vel ad defensionem parandam postulare. Quam Ordinarius potest iusta de causa, cum examinerum consensu, et modo id non cedat in detrimentum animarum, ad alios decem vel viginti dies concedere.

CAN. 13

§ 1. Si parochus invitationi sibi factae assentiri et paroecia se abdicare statuatur, renunciationem edere potest etiam sub

conditione, dummodo haec ab Ordinario legitime acceptari possit et acceptetur.

§ 2. Fas autem parochus renuncianti est loco causae ab Ordinario invocatae aliam ad renunciandum allegare sibi minus molestam vel gravem, dummodo vera et honesta sit, e.g., ut obsequatur Ordinarii desideriis.

§ 3. Renunciatione sequuta et ab Ordinario acceptata, Ordinarius beneficium vel officium vacans ex renunciatione declaret.

V.—DE AMOTIONIS DECRETO

CAN. 14

§ 1. Si parochus intra utile tempus nec renunciationem emittat, nec dilationem postulet, nec causas ad amotionem invocatas oppugnet, Ordinarius, postquam constiterit invitationem ad renunciandum rite factam, parochus innotuisse, neque ipsum quominus respondeat legitime impeditum fuisse, procedat ad amotionis decretum, servatis regulis quae in sequentibus canonibus statuuntur.

§ 2. Si vero non constet de superius indicatis duobus adiunctis, Ordinarius opportune provideat, aut iterans parochus invitationem ad renunciandum, aut eidem prorogans tempus utile ad respondendum.

CAN. 15

§ 1. Si parochus oppugnare velit causas ad amotionem decernendam invocatas, debet intra utile tempus scripto deducere iura sua, allegationibus ad hoc unum directis, ut causam ob quam renunciatio petitur impugnet et evertat.

§ 2. Potest etiam ad aliquod factum vel assertum quod sua intersit comprobandum, duos vel tres testes proponere, et ut examinentur postulare.

3. Ordinarii tamen est cum examinerum consensu eos vel aliquot ipsorum, si idonei sint et eorum examen necessarium videatur, admittere et excutere; vel etiam, si causa amotionis liqueat et testium examen inutile et ad moras nectendas petitiū appareat, excludere.

§ 4. Quod si, allegationibus exhibitis, dubium exoriat quod diluere oporteat ut tuto procedi liceat, Ordinarii erit cum examinerum consilio, etiam parochus non postulante, testes qui necessarii videantur inducere, et parochum ipsum, si opus sit, interrogare.

CAN. 16

§ 1. In examine testium sive ex officio sive rogante parochio inductorum, ea dumtaxat servantur quae necessaria sint ad veritatem in tuto ponendam, quolibet iudiciali apparatu et *reprobationibus* testium exclusis.

§ 2. Eadem regula in interrogatione parochi, si locum habeat, servetur.

CAN. 17

§ 1. Si parochus intersit et documenta ac nomina testium ipsi patefiant, ipsiusmet erit, si possit ac velit, contra ea quae afferuntur excipere.

§ 2. Quando vero parochus iuxta *can.* 9 invitari nequeat ad iura sua deducenda, aut quando iuxta *can.* 11 testium nomina et aliqua documenta ei manifestari nequeant, ipse Ordinarius curas et industrias omnes adhibeat, (seu *diligentias*, ut vulgo dicitur, peragat) ut de documentorum valore et de testium fide iustum iudicium fieri possit.

CAN. 18

§ 1. Ad renunciationem et amotionem impediendam nefas parochio est turbas ciere, publicas subscriptiones in sui favorem promovere, populum sermonibus aut scriptis excitare, aliaque agere quae legitimum iurisdictionis ecclesiasticae exercitium impedire possunt: secus, iuxta prudens Ordinarii iudicium, pro gravitate culpaepuniatur.

§ 2. Insuper cum agatur de re ad consulendum animarum bono directa et administrativo modo resolvenda, parochus, nisi legitime impeditus sit, debet ipse per se, excluso aliorum interventu, adstare. Si autem impeditus sit, potest probum aliquem sacerdotem sibi benevisum et ab Ordinario acceptatum procuratorem suum constituere.

CAN. 19

§ 1. Omnibus expletis quae ad iustam parochi tuitionem pertinent, de amotionis decreto ab Ordinario cum examinatribus discutiendum est, et per secreta suffragia iuxta praescripta in *can.* 6 res est definienda.

§ 2. Suffragium autem pro amotione nemo dare debet, nisi sibi certo constet causam parochio denuntiata[m] vere adesse eamque legitimam.

CAN. 20

§ 1. Si conclusio sit pro amotione, decretum ab Ordinario edi debet, quo generatim statuatur ratione boni animarum paro-

chum amoveri. Propria autem et peculiaris amotionis causa exprimi potest pro prudenti Ordinarii iudicio, si id expediat et absque incommodis liceat. Mentio tamen semper facienda erit de invitatione facta ad renunciandum, de exhibitis a parochio allegationibus ac de requisito et obtento examinerum suffragio.

§ 2. Decretum indicendum est sacerdoti ; sed promulgari non debet, nisi elapso tempore utili ad interponendum recursum.

CAN. 21

Si conclusio non sit pro amotione, certior ea de re faciendus est parochus. Ordinarius autem ne omittat addere monitiones, salutaria consilia et praecepta quae pro casuum diversitate opportuna aut necessaria videantur : de quibus maxima ratio habenda erit, si denuo de illius sacerdotis amotione res futura sit.

VI.—DE ACTORUM REVISIONE

CAN. 22

§ 1. Contra decretum amotionis datur dumtaxat recursus ad eundem Ordinarium pro revisione actorum coram novo Consilio, quod Ordinario et duobus parochis consultoribus constat iuxta § 2, *can. 3*.

§ 2. Recursus interponendus est intra decem dies ab indicto decreto ; nec remedium datur contra lapsum fatalium, nisi parochus probet se vi maiori impeditum a recursu fuisse ; de qua re videre debet Ordinarius cum examineribus, quorum consensus requiritur.

CAN. 23

Interposito recursu, dantur parochio adhuc decem dies ad novas allegationes producendas, iisdem servatis regulis quae superius in discussione coram examineribus statutae sunt, salva dispositione § 4, *can. seq.*

CAN. 24

§ 1. Consultores, convenientes cum Ordinario, de duobus tantum videre debent, utrum in actibus praecedentibus vitia formae in ea irrepserint quae rei substantiam attingant, et utrum adducta amotionis ratio sit fundamento destituta.

§ 2. Ad hunc finem omnia superius acta et adducta examinare debent atque perpendere.

§ 3. Possunt etiam ex officio ad illa duo memorata discussionis capita in tuto ponenda exquirere et percontari de rebus quas necessario cognoscendas putent, auditis etiam, si opus sit, novis testibus.

§ 4. Parochus tamen ius non habet exigendi ut novi testes inducantur et examinentur; nec ut sibi dilationes ulteriores ad deducenda sua iura concedantur.

CAN. 25

§ 1. Admissio vel relectio recursus maiore suffragiorum numero est decernenda.

§ 2. Adversus huius consilii resolutionem non datur locus ulteriori expostulationi.

VII.—DE AMOTI PROVISIONE.

CAN. 26

§ 1. Sacerdoti ex facta sibi invitatione renunciante, aut administrativo modo a paroecia amoto, Ordinarius pro viribus consulat, aut per translationem ad aliam paroeciam, aut per assignationem alicuius ecclesiastici officii, aut per pensionem aliquam, prout casus ferat et adiuncta permittant.

§ 2. In provisionis assignatione Ordinarius examinatores, vel parochos consultores si usque ad eos causa pervenerit, audire ne omittat.

CAN. 27

§ 1. Paroeciam Ordinarius ne assignet, nisi dignus idoneusque ad eam regendam sit sacerdos; proponere autem eidem potest paroeciam paris, inferioris aut etiam superioris ordinis, prout aequitas et prudentia videantur exigere.

§ 2. Si agatur de pensione, hanc Ordinarius ne assignet nisi servatis de iure servandis.

§ 3. In pari conditione, renunciante magis favendum in provisione est, quam amoto.

CAN. 28

§ 1. Negotium de provisione sacerdotis potest Ordinarius reservare post expletam causam amotionis, et generatim quam citius expediendum.

§ 2. Sed potest etiam in ipsa invitatione ad renuntiandum vel separatis litteris, pendente amotionis negotio, vel in ipso amotionis decreto provisionem hanc proponere et indicare, si expediens iudicaverit.

§ 3. In quolibet casu quaestio de provisione futura sacerdotis non debet commisceri cum quaestione praesenti de amotione a paroecia; neque illa hanc impedire aut remorari, si bonum animarum exigat ut expediatur.

CAN. 29

§ 1. Sacerdos qui renunciavit, aut a beneficio vel officio amotus fuit, debet quamprimum liberam relinquere paroecialem domum, et omnia quae ad paroeciam pertinent eius oeconomio regulariter tradere. Et si moras illegitime nectat, potest ecclesiasticis sanctionibus ad id cogi.

§ 2. Quod si agatur de infirmo, Ordinarius eidem permittat usum etiam *exclusivum*, ubi sit opus, paroecialium aedium, usque dum possit pro prudenti eiusdem Ordinarii iudicio commode alio transferri. Interim vero novus paroeciae rector aliquam aliam temporariam habitationem in paroecia sibi comparari curet.

VIII.—DE IIS QUI HUIC LEGI SUBIACENT.

CAN. 30

Superius constitutis regulis,—adamussim applicandis iis omnibus qui paroeciam, quovis titulo, ut proprii eius rectores obtinent, sive nuncupentur Vicarii perpetui, sive *desservants*, sive alio quolibet nomine,—locus non est, quoties paroecia committatur curae alicuius sacerdotis qua oeconomii temporalis vel Vicarii ad tempus, sive ob infirmitatem parochi, sive ob vacationem beneficii, aut ob aliam similem causam.

CAN. 31

§ 1. Si parochus in ius rapiatur ut reus criminis, pendente criminali iudicio sive coram ecclesiastica sive coram civili potestate, locus non datur administrativae illius amotioni; sed expectandus est exitus iudicii.

§ 2. Interim tamen si agatur de crimine quod infamiam facti inducat, Ordinarius parochum prohibere potest, quominus curam animarum exerceat ac temporalem administrationem beneficii gerat; ea vero munia cum congrua fructuum assignatione Vicario aliive a se eligendo committat.

§ 3. Iudicio autem criminali finito, locus erit restitutioni parochi, vel eius administrativae amotioni, vel canonicae destitutioni, prout iustitia exigat et adiuncta ferant.

CAN. 32

Ordinarii nomine pro omnibus quae in hoc titulo statuuntur non venit Vicarius Generalis, nisi speciali mandato ad hoc sit munitus.

Iis autem cito exsequendis quae in hoc decreto statuuntur, SSñus Dominus Noster mandat ut omnes et singuli Ordinarii quamprimum parochos aliquot consultores, iuxta praescripta

Can. 4. constituent. Quod vero ad examinatores attinet, si hi in dioecesi, sive in synodo sive extra synodum electi, habeantur, statuit ut, de cathedralis capituli vel consultorum dioecesanorum consilio, aut eos in officio confirmare (hac tamen lege ut post quinquennium a munere cessent), aut ad novam examinatorum electionem, servata regula *Can. 4.* devenire possint, prout prudentia et adiuncta suaserint. Deficientibus vero in dioecesi examinatoribus ad eorum electionem, servatis superius statutis, sine mora deveniant.

Praesentibus valituris, contrariis quibusvis non obstantibus.
Datum Romae, die 20 Augusti 1910.

C. CARD. DE LAI, *Secretarius.*
SCIPIO TECCHI, *Adessor.*

L. ✠ S.

DECREE OF SACRED CONGREGATION OF THE SACRAMENTS ON THE AGE FOR FIRST COMMUNION

S. CONGREGATIO DE SACRAMENTIS

DECRETUM

DE AETATE ADMITTENDORUM AD PRIMAM COMMUNIONEM EUCCHARISTICAM

Quam singulari Christus amore parvulos in terris fuerit prosequutus, Evangelii paginae plane testantur. Cum ipsis enim versari in deliciis habuit; ipsis manus imponere consuevit; ipsos complecti, ipsis benedicere. Idem indigne tulit repelli eos a discipulis, quos gravibus his dictis reprehendit: *Sinite parvulos venire ad me, et ne prohibueritis eos; talium est enim regnum Dei.*¹ Quanti vero eorundem innocentiam animique candorem faceret, satis ostendit quum, advocato parvulo, discipulis ait: *Amen dico vobis, nisi efficiamini sicut parvuli, non intrabitis in regnum coelorum. Quicumque ergo humiliaverit se sicut parvulus iste, hic est maior in regno coelorum.—Et qui susceperit unum parvulum talem in nomine meo me suscipit.*²

Haec memorans catholica Ecclesia, vel a sui primordiis, admovere Christo parvulos curavit per eucharisticam Communionem, quam iisdem subministrare solita est etiam lactentibus. Id, ut in omnibus fere antiquis libris ritualibus ad usque saeculum XIII praescriptum est, in baptizando fiebat, eaque consuetudo alicubi diutius obtinuit; apud Graecos et Orientales adhuc

¹ Marc x. 13, 14, 16.

² Matt. xviii. 3, 4, 5.

perseverat. Ad summovendum autem periculum, ne lactentes praesertim panem consecratum eiicerent, ab initio mos invaluit Eucharistiam iisdem sub vini tantum specie ministrandi.

Neque in baptismo solum, sed subinde saepius divino epulo reficiebantur infantes. Nam et ecclesiarum quarundam consuetudo fuit Eucharistiam praebendi puerulis continuo post clerum, et alibi post adultorum Communionem residua fragmenta iisdem tradendi.

Mos hic deinde in Ecclesia latina obsolevit, nec sacrae mensae participes fieri coeperunt infantes, nisi illucescentis rationis usum aliquem haberent et Augusti Sacramenti notitiam quandam. Quae nova disciplina, ab aliquot Synodis particularibus iam recepta, solenni sanctione firmata est oecumenici Concilii Lateranensis IV, anno MCCXV, promulgato celebri canone XXI, quo fidelibus, postquam aetatem rationis attigerint, sacramentalis Confessio praescribitur et Sacra Communio, hisce verbis : ' Omnis utriusque sexus fidelis, postquam ad annos discretionis pervenerit, omnia sua solus peccata confiteatur fideliter, saltem semel in anno proprio sacerdoti, et iniunctam sibi poenitentiam studeat pro viribus adimplere, suscipiens reverenter ad minus in Pascha Eucharistiae sacramentum, nisi forte de consilio proprii sacerdotis ob aliquam rationabilem causam ad tempus ab eius perceptione duxerit abstinendum.'

Concilium Tridentinum,¹ nullo pacto reprobans antiquam disciplinam ministrandae parvulis Eucharistiae ante usum rationis, Lateranense decretum confirmavit et anathema dixit in eos qui contra sentirent : ' Si quis negaverit omnes et singulos Christi fideles utriusque sexus, quum ad annos discretionis pervenerint, teneri singulis annis, saltem in Paschate, ad communicandum, iuxta praeceptum S. Matris Ecclesiae, anathema sit.'²

Igitur vi allati et adhuc vigentis decreti Lateranensis, Christi fideles, ubi primum ad annos discretionis pervenerint, obligatione tenentur accedendi, saltem semel in anno, ad Poenitentiae et Eucharistiae sacramenta.

Verum in hac rationis, seu discretionis aetate statuenda haud pauci errores plorandique abusus decursu temporis inducti sunt. Fuerunt enim qui aliam sacramento Poenitentiae, aliam Eucharistiae suscipiendae discretionis aetatem assignandam esse censerent. Ad Poenitentiam quidem eam esse aetatem discretionis

¹ Sess. XXI., de *Communione*, c. 4.

² Sess. XIII., de *Eucharistia*, c. 8., can. 9.

iudicarunt, in qua rectum ab inhonesto discerni posset, adeoque peccari; ad Eucharistiam vero seriore[m] requiri aetatem, in qua rerum fidei notitia plenior animique praeparatio posset afferri maturior. Atque ita, pro variis locorum usibus hominumve opinionibus, ad primam Eucharistiae receptionem hinc decem annorum aetas vel duodecim, hinc quatuordecim vel maior etiam est constituta, prohibitis interim ab eucharistica Communione pueris vel adolescentibus praescripta aetate minoribus.

Istiusmodi consuetudo, qua per speciem tutandi decoris augusti Sacramenti arcentur ab ipso fideles, complurium exstitit causa malorum. Fiebat enim ut puerilis aetatis innocentia a Christi complexu divulsa, nullo interioris vitae succo aleretur; ex quo illud etiam consequencebatur, ut praevalido destituta praesidio iuventus, tot insidiis circumventa, amisso candore, ante in vitia rueret, quam sancta mysteria delibasset. Etiam si vero primae Communioni diligentior institutio et accurata sacramentalis Confessio praemittatur, quod quidem non ubique fit, dolenda tamen semper est primae innocentiae iactura, quae, sumpta tenerioribus annis Eucharistia, poterat fortasse vitari.

Nec minus est reprobandus mos pluribus vicens in locis, quo sacramentalis Confessio inhibetur pueris nondum ad eucharisticam mensam admissis, aut iisdem absolutio non impertitur. Quo fit ut ipsi peccatorum fortasse gravium laqueis irretiti magno cum periculo diu iaceant.

Quod vero maximum est, quibusdam in locis pueri nondum ad primam Communionem admissi, ne instante quidem mortis discrimine, Sacro muniri Viatico permittuntur, atque ita, defuncti et more infantium illati tumulo, Ecclesiae suffragiis non iuvantur.

Eiusmodi damna inferunt qui extraordinariis praeparationibus primae Communioni praemittendis plus aequo insistent, forte minus animadvertentes, id genus cautelae a Iansenianis erroribus esse profectum, qui Sanctissimam Eucharistiam praemium esse contendunt, non humanae fragilitatis medelam. Contra tamen profecto sensit Tridentina Synodus quum docuit, eam esse 'antidotum quo liberemur a culpis quotidianis et a peccatis mortalibus praeservemur';¹ quae doctrina nuper a Sacra Congregatione Concilii pressius inculcata est decreto die XXVI mensis Decembris an. MDCCCCV lato, quo ad Communionem quotidianam aditus universis, tum provectoris tum tenerioris aetatis patuit, duabus tantummodo impositis conditionibus, statu gratiae et recto voluntatis proposito.

¹ Sess. XIII., *de Eucharistia*, c. 2.

Nec sane iusta causa esse videtur quamobrem, quum anti-quitus sacrarum specierum residua parvulis etiam lactentibus distribuerentur, extraordinaria nunc praeparatio a puerulis exigatur qui in primi candoris et innocentiae felicissima conditione versantur, mysticoque illo cibo, propter tot huius temporis insidias et pericula indigent maxime.

Quos reprehendimus abusus ex eo sunt repetendi, quod nec scite nec recte definiverint, quaenam sit aetas discretionis, qui aliam Poenitentiae, aliam Eucharistiae assignarunt. Unam tamen eandemque aetatem ad utrumque Sacramentum requirit Lateranense Concilium, quum coniunctum Confessionis et Communionis onus imponit. Igitur, quemadmodum ad Confessionem aetas discretionis ea censetur, in qua honestum ab inhonesto distingui potest, nempe qua ad usum aliquem rationis pervenitur; sic ad Communionem ea esse dicenda est, qua eucharisticus panis queat a communi dignosci; quae rursus eadem est aetas in qua puer usum rationis est assequutus.

Nec rem aliter acceperunt praecipui Concilii Lateranensis interpretes et aequales illorum temporum. Ex historia enim Ecclesiae constat, synodos plures et episcopalia decreta, iam inde a saeculo XII, paulo post Lateranense Concilium, pueros annorum septem ad primam Communionem admisisse. Exstat praeterea summae auctoritatis testimonium, Doctor Aquinas, cuius haec legimus: 'Quando iam pueri *incipiunt aliqualem* usum rationis habere, ut possint devotionem concipere huius Sacramenti (Eucharistiae), tunc potest eis hoc Sacramentum conferri.'¹ Quod sic explanat Ledesma: 'Dico ex omnium consensu, quod omnibus habentibus usum rationis danda est Eucharistia, quantumcumque cito habeant illum usum rationis; esto quod ahduc confuse cognoscat ille puer quid faciat.'² Eundem locum his verbis explicat Vasquez: 'Si puer semel ad hunc usum rationis pervenerit, statim ipso iure divino ita obligatur, ut Ecclesia non possit ipsum omnino liberare.'³ Eadem docuit S. Antoninus, scribens: 'Sed cum est doli cavax (puer), cum scilicet potest peccare mortaliter, tum obligatur ad praeceptum de Confessione, et per consequens de Communionem.'⁴ Tridentinum quoque Concilium ad hanc impellit conclusionem. Dum enim memorat Sess. XXI, c. 4: 'parvulos usu rationis carentes nulla obligari necessitate ad sacramentalem Eucharistiae communionem,' unam

¹ *Summ. Theol.*, 3 part., q. 80, a. 9, ad. 3.

² In S. Thom., 3 p., q. 80, a. 9, dub. 6.

³ In 3 p., S. Thom., disp. 214, c. 4, n. 43.

⁴ P. III., tit. 14, c. 2, § 5.

hanc rei rationem assignat, quod peccare non possint: 'Siquidem, inquit, adeptam filiorum Dei gratiam in illa aetate amittere non possunt.' Ex quo patet hanc esse Concilii mentem, tunc pueros Communionis necessitate atque obligatione teneri quum gratiam peccando possunt amittere. His consonant Concilii Romani verba, sub Benedicto XIII celebrati ac docentis, obligationem Eucharistiae sumendae incipere 'postquam pueruli ac puellae ad annum discretionis pervenerint, ad illam videlicet aetatem in qua sunt apti ad discernendum hunc sacramentalem cibum, qui alius non est quam verum Iesu Christi corpus, a pane communi et profano, et sciunt accedere cum debita pietate ac religione.'¹ Catechismus Romanus autem, 'qua aetate, inquit, pueris sacra mysteria danda sint, nemo melius constituere potest quam pater et sacerdos, cui illi confiteantur peccata. Ad illos enim pertinet explorare, et a pueris percunctari, an huius admirabilis Sacramenti cognitionem aliquam acceperint et gustum habeant.'²

Ex quibus omnibus colligitur aetatem discretionis ad Communionem eam esse, in qua puer panem eucharisticum a pane communi et corporali distinguere sciat ut ad altare possit devote accedere. Itaque non perfecta rerum Fidei cognitio requiritur, quum aliqua dumtaxat elementa sint satis, hoc est *aliqua cognitio*; neque plenus rationis usus, quum sufficiat usus quidam incipiens, hoc est *aliqualis usus rationis*. Quapropter Communionem ulterius differre, ad eamque recipiendam maturiorem aetatem constituere, improbandum omnino est, idque Apostolica Sedes damnavit pluries. Sic fel. rec. Pius Papa IX litteris Cardinalis Antonelli ad episcopos Galliae datis die XII Martii anno MDCCCLXVI invalescentem in quibusdam dioecesibus morem protrahendae primae Communionis ad maturiores eosque praefixos annos acriter improbavit. Sacra vero Congregatio Concilii, die XV mensis Martii an. MDCCCLI Concilii Provincialis Rothomagensis caput emendavit, quo pueri vetabantur infra duodecimum aetatis annum ad Communionem accedere. Nec absimili ratione se gessit haec S. Congregatio de disciplina Sacramentorum in causa Argentinensi die XXV mensis Martii anno MDCCCX; in qua cum ageretur, admittine possent ad sacram Communionem pueri vel duodecim vel quatuordecim annorum, rescripsit: 'Pueros et puellas, cum ad annos discretionis seu ad usum rationis pervenerint, ad sacram mensam admittendos esse.'

¹ Istruzione per quei che debbono la prima volta ammettersi alla S. Comunione. Append XXX., p. II.

² P. II., De Sac. Euchar., n. 63.

Hisce omnibus mature perpensis, Sacer hic Ordo de disciplina Sacramentorum, in generali Congregatione habita die XV mensis Iulii a. MDCCCCX, ut memorati abusus prorsus amoveantur et pueri vel a teneris annis Iesu Christo adhaereant, Eius vitam vivant, ac tutelam inveniant contra corruptelae pericula, sequentem normam de prima puerorum Communione, ubique servandam statuere opportunum censuit.

I. Aetas discretionis tum ad Confessionem tum ad S. Communionem ea est, in qua puer incipit ratiocinari, hoc est circa septimum annum, sive supra, sive etiam infra. Ex hoc tempore incipit obligatio satisfaciendi utrique praecepto Confessionis et Communionis.

II. Ad primam Confessionem et ad primam Communionem necessaria non est plena et perfecta doctrinae christianae cognitio. Puer tamen postea debet integrum catechismum pro modo suae intelligentiae gradatim addiscere.

III. Cognitio religionis quae in puero requiritur, ut ipse ad primam Communionem convenienter se praeparet, ea est, qua ipse fidei mysteria necessaria necessitate medii pro suo captu percipiat, atque eucharisticum panem a communi et corporali distinguat ut ea devotione quam ipsius fert aetas ad SS. Eucharistiam accedat.

IV. Obligatio praecepti Confessionis et Communionis, quae puerum gravat, in eos praecipue recidit qui ipsius curam habere debent, hoc est in parentes, in confessarium, in institutores et in parochum. Ad patrem vero, aut ad illos qui vices eius gerunt, et ad confessarium, secundum Catechismum Romanum, pertinet admittere puerum ad primam Communionem.

V. Semel aut pluries in anno curent parochi indicare atque habere Communionem generalem puerorum, ad eamque, non modo novensiles admittere, sed etiam alios, qui parentum confessariive consensu, ut supra dictum est, iam antea primitus de altari sancta libarunt. Pro utrisque dies aliquot instructionis et praeparationis praemittantur.

VI. Puerorum curam habentibus omni studio curandum est ut post primam Communionem iidem pueri ad sacram mensam saepius accedant, et, si fieri possit, etiam quotidie, prout Christus Iesus et mater Ecclesia desiderant, utque id agant ea animi devotione quam talis fert aetas. Meminerint praeterea quibus ea cura est gravissimum quo tenentur officium providendi ut publicis catechesis praeceptionibus pueri ipsi interesse pergant, sin minus, eorundem religiosae institutioni alio modo suppleant.

VII. Consuetudo non admittendi ad confessionem pueros,

aut nunquam eos absolvendi, quum ad usum rationis pervenerint, est omnino improbanda. Quare Ordinarii locorum, adhibitis etiam remediis iuris, curabunt ut penitus de medio tollatur.

VIII. Detestabilis omnino est abusus non ministrandi Viaticum et Extremam Unctionem pueris post usum rationis eosque sepeliendi ritu parvulorum. In eos, qui ab huiusmodi more non recedant, Ordinarii locorum severe animadvertant.

Haec a PP. Cardinalibus Sacrae huius Congregationis sancita SS^{ms} D. N. Pius Papa X, in audientia diei VII currentis mensis omnia adprobavit, iussitque praesens edi ac promulgari decretum. Singulis autem Ordinariis mandavit ut idem decretum, non modo parochis et clero significarent, sed etiam populo, cui voluit legi quotannis tempore praecepti paschalis, vernacula lingua. Ipsi autem Ordinarii debebunt, unoquoque exacto quinquennio, una cum ceteris dioecesis negotiis, etiam de huius observantia decreti ad S. Sedem referre.

Non obstantibus contrariis quibuscumque.

Datum Romae ex Aedibus eiusdem S. Congregationis, die VIII mensis Augusti anno MDCCCX.

D. CARD. FERRATA, *Praefectus*.

PH. GIUSTINI, *a Secretis*.

THE VOWS OF PRESENTATION NUNS IN IRELAND DECLARED
TO BE 'SIMPLE' BY SACRED CONGREGATION 'DE RELIGIOSIS'
IN REPLY TO HIS EMINENCE CARDINAL LOGUE

EX SECRETARIA

N. 888

SACRAE CONGREGATIONIS

IO

'DE RELIGIOSIS.'

(*In responsione hic numerus
referatur.*)

ROMAE, 23 Augusti, 1910.

ÊME AC REVME DOMINE MI OBSERVANTISSIME,

Postulavit Eminentia Vestra ab hac S. Congregatione Religiosorum, quid sentiendum esset de votis Sororum Praesentationis B.V.M. in Hibernia, habita praesertim consideratione Litterarum Apostolicarum in forma Brevis a f. r. Pio Papa VI datarum die 3 Septembris 1791, nec non Decreti S. Congregationis a Propaganda Fide, diei 16 Februarii 1805.

Iamvero, haec S. Congregatio in Comitibus Generalibus Eminentissimorum Patrum, sub die 29 Iulii 1910, omnibus attentissime perpensis, auditoque de more voto unius ex Rev^{ms} Consultoribus, proposito dubio 'Utrum vota Sororum Praesentationis

B.V.M. in Hibernia censeri debeant simplicia aut solemnia? 'respondendum censuit:—'Affirmative ad primam partem; negative ad secundam.'

Quae dum Eminentiae Vestrae Revmae participo, humillime manus deosculor.

Eminentiae Vestrae Revmae,
FR. J. C. CARD. VIVES, *Praef.*
F. CHERUBINI, *Subsecretarius.*

Eñõ ac Revñõ Domino

CARD. MICHAEL LOGUE,
Archiepiscopo Armacano.

POWER TO DISPENSE IN MATRIMONIAL IMPEDIMENTS AT THE APPROACH OF DEATH

S. CONGREGATIO DE SACRAMENTIS

ROMANO ET ALIARUM

DE FACULTATE DISPENSANDI AB IMPEDIMENTIS MATRIMONIALIBUS
IMMINENTE MORTIS PERICULO

Decreto S. Congregationis de disciplina Sacramentorum edito die 14 mensis Maii anno 1909, statutum fuit: 'Quemlibet Sacerdotem qui ad normam art. VII Decreti *Ne temere*, imminente mortis periculo, ubi parochus vel loci Ordinarius vel Sacerdos ab alterutro delegatus haberi nequeat, coram duobus testibus matrimonio adsistere valide ac licite potest, in iisdem rerum adiunctis dispensare quoque posse super impedimentis omnibus etiam publicis matrimonium iure ecclesiastico dirimentibus, exceptis sacro presbyteratus ordine et affinitate lineae rectae ex copula licita.'

Circa quod decretum eidem S. C. dirimendum propositum est dubium:

'An praefato decreto comprehendantur etiam parochi, etsi non fuerint ad normam declarationis S. Officii diei 9 Ianuarii 1889, habitualiter subdelegati a propriis Ordinariis.'

Et haec S. C., re perpensa, respondendum censuit: 'Affirmative.'

Datum ex aedibus eiusdem S. C., die 29 mensis Iulii, anno 1910.

D. CARD. FERRATA, *Praefectus.*
PH. GIUSTINI, *Secretarius.*

SECRECY PRESCRIBED AT ELECTIONS OF BISHOPS

DE SECRETO SERVANDO IN DESIGNANDIS AD SEDES EPISCOPALES

DECRETUM

Rogantibus nonnullis Antistitibus, ut decretum S. C. Consistorialis diei 30 Martii huius anni 1910, de secreto servando in iis designandis, qui ad sedes episcopales proponuntur in foederatis statibus Americae septentrionalis, extenderetur ad suas quoque dioeceses et provincias ubi eadem vel similis forma designationis obtinet. SS^{us} D. N. Pius PP. X, de consulto S. C. Consistorialis, votis sibi oblatis obsecundans in audientia diei 17 Iunii infrascripto Cardinali concessa, statuit ac decrevit, ut memoratum decretum, congrua congruis referendo, ad omnes praedictas regiones extendatur eiusque praescripta ab omnibus, ad quos spectat, adamussim servantur, contrariis quiblibet minime obstantibus.

Datum Romae, die 2 Iulii 1910.

C. CARD. DE LAI, *Secretarius.*

SCIPIO TECCHI, *Adessor.*

L. ✠ S.

**CONGREGATION HAVING POWER TO GRANT FACULTIES FOR
VOTIVE MASSES**

CIRCA COMPETENTIAM RELATE AD MISSAS VOTIVAS

Propositis dubiis: 1°. utrum ad Sacram Congregationem de disciplina Sacramentorum spectet concedere facultatem legendi Missam votivam, praeterquam coeco aut coecutienti, de quibus in normis Romanae Curiae (pars 2, cap. 7, art. 3, n. 10-g), etiam senio confectis vel alio morbo laborantibus; 2°. utrum eadem Sacra Congregatio in superius memoratis casibus concedere valeat facultatem non solum legendi Missam votivam B. M. Virginis aut pro defunctis, sed etiam alias Missas votivas a S. Sede adprobatis: haec Sacra Congregatio Consistorialis, prae-habito voto Consultoris, omnibusque sedulo perpensis, respondendum censuit: *affirmative ad utrumque.*

Facta autem relatione ab E^{no} Card. Secretario, SS^{us} Dominus noster praedictas resolutiones ratas habuit et confirmavit.

Die 16 Augusti 1910.

CAROLUS PEROSI, *Substitutus.*

NOTICES OF BOOKS

MEDITATIONS FOR EACH DAY OF THE MONTH OF JUNE.

Translated and adapted from the Italian. By Charles Santley. London: R. & T. Washbourne. 1910.

THE month of June is the Month of the Sacred Heart, and it is highly interesting to find a layman of Mr. Santley's years, experience, and culture helping to sanctify that month, and make more popular and widespread the devotion to the Sacred Heart.

Some years ago it was not at all a popular thing amongst at least a section of English Catholics to promote Italian practices and devotions in these northern latitudes. Mr. Santley was not frightened by this bogey; and as he was not deterred from following his pious inclination in the choice of a subject, neither was he deterred from adopting from the Italian a good deal of the matter of his work as well as something of its style. The veteran, however, has left the mark of his own genius on the work; and that will give it additional value in the eyes of all who value what is good and pure and true. Indeed it seems to us a very touching thing to find this 'grand old man' devoting the closing years of his life to such thoughts and such an occupation. We sincerely congratulate him on the result. He has given the busy man of the world, and indeed the priest and the religious, an admirable series of meditations for the days of June. Perhaps when the notes of his rich baritone voice are forgotten this little book will keep his name fresh and green in the affectionate remembrance of his fellow-Catholics.

J. F. H.

HOME RULE SPEECHES OF JOHN REDMOND, M.P. Edited, with an Introduction, by R. Barry O'Brien. London: Fisher Unwin. 1910.

MR. BARRY O'BRIEN has done a public service by the collection and publication in one volume of these speeches of Mr. Redmond. When we see them side by side in a bulky volume, covering many years and every phase of the subject, we cannot but be impressed by Mr. Redmond's devotion to the cause for

which he pleads, by his persevering fidelity and endurance, by the great ability and wide knowledge that characterize his speeches, and by the sacrifices a man of his gifts and attainments has made for the country he serves. There is in these speeches a dignity, a command of self, a high and magnanimous spirit, a charitable and Christian tone, which reflect the highest credit on their author, and are sure to bear fruit in due time. They have indeed borne much fruit already ; but the mature harvest has yet to come.


The speeches were not all delivered in the House of Commons. Some of them were addressed to audiences in America and in Ireland. They differ greatly in their immediate subject-matter ; but they all converge and lead up to the one conclusion. If the orator does not harp on one string the object of all his harmony is the same. His speeches will, no doubt, rank hereafter with those of O'Connell, of Lalor Shiel, of Isaac Butt, and of Parnell. Meanwhile they will enlighten, instruct, and persuade. They will reach a much wider audience than that to which they were addressed. The seed which they contain will take root in fertile soil and one day or other reward the labour—the immense labour—and the devotion of the husbandman.

J. F. H.

MR. B. HERDER, Publisher to the Holy Apostolic See, in sending us his Autumn Catalogue, writes us that he is about to open a London Branch at 68 Great Russell Street, W.C.

Many of our readers are probably acquainted with the name of this firm, whose publications are to be found in libraries all the world over, and have received many commendations from the Holy Father, the hierarchy, and the clergy. Among the more famous publications issued may be mentioned : Herder's *Konversations-Lexikon* (9 vols.), *Kirchenlexikon* (13 vols.), *Praelectiones dogmaticae* (9 vols.), *Cursus Philosophicus* (6 vols.), *Philosophia Lacensis* (11 vols.), *Acta et Decreta Conciliorum recentiorum*.

In a reprint from the article devoted to this house in the *Catholic Encyclopædia*, we notice that it was founded in 1801.



DARWINISM AND HISTORY: A DIALOGUE¹—I

PROLOGUE.

THE salient characteristic of this world is change. Through change is the material universe being renovated, and only for change it would never abide. Through change is nation passing into nation and civilization into civilization. Empires are born, flash for a moment in the sunlight, and are then swallowed up in the night. Babylon and Tyre have gone, Carthage and Rome are no more, the glories of Constantine and Charlemagne are memories of the past. The noblest efforts of man's genius seem born only to die; they have come and are gone, like the shadow on the wall or the bubble on the waters. Now and again he may succeed in building up some *monumentum aere perennius*—the proud ambition of the poet; but its chief home will be the class-room and its chief admirer the unwilling schoolboy. Great men are like great waves that rise up far out to sea, crest themselves with silver, and then disappear for ever. They have a brief hour of triumph, and some dim memorials of their greatness may stand as landmarks in the night of the past; but as a rule their works become forgotten links in the chain of continuity, whilst their names are remembered only to 'point a moral

¹ Occupied solely with an exposition of *pros* and *cons*, the author has deliberately eliminated the *obiter dicta* and by-play of ordinary conversation.

or adorn a tale.' Now this phenomenon of change, this ceaseless process of renewal, is plain to every observer of nature and every student of history; it lies on the surface, and was summed up long ago by Heraclitus in two small words, πάντα ῥεῖ—everything is flowing, moving, passing. Many attempts were made to probe its nature and formulate its laws, but without success. At last, on November 24, 1859, Darwin published his *Origin of Species*, and inaugurated a new era in the world of thought. If we are to believe his numerous disciples, the last word has now been said on social evolution, not indeed that Darwin uttered it, but that he sowed the golden seed. Let us see.

PADRAIG.—Well, you know for what we have met. Nearly every review in the United Kingdom has discussed the influence of Darwin on some branch of the natural sciences; but not one, to my knowledge, has touched the delicate question of history as affected by him. I know that you have fixed views on this problem, and am most anxious to hear them. So plunge at once *in medias res*.

CATHAL.—On December 27, 1831, Charles Darwin went for a voyage of circumnavigation in H.M.S. 'Beagle'; on November 24, 1859, he gave to the world his *Origin of Species*. These two events are closely connected as cause and effect. Like the fisherman in the *Arabian Nights*, Darwin cast his net into the deep sea¹ and brought up a bottle of unknown contents, sealed with the great seal of Suleyman.² Anxious and expectant he opened it, and a thick smoke ascended, which soon filled the whole earth. He had loosed the spirit of evolution and had put a spell on the world of science. Since then men of learning have been divided into two hostile armies fighting fiercely for the triumph or overthrow of this protean spirit, vague, subtle, and elusive, ever changing and yet ever the same. For fifty years the air has been ringing with the exultant

¹ In July, 1857, Darwin made the following entry in his note-book: 'In July opened the first note-book on the Transmutation of Species. Had been greatly struck from about the month of previous March by the character of South American fossils and species in Galapagos Archipelago. These facts (specially latter) origin of all my views.'—(*Life and Letters*, vol. i. p. 276.)

² Wisdom.

cries of 'natural selection,' 'struggle for life,' 'survival of the fittest,' 'adaptation to environment,' save when some daring champion enters the lists and proves—to his own satisfaction at least—that evolution is a figment of the imagination, a creation of the poet's fancy which has given to 'airy nothing a local habitation and a name.' But these discordant notes, which are heard from time to time, seem only to heighten the general harmony of the great pæan of victory. Pitiless logic may prove all systems of evolution to be foundationless and impossible; still the word remains as an eloquent refutation of the poet's question: What's in a name? Darwinism, in one form or another, has gone forth conquering and to conquer. It has possessed the world and maintains its possession. If it cannot be proved to be a reality, it is accepted as a postulate of the reason.¹ For me the chief glory of Darwin lies in the fact that he incorporated into science the concept of evolution and forced men to adopt it as a guiding principle of all research. His particular explanation of the process may be abandoned or modified beyond recognition, still the conviction² remains that the world of mind no less than the world of matter is governed by some unchanging law of change and that this law is the expression of natural forces which can be discovered by a patient observation of social phenomena.

PADRAIG.—The glory therefore of Darwin rests on the fact that he made men believe what they cannot prove. That is not very honourable for Darwin or for his followers.

CATHAL.—You must not misunderstand me. I do not say that evolution is wholly unproven. A fact may exist which we cannot fully explain. All I say at present is that Darwin so impressed men of science with the idea of

¹ 'La continuité de l'évolution ne saurait être contestée attendu qu'elle est un postulat de la raison, avant d'être une démonstration de fait.'—(A. D. Xénopol, *Théorie de l'histoire*, p. 114.)

² 'Nowadays we are all devotees of the theory of development: it is no longer a theory, it has become the basis and guiding principle of our thought and mind; we must see development everywhere.'—(Sir Wm. Ramsay, *The Cities of St. Paul*, p. 16.)

evolution that they took it up with enthusiasm and applied it to every phenomenon of this world—even to man in all manifestations of his complex nature. He sowed the tiny seed : we are gathering in the golden harvest.

PADRAIG.—It is not so clear that Darwin was the great prophet who persuaded men to believe in evolution. Let us limit our discussion to the field of history.¹ To say nothing of Thucydides, who proved the validity of his work for all time by an appeal to the fact that history repeats itself, or of the Italian philosopher, Vico, who expressed the same idea in his *corsi* and *ricorsi* (recurrent periods),² or of St. Augustine³ and Bossuet,⁴ who reviewed the story of man as a grand drama over which the spirit of God brooded, guiding all things to His own wise ends, we have Montesquieu,⁵ who saw the social phenomena of this world ruled by constant inevitable laws beside which the legislation of governments and the force of great personalities were of minor importance. For him, as for his countryman Bodin, climate plays a preponderating part in the civilization of nations, and climate, as you know, is a factor on which Darwinians have built much. Then came Turgot and Condorcet, with their theory that progress is an essential character of human society, and what is progress but evolution. About the same time Herder stimulated German thought with his *Philosophy of History*,⁶ and inaugurated the idealist movement which culminated in the evolutionary

¹ If anyone wishes to know the precursors of Darwin in the various branches of the Natural Sciences, he will find the question fully discussed in *Darwin and Modern Science* (Cambridge, 1909), in Osborn's *From the Greeks to Darwin*, and in Butler's *Evolution, Old and New*.

² *Scienza Nuova* (1725).

³ *De Civitate Dei* (413-426).

⁴ *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* (1681) : 'It should be added that he (Bossuet) founded the "philosophy of history" as a part of European literature'—(Brunetière).

⁵ *Esprit des Lois* (1748).

⁶ 'On peut même dire que sans la philosophie de l'histoire l'évolutionisme n'aurait pas vu le jour. Spencer a tiré sa philosophie synthétique d'une combinaison de l'idéalisme hégélien, de l'agnosticisme de Hamilton, et du positivisme anglais, mais l'élément dominant de la combinaison a été l'hégélianisme. . . . Or sans la philosophie de l'histoire de Herder et de ses successeurs, jamais le système de l'idéalisme objectif n'aurait pu être échafaudé.'—(G. Richard, *L'idée d'évolution dans la nature et l'histoire*, p. 152.)

systems of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Auguste Comte, the founder of Sociology, and Buckle, the great exponent of physical environment as a factor in history, must not be neglected. Finally, Darwin was preceded by one great Englishman, whose existence is persistently ignored in this matter, and yet Newman's *Development of Christian Doctrine*¹ is a magnificent example of evolution.

CATHAL.—I can easily admit most of what you have said. Darwin himself would be the first to acknowledge his indebtedness to others, and as a matter of fact did so. Referring to the train of thought which Malthus' work on population stirred up within him in 1838, he wrote these words: 'Here, then, I had at last a theory by which to work.'² The work of Darwin would be an exception to his own theory if he had no precursors; for the very essence of evolution is that there should be no abrupt transitions, not even in the world of mind. Great changes, whether political, social, intellectual, or moral, do not spring Pallas-like from the brain of some genius. They are the resultant of many forces which have been slowly moving to their consummation, but which a great mind may quicken or modify. Accordingly, the men who have left their mark in history are the men who have grappled with the dominant tendencies of their time, have engrafted them on their principles, and have worked them to their ends. Such a man was Darwin. He did not invent the idea of evolution. It was in the air and stimulated men to wrestle with it. Darwin showed how one aspect of the world-movement might be explained by natural causes, and thus shifted the axis of synthetic history into the groove of induction.

PADRAIG.—If you do not mind you will soon have taken away all originality and glory from your hero. Allow me to help a little in this work of demolition. You very justly dwelt on social environment or the dominant tendency as a factor in history; but you overlooked one special character of the period in which Darwin wrote, though it largely

¹ 1845.

² *Life and Letters*, vol. i. p. 83.

explains the unmerited success of his work. Rationalism, which had emblazoned on its banner the motto : ' La négation du surnaturel est devenue un dogme absolu pour tout esprit cultivé,'¹ was seeking a means of eliminating God from His creation. This it found in evolution. Hence the apotheosis of Darwin.² But we have said enough on his precursors. What do you hold to be the exact contribution of Darwinism to historical methods ?

CATHAL.—A close examination of social phenomena convinced the Darwinian historian that there is a law of development in human society. His first duty, therefore, is to lay bare this golden thread which binds the centuries into one. This he does by showing the sequence of cause and effect. The old method was analytic and static, the new is synthetic and dynamic.

PADRAIG.—Surely, there is nothing very new in the introduction of a genetic method into history. Every historian since the days of Herodotus has given as far as lay in his power the causes of events. Is not Thucydides famous for his deep insight into the factors of history and the motives of men ? You cannot have science without causes. ' Scientia est cognitio rerum per causas,' said the Scholastics after Aristotle, and Bacon expressed the same idea when he wrote : ' Vere scire, per causas scire.' Perhaps you will deny that ancient history was scientific. Look up Lucan's essay on how history should be written, and you will see that the moderns have not advanced so very far.

CATHAL.—Of course every historian traces to some extent the causes of events. He cannot read his documents intelligently without doing so ; for they generally give the

¹ Renan.

² ' Le triomphe du darwinisme marque l'affranchissement de l'esprit humain des liens de la théologie. Par suite, il est un des événements les plus importants de l'histoire de notre espèce . . . La vie et la pensée prouvaient l'existence de Dieu et la vérité de la philosophie. La théorie darwinienne fit écrouler tout cet édifice construit patiemment pendant de longs siècles. . . . La nature rentrait dans une magnifique et grandiose unité. L'ordre immuable remplaçait dans l'univers les caprices de la divinité. L'homme relevait la tête ; il se sentait le maître du monde. . . . Le darwinisme apportant la libération définitive de l'esprit humain, on peut comprendre avec quel enthousiasme il fut accueilli.'—(J. Novicow, *La critique du darwinisme social*, p. 10 ; Paris, 1910.)

immediate and particular cause. But there are various ways of seeing and describing facts. The historian might take as a subject for investigation Roman society in the days of Nero and describe its complex phenomena in a state of rest, without asking whence they came, how they arose, whither they are going. Such a history would be a mere exposition of facts. As Lamprecht has remarked somewhere, it would be description, not comprehension. Our historian might then proceed to compare this *state* of society with that of another, deducing the general ideas or common features which mark definite stages of civilization. Such a picture would deal primarily with repeated as distinguished from successive facts, and consequently its results, like the results of the natural sciences, might be expressed in the form of laws. It would be a chapter of static as distinguished from dynamic sociology. But there is another aspect of human society, the aspect of change, and it is with this that history is mainly concerned. Events have always been and will always be the chief material of history, and events do not repeat themselves. At least the note of dissimilarity is the dominant note in their constitution, and it is this note which differentiates the various stages of social evolution. The story of this world is built upon a law of change no less than upon a law of permanency, upon facts which happen only once as well as upon facts which repeat themselves. History and dynamic sociology deal with the former; the natural sciences and static sociology deal with the latter.

PADRAIG.—A moment. I am getting confused. I thought history as influenced by Darwinism was being brought more and more into the domain of the natural sciences. But that cannot be, if you eliminate repeated facts and laws; for the essence of inductive science is generalization based on the repetition of a given fact.

CATHAL.—Your difficulty touches the delicate and much-debated question of historical laws. M. Lacombe, as you know, has written a fine work,¹ in which he argues strongly

¹ *De l'histoire considérée comme science* (Paris, 1894).

that history cannot be a science unless it reduces its facts to laws. M. Xénopol, on the other hand, contends no less strongly that history cannot generalize its results into laws, for it deals with the particular and successive as distinguished from the universal and repeated. In his monumental work, *Théorie de l'histoire*, he criticizes Lacombe and others at much length, and then gives a new classification of the sciences,¹ and, what he holds, a new view of history. M. Heinrich Rickert, the distinguished professor of Freiburg, is of the same opinion. He defines history as 'la science de l'individuel, de ce qui se produit une fois, par opposition avec les sciences naturelles, qui ont pour object l'universel, ce qui reparaît toujours avec les mêmes caractères.'² There is nothing original in this definition; for Aristotle had long ago distinguished history from poetry by saying the former treated of the particular, whilst the latter treated of the universal. But there is really no need to enter into this controversy. It is sufficient to know that they all introduce the element of cause and under that head distinguish the modern from the ancient historical method.

PADRAIG.—You have made one more concession to me: history as influenced by Darwinism does not necessarily mean the introduction of laws. Its scientific character, you say, is sufficiently guaranteed by the play of cause and effect. But I have already pointed out that this character is found in the older type of history. Would you kindly explain the real differences between the two methods?

CATHAL.—The Darwinian historian is guided by the concept of evolution in his analysis and exposition of facts. He goes to work with the belief, or at least with the hypothesis, that some law of development governs the march of human events. Consequently his first aim is to discover the chain of causality which links together the various stages of this development. To do this in a manner worthy

¹ 'Les sciences se divisent en deux grandes branches, celles qui traitent des faits de répétition,—sciences de lois ou théoriques,—et celles qui traitent des faits successifs—sciences de séries ou historiques' (p. 161).

² *Revue de synthèse historique*, April, 1901, p. 123.

of his great subject he must make a careful analysis of causes, rising from the transitory, particular, and immediate to the permanent, universal, and remote. Now the ancients had no clear consciousness of man's development, nor of that 'unity of history' which Freeman taught us to seek and find. Want of documents limited their vision in time and space; and accordingly they were never struck by that living picture of social evolution which unfolds itself from age to age, binding the centuries into one. You must not, therefore, look for a keen analysis of causes in their writings. Heraclitus indeed and others recognized the kaleidoscopic character of this world; but they made no serious attempt to lay bare the causal nexus which gave unity to the social phenomena. Like most of us they were interested spectators of the world-drama, and described, with consummate art, its static character. But they troubled little about the hidden springs of human action, or at most were satisfied with particular explanations of particular incidents. The 'great man' theory settled all. To sum up, synthetic history as influenced by Darwinism seeks other and more permanent factors of change than the force of great personalities; it groups its facts in series bound together by a genetic rather than a chronological order; it traces this evolution not only in the sphere of politics, but also in other departments of human activity; and finally, with the cold impassive logic of positivism, it bases this evolution on an impartial analysis of facts.¹ In a word, it examines human society as an organic whole, evolving slowly down the centuries under the pressure of general causes, the disturbing element of human freedom having been eliminated, or at least immensely restricted. 'Here below to live is to change, to be perfect is to have changed often.'²

PADRAIG.—If I have rightly understood you, Darwinian history may be said to have three characteristics. First,

¹ This last characteristic note shows how modern philosophies of history differ from those of one hundred years ago, which were vast *a priori* structures built on deduction and imagination rather than on induction and hard facts.

² Newman, *Development of Christian Doctrine*, p. 40.

it views human society as a living organism which evolves under the pressure of certain forces. Secondly, as a matter of vital importance it investigates these causes. Thirdly, it reduces all particular and accidental causes to the great, general and necessary factors which operate unchangingly at all times and in all places. Now what are these general causes? That is my first difficulty. But, before you give an answer, there is another point on which I seek enlightenment. One would imagine from your words that synthetic or Darwinian history was the order of the day, whereas the contrary is really the case. We are speculating on a purely theoretical problem. During fifty years it has been a sort of axiom that you should not attempt a synthesis until the work of analysis was complete. The most distinguished historians have inculcated this doctrine. 'Aussi longtemps,' said Renan, 'que toutes les parties de la science ne seront élucidées par des monographies spéciales, les travaux généraux seront prématurés.' And Fustel de Coulanges, the great master of the analytic method, makes a similar remark: 'Pour un jour de synthèse, il faut des années d'analyse.'¹ It is hard to condemn him when we remember the great dangers of synthesis. The historian, who is guided by preconceived principles, will not easily avoid the subjective element; he will force the facts consciously or unconsciously into these moulds. You remember the words of Browning: 'The instinctive theorizing whence the fact looks to the eye as the eye likes the look.' Nay, there are great authorities—Droysen, Fustel de Coulanges, Münsterberg, and Lester Ward—who deny that the historian has any right to investigate causes.

CATHAL.—You must remember that the nineteenth century has been in a peculiar manner the age of history, not that it does not also claim as its special heritage the natural sciences. But these have been slowly evolving since the days of Bacon, whereas history has been completely revolutionized in scope and method within the last fifty years. As Bacon has been called the father of modern

¹ *Histoire des institutions politiques de l'ancienne France*, Introduction.

science, so Ranke has been called the father of modern history. It was he who 'taught it to be critical, to be colourless, and to be new.'¹ It was he who gave a lasting impetus to that analytic, comparative, and *a posteriori* method which has already won its way into all branches of human knowledge. Now this development of history had necessarily to begin with analysis; for every sound synthesis pre-supposes a sound analysis. The one is built upon the other. The only scientific course, therefore, was to give the analytic method time to do its work, and this is what has been done. The great doctors you cited demand nothing more. 'On a senti,' said M. Monod in his famous introduction to the *Revue Historique* (1876), 'que l'histoire doit être l'objet d'une investigation lente et méthodique, où l'on avance graduellement du particulier au général, du détail à l'ensemble.' Evolution is a gradual process, and synthetic history, like everything else, is the fruit of evolution. At the present moment, however, it has already won its laurels in Germany and France, and is daily gaining ground in England and America. A great reaction has set in against the microscopic criticism and exaggerated methods of the analytic historians. People have come to recognize that the work of the historian means something more than a laborious pursuit and bewildering accumulation of facts. In August, 1900, this feeling found an organ of expression in the *Revue de Synthèse historique* established by M. Henri Berr. The most distinguished European scholars have contributed to the pages of this review, so that the synthetic movement in history has now become fully conscious of its mission.

PADRAIG.—All you have said only proves that men are beginning to speculate on a theory of synthetic history. The adoption and application of such a theory is quite another matter. It is easy enough for the philosopher or sociologist to sit in his arm-chair and build on the smoke of his cigar some grand system of social evolution. The paths of science and philosophy are strewn with the bodies

¹ Lord Acton, *The Study of History*, p. 48.

of extinct theories. What I want to know, therefore, are the real practical attempts which have been made to apply Darwinian principles to the writing of history. Can you point to a single historian who has applied them?

CATHAL.—Certainly. As early as 1863 Hippolyte Taine had formulated in the Introduction to his *Histoire de la littérature anglaise* a theory of general causes based on Darwinian principles, which has influenced every synthetic historian since his day. With the three factors of race, environment, and moment he proposed to reconstitute the history of English Literature. For him these forces are all powerful, producing literary works or social phenomena as inevitably as the liver secretes bile. Another disciple of Darwin was Ferdinand Brunetière, who wrote in the preface to the English edition of his *Manual of the History of French Literature*, 'It would doubtless be impossible for me to find a better or surer means of inviting the indulgence of English readers for the present Manual than to offer it to them for what it is: an application of the doctrine of Evolution to the history of a great literature. In any way the work is placed, as it were, under the auspices of the great name of Charles Darwin.' Such Darwinian principles as 'natural selection,' 'struggle for life,' 'adaptation to environment,' have been applied by O. Seeck to the decline of Graeco-Roman civilization in his *Untergang der antiken Welt*, and Dr. Emil Reich,¹ though not a believer in a rigid system of social evolution, has certainly been influenced by the synthetic theories of history which owe their origin to Darwin. Then there is Karl Lamprecht,² who is perhaps the greatest living exponent of synthetic history and about whom we shall have more to say in the course of this discussion. Other names might be quoted: but these suffice to show that Darwinian history is not an abstract theory, a mere speculation of the brain. Finally, even though I could bring forward no striking illustration

¹ *General History of Western Nations* (Macmillan, 1908); and *Success among Nations* (Chapman & Hall, 1904).

² Lamprecht has expounded his theory amongst other places in *What is History?* (Macmillan, 1905); but the language is so transcendental that it is practically unintelligible for ordinary mortals.

of such history, my theory would still stand. I merely assert that the idea of evolution has so possessed our modern historians that we may confidently look forward to a rich harvest in the near future. 'A right notion of the bearing of history on affairs, both for the statesman and the citizen, could not be formed or formulated until men had grasped the idea of human development. This is the great transforming conception, which enables history to define her scope,'¹ and this is the conception which we owe to Darwinism.

PADRAIG.—Granting for the moment that there are examples of such history, and that their salient characteristic is a conception of human society as a progressive development explained by general causes, I should like to know what these causes are.

CATHAL.—The supreme cause for the Darwinian sociologist or historian is the 'struggle for life,' which eliminates the weak and preserves the strong. You will find this factor in one form or another at the foundation of every Darwinian conception of human society. It is the alpha and omega of social evolution, the great force which has shaped the destinies of man in all ages. Its greatest exponent was Herbert Spencer; indeed, it was he who invented the formula with its correlative, the 'survival of the fittest.' I prefer, however, to quote from some living authors. 'But it is not,' says Mr. Benjamin Kidd, 'until we draw aside the veil from our civilization, and watch what is taking place within our borders between the individuals and the classes comprising it, that we begin to realize, with some degree of clearness, the nature of the rivalry which compels us to make progress whether we will or not, its tendency to develop in intensity rather than to disappear, and our own powerlessness either to stay its course or to escape its influence. . . . We have only to look around us in the world in which we live to see that this rivalry which man maintains with his fellows has become the leading and dominant feature of our civilization.'² 'The struggle for life,' remarks

¹ J. B. Bury, Inaugural Lecture, p. 17 (Cambridge, 1903).

² *Social Evolution*, pp. 52, 53 (Macmillan, 1894).

Mr. Iwan-Müller, "with all its attendant consequences of inequality and poverty, is the mainspring of civilization. There is no substitute for it, and if it be destroyed the clock stops. Struggle is not only the cause, but it is the condition of progress."¹ These quotations suffice for the United Kingdom. If we cross the Atlantic, we shall hear the same note struck. Mr. Lester Ward, the most distinguished sociologist in America, writes: 'In making this objective enquiry it [Pure Sociology] finds that, as a matter of fact, war has been the chief and leading condition of human progress. This is perfectly obvious to anyone who understands the meaning of the struggle of races. When races stop struggling, progress ceases.'² Dr. F. S. Schenck writes in the same strain: 'The conflict waged from the beginning in all orders of life has not been suspended in the case of man, he is as powerless to escape from it as is the lowest organism; but the beneficence of the law is seen, in that here too the result is ceaseless and inevitable progress.'³

PADRAIG.—Enough, enough; I am quite convinced that the 'struggle for life' is the magic watchword of our Darwinian sociologists and historians. It is the 'Open Sesame' of all social problems. Perhaps no shibboleth with as little objective truth has ever exercised the same influence on man. It has hypnotized the world of science. I do not of course deny that a grim struggle reigns through the organic world. Since that far-off day when God commanded Adam and his descendants to earn their bread in the sweat of their brows, man has been waging a constant warfare with forces from within and from without. What I do repudiate is the apotheosis of an abstract formula, the erection of a metaphysical entity into a natural and all pervading force.⁴ It is a contradiction to say that human

¹ *Fortnightly Review*, August, 1909, p. 215.

² *Pure Sociology*, p. 238 (Macmillan, 1903).

³ *The Sociology of the Bible*, p. 23 (New York, 1909).

⁴ 'Dans ces dernières années, par le fait du darwinisme, la lutte est devenue la plus grande divinité de la mythologie occidentale. Elle a été exaltée comme le souverain bien, elle a des adorateurs fervents et enthousiastes, des croyants convaincus. Mais, vraiment, elle ne mérite pas cet excès d'honneur. La lutte n'est plus une divinité qu'une entité métaphysique.'—(J. Novicow, *La critique du darwinisme social*, p. 92.)

society, which means union, organization, equilibrium, is built on a 'struggle for life,' which means disunion, confusion, disorganization. Man, as Aristotle defined him long ago, is a social animal—*ζῶον φύσει πολιτικόν*. He is driven to live in union with others not by the external force of a 'struggle for life,' but by the internal force of his own nature—*insitum homini naturâ est ut in civili societate vivat* (Leo XIII.). Now the primary end of civil society is the preservation of the juridical order, the reign of justice amongst men, whereas the 'struggle for life' as a social principle is but another expression of 'might is right.' This is clear from the ardent defence Darwinists have always made of Individualism, the doctrine which emancipates the individual more and more from every form of government. 'The doctrine of evolution,' says Mr. Benjamin Kidd, 'appeared to give the last sanction to individualism and to all the tendencies which from the period of the Renaissance onwards had been making for emancipation. It was taken by many to be a doctrine which justified from the fundamental order of nature the claim of the individual to stand forth—as the extreme advocate of individualism has always insisted—independent of all social powers, organizations, institutions, and creeds, being himself the end of evolution, the Atlas who carried forward on his shoulders, in the struggle which he waged with his fellows for his own visible interest in his own lifetime, the end and welfare of the whole order of the world which surrounded him.'¹ There is no need to refute this unnatural view of human society. It has been weighed in the balance and found wanting, as acknowledged in a later passage by Mr. Kidd.² Bitter experience has taught the governments of the world that the interests of the individual are not necessarily coincident with the highest good of the society, that unregulated competition does not always make for the common weal.

CATHAL.—This whole onslaught of yours is beside the

¹ *Individualism and After*, p. 12 (Oxford, 1908).

² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

mark : it is based on a confusion between the science of ethics and the science of history. We have already ruled out of court the vexed question of historical laws, and are arguing on the assumption that Darwinian history deals with the sequences of cause and effect rather than with the formulation of laws. It does not matter, therefore, if ethics or sociology prove that the 'struggle for life' is not a law of nature. It may still be a factor of human progress ; for man is ruled by other forces than the laws of his nature—*video meliora proboque ; deteriora sequor*. It is sufficient for me if his development in the past has been governed by the constant and pitiless force of competition. Whether this be a law of his nature or not does not concern history. Now, I contend that there is no more firmly established fact in history than this rivalry of life, no more universal cause of social change. As Herbert Spencer has very justly pointed out in his *Principles of Sociology*, it has been the supreme instrument of evolution. It has grouped together and organized men that they might present a united front for attack and defence. This combined action has been the beginning of social co-operation, and social co-operation is the beginning of all progress. Even though we cannot justify the horrors of this universal struggle, whether in arms as of old or in money as to-day, we must at least recognize the hard fact that it has existed in all ages and has worked for human progress. Nay, it dominates the modern no less than the ancient world, though you wish to believe that individualism and its correlative doctrine of unfettered competition are dying, and buttress up this belief with a reference to Mr. Kidd. It is, indeed, quite true that this distinguished exponent of Darwinian sociology acknowledges a change in the political world with regard to the advantages of unrestricted competition ; but he soon shows that this change, far from killing individualism, has only set up another rival and thereby created a new form of the eternal struggle for life. Here are his words as found in the same essay from which you have quoted : ' On the one side we see now a conviction strongly entrenched in all the institutions of our time of the superi-

ority of private enterprise under voluntary co-operation as applied to all the affairs of the world. On the other side, we see largely held an opposing conviction that the necessity is developing for greatly extended corporate action on the part of the State, and that the corporate consciousness, acting through the State, can alone carry through those long sequences of the public weal in which the present must be subordinate to the future. We have here two counter-principles which the meaning of our history will, it seems to me, drive us to embody in two normally antagonistic policies in the future. Probably in no other way can either policy be trusted to develop its full meaning and its full efficiency in the future.'¹ No observer of social phenomena could say that the 'struggle for life' was dying in the modern world. Its form alone has changed.

PADRAIG.—There are so many things to criticize in these last remarks of yours that I do not know where to begin. By granting that the 'struggle for life' is not a law of nature, you are abandoning the central doctrine of Darwinian sociology and are rendering your own position untenable. It is ridiculous to say that the supreme factor of human progress is a force which is not only unnatural, but even antagonistic to every tendency of the human heart. No man loves the struggles of war or of commerce for their own sake. His desires are for peace, happiness, enjoyment, and these are attained far more efficiently by co-operation and the reign of justice. Now and again the wickedness of others forces him to fight; but to establish a universal rivalry of life is to establish universal wickedness, universal lawlessness, a state of society which has never and can never exist. It would be the perversion of human nature, the glorification of egoism, the apotheosis of brute force. I did not, therefore, make any confusion between the science of ethics and the science of history. I showed that the 'struggle for life' is not a law of human nature. If it is not a law, it is not a universal factor of social progress. Not even in the animal kingdom is it a law; for those of the same species rarely fight.

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 33, 34.

CATHAL.—*Contra factum non valet argumentum.* What is the one salient character of ancient history? War, incessant war. ‘The first prominent feature,’ says Mr. Kidd, ‘which we have everywhere to notice in groups and associations of primitive men is their military character. In whatever part of the world savage man may have been met with, he is engaged in continuous warfare. The great business in life of the society to which he belongs is always war with other societies of the same kind. To ensure success in this direction, every aspiration of the individual and the community seem to be directed. Savage societies rise, flourish, and disappear with marvellous rapidity; but the secret of their progress or decadence is always the same—they have grown strong or weak as fighting organizations.’¹ There is one word and only one emblazoned on the banner of humanity as it marches down the centuries, one word which has presided at the birth of every revolutionary movement and directed the forces of change in every country, and that word is Rivalry. It assumes many different forms and puts on many attractive colours according to time, place, and circumstances; but the ultimate analysis of the springs of action will always reveal this primal element. Proteus-like in its manifestations, it is ever the constant factor, the permanent force, the unchanging principle, of change. It is the lord of the modern no less than the ancient world.

PADRAIG.—*Contra factum non valet argumentum.* Certainly, but I deny your facts. They are mainly the work of the imagination. The Darwinian historian has only a smile of infinite pity for the older philosophies of history, because they were largely built on *a priori* reasoning. But if we examine the genesis of his own ‘struggle-theory,’ we shall see that it also has a similar foundation. The Darwinian historian assumes the evolution of man from some primeval animal. How exactly this happened he does not know. It is a postulate of the reason. With that assumption it is natural for him to conceive primitive man as

¹ *Social Evolution*, p. 40.

antisocial, savage, lawless, blind to every claim of justice and deaf to every whisper of love. The imagination is allowed to paint the picture, and it does so in the most lurid colours. Surely, such a method is not scientific. Facts are to be proved, not imagined. Again, history has nothing to do with the origin of man and society. They are beyond its sphere. The sources of history are documents, and the earliest of them outside Holy Writ do not carry us to the beginnings of human society.

CATHAL.—What about the facts which anthropology lays at the service of history? Are they imaginary? This science, as you know, deals mainly with savage tribes, and savage tribes scarcely change from age to age. They have not sufficient intelligence to invent something new, and consequently move in the same rigid groove. The transforming force of great personalities is unknown amongst them; for all the members 'are absolutely of the same psychic equality, so much so that they in action and feeling can be said to stand side by side as examples of the same endowments.'¹ Now these three facts—rude character of civilization, equality of mental development, and the inevitable correlative fixity of the social type—render it possible to reconstruct scientifically their primitive state. But this primitive state, according to the universally accepted conclusions of modern science, is similar in all respects to that from which we, the heirs of all the ages, have evolved.²

PADRAIG.—Indeed, I was just going to speak of anthropology and the imaginary structures which have been built upon it. There is no proof whatever that the earliest

¹ K. Lamprecht, *What is History?* p. 4.

² 'Voilà pourquoi nous croyons que les races humaines se sont succédé sur la terre toujours de plus en plus parfaites; qu'elles ont commencé par le type noir pour passer au jaune, et de là au blanc, expression suprême de l'humanité.'—(A. Xénopol, *Théorie de l'histoire*, p. 215.)

'Looking back through the glasses of modern science we behold him (man) at first outwardly a brute, feebly holding his own against many fierce competitors. He has no wants above those of the beast; he lives in holes and dens in the rocks: he is a brute, even more feeble in body than many of the animals with which he struggles for a brute's portion. Tens of thousands of years pass over him, and his progress is slow and painful to a degree.'—(B. Kidd, *Social Evolution*, p. 29.)

inhabitants were savages from whom we have been unconsciously evolved by the stern force of circumstances. Nay, the facts which are gradually coming to light prove independently of Holy Writ that a high form of civilization flourished in the remotest periods. Writing on the antiquity of literature, Dr. A. H. Sayce, Professor of Assyriology in the University of Oxford, says: 'Centuries before Abraham was born Egypt and Babylonia were alike full of schools and libraries, of teachers and pupils, of poets and prose-writers, and of the literary works which they had produced. . . . The Babylonia of the age of Abraham was a more highly educated country than the England of George III. . . . The civilized world was a world of books, and a knowledge of writing extended even to the classes engaged in manual labour. . . . We have learned many things of late years from archæology, but its chiefest lesson has been that the age of Moses, and even the age of Abraham, was almost as literary as our own.'¹ With such facts before him it is no wonder Sir William Ramsay rebukes the evolutionists who 'arrange religions in a series from the lowest to the highest,' and 'assume that this series represents the historical development of religion from the most primitive to the most advanced.' It does not. 'Wherever evidence exists, with the rarest exceptions, the history of religion among men is a history of degeneration, and the development of a few Western nations in invention and in civilization during recent centuries should not blind us to the fact that among the vast majority of the nations the history of manners and civilization is a story of degeneration.'² Really, colossal is the only word to be applied to the assumptions of that science which is to solve all mysteries, satisfy all wants, and renovate this moribund world. No figment of the imagination, which is required to bolster up the theory of evolution, is too absurd for the credulity of its grand hierophants, for those men who have only insolent pity for the 'benighted superstitions' of all Christians. But waiving these points for the sake of dis-

¹ *Monument Facts and Higher Critical Fancies*, pp. 29, 35, 43.

² Sir Wm. Ramsay, *The Cities of St. Paul*, p. 17.

cussion, how do you explain the complex network of relations between man and man by such a simple formula as the struggle for life?

CATHAL.—This formula is not so simple as many seem to imagine. Indeed it is utter ignorance of the vast and complicated forces over which it presides that has prompted much shallow criticism. Its scientific application presupposes a sound knowledge of ethnology, physical and social environment, historical moments, general tendencies, individual and collective psychology. The working of these factors is a very interesting problem; but as our discussion has already been prolonged to a late hour, I think we had better postpone this question to another date.

PADRAIG.—Very good. Do not, however, be too confident of convincing me. I have definite views on these general factors.

P. J. CONNOLLY, S.J.

[*To be continued.*]

IRISH HONESTY

DESPITE repeated and malicious slanders on our nation, honesty is still recognized as a distinctive trait of the Irish character. 'Poor, but honest,' continues to be the proud boast of our impoverished race. Had the probity of our forefathers been purchasable by gold, they might, indeed, have left us rich in the goods of this world. But no ; they rejected every bribe, they endured poverty and persecution, that they might hand down to us, unsullied and enhanced, the priceless heritage of honesty. Do we cherish it as we ought ? Are we guarding it as we might ? Or is it, like the rest of our national heritage, being spirited away under the fatal spell of alien civilization ? In the heroic struggle being made at present to preserve all that is noblest and best of our ancient civilization, let us not forget to include among the national virtues that which is known as Irish honesty.

The least observant of us must have noticed that the opportunities and temptations to be dishonest are multiplied a hundredfold for our young people at the present day. Fraud, when practised in certain circumstances, and according to certain recognized methods, is often connived at and readily condoned. There are tricks of trade in common use to-day which, if adopted twenty years ago, would have been considered mean and dishonest. Roguery has reached such a degree of finesse, and is concealed under so many plausible names, that it almost defies detection. The principles of strict justice are modified without scruple in order to meet the so-called exigencies of modern life. Honesty, it is to be feared, is no longer regarded as the best policy. Make money honestly, if you can, but have it at all costs, is apparently the motto of the majority. To be poor but honest is all very well—to be rich is much better still.

Yet it is not so much the love of money as the love of

pleasure that leads most frequently to dishonesty. We live in an age of enjoyment. The modicum of amusement which satisfied our fathers would be considered insufficient by the least enthusiastic pleasure-seeker of the present day. In rural districts, not so many years ago, people seldom rambled beyond the limits of their own parish. Sunday was a day of rest bringing little in the way of recreation beyond a stroll through the fields and a chat at the cross-roads. There was no alternative but to stay at home. Only those who were styled 'the gentry' kept a horse and trap for driving to Mass on Sundays. Bicycles were unknown. Railway communication was very incomplete. Life in rural towns was little better. When the week's work was done business apprentices were glad to spend the Sunday with their parents and friends in the country. Clubs and billiard-rooms were reserved for the wealthy classes. Excursions by rail and by river were rare treats for the young people of thirty years ago. The half-holiday and the week-end had no meaning for them.

How different now! Notwithstanding all that has been written about the dullness and monotony of Irish life, no one can deny that the standard of comfort and of enjoyment has advanced out of all proportion with our national prosperity in recent times. We live better; we dress more stylishly; we travel more frequently; we spend more money in amusements. Take, for example, the poor country lad already mentioned, who becomes an apprentice in town. Scarcely has he arrived when he is invited by his *confrères* to join a billiard-room, a football team, a cycle club. If he refuse, he will find himself ostracised. If he consent, he must be prepared to do as others do. It will be necessary to procure a bicycle for the club runs and Sunday outings. He will be expected to accompany his friends when they compete at sports in Dublin or elsewhere. He must pay more than one annual subscription, and contribute his share to various projects from time to time. How is he to meet this ever-increasing demand on his purse? The little pocket-money he received from his parents on leaving home is soon spent. He does not like to appeal too frequently to

them ; for he knows how hard they find it to keep him supplied with clothes and other necessities. What is he to do ? Five or six years must elapse before he can hope to receive any remuneration from his employer. When his companions start on their Sunday excursion, will he pace the lonely streets ? When they gather round the billiard-table will he look on, with his hands in his pockets ? When they take an occasional night at the theatre, or the concert hall, will he remain outside, waiting ? When his football team travels by train to some neighbouring town, will he be left behind ? ‘ Who is he, and we will praise him ? ’

Seldom, indeed, is probity able to stand such a strain. Many a young Irish boy, placed in such circumstances, has lapsed into dishonest practices. Rather than admit his poverty, rather than forfeit the friendship of his companions, he begins to borrow money from his master’s till without his master’s consent. He thinks it no crime to take the loan of a few shillings for a few days. Does not his master give credit for months—and for years oftentimes—to far less deserving persons ? With the good intention, therefore, of refunding the money *quam primum*, the apprentice raises his first loan. Soon, however, he is forced to borrow a second instalment ; and at the end of a year he is hopelessly in debt. Restitution is now out of the question : for as a result of spending his master’s money, he has gained much popularity and influence amongst his companions ; he enjoys the reputation of being generous and fond of sport. Should he attempt to curtail expenses at this stage of his career, he will be dubbed mean and miserly. As matters stand now, ‘ as well be hanged for a sheep as a lamb.’ It is only a few pounds more, at most. His apprenticeship will be served in two or three years ; and once drawing a salary he can pay back twenty pounds as easily as ten. Thus he succeeds in silencing the voice of conscience and drifts from bad to worse, until, in the end, he loses all sense of honour and honesty.

Yes, the apprenticeship system, as worked at present, proves a school of thievery for not a few sons of poor but honest Irish parents. With whom does the fault lie ?

Partly with the apprentice ; partly with his parents ; and partly with his employer.

No one who understands the many attractions of town life for the young apprentice, fresh from the country, will begrudge him a reasonable share of innocent recreation ; granted even that up-to-date standard measures are used in calculating what is a reasonable share. But, making due allowance for the pleasure-seeking tendencies of modern life, it must, nevertheless, be conceded that the young Irish apprentice and others similarly circumstanced often outstep the bounds of moderation and go beyond their means in search of enjoyment. Indeed, were there no other way of distinguishing master from servant except by the amount of money each spends on dress and amusements, we would be often at a loss to know who's who.

A word, now, about the conduct of some parents towards their boys at business in town. The majority of apprentices in our towns and cities are the sons of ' small farmers '—honest, respectable people, no doubt, but with very little experience of the needs of urban life. To send one of their boys to business is to make a gentleman of him, with the least possible expenditure. Having provided him with a complete outfit and given him a few shillings in his pocket, they regard him as having no further claim on the family exchequer. Why so, is not quite clear. They cannot be ignorant of the fact that their son will not receive a salary of any sort for several years. On the other hand, they must notice that, as time goes on, he dresses more stylishly and has money to spend. Yet, they never seem to inquire what secret source of revenue the lad has discovered. Serious doubts they must have ; but, unfortunately, they have not the moral courage to express them, lest they put their child to shame. Be they ever so guileless, they know full well that gold is not found on the streets of an Irish town.

In conclusion, what of the masters ? How are they in any way responsible for the dishonest habits of the young apprentice ? Briefly, by their neglect and niggardliness. The master who takes an innocent country boy into his

employment is bound to watch over him with paternal solicitude. There is an implicit understanding to this effect between him and the boy's parents. The moral as well as the business training of their son is entrusted to his care. It is the master's duty to know with whom such a youngster associates, and where he spends his leisure hours. How many masters do so? In some establishments, at least, if the apprentice does his work satisfactorily for a certain number of hours every day, and returns at a fixed hour every night, he may spend his free time how and where he will. Conscious, therefore, of his freedom—with no one to question his choice of companions—with no friend to speak a kindly word of warning, deprived of home influence, and home comforts—small wonder, indeed, that the young, irresponsible, inexperienced country boy is tempted to lead a harum-scarum sort of life. Had he been treated as a friend and not as a hired servant, had he received a trifling gratuity from time to time in recognition of his industry and honesty, in all probability he would have become a sensible, sober, successful business man, an honourable, upright citizen, a credit to his country and to his religion.

M. O'BYRNE.

FRAGMENT FROM 'LEABHAR BREAC'

THE following tract on clerical duties is taken from *Leabhar Breac*, fac. [260] b. The piece is anonymous, and is not complete. Some of the advice is not yet out of date.

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| 1. Cú ip dech do clepech.
ní [hanra.] | 1. What is meet for a cleric?
Not [<i>difficult the answer.</i>] |
| 2. Léirí deşreputáin. | 2. Fervour in good meditation. |
| 3. Şaife maşırtech. | 3. Filial affection for masters. |
| 4. Erşí moémaírne. | 4. Early rising. |
| 5. Uíomán éca. | 5. Great fear of death. |
| 6. Uađar deşoaine. | 6. A few good people. |
| 7. Şper eřnaşcú. | 7. Continual prayer. |
| 8. Denam becoibre. | 8. Doing little work. |
| 9. Deirh for tepecur. | 9. To have little property. |
| 10. Úám řpí banpedú. | 10. To give up womenfolk. |
| 11. Nem-řpichnum éctaiş. | 11. Indifference about clothing. |
| 12. řailte cen cluchaíge. | 12. Joy without hilarity. |
| 13. Menma řpí řpuichí. | 13. Attention to nobleness. |
| 14. Ĥimşabail ocbad. | 14. Avoidance of youth. |
| 15. Şper legínó. | 15. Continual study. |
| 16. Timrıbe éodultá. | 16. Shortening of sleep. |
| 17. Reo-legínó řtaípe. | 17. Easy reading of history. |
| 18. řrecept Chanóine. | 18. Preaching the Canon. |
| 19. Şnár řorcetáil. | 19. Continual teaching. |
| 20. Dúl deşmaşırtech. | 20. Going to a good master (?). |
| 21. Sceluşuró Şereptuir. | 21. Narrating Scripture. |
| 22. Oró necláirí. | 22. Order of the Church. |
| 23. Timchell cřoir. | 23. Round the Cross (?): |
| 24. Comřad řpí řpuichí. | 24. Converse with elders. |
| 25. Tabáirte nalmřan. | 25. Almsgiving. |
| 26. Tabáirte coibřen. | 26. Giving confession. |
| 27. řpí toil muinci. | 27. Restraint on (the) will. |
| 28. Imşabail cornuma. | 28. Avoidance of contention. |
| 29. Coibřena şłana. | 29. Pure confession. |
| 30. Cříve şłan. | 30. Pure heart. |
| 31. Ađcomairce menci. | 31. Frequent questioning. |

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| 32. Omun òichmaire. | 32. Fear of transgression. |
| 33. Comét riasla. | 33. Keeping of rules. |
| 34. Corc fpu hailgine. | 34. Restraint on pleasures. |
| 35. Stemna fpu gairbu. | 35. Patience in adversity. |
| 36. Fír iar ngsa. | 36. Truth after falsehood. |
| 37. To iar neirlabru. | 37. Silence after generosity. |
| 38. Sepe ocup omun in
Choimteo. | 38. Love and fear of God. |
| 39. Mipeair in domain. | 39. Hatred of the world. |
| 40. Decoatcu a miaoamlu. | 40. Humility in honour. |
| 41. Abrtanaic a nimac. | 41. Abstinence in abundance. |
| 42. Timóibe a rumóoir. | 42. Restriction of comforts. |
| 43. M . . . a almpán òo
éapao épaibóis. | 43. . . . of alms to a pious
friend. |
| 44. Epnaisci léir. | 44. Earnest prayer. |
| 45. Iegeno gnepech. | 45. Continual study. |
| 46. Speim fpu raith. | 46. Power against evil (?). |
| 47. Fogluim ó Sanctaib. | 47. Learning from the saints. |
| 48. Saípe maíci. | 48. Respect of good (?). |
| 49. Coimet nimóecha. | 49. Restraint on going about. |
| 50. Ecorc peamail. | 50. Patient countenance. |
| 51. Spao òo oisuo. | 51. Love of forgiveness. |
| 52. Oiumar òo oisde. | 52. To banish pride. |
| 53. Cocao fpu toil. | 53. Battle with the will. |
| 54. Ailgine cen laxu. | 54. Pleasure without laxity. |
| 55. Meici òo mitchin. | 55. Drunkenness . . . |
| 56. Erisi la ceudguth maísi-
rpech. | 56. Rising at the first voice of
a master. |
| 57. Sapao na mbocht. | 57. Food to the poor. |
| 58. Bpat òo nocht. | 58. A mantle to the naked. |
| 59. Deoch òon íctmar. | 59. Drink to the thirsty. |
| 60. Timorpun rúla. | 60. Guarding the eyes. |
| 61. Cobpaíde aicmó. | 61. Firmness of mind. |
| 62. Menma ípel. | 62. Humble mind. |
| 63. Cain òuthpacht epíde. | 63. Kindness of heart. |
| 64. Sepe bpaitharóai. | 64. Brotherly love. |
| 65. Degetheirt for chach. | 65. Good testimony for all. |
| 66. Mipeair echnais. | 66. Hatred of detraction. |
| 67. Inoapbe roóuipó. | 67. Banishment of murmuring. |
| 68. Moíao maíteapa. | 68. Exaltation of goodness. |
| 69. Toipneam cech uile. | 69. Oppression of evil. |
| 70. Aine merraischi. | 70. Moderate fasting. |

71. Uatí répe.	71. Little food.
72. Forur comairle.	72. Solidity of advice.
73. Labrao chobraso.	73. Firm speech.
74. Menci ruitaire.	74. Frequency of watching.
75. Oirmitiu do turctioe 7 cech oen ar rinu.	75. Reverence to parents and to seniors.
76. Onóir don abbaio . . .	76. Honour to the Abbot . . .

The following verbal resemblances between this fragment and other Irish rules may be of interest. Also there is a remarkable likeness between the present list and the list in the Rule of St. Benedict, chap. iv. of *instrumenta bonorum operum*. The abbreviations used are :—

- A. Rule of Ailbe, *Ériu*, III. 92.
- B. Cap. IV. Reg. Mon. S. Benedicti, Holsten., *Codex I.* 115.
- C¹. Rule of Colm Cille (Irish), *Prim. Coll. Visit.* 109, *ZiCP.* III.
- C². Rule of Colm Cille (Latin), Holsten., *Codex I.* 221.
- D. Rule of Columbanus (Latin), Holsten., *Codex I.* 170.
- E. Rule of Comgall, *Ériu*, I. 191.
- F. Rule of Cormac, *Ériu*, II. 62.
- G. Rule of Mochuta, I. E. RECORD, xvii., 495.

The English is given in the case of the rules in the Irish language.

5. B. 'mortem quotidie ante oculos suspectam habere.'
E. 'heed of death every day.' G. 'with remembrance of the day of death that is certain for all.'

6. C¹. 'A few religious men to converse with thee of God and of His Testament.'

7. A. 'Let him be constant in prayer.' B. 'orationi frequenter incumbere.' C¹. 'three works in the day, prayer and labour and study.' D. 'quotidie ieiunandum est sicut quotidie orandum est, quotidie laborandum, quotidie est legendum.'

8. Contrast note on 7 *sup.*

9. D. 'cum non solum superflua (monachos) habere damnabile est, sed etiam velle.'

10. A. 'no warrior or woman should be in the place where they dwell.' B. 'non adulterari . . . non concupiscere . . . , desideria carnis non perficere . . . castitatem amare.'

11. v. 9, note.

12. B. 'elationem fugere.'

15. *v.* 7, note.
16. B. 'non somnolentum.'
18. F. 'Intentness on conversing with the Canon.'
21. C¹. 'a few religious men . . . to strengthen thee in the Testaments of God and the narratives of the Scriptures.'
22. C¹. 'Everything in its proper order.'
24. F. 'Study with a well-spoken senior.'
25. C¹. 'Follow almsgiving before all things.'
26. A. 'The confession of everyone who gives it, let it be right closely that he conceal it.' B. 'cogitationes malas cordi suo advenientes mox ad Christum allidere et seniori spiritali patefacere.' F. 'order of confession.' G. 'Frequent diligent confessions.'
28. B. 'contentiones non amare.' G. 'without dissension.'
30. A. 'Holy and pure be their hearts.'
33. E. 'Preserve the rule of the Lord.'
35. G. 'Joy in tribulations, patience with them ever.'
37. G. 'Right closely shall you give them (alms) for that is their virtue.'
38. C¹. 'Love of God with all thy heart and all thy strength.' C². 'Primum omnium Deus timendus est et diligendus ex totis viribus.' E. 'Through fear is the love of the King who heals every misery.' F. 'God's love demands His fear.' G. 'Let there be no lasting love in thy heart but only the love of God.'
39. C². 'nihil quaerere debemus ex his quae ad saeculum pertinent . . . omnes divitiae mundi alienae esse a nobis noscuntur.'
41. B. 'non multum edacem. . . . Ieiunium amare.' C². 'neque ad satietatem edendum est.' D. 'Si enim modum abstinentia excesserit vitium erit non virtus.' E. 'eat thy due portion of food.' F. 'a holy dinner without repletion, without a full meal (?) : a small fair ration : being a-fasting : Fasting when it is proper, excellent the restraint it brings.' Cf. also a fragment in *Ériu*, II. 224 : 'He does not praise fasting. He prefers moderate eating always. There is no rule at all in which is found fasting. Of fasting in the rule of Comgell, i.e., the Wednesday before Easter.' Evidently the last sentence was added by a scribe who had read Comgall's rule and wished to correct the first scribe.
42. B. 'Delicias non amplecti.'
- 44, 45. *v.* 7, note.
50. A. 'Gentle be his countenance.'

51. B. 'nullum odire . . . pro inimicis orare . . . inimicos diligere.' G. 'Forgiveness to all who did us evil . . . without hate towards anybody.'

52. A. 'without pride.' B. 'non esse superbum.'

54. G. 'without excessive joy.'

55. B. 'non esse vinolentum.' C². 'caro et vinum vel potus in quo fit ebrietas refutanda sunt monachis.' G. 'without intemperance.'

56. C². 'ad primum verbum senioris omnes qui audierint ex fratribus assurgere oportet.' D. 'ad primum verbum senioris omnes ad obediendum audientes surgere oportet.'

57. B. 'pauperes recreare.'

58. B. 'nudos vestire.' C². 'cura pauperum semper est facienda, et omnia nostra cum charitate fiant.'

60. G. 'restraint of feet, hands, eyes and ears.'

61. A. 'Let him be steady' (*bis*). G. 'with firmness' (*bis*).

65. B. 'Honorare omnes homines.' E. 'Goodwill to every man.'

66. A. 'without calumny or attacking, without reviling (*ecnach*) a living thing.' B. 'non detractorem.' C². 'si quis ex fratribus dixerit verbum de fratre, illo non audiente vel absente, si non ad laudem et dilectionem illius pertineat, hic tamquam blasphemator iudicandus est.'

67. B. 'non murmuriosum.' C². 'Si quis frater murmurans inventus fuerit, hic ipse mittendus est in carcerem . . . et poenitentiam agat secundum examen senioris.' D. 'Si quis murmuraverit . . . inobediens est putandus.'

68. G. 'Subjugation of the wicked . . . magnification of truth ; yours to magnify the good and banish evil ; with promulgation of truth, proscription of falsehood.'

70, 71. *v.* 41, note.

74. B. 'actus vitae suae omni hora custodire.'

75. B. 'Seniores venerari.' G. 'Reverence to parents . . . and to who are older and more venerable ; Reverence to seniors and obedience to them.' C². 'Si quis seniori suo detraxerit, non seniori detrahit sed Deo ; si quis inventus fuerit in aliquo spernere seniore suum, non hominem spernit sed Deum . . . et omnia quaecumque senior praeceperit, secundum mandata Domini explenda sunt.'

Mac Eclairi.

SOME IRISH ECCLESIASTICS AT THE SEMINARY OF ST. NICOLAS DU CHARDONNET, PARIS¹

(A.D. 1735-1791)

WHEN Rome was at the zenith of its power Virgil sang the praises of his native land, and apostrophized Italy as the mother of great men : ' *Salve magna parens frugum, Saturnia tellus, Magna virum.*'² A similar eulogy might be paid to France of the seventeenth century. France was, at that time, *Magna Parens virum*, prolific of great men. Richelieu and Mazarin as statesmen, Condé and Turenne in military genius, Bossuet in eloquence, Pascal in science, shed a lustre on France. At the same time Vincent de Paul and John James Olier were shedding on her a lustre yet more glorious by their zeal for the renovation of ecclesiastical discipline.

Another holy priest less widely known rivalled them in this glorious work, viz., Adrian Bourdoise, founder of the community and seminary of St. Nicolas du Chardonnet. Adrian Bourdoise was born at Chartres in 1584. Before making up his mind to take Holy Orders he meditated long on the responsibility of the ecclesiastical state and the dangers to which priests living in the world are exposed. It seemed to him that the security and efficiency of the parochial clergy would be promoted if the priests in each parish formed themselves into a community. Soon after his ordination Adrian Bourdoise accepted the post of assistant priest in the parish of St. Nicolas du Chardonnet, where he eventually became parish priest. Here he commenced to reduce to practice the idea he had conceived of forming a parochial community of secular priests. In 1628 the rules of the new community were approved by ecclesiastical authority, and in 1632 by royal letters patent the

¹ Sources: *Histoire du Séminaire de Saint Nicolas du Chardonnet*, par L'Abbé P. Schoenher (Paris, 1909); *Registres MSS. aux Archives Nationales*, M.M. 479, M.M. 480.

² *Georg.*, ii. 172.

new institute received legal recognition. The members of the community were not bound by vows; the parochial house was their monastery, the parish church their oratory, and the Bishop of the diocese their superior. The new institute soon attracted the attention of ecclesiastics zealous for the reformation of the clergy. In 1644 Mgr. de Gondi, Archbishop of Paris, raised the community of St. Nicolas du Chardonnet to the rank of a diocesan seminary. The students resided in the seminary, and attended the classes at the College of Navarre, or at the Sorbonne. They had also repetitions or private lectures in the seminary, and they assisted at the offices in the parish church.

In addition to the seminary properly so called, there was opened in 1710 a house of residence for ecclesiastics not belonging to the diocese of Paris. Its official title was 'La Petite Communauté de Saint-Nicolas du Chardonnet.' In this community many Irish ecclesiastics found a temporary home. Most of them were already priests. Some of them awaited a vacancy at the Irish College, called 'des Lombards.' Others had completed the usual course of studies and desired to prolong their residence in Paris.

At the close of the eighteenth century the seminary of Saint Nicolas du Chardonnet, like all similar institutions, perished. Two registers, however, containing the names of its inmates have escaped destruction, and are to be found at the Archives Nationales, Paris.

One of them, M.M. 479, contains the names of those who entered the little community of St. Nicolas du Chardonnet from its foundation in 1710. The other, M.M. 480, contains the names of the ecclesiastics who entered the seminary from 1758 to 1792.

The registers are written in French, and state the name, the age, the diocese, the orders, the date of entrance and departure of each ecclesiastic admitted, the object for which he came, his means of support, and generally the correspondent who presented him. From these entries we gather that the amount of the pension for twelve months was 550 francs, which, about 1790, was increased to 600 francs.

We gather also that in many cases a portion of the pension was paid by means of the stipends for Masses.

Besides the entries in French, there are in many cases marginal notes in Latin, in an abbreviated form, relative to the conduct, the piety, and the talents of the students. They are such as the following: *P. bona*; *C. optima*; *In. optima*; *M. boni*. These letters are the initials of *Pietas*, *Capacitas*, *Indoles*, *Mores*. In the case of a few there are notes of a more severe tone, as *C. mediocr.*, *In. pigra*. The registers and the notes of the students were not meant for publicity. They are therefore the more valuable, and in the case of the Irish ecclesiastics who lodged at St. Nicolas they show the estimate in which they were held by foreign superiors.

The present writer has gone over the list of names in the registers above mentioned, and has extracted from them the names of all the Irish ecclesiastics, including two or three of Irish descent born in France, which they contain, from the first entry of an Irish name in 1735 to the last in 1791. He trusts that it is now no indiscretion to make them public. The notes of the Irishmen are generally good, and in nearly all cases where they are depreciatory they refer to faults of character rather than to serious offences.

They are as follows:—

1735.

September 13.—Entered Lucius Joseph Hooke, of Dublin. Acolyte since last Trinity. Age, 21 years. Entered to profess Philosophy, and to prepare for his Degree Examination. Correspondent, Madame la Maréchale de Gramont. Left March 14, 1737, Bachelor of the Sorbonne, to go to reside there. *P. optima*. *C. optima*. *I. optima*.

1750.

October 17.—Entered Thomas Herbert Hussey, from Ireland, diocese of Kerry. Subdeacon since the Christmas ordination, 1749. Bachelor and Professor of the House of the Sorbonne.

1751.

October 4.—Entered Francis Shenan. Age, 23 years. Priest of the diocese of Killaloe, in Ireland. Nephew of M. Shenan,

Vicar-General of the Bishop of Killaloe. Priest since the Trinity. Arrived from Ireland to commence Theology.

November 23.—Entered M. Charles Callahan. Age, 23 years. Son of M^{me}. Callahan, of Lillers in Artois. Relative of M. O'Molonne (O'Molony) de Seve, diocese of Paris. Subdeacon for two years past, Canon of Lillers, diocese of St. Omer. Has completed his 5^{um}, and spent three years at St. Louis, to prepare for the degree of Bachelor.

1752.

July 3.—Entered M. Robert Blake. Age, 24 years. Priest of the diocese of Tuam. Ordained one year. Studied Philosophy at Toulouse, and Theology for two years at Bordeaux. Comes to take Degrees in Paris.

1753.

October 12.—Entered John Connell. Age, over 23 years. A priest since July 29 last. Of the diocese of Ferns. Recommended by M. Devereux, Principal of the Lombard College. For Logic. Left December 17 following. *M. boni*.

October 20.—Entered M. Justin Terry. Age, 27 years. Of the diocese of Cloyne in Ireland. Two years a priest. Made his studies in Philosophy and Theology at Salamanca, and comes to improve himself further. He left February 16, 1754. *P. bona. C. bona. I. optima et culta*.

1754.

December 10.—Entered M. Edmund O'Reilly. Age, 25 years. Related to M. l'Abbé Farely, of the College of Rheims. Priest of the diocese of Meath. For Logic. Left December 25, 1754, having remained only a few days.

1756.

May 21.—Entered Joseph F——. Age, 22 years. An acquaintance of the Curé of St. Sulpice, who protects him, and of Mr. Macmaon (*sic*) (MacMahon). A cleric of the diocese of Dublin. In his first year's Theology, which he commenced in the Community of Lisieux. Left May 27, 1757. *Suspect pour la foi et les mœurs*.

1760.

May 3.—Entered John Baptist Henegan. Age, 30 years. Of the diocese of Cork, in Ireland. A priest of six years' standing.

Has finished his *quinquennium*.¹ No burse. Pension, his Masses. Correspondent, M. Henegan, Provisor of the Lombards. Left October 24, 1760 ; re-entered December 16, 1760 ; left May 4, 1761.

1761.

October 7.—Entered M. George Constantine Mary Magenis, son of M^{me}. Magenis, widow of an officer of the regiment of Lee. Born at Ava. Tonsured. Age, 16 $\frac{3}{4}$ years. For first year's Theology. Left November, 1761.

1764.

October 4.—Entered Edmund Doyle. Age, about 30 years. Of the diocese of Leighlin. A priest of six years' standing. Has finished his *quinquennium*. Correspondent, the Principal of the Lombard College. *P. optima. C. bona. I. optima.*

October 23.—Entered Walter Herron. Age, 25 years. A priest since January, 1764. Made his studies in Philosophy and Theology at Salamanca. Correspondents, Eleonora Herron, residing at Wexford, in Ireland ; and Mr. Devereux, Principal of the Lombard College. Left July 21, 1766.

1765.

May 24.—Entered M. Michael O'Mahony. Age, 38 years. Of the diocese of Cashel, in Ireland. A priest of three years' standing. Has studied Philosophy, and one year's Theology in Paris. Pension, his Masses. Correspondent, M. de la Roche, Superior of the *Trente-Trois*.² Left February 21, 1767 ; re-entered May 4, 1767 ; left June 5 following.

August 8.—Entered Thaddeus O'Brien. Age, 31 years. Of the diocese of Cloyne, in Ireland. A priest of five years' standing. His 5^{um} in the Lombard College. Pension, his Masses. Correspondent, M. de la Roche, Superior of the *Trente-Trois*.

October 26.—Entered M. T——, diocese of Clogher. Age, 26 years. Presented by M. Kelly, Superior of the Irish Community. Priest of Clogher. For Logic. Left January 23 following. *Sujet sans education, et peu temperant.*

November 13.—Entered M. Meyler, of the diocese of Ferns, in Ireland. Age, about 30 years. Presented by M. La Roche, Superior of the *Trente-Trois*. In priest's orders. For Theology.

¹ The *Quinquennium* was the full course of two years' Philosophy and three years' Theology.

² The *Trente-Trois* was the title of a Seminary near the Lombard College, where 33 students were educated. The number was fixed in honour of the thirty-three years of our Lord's life.

1766.

December 13.—Entered M. Joseph Dixon. Age, 33 years. Of the diocese of Dublin, in Ireland. A priest since 1756. Entered the Lombard College; studied two years' Theology. Has resided for six years with M. Dillon, Archbishop of Narbonne, as tutor to his nephews. No burse. Will pay 200 liv. Correspondents, the Archbishop of Narbonne and M. Cahill, priest of the Lombard College.

1767.

August 3.—Entered M. James Doran. Age, 28 years. Of the diocese of Dublin. A priest of six years' standing. Studied Philosophy and three years' Theology at Alcalá in Spain. Pension, his Masses; and will pay 150 liv. Correspondent, M. de la Roche, Superior of the Seminary of the *Trente-Trois*.

December 1.—Entered M. Michael O'Reilly. Age, 30 years. Of the diocese of Limerick. A priest of four years' standing. Master of Arts in the University of Nantes. Studied Theology for six months in the Irish Seminary at Nantes. Pension, his Masses; and will pay 100 liv. A good priest.

1768.

August 16.—Entered M. Laurence O'Loghlen. Age, about 20 years. Son of M. O'Loghlen, who resides in the County Galway, in Ireland, diocese of Kilmacduagh. Cleric. Left December 14, 1769; re-entered August 6, 1771, for Logic. He wishes to study Physics. Presented by Père Duhany, Augustinian de la Vallée. *Per raro Communicans. C. optima. I. optima.*

1769.

June 15.—Entered M. Thomas Hussey. Age, 23 years and two months. Of the diocese of Miden (Meath), in Ireland. A priest since the month of March, 1769. Three years' Philosophy and four years' Theology at Seville, in Spain. Pension, his Masses, and 300f. Correspondent, M. Devereux, Principal of the College des Lombards. Left August 6, 1770. *Optima.*

April 5.—Entered M. Joseph Peter O'Dea. Priest since the ordination at St. Matthew's, 1767. From Paimbœuf, diocese of Nantes. Made his *quinquennium* at St. Sulpice. Comes to prepare for the Degree of Bachelor. His father, an Irish gentleman, resides at Paimbœuf, seven leagues from Nantes. Known to M. le Comte de Lanon, rue de Verneuil, and M. Noel, steward of the Duke d'Aiguillon, rue de l'Université. Left January 27, 1770. *Indoles arrogans, irregularis, et mundana.*

1774.

October 4.—Entered M. Richard FitzGerald. Priest of the diocese of Kildare, in Ireland. To recommence his Logic in the University. Presented by the Superior of the Seminary des Lombards. Left May 10. *P. bona. Cap. medioc. Ind. bona sed pigra et mundana.*

October 15.—Entered M. Richard FitzGerald.¹ Priest of the diocese of Kildare. For Logic. Presented by the Superior of the Lombards. Left May 9, to go to the Lombards. *Bona medioc. cap.*

October 16.—Entered M. George Lacy. Priest of the diocese of Limerick. For Logic. Presented by the Superior of the Lombards. Left December 5 following, to enter the Seminary of the Lombards. *P. bona. Ind. optima. C. bona.*

1777.

October 13.—Entered M. Hugh O'Reilly. An Irish priest of the diocese of Kilmore. For Theology. Left May 29. Hardly able to pay the pension. *Variis moribus. Aptus scientiae. Indoles bona. Pietate pollens.*

October 20.—Mack Nully (MacNally?). Age, 28 years. Priest of the diocese of Connor, in Ireland. For Theology. Left February 14, 1778, to go to the College des Lombards. Of good conduct; observant of rule.

October 23.—Entered M. Henry Conwell. Priest of the diocese of Armagh, in Ireland. For Physics. Left May 27, 1778, to go to the College des Lombards. Good disposition; pious; talented.

October 23.—Entered M. James Devlin. Of the diocese of Armagh, in Ireland. For Physics. Left to go to the Lombard College. Applied to study, with success; good and agreeable conduct.

1778.

December 21.—Entered M. Edmund Power. Priest of the diocese of Cork, in Ireland. Age, 25 years. Has read two years' Philosophy, and one year's Theology in the College des Lombards, rue des Carmes. Presented by M. O'Neil, Principal of the said College. Left May, 1779. *P. bona. C. bona. Ind. bona.*

August 25.—Entered Moses Keavin. Laic. Age, about 21 years. Of the diocese of Ferns, in Ireland. Presented by his

¹ This second entry occurs on the page following the previous one. But it seems to refer to the same person.

compatriot, Abbé FitzGerald, formerly Professor in the Community. For Logic. Left October 29, to return to his native country. Slothful.

1780.

September 5.—Entered Bernard Muldoon, an Irishman. Priest of Armagh, of one year's standing. Age, 25 years. To commence Logic. Left July 31, 1781.

September 5.—Entered M. Bernard Quin, an Irishman. Age, 25 years. Priest of Armagh. Entered for Logic. Left July 31, 1781.

September 5.—Entered Francis Corr, an Irishman. Age, 26 years. Priest of Armagh. For Logic. Left July 31, 1781.

September 5.—Entered M. Patrick Kavanagh, an Irishman. Age, 26 years. Priest of Armagh. For Logic. Left July 30, 1781.

October 3.—Entered M. Ambrose Mullholland. Age, 26 years. An Irishman. Priest of Derry. For Logic. Left July 31, 1781.

October 3.—Entered M. John Diamond, an Irishman. Age, 25 years. Priest of Derry. For Logic. Left July 31, 1781.

1781.

October 31.—Entered M. Hugh MacCosker. Age, 28 years. Priest of Armagh. For Logic.

October 31.—Entered M. MacArdell. Age, 26 years. Priest of the diocese of Armagh, in Ireland. For Logic.

February 10.—Entered M. Thomas Flynn. Age, 23 years. Deacon of the Trinity Ordination, 1780. Native of the diocese of Cloyne, in Ireland. The Superior of the Seminary of Irish Clerics is responsible for him, and has faculties for his ordination to priesthood. Left for the Easter ordination without being presented by the House.

1782.

October 4.—Entered M. Michael Kearney. Subdeacon of Meath. Of the ordination of September last. Studied Philosophy at the Irish College, rue du pot de fer (*sic*). Correspondents, Mr. Flood and Mr. Marquis (*sic*) (Markey). Burse, none. Pension, 550 liv.

November 1.—Entered William Moran. Priest of the diocese of Waterford, in Ireland. Studied Philosophy in the College de Plessis, and Theology at the College des Lombards. Presented

by Mr. Kelly, Superior of the Lombards. Pension, 550 f. Left September 22, 1783.

1783.

June 23.—Entered M. Felix MacCabe. Priest of the diocese of Kilmore, in Ireland. Having served as Chaplain for eight years in the (Regt.) *Les Vaisseaux du Roi*. Pens., 350. *M. optima. C. bona. S. optima.* Left April 15, 1784.

September 3.—Entered Francis Lynam. Priest of Dublin, in Ireland. Pension, 550 liv. Correspondent, M. Flood, Professor at (the College of) Navarre. Left July 25, 1786. *Optima.*

December 3.—Entered M. Philip Meagher. Of the diocese of Killaloe, in Ireland. Age, 24 years. Priest. Pension, 550 liv. Correspondent, M. Burke of the Lombard College, rue des Carmes. Left April 17, 1784. *Bona.*

August 28.—Entered M. Paul Long.¹ Subdeacon of the diocese of Dublin, in Ireland. Studied at the Irish Seminary. Age, 21 years. Correspondent, M. Flood, Superior of the Lombard College. Pens., 350. *P. optima. C. optima. In. taciturna.* Left August 19, 1785.

1784.

August 3.—Entered M. Barth. Mackey. Diocese of Espl (sic) (Cashel?), Ireland. Age, 24 years. Studied two years' Theology in the Irish Community. Deacon. Pens., 350. *P. bona. C. bona. Ind. difficillima.* Left August 24; re-entered September 1, 1785; left December 21, 1785.

October 8.—Entered Michael Cullen. Of the diocese of Dublin. Priest. Pension, 550 f. *P. bona. C. ignota. Indol. bona.*

1785.

October 1.—Entered M. Robert D——. Born in Limerick, October 15, 1761. An orphan. Priest of the diocese of Limerick. Presented by the Superiors of the Seminary des Lombards. To begin Philosophy. Left to go to the Lombards, April 24, 1786; re-entered February 27, 1788; left finally April 4, 1788. *Vino more Hibernorum deditus et sub omni respectu expellendus, expulsusque fuit.*

1786.

October 7.—Entered M. Leonard M'Kenna. Born December 25, 1766, in the province of Leinster, in Ireland. Has studied

¹ Subsequently Rector of the Irish College, Paris, 1815-1819.

for three years in the *Seminaire des Irlandais*. Laic of the diocese of Cloyne.¹ Will pay pension. Correspondent, M. Flood, Superior of the *College des Lombards*. Left December 15, 1787.

June 11.—Entered James Joseph Wilde. Of the diocese of Dublin. Age, 23 years. Three years' Theology. Deacon. Left in August, 1786. Pension, 550. *P. optima. C. optima. Ind. optima.* Master of Conferences.

1787.

November 5.—Entered M. Charles MacBride. Born in 1763, at Cosquin, in Ireland. Deacon of the diocese of Derry since September, 1787. Studied at the Irish College, *rue due Cheval Vert*, Humanity, Philosophy, and two years' Theology. Pension, 550 f. Presented by M. O'Neil, Superior of the said College. Left August 2, 1788; re-entered November 9, 1788; left July 7, 1789.

1790.

September 23.—Entered Edward Butler. Born October 26, 1767, in Cashel. Tonsured cleric of Cashel. Studied his Humanities and the greater part of his Philosophy at the College of Plessis. Resided at the Irish Seminary, whence he comes. Pension, 600 f. Correspondents, M. Walsh and Carney (*sic*) (Kearney), Superior of the Irish Seminary.

1791.

February 10.—Entered M. Thomas Walton. Born February 1, 1765. Deacon of Ossory since September, 1790. Made his studies in Philosophy and Theology in the Irish Seminary, *rue du Cheval Vert*. Correspondent, M. Kearney, Superior of the said Seminary.

In addition to the fact that it gave hospitality to so many Irishmen there was another bond between the Seminary of St. Nicolas du Chardonnet and the Church in Ireland. The diocesan ordinations took place four times a year at the Church of St. Nicolas du Chardonnet, and thither the students of the Irish College who had not been ordained in Ireland went to receive Orders. The register of the ordinations was regularly kept. But during the Revolution of 1830 the palace of the Archbishop of Paris,

¹ Not yet tonsured.

and with it the diocesan archives, were destroyed. One or two registers only have escaped. One of these is still to be seen at the Archives de la Seine, Paris, and in it are found the names of the ecclesiastics who received Orders at the Church of St. Nicolas du Chardonnet at the Quarter Tenses of 1770 and 1771. Amongst them are the names of many Irish students whom we know from other sources to have been pupils of the Irish College.¹ At the Summer Quarter Tense of 1770 the following Irishmen were promoted to Orders :—

Minor Orders.—Charles O’Kearney, Cashel ; Laurence O’Loughlin, Kilmacduagh ; James Finn, Cloyne ; William FitzSimmons, Dublin ; Andrew Cormack, Cashel ; Patrick Davin, Killaloe ; John Dillon, Elphin ; Thomas MacCawell, Derry ; Miles Ward, Cloyne ; Peter Prendergast, Tuam.

Subdeacon.—James Markey,² Armagh ; Patrick Dowling, Leighlin ; Patrick Cood, Ferns ; Charles Lynagh, Tuam.

Deacons.—William Anderson, Dublin ; Matthew Kelly, Dublin ; Daniel Delany, Leighlin ; Patrick Langan, Meath ; Nicholas Nealon, Kerry ; James Martin, Tuam.

Priesthood.—Demetrius Schanahan, Kerry ; Edmund Cormick, Cashel.

SEPTEMBER, 1770.

Minor Orders.—James Crowley, Cork.

Subdeacons.—Henry Dougherty, Meath ; James Cotter, Cloyne.

Priesthood.—Patrick Corr, Armagh.

MARCH 16, 1771.

Subdeacons.—James Crowley, Cork ; Patrick Smith, Meath.

MAY, 1771.

Minor Orders.—Thomas Sennick, Cork ; John Flinn, Tuam ; Malachy MacKeown, Ardagh ; James Ferral, Dublin ; Denis O’Beirne, Ardagh ; John Cruise, Ardagh ; Francis Maglone, Kilmore ; Joseph Walsh, Dublin.

Subdeacons.—William FitzSimmons, Dublin ; James Sinot, Cloyne ; Patrick Davin, Killaloe ; Andrew Cormick, Cashel ; Peter Prendergast, Tuam.

Deacons.—James Markey, Armagh ; Patrick Cood, Ferns ; Patrick Dowling, Leighlin.

¹ See *The Irish College in Paris*, by Rev. P. Boyle, C.M., pp. 200, 201.

² Subsequently Rector of the Irish College, Paris.

Priesthood.—Patrick Langan, Meath ; James Cotter, Cloyne ; Matthew Kelly, Dublin ; Henry Dougherty, Meath ; William Anderson, Dublin.

SEPTEMBER 21, 1771.

Subdeacon.—Thomas MacCawell, Derry.

Deacons.—James Crowley, Cork ; Charles Lynagh, Tuam ; Patrick Maginn, Clogher.

DECEMBER 21, 1771.

Minor Orders.—John O'Donnell, Cloyne ; Maurice Keegan, Dublin.

Subdeacons.—Michael Harrington, Cloyne ; Charles O'Kearney,¹ Cashel.

The Seminary of St. Nicolas du Chardonnet continued to be the nursing mother of good ecclesiastics until 1792. It was then suppressed, its students dispersed, and its superiors, ten in number, placed under arrest, and confined in the Seminary of St. Firmin, otherwise called the College des Bons Enfants, along with the Lazarist Fathers of that house. On September 3 the ten priests of St. Nicolas du Chardonnet and several Lazarist Fathers were delivered up to an infuriated mob of revolutionists, and barbarously put to death. Like those who suffered on the same date at the Church des Carmes, the introduction of the cause of their beatification as martyrs for the faith is in progress. Let us hope they may one day be raised to the honours of the altars.

When order was restored in France, and religion once more recognized, the Seminary of St. Nicolas du Chardonnet was re-opened in 1811. From that date it served as a *petit seminaire* for the ecclesiastical students of the diocese of Paris. During the whole of the nineteenth century it continued its peaceful work. But once more it has fallen a prey to the spoiler. In December, 1906, it was closed, and confiscated in virtue of the law of separation of Church and State. Its services to Ireland ought not to pass unrecorded.

PATRICK BOYLE, C.M.

¹ Subsequently Rector of the Irish College.

Notes and Queries

THEOLOGY

LAWFULNESS OF CERTAIN SURGICAL OPERATIONS

REV. DEAR SIR,—I shall be grateful to you to give an answer to the following query:—

It has been already expressly decided—unless I am mistaken—by the Holy See, that it is never lawful *directly* to cause abortion; and that an extrauterine fetus must be treated as if it were an ordinary fetus. Now, in the light of this decision, what is to be said of the opinion of Father Antonelli, which the Rev. Thomas Slater, S.J., quotes in his *English Moral Theology*, vol. i. pp. 313-14? Is it not direct abortion ‘to remove an ulcerated womb which is threatening the life of a pregnant woman,’ or to excise ‘an extrauterine fetus whose further growth would cause the certain death of the mother’? Is Antonelli’s opinion tenable or safe in practice?

C.C.

According to the teaching of the Church and of the theologians, every surgical operation that directly kills a fetus is murder, and as such is forbidden by the natural law. ‘In scholis Catholicis tuto doceri non posse licitam esse operationem chirurgicam, quam craniotomiam appellant, sicut declaratum fuit die 28 Maii, 1884, et quamcumque chirurgicam operationem directe occisivam foetus vel matris gestantis.’¹ The theological foundation of this doctrine is to be found in the dictate of the natural law, which condemns the direct subordination, one to another, of beings who by nature are independent. Human life is sacred so long as unjust aggression, or crime for which the penalty of death is inflicted by law, has not taken away the right to live; so that directly to kill an innocent fetus is opposed to the command: ‘Thou shalt not kill.’

Indirect killing of an immature fetus is lawful, if there

¹ H.O. August 19, 1889.

is sufficient reason for performing the action which indirectly leads to death. Though direct subordination of one independent being to another is a forbidden deordination, the indirect subordination of one to another for proportionately grave reasons does not deserve similar condemnation. No person would regard war as unlawful simply because indirectly it causes the death of many innocent victims.

It is all-important, then, carefully to distinguish between direct and indirect killing of a fetus. An action which, looked at objectively, tends to an effect to be procured for its own sake or as a means to a further end is the direct cause of that effect. An action which, looked at objectively, tends to an effect neither for its own sake nor as the means to a further end, can be only the indirect cause of that effect. The objective tendency of an action is not always the same as the subjective aim of the operator, but this subjective intention does not change the objective nature of the action. Though subjectively wrong, objectively the action might be perfectly lawful. Thus, subjectively, the intentions of a besieging army might be unlawful, but objectively their military operations would be lawful though innocent women and children might fall victims to their destructive fire.

In the case of craniotomy, the death of the fetus is the direct effect of the surgical operation. So, too, direct abortion of an unviable fetus is the direct cause of death, since the objective aim of the operation is the expulsion of a living fetus from the environment which nature has made necessary for fetal life.

On the other hand, when a pregnant womb is attacked by malignant tumour or ulcer, the excision of the diseased womb is only the indirect cause of the resultant death of the unviable fetus, since the direct aim of the surgical operation is the removal of the tumour or ulcer and not the death of the child. The truth of this statement is seen from consideration of the fact that precisely the same operation would take place if the womb were not pregnant. This indirect killing of the fetus is justified by the necessity of saving the mother's life, which would be lost if the surgeon

were to await the age when the child could live. Nor does the certainty with which the fetus will lose its life change the nature of the action from which death results ; no matter how certain will be the death of the innocent women and children in a besieged fortress, the besiegers are only the indirect cause of this calamity so long as their fire aims at the destruction of the fortress and its unjust defenders. I believe, then, with Fathers Antonelli and Slater, that it is quite lawful 'to remove an ulcerated womb which is threatening the life of a pregnant mother, though the operation cause the death of the fetus.'

Is it equally lawful 'to remove an extrauterine fetus whose further growth would cause the certain death of the mother' ? Only one reply is tenable : the operation is certainly unlawful. Were there question of an extrauterine fetus that had already reached the age of viability, there would be no doubt about the lawfulness of the operation. Or again, if there were reasonable doubt as to whether the growth were a fetus at all, the excision would be justified by the necessity to save the woman's life. But if there certainly is an extrauterine unviable fetus, its removal for the purpose of avoiding the mother's death is unlawful. Whether the gestation is uterine or extrauterine, the extraction of the fetus tends directly towards the destruction of fetal life ; in both cases there is direct abortion of an unviable fetus, since the excision of the fetus is the means of saving the mother's life. Nor can the extrauterine fetus be regarded as an unjust aggressor, since it has committed no crime. Hence the opinion quoted by Father Slater is ethically untenable.

Moreover, that opinion is in direct opposition to the decisions of the Holy Office :—

Estne licita laparatomia quando agitur de praegnatione extrauterina, seu de ectopicis conceptibus ?

*R. Necessitate cogente, licitam esse laparatomiam ad extrahendos e sinu matris ectopicos conceptus, dummodo et foetus et matris vitae, quantum fieri potest, serio et opportune provideatur.*¹

¹ 4 Maii, 1898.

Utrum aliquando liceat e sinu matris extrahere foetus ectopicos (extrauterinos), adhuc immaturos, nondum exacto sexto mense post conceptionem?

R. *Negative* (juxta decretum, 4 Maii, 1898), vi cujus foetus et matris vitae, quantum fieri potest serio et opportune providendum est; quoad vero tempus, juxta idem decretum, orator meminerit, nullam partus accelerationem licitam esse, nisi perficiatur tempore ac modis, quibus ex ordinarie contingentibus *matris ac foetus vitae* consulatur.¹

In view of these clear decisions of the Holy Office, there can be no doubt about the unlawful nature of the operation.

In fine, it is only fair to Father Antonelli to add that, in the second edition of his work on Pastoral Medicine, he has brought his teaching into harmony with the official teaching of the Holy Office. No doubt, in the second edition of his valuable *Moral Theology*, Father Slater will modify the quotation from Father Antonelli, and thereby remove an occasion of misunderstanding.

TRANSCIENCE OF RETURN RAILWAY TICKETS

REV. DEAR SIR,—I shall feel grateful if you will be so kind as to answer the following question in the next number of the I. E. RECORD:—

Two Sisters (of the same Community) travel to a branch house on a Government railway with return tickets (which are not transferable). Two other Sisters of the same Order return on their tickets. Is the Order bound in justice to make restitution to the Railway Company?

SUBSCRIBER.

I. In replying to the very practical question of my correspondent, I take it for granted that the same solution holds whether the railway is Government property or belongs to an ordinary company; both classes of railways are worked on business principles, and are subject to similar contractual conditions. I presume also that in relation to contracts, such as those with which we are at present concerned, members of a religious Order or Con-

¹ 5 Martii, 1902.

gregation must be considered in the same light as ordinary people ; the community of life and property does not extend beyond the Order or Congregation. I assume, too, that, though the same person pays for all the tickets, this makes no difference in our guiding ethical principles ; in ordinary contracts this fact, apart from special concessions, makes no difference ; and there seems to be no reason for applying any other rule to railway contracts so long as the company has made no special reduction of fare. The question for solution, then, is brought down to the simple point : If a transference of the return part of a railway ticket takes place, is there an obligation of justice to pay the difference between the cost of the return ticket and the price of two single tickets ?

II. There seems to be an obligation of justice to pay this excess to the railway company, so that in the particular case under discussion the Order, which is responsible for the expenses of its members, is bound in justice to pay the difference between the two return fares and four single fares. Between the travellers and the railway company there is a strict contract, in virtue of which the company provides travelling accommodation and the travellers pay the scheduled price. In the present case the railway company provides accommodation for four single journeys, and the travellers are bound to pay for these four single journeys. Having paid only for two return journeys, these are bound to make good the deficit.

To bring out more clearly the truth of this reply I shall examine the main arguments which at times are put forward in the attempt to show that there is no obligation of paying anything in addition to the return fares. In the first place, it is urged that the phrase 'not transferable' is only a penal clause, and therefore, *ante sententiam*, imposes no obligation in conscience. This statement, however, contains only a half-truth. In common estimation and practice the phrase 'not transferable' is penal in the sense that no injustice is done if the transference of a ticket takes place without causing any loss to the railway company. But if the transference results in loss to the company it cannot

justly take place unless the loss is made good ; no common estimation or conscientious practice warrants a transference of tickets that would deprive the company of its scheduled fares. In our case the unconditional transference of the return halves of the tickets would cause a loss of the excess of the price of four single tickets over the price of two return tickets, and would consequently not be just.

In the second place, it is stated that the transference, as a matter of fact, causes no loss to the company, because it is all the same to the company whether it brings back the same or a different person—the cost of expended energy is the same whether the person who got the return ticket or his substitute returns. To this argument I reply, that the contract between the company and the traveller concerns, not the cost to the company, but on the one hand the accommodation supplied and on the other hand the reasonable scheduled price of that accommodation. The proximate determinant of the just price of any marketable commodity is common estimation, legal enactment, or—in the absence of these—mutual agreement. The cost of production is only a remote factor in the determination of just price, and is not the only factor. Besides relative supply, which is considerably governed by the cost of production, the common estimation takes into account the relative demand. Taking these various elements into consideration, common estimation, and, to some extent, legal enactment, sanction the scheduled fares of railway companies. In particular it is recognized as quite fair and reasonable on the part of railway companies to allow a reduction to one person who does the double journey, though no such reduction be conceded to two persons who do only single journeys.

In the third place, it is sometimes said that, whatever be the rule of strict justice, people can presume on the consent of the railway company to transfer the return half of a ticket without thereby giving rise to an obligation of paying the excess. I am afraid, however, that in this matter people generally can no more presume on the consent of the railway company than they can presume on consent to travel without a ticket. In the latter case there is no

ticket, and in the former case there is a partial ticket ; the difference is one of degree, not of principle.

Finally, it is urged that people can presume at times on the consent of the company to travel without additional payment in a higher class than that to which their tickets grant admission. The most notable example is when there is no space in the class to which the ticket gives admission. Even outside this clear case, if for some special reason a person travels in a higher class and if the officials of the company do not insist on payment of the excess, common opinion and practice say that the company's consent can reasonably be presumed. Perhaps this same rule holds in regard to return tickets and their transference. I reply that in so far as there is a parity between the two cases the same rule holds, but the argument must not be urged beyond the point in which conscientious practice admits that there is a parity. This, however, opens up another part of our question which needs special treatment.

III. If the return ticket is third class no difficulty arises in applying the general principles which I have so far been considering. But if the return ticket is a second- or first-class ticket, what amount of compensation must be made to the railway company ? Is it sufficient to pay the excess (if any) of a third-class fare over the part of the price of the return ticket which should be looked on as payment for the return part of the journey ? For example, a return second-class ticket between Dublin and London is 51s., a single second is 32s. 6d., and a single third is 29s. 6d. The excess above mentioned would in this case amount to 11s. A similar question arises in connexion with a person who travelled second or first class without a ticket, and who now wishes to make restitution. Is it sufficient to pay third-class fare ? Since in some cases people can presume on the consent of the railway company to travel without additional payment in a compartment of a higher class than that to which their tickets give admission, it would seem reasonable to say that in similar circumstances it would be sufficient, in making restitution, to take the third-class fare as the basis of calculation. It must, how-

ever, always be borne in mind that the circumstances which permit a person so to travel in the higher class are exceptional; they do not universally exist and do not exist at all in the case of a person who would have travelled in the same class if he had not obtained a transferred return half of a ticket or had purchased his ticket before he began his journey. Since the two Sisters to whom my correspondent refers would, presumably, have travelled in the same class even if they had not obtained from their companion Sisters the return halves of the tickets, the alleviation to which this paragraph of my reply refers cannot be applied to them. They, or their Order, are bound to make good the full difference between the price of the two return tickets and the price of four single tickets of the same class.

J. M. HARTY.

CANON LAW

THE EFFECTS OF SOLEMN VOWS

REV. DEAR SIR,—Can a religious with solemn vows ever hold property or make a will? I know it is the common teaching that we have irrevocably lost power of ownership and that, under this aspect, our personality is completely merged in that of the Order. But I can hardly imagine that ownership is a complete impossibility, or that some kind of arrangement may not be made in very exceptional circumstances. Suppose, for instance—and the case is not theoretical—that the civil law insists on a certain piece of property being really held in the name of a religious to whom it is given or left by will. Is there no provision made to meet the case? Is incapacity to hold property an essential effect of the vow? Kindly say something on the question.

RELIGIOSUS.

As is well known, authorities are very much at variance as to the exact difference between solemn and simple vows. Abstracting from views that have little or nothing to recommend them, it will be remembered that there are three

main opinions. Without entering very closely into the relative merits of the theories, it may be well to recall them. Some regard the difference as consisting essentially in the juridical effects produced: simple vows, to their mind, are those that render certain acts unlawful; solemn vows are those that render them invalid.¹ If the theory were strictly correct, it would obviously be impossible for any person with a solemn vow of poverty to acquire, own, or bequeath anything: if his vow were compatible with ownership, it would not, according to the definition, be a solemn vow at all. There are, however, so many difficulties in the way of the theory that others prefer to regard the distinction as being one entirely dependent on the will of the Church: solemn vows are solemn because accepted as such by the Church; simple vows simple for the very same reason.² The theory is good as far as it goes, but leaves us without any explanation as to why the Church makes the distinction: there surely must be something peculiar to the solemn vow itself, something which either leads to, or is caused by, the very special manner in which the Church receives it. A considerable number of theologians, therefore, adopt a third opinion, maintaining that in the case of the solemn vow there is a special form of consecration, a more firm and irrevocable handing over of oneself to God's service—irrevocable not only on the part of the individual who offers, but also *per se* on the part of those who accept—to which alone, as a general rule, the Church naturally enough attaches the juridical effects already mentioned.³

We say 'as a general rule,' because in point of fact these effects are sometimes produced even when the vows are

¹ Suarez, *De religione*, l. 2, cc. 8, 10, 11, 12, 13; quotes several others ib. c. 10. Tolet., in. ii. ii. q. 88, a. 7. Schmalz., l. 3, t. 34, n. 8. Cf. Wernz, *Jus Decret.*, t. 3, n. 654. Bouix, *De Jure reg.*, I, p. 1, s. 3.

² Craisson, *Man. Jur. Can.*, 2473 sqq. So Vermeersch, *De Religiosis*, ii. 14, defines a solemn vow as 'votum plane authenticum in facie Ecclesiae.' The view is based on the section 'De voto et voti redemp.' iii. 15, in vi^o; 'Nos attendentes quod voti solemnitas ex sola consuetudine Ecclesiae est inventa.'

³ Vasquez, in i. ii., d. 165, n. 8. Probably St. Thomas, ii., ii. q. 88, aa. 7, 9. Lehmkuhl, *Theol. Mor.*, i. 649 (ed. 1910). The theory really differs very little from those of Suarez and Wernz.

only simple. For example, the simple vow of chastity taken by members of the Jesuit Order after two years' novitiate constitutes a diriment matrimonial impediment, and the simple vow of poverty taken later on has the same effects as the corresponding solemn vow in other circumstances.¹ And seeing that simple vows may produce these effects without ceasing to be simple, we might expect that the converse is also possible; in other words, that solemn vows might, in certain cases, if the Church so wished, be made compatible with the valid exercise of acts against which they are taken, without on that account ceasing to be solemn.

And, as a matter of fact, we find instances of the kind in history. Confining ourselves to recent times and to the particular matter referred to by our correspondent—the ownership and disposal of property—we may mention a few.

In the beginning of the last century the Belgian Government required that members of religious Orders should hold property in their own names. The matter was brought under the notice of the Penitentiary, and on December 1, 1820, 'understanding that the express will of the Government was that the old decree of February 18, 1809,² should be observed by the Regulars of the Belgian State, according to which decree the ownership, possession, and administration of property that came to them was secured for all the religious or nuns,' the Congregation 'granted by express apostolic authority to the regulars of both sexes, already solemnly professed, power to acquire, retain, and administer property, and to dispose of it for good and pious purposes, notwithstanding their vow of poverty, provided they did so with due dependence on their legitimate Religious Superiors.'³

In course of time doubts arose as to whether the per-

¹ Greg. XIII. Constit. *Ascendente Domino*.

² Of which the ninth article ran: 'Chaque hospitalière conservera l'entière propriété de ses biens et revenus, et le droit de les administrer et d'en disposer conformément au Code Napoléon.'

³ Vermeersch, *De Relig.*, ii. p. 78: 'De expressa auctoritate apostolica . . . jam solemniter professis, ut ea bona acquirere retinere et administrare . . . possint, non obstante paupertatis voto.'

mission still continued. The Archbishop of Mechlin, accordingly, with his suffragans, wrote to Pope Leo XIII., asking him, 'for the removal of all doubts whatever, to explain and declare whether the rescript of December 1, 1820 . . . still remained in full force.' On July 31, 1878 a reply was received from the Secretary of the Congregation for Extraordinary Affairs stating that

His Holiness had ordered a reply to be sent in the affirmative. 'By this present letter [the document continues] he has deigned to declare, as far as is needful, that all the regulars of Belgium, of both sexes, even those who have taken solemn vows, have exercised and still exercise validly and lawfully all the aforementioned acts (connected with the acquisition, retention, and disposal of property), and, consequently, might and may, with safe conscience, even on oath, assert that they had the intention, as the civil laws demanded, of acquiring true ownership of the goods they possessed, and also the right of disposing of the same.'¹

Now it may be said, and in fact is said, by some, that the ownership here was merely 'civil,' and that in conscience and before God there was no real ownership whatever.² It requires no small amount of ingenuity to reconcile such a position with the honest obvious meaning of the words we have quoted. And the circumstances of the time strengthen our conviction that no reconciliation is possible. The Liberals in Belgium had contended that the statements made by the religious Orders to the effect that they meant to acquire ownership were nothing more than a pretence, a mere outward concession to civil requirements³—in fact, that they had just such an intention as the commentators referred to maintain they had and still have. The only effective reply from the Catholic side would, therefore, clearly, be a straightforward arrangement by which owner-

¹ Marres, *De Just.*, t. 1, p. 440. Vermeersch, *ib.* p. 77. Lehmkuhl, i. 678: 'Omnes regulares' etiam qui vota solemnia nuncuparunt, prae dictos omnes actus valide ac licite exercuisse et exercere, ac proinde potuisse et posse tuta conscientia etiam cum jurejurando asserere se voluisse . . . verum dominium bonorum . . . acquirere, una cum jure de eis disponendi.'

² Bouix, *De Jur. reg.*, i. pp. 420 sqq.; Daris, *Praelect. can.*, v. 4, p. 135.

³ Vermeersch, *ib.* ii. 80.

ship could, and would, be assumed in the fullest and most unambiguous sense of the term.¹ These regulations, besides—as may be gathered from the rescript of 1820—were issued to ratify the conditions demanded by the old decree of 1809; and no one who reads the 9th and 10th articles of the latter² can possibly maintain that there was any restriction whatever placed upon the power of the Religious to possess, administer, and dispose of property. Be that as it may, it is quite clear that the Religious became owners to the fullest extent the civil laws could demand, and that the dispensation granted—and any similar dispensation in the future—would meet all the purposes contemplated by our correspondent.

Similarly by a decree of the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, dated May 7, 1883, permission was granted to the Capuchins to select members from the Order and have them hold property.³ It may very well be doubted, however, whether there was any intention of conferring real ownership. In the indult the members selected are called 'true owners' (*veri proprietarii*), but, at the same time, are asked to remember that they hold 'possession not in their own name but only in the name of the Holy See.' But then, again, a permission of the kind, however it be explained in theory, would in practice be sufficient to secure the purpose for which 'Religiosus' suggests 'some kind of an arrangement.'

Or to take another instance. Not many years ago a legacy was left to a nun in the diocese of Zamora in Spain. Neither her name nor the name of the town she lived in are given in the official document. The Bishop wrote to Rome saying that 'according to the civil constitutions of Spain she had a right to receive the legacy which fell to her by her brother's death,' and enquired (1°) 'whether, considering the solemn vow of profession she had taken, she could lawfully take steps to get possession of the legacy in her own name, before the secular judge, for the good of

¹ Ibid.

² *Vide supra*.

³ Vermeersch, *ib.* p. 81; Wernz, *Jus Decret.*, iii. 650.

the whole community,'¹ and (2°) 'whether, in case a dispensation were required, it could be given by her immediate superiors or should be sought from the Holy See.' In the latter hypothesis he asked (3°) that she should get the required dispensation for 'acquiring for herself, and in her own name, the legacy which was to be for the good of the whole community';² and (4°) 'that he himself should be empowered to grant similar dispensations in the future.' On January 15, 1897, the Congregation of Bishops and Regulars replied by granting the required dispensation 'on condition that the legacy be acquired for the monastery,'³ and by granting the Bishop also, for three years and for urgent cases, the powers sought for. The only reply to the two questions was *providebitur in tertio*.⁴ We may, therefore, argue (1) that a dispensation from the Pope, or from his delegate, is required in cases of the kind; and (2) that, by virtue of the dispensation, a Religious with solemn vows is empowered to acquire property for herself and in her own name. True, the legacy was to go to the monastery in the case, but that was a mere extrinsic condition that did not affect the intention the nun had of becoming real owner, and did not mean that she should act merely in the name of the convent or Order she belonged to.

We can, therefore, easily understand the opening words of a decree of the Penitentiary, issued in 1820, to the Bishop of Limoges, in regard to nuns in France:—

A solemn vow [it states] is one which is accepted as such by the Church, and which—*regard being had to the ordinary law, and apart from a dispensation from the Pope*—deprives for ever and irrevocably the person taking it of the power to contract marriage, or to acquire and retain ownership of property.⁵

¹ 'An posita sollemni religiosa professione . . . licite in conscientia possit gestiones agere . . . ut hereditatem capiat proprio nomine . . . in bonum tamen totius communitatis.'

² 'Pro hereditate sibi et proprio nomine capienda quae in bonum cedat totius communitatis.'

³ 'Ita tamen ut hereditas acquiratur monasterio.'

⁴ *Monitore Ecclesiastico*, t. 10, p. 1, p. 100.

⁵ 'Et voventem inhabilem reddit in perpetuum et immutabiliter—spectata lege ordinaria et seclusa dispensatione pontifica—ad matrimonium, contrahendem,' etc.—Gury-Ballerini, ii. 178; Lehmkühl, ib. 677.

Our conclusion, therefore, is, that incapacity to hold property is not essential to the solemn vow of poverty; that it is, however, almost universally imposed by the will of the Church on those who are solemnly professed; and finally, since 'omnis res per quascunque causas nascitur, per easdem dissolvitur,' that the Pope may, without interfering with the solemnity of the vow, remove the restriction the Church has freely imposed.

WHO HAS A RIGHT TO BE PRESENT, OR PRESIDE, AT THE
ELECTION OF A SUPERIORESS OF NUNS?

REV. DEAR SIR,—Please say : (1°) Who has a right to preside at the election of a Superioress of a Convent—the Bishop of the diocese or the regular Superior? (2°) Have any particular priests, by virtue of the office they hold, any right to be present?

CHAPLAIN.

1°. The Bishop of the diocese has a right to preside, if he pleases, at all elections of the kind. There can be no difference of opinion obviously if the Order is a purely diocesan one over which he has full control. As regards Orders exempt from his jurisdiction, a slight distinction has to be made between the various kinds. If the Order is exempt and placed immediately under the jurisdiction of the Holy See, the Bishop has, in accordance with the arrangement made by the Council of Trent,¹ a right to preside as delegate of the Pope, to the exclusion of everyone else. If the Order is subject to the immediate jurisdiction of the Regular Prelates, he still has the right to preside, but not with the full rights of jurisdiction. He is there to see that everything is done properly and with due attention to the regulations. The regular prelate in the case receives the votes of the Sisters, and discharges the other necessary duties. The Bishop, however, as becomes his position as president, is to hear and know all that is being done.²

2°. There used to be considerable divergence of view on the point. This matter has, however, been definitely

¹ Sess. XXV., c. 9, *De regular.*

² *Vide Ferraris, Abbatissa*, n. 33..

settled by a recent decree,¹ so we need not trouble about previous opinions. Some two priests are to attend. No particular priest has any right to be selected, as far as we can see, no matter what office he holds. We hope our correspondent has no interest in being one of the number, for the regulations expressly exclude him. It may be well to give the decree :—

In electionibus Abbatisssae aut Priorissae, sive Monasterium subiiciatur Episcopo sive Praelato Regulari, singula vota Monialium in urna clausa colligantur et a Praelato Praeside cum duobus Sacerdotibus scrutatoribus aperiantur : quod si gravi de causa vota oretenus dentur, id fiat coram Praelato, adsistentibus tamen sacerdotibus scrutatoribus. Sacerdotes, de quibus agitur, sint maturae aetatis et probatae virtutis. Attamen uti scrutatores aut socii Episcopi vel Praelati non admittantur ipsi Monialium confessarii ordinarii.²

Should the decree modify the answer given to the first question so far as regards the privileges of the Bishop and Regular Prelate when both are present? Most probably not, we think. Apparently it takes no account of the case. The question before the Congregation was : ' Si et quot sacerdotes sociare sibi debet Episcopus vel Praelatus Regularis, qui praeest Monialium Capitulo ad eligendam Abbatisam vel Priorissam Monasterii coacto ; ' and to this question it confined itself without expressing any opinion on the merits of the other.

M. J. O'DONNELL.

LITURGY

AUTUMN QUARTER TENSE

REV. DEAR SIR,—In your kind remarks on the above-named subject, which appear in the October number of the I. E. RECORD, you begin by saying : ' Our correspondent does not state where the Missal assigns the seventeenth week after Pentecost as that in which the Autumn Quarter Tense occurs.' Let me do so now. If you look into any Missal, old or new,

¹ August 27, 1910.

² *Acta Apost. Sedis*, vol. ii. p. 732.

and find the seventeenth Sunday after Pentecost you will also find the Masses for Feria iv., v. et Sabato Quat. Temp. Septembris set down for that week. The Ordo says—and rightly says—that the Feria iv. et v. ac Sabato of the following week are the Quarter Tense for the Autumn quarter of this year, as they follow the Feast of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross. The Missal and the Ordo, therefore, differ in this respect. I would like to see some explanation of the apparent discrepancy. I have formed some opinion of my own on this matter. But my object is to get, not give, information. Your readers, or some of them, may care to see a quaint doggerel, partly English and Latin, that will serve as a mnemonic as to the incidence of Quarter Tense days for all the year round ; they occur :—

‘ Post Lent post pente,
Post Crucem post Lucium.’

Believe me, Rev. Dear Sir, yours very faithfully,

SACERDOS.

It is not correct to say that the Missal *assigns* the seventeenth week after Pentecost as that in which the Autumn Quarter Tense days occur. What is true is that the Masses for these days are *inserted* in the Missal after the seventeenth Sunday, but no direction as to the incidence of these days is intended by this arrangement. Indeed there does not seem to be any rubrical reason for putting them in this particular place. Quarter Tense may occur after any Sunday from the thirteenth to the eighteenth *post Pentecostem*, and as its relative position with regard to these varies from year to year there can be no explanation offered why the Masses are inserted after any particular Sunday in this cycle, unless it be that this order is suggested by considerations of convenience.

The Masses for the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth Sundays after Epiphany occur after the twenty-fourth Sunday after Pentecost. But this does not imply that they are to be celebrated *after* the latter Sunday. In reality, therefore, there is no discrepancy of any kind between the Ordo and the Missal in regard to the matter at issue.

ABOUT RESERVATION OF THE BLESSED EUCHARIST

REV. DEAR SIR,—I am in a difficulty as to whether it is lawful for me to keep the Blessed Sacrament in one of the churches of this parish, which church is three miles away from the parochial house. There is no danger of irreverence, as there is a sexton living beside said church. Mass is said there every Sunday and holiday, but seldom on a week-day, as there is only one priest here. The Blessed Sacrament has always been kept in said church, which is really the principal church of the parish, in size, and in the number of Catholics residing near it, who were always allowed this privilege of having the Blessed Sacrament in their midst up to the present. The Blessed Sacrament is renewed every week, and the lamp kept going continually. My difficulty arises now from recent decrees, which I do not think apply to above case. The church is open to the faithful every day.

Again, I am in doubt as to the keeping of the key of the tabernacle of above church. It seems a moral impossibility to keep it constantly about one's person or in such a place as to which no one but myself (absolutely speaking) can gain access. It has been the custom here to place the key in a safely locked press, and, after locking the press, to give the keys of the press to the sexton for safe keeping. This is the custom in larger churches in cities to my knowledge, yet it seems to be contrary to decree 93 of Maynooth. I think a greater danger would arise from carrying the key about one's person, to say nothing of the likelihood of forgetting key on many an occasion when a congregation assembled for Mass, Holy Communion, or Benediction would be much disappointed. I presume no law or rule can destroy the axiom 'humano modo,' even in this case, since our Blessed Lord in the Eucharist has placed Himself in the hands of and at the disposal of men, who, no doubt, are not excused from the greatest reverence, but are not expected to become victims to a continual dread through anxiety to observe a law whose application may in some cases be morally impossible.

A third question arises as to the lawfulness of giving Communion to persons desirous of receiving on the occasion of bringing the Blessed Eucharist to the homes of the aged or infirm, which practice I follow about once in the three months. If at such a home I find persons healthy and able to go to the church can I give them Holy Communion, even if it is only from devotion that they wish to receive? Can I at any rate give such

persons Communion if they are unwilling to go to the church to receive, or are living at a great distance from the church?

On above points your expert opinion will be received with much satisfaction by

JUNIOR PAROCHUS.

There is no difficulty about the reservation of the Blessed Sacrament in the church mentioned. Since it is a parochial church, either really or virtually, the Blessed Sacrament may be reserved there even by the general law. The only thing that creates any difficulty in the matter is the distance from the parochial house, and, consequently, the impossibility of having daily Mass, which seems to be required by a decree of the Congregation of Rites, dated March 16, 1833. A subsequent decree, however, appears to sanction the reservation in *filial* churches, where Mass is celebrated only once a week, provided that the door is open a few hours each day for those who wish to visit the Blessed Sacrament.¹ This would correspond with the circumstances described in the query. Further, our correspondent alleges custom in favour of the practice he wishes to retain. All the facts would go to show that the reservation of the Blessed Sacrament in the circumstances has the sanction of requisite authority, that there is no danger of any kind of irreverence, and that therefore it may be continued until, at all events, there are stronger reasons against it than appear at present.

About the custody of the key of the tabernacle, the plan adopted is approved by reliable authority. There are, indeed, decrees of the Congregation of Rites² which require the rector of the church to have the custody of the key or keys of the tabernacle, but Gasparri, who had all these enactments before him, declares that it is enough if the priest keeps them in a press or safe in the sacristy and entrusts the key of this receptacle to the sacristan or custodian.³

In regard to the third point, as a general rule it is not lawful to give Communion *extra Missam* in private houses

¹ November 15, 1890.

³ Cf. *De Euch.*, n. 1000.

² Cf. nn. 529, 2830, 2904, etc.

to those who are physically able to receive it in church. The Ritual makes provision in these cases only for those who are infirm. Hence the section entitled *Communio Infirmorum*. At the same time, it may be a question whether the privilege which belongs *de jure* to the sick might not in certain cases be extended to those who, for one reason or another, cannot be induced to approach the altar, even though there is no impediment on the score of health. The motives which deter these people from going to the church should be weighed and the circumstances of each particular case carefully considered. Then it might be left to the wise discretion of a priest either to refuse the Blessed Sacrament or to give it on an exceptional occasion. If there is question of the Easter Communion there would be all the more reason for taking a lenient view of the situation.

OBLIGATION OF OCTOBER DEVOTIONS

REV. DEAR SIR,—You would very much oblige by answering the following questions in the October number of your esteemed review :—

1. Do the October Devotions of the Rosary bind *sub gravi* parish priests, and in their absence curates, to conduct them *personally*?

2. If so, what would reasonably be considered a *lexis materia* in regard to absence?

3. How can the 'law' be carried out in the case of far-distant chapels? Does it not seem to be an intolerable burden to require the *personal attendance* of the parish priest or curate each day during the month of October, especially when we remember that the excellent practice of family prayers including the Rosary, is so widespread among our simple and fervent Irish people?

Moreover, it is the deliberate conviction of many experienced pastors, who are by no means 'rigidists,' that the promiscuous gathering of young people in the dark October nights is by no means free from serious danger, and is a very convenient handle for night-walking and its usual *consectaria*. Of course I speak of rural parishes—not of cities or large towns.

Again, occasions may arise when the absence of the pastor from the parish is unavoidable, v.g., death of friends, etc.; or he may desire to gratify the very meritorious pleasure of being present at some meeting or congress, v.g., Catholic Truth Society Annual Convention in Dublin. Surely the interests of religion cannot require him to forego the many advantages that are to be reaped from participating in these gatherings?

A word of definite teaching on this matter will, I am sure, be welcome to many readers of the I. E. RECORD. Thanking you in anticipation,—I remain, yours faithfully,

MIDENSIS.

These questions did not come to hand until after the middle of September. It was, therefore, impossible to have them answered in the October issue. The October Devotions were finally and quasi-permanently established by a general decree of the Congregation of Rites issued, by command of Leo XIII., on September 11, 1887. The words of the decree leave no doubt that the Sovereign Pontiff meant to make it binding in conscience: '*Ad haec, quaecumque superioribus annis ac postremo per Decretum Sacrorum Rituum Congregationis 26 Aug., 1886, de mense Octobri caelesti Reginae a Rosario dicando, decrevit, indulxit et jussit, iterum decernit, praecipit et concedit.*' The terms employed here are indicative of the legislator's intention to impose a strict obligation which will also be grave *pro materia subjecta*.

This obligation falls in the first instance upon the parish priest or rector, who is bound to have these Devotions carried out either *per se* or *per alium*, just as in the case of all other parochial duties. In carrying out the Devotions in the evening the personal attendance of some priest will be necessary to give the Benediction. If said in the morning, the prayers may be recited by a lay person during Mass. When it is said that the obligation of having the Devotions is grave, it is not meant to imply that this is so in regard to each performance. One omission would certainly not be serious. How many such would constitute a grave dereliction, it is not easy to determine with exactness. If the omissions were more numerous than the performances there could be no doubt about the matter, since negligence

to such an extent would amount to a *notable* disregard of the precept. Much, of course, will depend on circumstances. Where people are accustomed to attend in large numbers fewer omissions would be required than where the attendance is sparse. To the solution of each case the ordinary principles of Moral Theology must be applied.

The decree ordains that the Devotions be held in cathedrals, parochial churches, public oratories dedicated to the Blessed Virgin, and such other churches as are designated by the Ordinary. The rural or far-distant chapels, about which mention is made in the query and about which the chief difficulty is, belong to the last-named category. If, then, the Bishop, who is acquainted with the facts and circumstances of each locality, prescribes the Devotions for a particular chapel, his command must be respected, and it is not to be assumed that his edict will impose an unreasonable or 'intolerable burden.' Should it appear that it is too much to expect a priest in a rural district to carry out the Devotions every day, then, if representations are made in the proper quarter, matters will probably be so adjusted that it will be sufficient to have the Devotions only on certain days each week.

As to the inconveniences alleged to be associated with the Devotions when held at night, there is a very large and famous principle involved, the discussion of which would serve no practical purpose. The fact that thoughtless persons will be found who draw evil out of good and wrest to their 'own destruction the means of grace and salvation, is no reason why opportunities of spiritual gain should be denied to the body of the faithful. The Angel who holds the balance will probably be able to say on the last day that in this, as in so many similar things, the good results far more than outweigh the evil. The abuses referred to would make it desirable that, if at all possible, the Rosary and prayers should be recited during the morning Mass.

Finally, if a priest finds his legitimate liberty, as man and minister, unduly hampered by being obliged to attend at the Devotions every day during October, no one, much less

pia Mater Ecclesiae, would wish to defeat a reasonable desire on his part to fulfil from time to time an engagement of some importance which clashes with what may be called a minor duty of his office. The conclusion, therefore, is that the October Devotions impose a grave obligation, that *notable* failure to fulfil it is a serious matter, but that an occasional absence, if justified by necessity, may be not only free from grave sin but even excusable.

PATRICK MORRISROE.

DOCUMENTS

LETTER OF HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS X. TO THE FRENCH
BISHOPS

LETTRE AUX ARCHEVÊQUES ET ÉVÊQUES FRANÇAIS

À NOS BIENAIMÉS FILS

PIERRE HECTOR COULLIÉ, CARDINAL PRÊTRE DE LA S. E. R.
ARCHEVÊQUE DE LYON,

LOUIS HENRI LUÇON, CARDINAL PRÊTRE DE LA S. E. R.
ARCHEVÊQUE DE REIMS,

PAULIN PIERRE ANDRIEU, CARDINAL PRÊTRE DE LA S. E. R.
ARCHEVÊQUE DE BORDEAUX,

ET À TOUS NOS AUTRES VÉNÉRABLES FRÈRES
LES ARCHEVÊQUES ET ÉVÊQUES FRANÇAIS

PIE X PAPE

VÉNÉRABLES FRÈRES SALUT ET BÉNÉDICTION APOSTOLIQUE

Notre charge apostolique nous fait un devoir de veiller à la pureté de la foi et à l'intégrité de la discipline catholique, de préserver les fidèles des dangers de l'erreur et du mal, surtout quand l'erreur et le mal leur sont présentés dans un langage entraînant, qui, voilant le vague des idées et l'équivoque des expressions sous l'ardeur du sentiment et la sonorité des mots, peut enflammer les cœurs pour des causes séduisantes mais funestes. Telles ont été naguère les doctrines des prétendus philosophes du dix-huitième siècle, celles de la Révolution et du libéralisme tant de fois condamnées ; telles sont encore aujourd'hui les théories du *Sillon*, qui, sous leurs apparences brillantes et généreuses, manquent trop souvent de clarté, de logique et de vérité, et, sous ce rapport, ne relèvent pas du génie catholique et français.

Nous avons hésité longtemps, Vénérables Frères, à dire publiquement et solennellement notre pensée sur le *Sillon*. Il a fallu que vos préoccupations vinssent s'ajouter aux nôtres pour nous décider à le faire. Car nous aimons la vaillante jeunesse enrôlée sous le drapeau du *Sillon*, et nous la croyons digne, à bien des égards, d'éloge et d'admiration. Nous aimons ses chefs, en qui nous nous plaisons à reconnaître des âmes élevées,

supérieures aux passions vulgaires et animées du plus noble enthousiasme pour le bien. Vous les avez vus, Vénérables Frères, pénétrés d'un sentiment très vif de la fraternité humaine, aller au devant de ceux qui travaillent et qui souffrent pour les relever, soutenus dans leur dévouement par leur amour pour Jésus-Christ et la pratique exemplaire de la religion.

C'était au lendemain de la mémorable Encyclique de notre prédécesseur d'heureuse mémoire, Léon XIII, sur la condition des ouvriers. L'Eglise, par la bouche de son chef suprême, avait déversé sur les humbles et les petits toutes les tendresses de son cœur maternel, et semblait appeler de ses vœux des champions toujours plus nombreux de la restauration de l'ordre et de la justice dans notre société troublée. Les fondateurs du *Sillon* ne venaient-ils pas, au moment opportun, mettre à son service des troupes jeunes et croyantes pour la réalisation de ses désirs et de ses espérances ? Et, de fait, le *Sillon* éleva parmi les classes ouvrières l'étendard de Jésus-Christ, le signe du salut pour les individus et les nations, alimentant son activité sociale aux sources de la grâce, imposant le respect de la religion aux milieux les moins favorables, habituant les ignorants et les impies à entendre parler de Dieu, et souvent, dans des conférences contradictoires, en face d'un auditoire hostile, surgissant, éveillé par une question ou un sarcasme, pour crier hautement et fièrement sa foi. C'étaient les beaux temps du *Sillon* ; c'est son beau côté, qui explique les encouragements et les approbations que ne lui ont pas ménagés l'Episcopat et le Saint-Siège, tant que cette ferveur religieuse a pu voiler le vrai caractère du mouvement silloniste.

Car, il faut le dire, Vénérables Frères, nos espérances ont été, en grande partie, trompées. Un jour vint où le *Sillon* accusa, pour les yeux clairvoyants, des tendances inquiétantes. Le *Sillon* s'égara. Pouvait-il en être autrement ? Ses fondateurs, jeunes, enthousiastes et pleins de confiance en eux-mêmes, n'étaient pas suffisamment armés de science historique, de saine philosophie et de forte théologie pour affronter sans péril les difficiles problèmes sociaux vers lesquels ils étaient entraînés par leur activité et leur cœur, et pour se prémunir, sur le terrain de la doctrine et de l'obéissance, contre les infiltrations libérales et protestantes.

Les conseils ne leur ont pas manqué ; les admonestations vinrent après les conseils ; mais nous avons eu la douleur de voir et les avis et les reproches glisser sur leurs âmes fuyantes et

demeurer sans résultat. Les choses en sont venues à ce point que nous trahirions notre devoir, si nous gardions plus longtemps le silence. Nous devons la vérité à nos chers enfants du *Sillon* qu'une ardeur généreuse a emportés dans une voie aussi fausse que dangereuse. Nous la devons à un grand nombre de séminaristes et de prêtres que le *Sillon* a soustraits, sinon à l'autorité, au moins à la direction et à l'influence de leurs évêques ; nous la devons enfin à l'Eglise, où le *Sillon* sème la division et dont il compromet les intérêts.

En premier lieu il convient de relever sévèrement la prétention du *Sillon* d'échapper à la direction de l'autorité ecclésiastique. Les chefs du *Sillon*, en effet, allèguent qu'ils évoluent sur un terrain qui n'est pas celui de l'Eglise ; qu'ils ne poursuivent que des intérêts de l'ordre temporel et non de l'ordre spirituel ; que le Silloniste est tout simplement un catholique voué à la cause des classes laborieuses, aux œuvres démocratiques, et puisant dans les pratiques de sa foi l'énergie de son dévouement ; que ni plus ni moins que les artisans, les laboureurs, les économes et les politiciens catholiques, il demeure soumis aux règles de la morale communes à tous, sans relever, ni plus ni moins qu'eux, d'une façon spéciale, de l'autorité ecclésiastique.

La réponse à ces subterfuges n'est que trop facile. A qui fera-t-on croire en effet que les Sillonistes catholiques, que les prêtres et les séminaristes enrôlés dans leurs rangs n'ont en vue, dans leur activité sociale, que les intérêts temporels des classes ouvrières ? Ce serait, pensons-nous, leur faire injure que de le soutenir. La vérité est que les chefs du *Sillon* se proclament des idéalistes irréductibles, qu'ils prétendent relever les classes laborieuses en relevant d'abord la conscience humaine, qu'ils ont une doctrine sociale et des principes philosophiques et religieux pour reconstruire la société sur un plan nouveau, qu'ils ont une conception spéciale de la dignité humaine, de la liberté, de la justice et de la fraternité, et que, pour justifier leurs rêves sociaux, ils en appellent à l'Evangile interprété à leur manière, et, ce qui est plus grave encore, à un Christ défiguré et diminué. De plus, ces idées ils les enseignent dans leurs cercles d'études, ils les inculquent à leurs camarades ; ils les font passer dans leurs œuvres. Ils sont donc vraiment professeurs de morale sociale, civique et religieuse ; et, quelques modifications qu'ils puissent introduire dans l'organisation du mouvement silloniste, nous avons le droit de dire que le but du *Sillon*, son caractère, son

action ressortissent au domaine moral, qui est le domaine propre de l'Eglise, et, qu'en conséquence, les Sillonistes se font illusion lorsqu'ils croient évoluer sur un terrain aux confins duquel expirent les droits du pouvoir doctrinal et directif de l'autorité ecclésiastique.

Si leurs doctrines étaient exemptes d'erreur, c'eût déjà été un manquement très grave à la discipline catholique, que de se soustraire obstinément à la direction de ceux qui ont reçu du Ciel la mission de guider les individus et les sociétés dans le droit chemin de la vérité et du bien. Mais le mal est plus profond, nous l'avons déjà dit : le *Sillon*, emporté par un amour mal entendu des faibles, a glissé dans l'erreur.

En effet, le *Sillon* se propose le relèvement et la régénération des classes ouvrières. Or sur cette matière les principes de la doctrine catholique sont fixés, et l'histoire de la civilisation chrétienne est là pour en attester la bienfaisante fécondité. Notre prédécesseur, d'heureuse mémoire, les a rappelés dans des pages magistrales, que les catholiques occupés de questions sociales doivent étudier et toujours garder sous les yeux. Il a enseigné notamment que la démocratie chrétienne doit 'maintenir la diversité des classes qui est assurément le propre de la cité bien constituée, et vouloir pour la société humaine la forme et le caractère que Dieu, son auteur, lui a imprimés.'¹ Il a flétri 'une certaine démocratie qui va jusqu'à ce degré de perversité que d'attribuer dans la société la souveraineté au peuple et à poursuivre la suppression et le nivellement des classes.' En même temps, Léon XIII imposait aux catholiques un programme d'action, le seul programme capable de replacer et de maintenir la société sur ses bases chrétiennes séculaires. Or, qu'ont fait les chefs du *Sillon* ? Non seulement ils ont adopté un programme et un enseignement différents de celui de Léon XIII (ce qui serait déjà singulièrement audacieux de la part de laïques se posant ainsi, concurremment avec le Souverain Pontife, en directeurs de l'activité sociale dans l'Eglise) ; mais ils ont ouvertement rejeté le programme tracé par Léon XIII et en ont adopté un diamétralement opposé ; de plus ils repoussent la doctrine rappelée par Léon XIII sur les principes essentiels de la société, placent l'autorité dans le peuple ou la suppriment à peu près, et prennent comme idéal à réaliser le nivellement des

¹ 'Disperses tuentur ordines, sane proprios bene constitutae civitatis ; eam denum humano convictui velit formam atque indolem esse, qualem Deus auctor indidit' (Encyclique *Graves de communi*).

classes. Ils vont donc, au rebours de la doctrine catholique, vers un idéal condamné.

Nous savons bien qu'ils se flattent de relever la dignité humaine et la condition trop méprisée des classes laborieuses, de rendre justes et parfaites les lois du travail et les relations entre le capital et les salariés, enfin de faire régner sur terre une meilleure justice et plus de charité, et, par des mouvements sociaux profonds et féconds, de promouvoir dans l'humanité un progrès inattendu. Et certes nous ne blâmons pas ces efforts qui seraient, de tous points, excellents, si les Sillonistes n'oubliaient pas que le progrès d'un être consiste à fortifier ses facultés naturelles par des énergies nouvelles et à faciliter le jeu de leur activité dans le cadre et conformément aux lois de sa constitution, et, qu'au contraire, en blessant ses organes essentiels, en brisant le cadre de leur activité, on pousse l'être non pas vers le progrès, mais vers la mort. C'est cependant ce qu'ils veulent faire de la société humaine ; c'est leur rêve de changer ses bases naturelles et traditionnelles, et de promettre une cité future édifiée sur d'autres principes, qu'ils osent déclarer plus féconds, plus bienfaisants que les principes sur lesquels repose la cité chrétienne actuelle.

Non, Vénérables Frères,—il faut le rappeler énergiquement dans ces temps d'anarchie sociale et intellectuelle où chacun se pose en docteur et en législateur,—on ne bâtira pas la cité autrement que Dieu ne l'a bâtie ; on n'édifiera pas la société, si l'Eglise n'en jette les bases et ne dirige les travaux ; non, la civilisation n'est plus à inventer, ni la cité nouvelle à bâtir dans les nuées. Elle a été, elle est ; c'est la civilisation chrétienne, c'est la cité catholique. Il ne s'agit que de l'instaurer et la restaurer sans cesse sur ces fondements naturels et divins contre les attaques toujours renaissantes de l'utopie malsaine, de la révolte et de l'impiété : *omnia instaurare in Christo*.

Et pour qu'on ne nous accuse pas de juger trop sommairement et avec une rigueur non justifiée les théories sociales du *Sillon* nous voulons en rappeler les points essentiels.

Le *Sillon* a le noble souci de la dignité humaine. Mais cette dignité, il la comprend à la manière de certains philosophes dont l'Eglise est loin d'avoir à se louer. Le premier élément de cette dignité est la liberté, entendue en ce sens que, sauf en matière de religion, chaque homme est autonome. De ce principe fondamental il tire les conclusions suivantes : Aujourd'hui le peuple

est en tutelle sous une autorité distincte de lui, il doit s'en affranchir: *émancipation politique*. Il est sous la dépendance de patrons qui, détenant ses instruments de travail, l'exploitent, l'oppriment et l'abaissent; il doit secouer lour joug: *émancipation économique*. Il est dominé enfin par une caste appelée dirigeante, à qui son développement intellectuel assure une prépondérance indue dans la direction des affaires; il doit se soustraire à sa domination: *émancipation intellectuelle*. Le nivellement des conditions à ce triple point de vue établira parmi les hommes l'égalité, et cette égalité est la vraie justice humaine. Une organisation politique et sociale fondée sur cette double base, la liberté et l'égalité (auxquelles viendra bientôt s'ajouter la fraternité), voilà ce qu'ils appellent Démocratie.

Néanmoins la liberté et l'égalité n'en constituent que le côté pour ainsi dire négatif. Ce qui fait proprement et positivement la Démocratie, c'est la participation la plus grande possible de chacun au gouvernement de la chose publique. Et cela comprend un triple élément, politique, économique et moral.

D'abord en politique, le *Sillon* n'abolit pas l'autorité; il l'estime, au contraire, nécessaire; mais il veut la partager, ou, pour mieux dire, la multiplier de telle façon que chaque citoyen deviendra une sorte de roi. L'autorité, il est vrai, émane de Dieu, mais elle réside primordialement dans le peuple et s'en dégage par voie d'élection ou, mieux encore, de sélection, sans pour cela quitter le peuple et devenir indépendante de lui; elle sera extérieure, mais en apparence seulement; en réalité elle sera intérieure, parce que ce sera une autorité consentie.

Proportions gardées, il en sera de même dans l'ordre économique. Soustrait à une classe particulière, le patronat sera si bien multiplié que chaque ouvrier deviendra une sorte de patron. La forme appelée à réaliser cet idéal économique n'est point, affirme-t-on, celle du socialisme; c'est une système de coopératives suffisamment multipliées pour provoquer une concurrence féconde et pour sauvegarder l'indépendance des ouvriers qui ne seront enchaînés à aucune d'entre elles.

Voici maintenant l'élément capital, l'élément moral. Comme l'autorité, on l'a vu, est très réduite, il faut une autre force pour la suppléer et pour opposer une réaction permanente à l'égoïsme individuel. Ce nouveau principe, cette force, c'est l'amour de l'intérêt professionnel et de l'intérêt public, c'est-à-dire de la fin même de la profession et de la société. Imaginez une société

où dans l'âme d'un chacun, avec l'amour inné du bien individuel et du bien familial, règnerait l'amour du bien professionnel et du bien public ; où dans la conscience d'un chacun ces amours se subordonneraient de telle façon que le bien supérieur primât toujours le bien inférieur, cette société-là ne pourrait-elle pas à peu près se passer d'autorité, et n'offrirait-elle pas l'idéal de la dignité humaine, chaque citoyen ayant une âme de roi, chaque ouvrier une âme de patron. Arraché à l'étroitesse de ses intérêts privés et élevé jusqu'aux intérêts de sa profession, et plus haut, jusqu'à ceux de la nation entière, et plus haut encore, jusqu'à ceux de l'humanité (car l'horizon du *Sillon* ne s'arrête pas aux frontières de la patrie, il s'étend à tous les hommes jusqu'aux confins du monde), le cœur humain, élargi par l'amour du bien commun, embrasserait tous les camarades de la même profession, tous les compatriotes, tous les hommes. Et voilà la grandeur et la noblesse humaine idéale réalisée par la célèbre trilogie : Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité.

Or ces trois éléments, politique, économique et moral, sont subordonnés l'un à l'autre, et c'est l'élément moral, nous l'avons dit, qui est le principal. En effet, nulle démocratie politique n'est viable, si elle n'a des points d'attache profonds dans la démocratie économique. A leur tour, ni l'une ni l'autre ne sont possibles, si elles ne s'enracinent pas dans un état d'esprit où la conscience se trouve investie de responsabilités et d'énergies morales proportionnées. Mais supposez cet état d'esprit, ainsi fait de responsabilité consciente et de forces morales, la démocratie économique s'en dégagera naturellement par traduction en actes de cette conscience et de ces énergies ; et de même, et par la même voie, du régime corporatif sortira la démocratie politique ; et la démocratie politique et économique, celle-ci portant l'autre, se trouveront fixées dans la conscience même du peuple sur des assises inébranlables.

Telle est, en résumé, la théorie, on pourrait dire le rêve, du *Sillon*, le c'est à cela que tend son enseignement et ce qu'il appelle l'éducation démocratique du peuple, c'est-à-dire à porter à son maximum la conscience et la responsabilité civique de chacun, d'où découlera la démocratie économique et politique, et le règne de la justice, de la liberté, de l'égalité et de la fraternité.

Ce rapide exposé, Vénérables Frères, vous montre déjà clairement combien nous avons raison de dire que le *Sillon* oppose doctrine à doctrine, qu'il bâtit sa cité sur une théorie contraire à la vérité catholique et qu'il fausse les notions essentielles et

fondamentales qui règlent les rapports sociaux dans toute société humaine. Cette opposition ressortira davantage encore des considérations suivantes.

Le *Sillon* place primordialement l'autorité publique dans le peuple, de qui elle dérive ensuite aux gouvernants, de telle façon cependant qu'elle continue à résider en lui. Or Léon XIII a formellement condamné cette doctrine dans son encyclique '*Diuturnum illud*' du Principat politique, où il dit : 'Des modernes en grand nombre, marchant sur les traces de ceux qui, au siècle dernier, se donnèrent le nom de philosophes, déclarent que toute puissance vient du peuple ; qu'en conséquence ceux qui exercent le pouvoir dans la société ne l'exercent pas comme leur autorité propre, mais comme une autorité à eux déléguée par le peuple et sous la condition qu'elle puisse être révoquée par la volonté du peuple de qui ils la tiennent. Tout contraire est le sentiment des catholiques qui font dériver le droit de commander de Dieu, comme de son principe naturel et nécessaire.'¹ Sans doute le *Sillon* fait descendre de Dieu cette autorité qu'il place d'abord dans le peuple, mais de telle sorte qu' 'elle remonte d'en bas pour aller en haut, tandis que dans l'organisation de l'Eglise le pouvoir descend d'en haut pour aller en bas.'² Mais outre qu'il est anormal que la délégation monte, puis qu'il est de sa nature de descendre, Léon XIII a réfuté par avance cette tentative de conciliation de la doctrine catholique avec l'erreur du philosophisme. Car il poursuit : 'Il importe de le remarquer ici ; ceux qui président au gouvernement de la chose publique peuvent bien, en certains cas être élus par la volonté et le jugement de la multitude, sans répugnance ni opposition avec la doctrine catholique. Mais si ce choix désigne le gouvernant, il ne lui confère pas l'autorité de gouverner ; il ne délègue pas le pouvoir, il désigne la personne qui en sera investie.'³

¹ 'Imo recentiores perplures, eorum vestigiis ingredientes, qui sibi superiore saeculo philosophorum nomen inscripserunt, omnem iniquit potestatem a populo esse : quare qui eam in civitate gerunt, ab iis non uti suam geri, sed ut a populo sibi mandatam, et hac quidem lege, ut populi ipsius voluntate a quo mandata est revocari possit. Ab his vero dissentiunt catholici homines, qui ius imperandi a Deo repetunt veluti a naturali necessarioque principio.'

² Marc Sangnier, *Discours de Rouen*, 1907.

³ 'Interest autem attendere hoc loco eos qui reipublicae praefuturi sint posse in quibusdam causis voluntate iudicioque deligi multitudinis, non adversante neque repugnante doctrina catholica. Quo sane delectu designatur princeps, non conferuntur iura principatus, neque mandatur imperium, sed statuitur a quo sit gerendum.'

Au reste, si le peuple demeure le détenteur du pouvoir, que devient l'autorité ? une ombre, un mythe ; il n'y a plus de loi proprement dite, il n'y a plus d'obéissance. Le *Sillon* l'a reconnu ; puisqu'en effet il réclame, au nom de la dignité humaine, la triple émancipation politique, économique et intellectuelle, la cité future à laquelle il travaille n'aura plus de maîtres ni de serviteurs ; les citoyens y seront tous libres, tous camarades, tous rois. Un ordre, un précepte serait {un attentat à la liberté, la subordination à une supériorité quelconque serait une diminution de l'homme, l'obéissance une déchéance. Est-ce ainsi, Vénérables Frères, que la doctrine traditionnelle de l'Eglise nous représente les relations sociales dans la cité même la plus parfaite possible ? Est-ce que toute société de créatures indépendantes et inégales par nature n'a pas besoin d'une autorité qui dirige leur activité vers le bien commun et qui impose sa loi ? Et si dans la société il se trouve des êtres pervers (et il y en aura toujours), l'autorité ne devra-t-elle pas être d'autant plus forte que l'égoïsme des méchants sera plus menaçant ? Ensuite, peut-on dire avec une ombre de raison qu'il y a incompatibilité entre l'autorité et la liberté, à moins de se tromper lourdement sur le concept de la liberté ? Peut-on enseigner que l'obéissance est contraire à la dignité humaine et que l'idéal serait de la remplacer par 'l'autorité consentie ?' Est-ce que l'apôtre Saint-Paul n'avait pas en vue la société humaine à toutes ses étapes possibles, quand il prescrivait aux fidèles d'être soumis à toute autorité ? Est-ce que l'obéissance aux hommes en tant que représentants légitimes de Dieu, c'est-à-dire en fin de compte l'obéissance à Dieu, abaisse l'homme et le ravale au dessous de lui-même ? Est-ce que l'état religieux fondé sur l'obéissance serait contraire à l'idéal de la nature humaine ? Est-ce que les Saints, qui ont été les plus obéissants des hommes étaient des esclaves et des dégénérés ? Est-ce qu'enfin on peut imaginer un état social, où Jésus-Christ revenu sur terre ne donnerait plus l'exemple de l'obéissance et ne dirait plus : Rendez à César ce qui est à César, et à Dieu ce qui est à Dieu ?

Le *Sillon*, qui enseigne de pareilles doctrines et les met en pratique dans sa vie intérieure, sème donc parmi votre jeunesse catholique des notions erronées et funestes sur l'autorité, la liberté et l'obéissance. Il n'en est pas autrement de la justice et de l'égalité. Il travaille, dit-il, à réaliser une ère d'égalité qui serait par la même une ère de meilleure justice. Ainsi pour lui, toute inégalité de condition est une injustice ou, au moins,

une moindre justice ! Principe souverainement contraire à la nature des choses, générateur de jalousie et d'injustice et subversif de tout ordre social. Ainsi la démocratie seule inaugurerait le règne de la parfaite justice ! N'est-ce pas une injure faite aux autres formes de gouvernement qu'on ravale, de la sorte, au rang de gouvernements de pis-aller impuissants ? Au reste le *Sillon* se heurte encore sur ce point à l'enseignement de Léon XIII. Il aurait pu lire dans l'Encyclique déjà citée du Principat politique que '*la justice sauvegardée*, il n'est pas interdit aux peuples de se donner le gouvernement qui répond le mieux à leur caractère ou aux institutions et coutumes qu'ils ont reçus de leurs ancêtres' ;¹ et l'Encyclique fait allusion à la triple forme de gouvernement bien connue. Elle suppose donc que la justice est compatible avec chacune d'elles. Et l'Encyclique sur la condition des ouvriers n'affirme-t-elle pas clairement la possibilité de restaurer la justice dans les organisations actuelles de la société, puisqu'elle en indique les moyens. Or, sans aucun doute, Léon XIII entendait parler, non pas d'une justice quelconque, mais de la justice parfaite. En enseignant donc que la justice est compatible avec les trois formes de gouvernement qu'on sait, il enseignait que, sous ce rapport, la Démocratie ne jouit pas d'un privilège spécial. Les Sillonistes qui prétendent le contraire, ou bien refusent d'écouter l'Eglise ou se forment de la justice et de l'égalité un concept qui n'est pas catholique.

Il en est de même de la notion de la fraternité, dont ils mettent la base dans l'amour des intérêts communs, ou, par delà toutes les philosophies et toutes les religions, dans la simple notion d'humanité, englobant ainsi dans le même amour et une égale tolérance tous les hommes avec toutes leurs misères, aussi bien intellectuelles et morales que physiques et temporelles. Or la doctrine catholique nous enseigne que le premier devoir de la charité n'est pas dans la tolérance des convictions erronées, quelque sincères qu'elles soient, ni dans l'indifférence théorique ou pratique pour l'erreur ou le vice où nous voyons plongés nos frères, mais dans le zèle pour leur amélioration intellectuelle et morale non moins que pour leur bien être matériel. Cette même doctrine catholique nous enseigne aussi que la source de l'amour du prochain se trouve dans l'amour de Dieu, père commun et fin commune de toute la famille humaine, et dans

¹ 'Quamobrem, salva iustitia, non prohibentur populi illud sibi genus comparare reipublicae, quod aut ipsorum ingenio aut maiorum institutis moribusque magis respondeat.'

l'amour de Jésus-Christ, dont nous sommes les membres au point que soulager un malheureux c'est faire du bien à Jésus-Christ lui-même. Tout autre amour est illusion ou sentiment stérile et passager. Certes l'expérience humaine est là, dans les sociétés païennes ou laïques de tous les temps, pour prouver qu'à certaines heures la considération des intérêts communs ou de la similitude de nature pèse fort peu devant les passions et les convoitises du cœur. Non, Vénérables Frères, il n'y a pas de vraie fraternité en dehors de la charité chrétienne qui par amour pour Dieu et son Fils Jésus-Christ, notre Sauveur, embrasse tous les hommes pour les soulager tous et pour les amener tous à la même foi et au même bonheur du ciel. En séparant la fraternité de la charité chrétienne ainsi entendue, la Démocratie, loin d'être un progrès, constituerait un recul désastreux pour la civilisation. Car si l'on veut arriver, et nous le désirons de toute notre âme, à la plus grande somme de bien être possible pour la société et pour chacun de ses membres par la fraternité, ou comme on dit encore par la solidarité universelle, il faut l'union des esprits dans la vérité, l'union des volontés dans la morale, l'union des cœurs dans l'amour de Dieu et de son Fils, Jésus-Christ. Or cette union n'est réalisable que par la charité catholique, laquelle, seule par conséquent, peut conduire les peuples dans la marche du progrès vers l'idéal de la civilisation.

Enfin à la base de toutes les falsifications des notions sociales fondamentales, le *Sillon* place une fausse idée de la dignité humaine. D'après lui, l'homme ne sera vraiment homme, digne de ce nom, que du jour où il aura acquis une conscience éclairée, forte, indépendante, autonome, pouvant se passer de maître, ne s'obéissant qu'à elle-même et capable d'assumer et de porter, sans forfaire, les plus graves responsabilités. Voilà de ces grands mots avec lesquels on exalte le sentiment de l'orgueil humain ; tel un rêve qui entraîne l'homme sans lumière, sans guide et sans secours dans la voie de l'illusion, où, en attendant le grand jour de la pleine conscience, il sera dévoré par l'erreur et les passions. Et ce grand jour quand viendra-t-il ? A moins de changer la nature humaine (ce qui n'est pas au pouvoir du *Sillon*) viendra-t-il jamais ? Est-ce que les Saints, qui ont porté la dignité humaine à son apogée, avaient cette dignité-là ? Et les humbles de la terre, qui ne peuvent monter si haut, et qui se contentent de tracer modestement leur sillon, au rang que la Providence leur a assigné, en remplissant énergiquement leurs devoirs dans l'humilité, l'obéissance et la patience chré-

tienne, ne seraient-ils pas dignes du nom d'hommes, eux que le Seigneur tirera un jour de leur condition obscure pour les placer au ciel parmi les princes de son peuple ?

Nous arrêtons là nos réflexions sur les erreurs du *Sillon*. Nous ne prétendons pas épuiser le sujet, car il y aurait encore à attirer votre attention, sur d'autres points également faux et dangereux, par exemple, sur sa manière de comprendre le pouvoir coercitif de l'Eglise. Il importe maintenant de voir l'influence de ces erreurs sur la conduite pratique du *Sillon* et sur son action sociale.

Les doctrines du *Sillon* ne restent pas dans le domaine de l'abstraction philosophique. Elles sont enseignées à la jeunesse catholique, et, bien plus, on s'essaie à les *vivre*. Le *Sillon* se regarde comme le noyau de la cité future ; il la reflète donc aussi fidèlement que possible. En effet, il n'y a pas de hiérarchie dans le *Sillon*. L'élite qui le dirige s'est dégagée de la masse par sélection, c'est-à-dire en s'imposant par son autorité morale et par ses vertus. On y entre librement, comme librement on en sort. Les études s'y font sans maître, tout au plus avec un conseiller. Les cercles d'études sont de véritables coopératives intellectuelles, où chacun est tout ensemble maître et élève. La camaraderie la plus absolue règne entre les membres et met en contact total leurs âmes ; de là, l'âme commune du *Sillon*. On l'a défini 'une amitié.' Le prêtre lui-même, quand il y entre, abaisse l'émminente dignité de son sacerdoce, et, par le plus étrange renversement des rôles, se fait élève, se met au niveau de ses jeunes amis et n'est plus qu'un camarade.

Dans ces habitudes démocratiques et les théories sur la cité idéale qui les inspirent, vous reconnaîtrez, Vénérables Frères, la cause secrète des manquements disciplinaires que vous avez dû, si souvent, reprocher au *Sillon*. Il n'est pas étonnant que vous ne trouviez pas chez les chefs et chez leurs camarades ainsi formés, fussent-ils séminaristes ou prêtres, le respect, la docilité et l'obéissance qui sont dûs à vos personnes et à votre autorité ; que vous sentiez de leur part une sourde opposition, et que vous ayez le regret de les voir se soustraire totalement, ou, quand ils y sont forcés par l'obéissance, se livrer avec dégoût à des œuvres non sillonistes. Vous êtes le passé ; eux sont les pionniers de la civilisation future. Vous représentez la hiérarchie, les inégalités sociales, l'autorité et l'obéissance : institutions vieilles, auxquelles leurs âmes, éprises d'un autre idéal, ne peuvent plus

se plier. Nous avons sur cet état d'esprit le témoignage de faits douloureux, capables d'arracher des larmes ; et nous ne pouvons, malgré notre longanimité, nous défendre d'un juste sentiment d'indignation. Eh quoi ! on inspire à votre jeunesse catholique la défiance envers l'Eglise, leur mère ; on leur apprend que depuis dix-neuf siècles elle n'a pas encore réussi dans le monde à constituer la société sur ses vraies bases ; qu'elle n'a pas compris les notions sociales de l'autorité, de la liberté, de l'égalité, de la fraternité et de la dignité humaine ; que les grands évêques et les grands monarques, qui ont créé et si glorieusement gouverné la France n'ont pas su donner à leur peuple, ni la vraie justice ni le vrai bonheur, parce qu'ils n'avaient pas l'idéal du *Sillon* !

Le souffle de la Révolution a passé par là, et nous pouvons conclure que si les doctrines sociales du *Sillon* sont erronées, son esprit est dangereux et son éducation funeste.

Mais alors que devons-nous penser de son action dans l'Eglise, lui dont le catholicisme est si pointilleux que d'un peu plus, à moins d'embrasser sa cause, on serait, à ses yeux, un ennemi intérieur du catholicisme et l'on ne comprendrait rien à l'Evangile et à Jésus-Christ ? Nous croyons bon d'insister sur cette question, parce que c'est précisément son ardeur catholique qui a valu au *Sillon*, jusque dans ces derniers temps, de précieux encouragements et d'illustres suffrages. Eh bien ! devant les paroles et les faits nous sommes obligés de dire que dans son action comme dans sa doctrine le *Sillon* ne donne pas satisfaction à l'Eglise.

D'abord son catholicisme ne s'accommode que de la forme du gouvernement démocratique, qu'il estime être la plus favorable à l'Eglise et se confondre pour ainsi dire avec elle ; il inféode donc sa religion à un parti politique. Nous n'avons pas à démontrer que l'avènement de la démocratie universelle n'importe pas à l'action de l'Eglise dans le monde ; nous avons déjà rappelé que l'Eglise a toujours laissé aux nations le souci de se donner le gouvernement qu'elles estiment le plus avantageux pour leur intérêts. Ce que nous voulons affirmer encore une fois, après notre prédécesseur, c'est qu'il y a erreur et danger à inféoder, par principe, le catholicisme à une forme de gouvernement ; erreur et danger qui sont d'autant plus grands lorsqu'on synthétise la religion avec un genre de démocratie dont les doctrines sont erronées. Or c'est le cas du *Sillon* ; lequel, par le fait, et pour une forme politique spéciale, en compromettant l'Eglise, divise les catholiques, arrache la jeunesse et même des

prêtres et des séminaristes à l'action simplement catholique et dépense, en pure perte, les forces vives d'une partie de la nation.

Et voyez, Vénérables Frères, une étonnante contradiction. C'est précisément parce que la religion doit dominer tous les partis, c'est en invoquant ce principe que le *Sillon* s'abstient de défendre l'Eglise attaquée. Certes ce n'est pas l'Eglise qui est descendue dans l'arène politique ; on l'y a entraînée et pour la mutiler et pour la dépouiller. Le devoir de tout catholique n'est-il donc pas d'user des armes politiques qu'il tient en mains pour la défendre, et aussi pour forcer la politique à rester dans son domaine et à ne s'occuper de l'Eglise que pour lui rendre ce qui lui est dû ? Eh bien ! en face de l'Eglise ainsi violentée, on a souvent la douleur de voir les Sillonistes se croiser les bras, si ce n'est qu'à la défendre ils trouvent leur compte ; on les voit dicter ou soutenir un programme qui nulle part ni à aucun degré ne révèle le catholique. Ce qui n'empêche pas les mêmes hommes en pleine lutte politique, sous le coup d'une provocation, d'afficher publiquement leur foi. Qu'est-ce à dire, sinon qu'il y a deux hommes dans le Silloniste : l'individu qui est catholique ; le Silloniste, l'homme d'action, qui est neutre.

Il fut un temps où le *Sillon*, comme tel, était formellement catholique. En fait de force morale, il n'en connaissait qu'une, la force catholique, et il allait proclamant que la démocratie serait catholique ou qu'elle ne serait pas. Un moment vint où il se ravisa. Il laissa à chacun sa religion ou sa philosophie. Il cessa lui-même de se qualifier de catholique, et à la formule : 'la démocratie sera catholique,' il substitua cette autre : 'la démocratie ne sera pas anticatholique,' pas plus d'ailleurs qu'anti-juive ou anti-bouddhiste. Ce fut l'époque du *plus grand Sillon*. On appela à la construction de la cité future tous les ouvriers de toutes les religions et de toutes les sectes. On ne leur demanda que d'embrasser le même idéal social, de respecter toutes les croyances et d'apporter un certain appoint de forces morales. Certes, proclamait-on, 'les chefs du *Sillon* mettent leur foi religieuse au dessus de tout. Mais peuvent-ils ôter aux autres le droit de puiser leur énergie morale là où ils peuvent ? En revanche, ils veulent que les autres respectent leur droit, à eux, de la puiser dans la foi catholique. Ils demandent donc à tous ceux qui veulent transformer la société présente dans le sens de la démocratie de ne pas se repousser mutuellement à cause des convictions philosophiques ou religieuses qui peuvent les séparer, mais de marcher la main dans la main, non pas en

renonçant à leurs convictions, mais en essayant de faire sur le terrain des réalités pratiques la preuve de l'excellence de leurs convictions personnelles. Peut-être sur ce terrain de l'émulation entre âmes attachées à différentes convictions religieuses ou philosophiques l'union pourra se réaliser.¹ Et l'on déclara en même temps (comment cela pouvait-il s'accomplir ?) que le petit Sillon catholique serait l'âme du grand Sillon cosmopolite.

Récemment le nom du *plus grand Sillon* a disparu, et une nouvelle organisation est intervenue, sans modifier, bien au contraire, l'esprit et le fond des choses 'pour mettre de l'ordre dans le travail et organiser les diverses forces d'activité. Le *Sillon* reste toujours une âme, un esprit, qui se mêlera aux groupes et inspirera leur activité.' Et tous les groupements nouveaux, devenus en apparence autonomes : catholiques, protestants, libres penseurs, sont priés de se mettre à l'œuvre. 'Les camarades catholiques travailleront entre eux dans une organisation spéciale à s'instruire et à s'éduquer. Les démocrates protestants et libres penseurs, en feront autant de leur côté. Tous, catholiques, protestants et libres penseurs auront à cœur d'armer la jeunesse, non pas pour une lutte fratricide, mais pour une généreuse émulation sur le terrain des vertus sociales et civiques.'²

Ces déclarations et cette nouvelle organisation de l'action Silloniste appellent de bien graves réflexions.

Voici fondée par des catholiques une association interconfessionnelle, pour travailler à la réforme de la civilisation, œuvre religieuse au premier chef ; car pas de vraie civilisation sans civilisation morale, et pas de vraie civilisation morale sans la vraie religion : c'est une vérité démontrée, c'est un fait d'histoire. Et les nouveaux Sillonistes ne pourront pas prétexter qu'ils ne travailleront que 'sur le terrain des réalités pratiques' où la diversité des croyances n'importe pas. Leur chef sent si bien cette influence des convictions de l'esprit sur le résultat de l'action, qu'il les invite, à quelque religion qu'ils appartiennent, à 'faire sur le terrain des réalités pratiques la preuve de l'excellence de leurs convictions personnelles.' Et avec raison, car les réalisations pratiques revêtent le caractère des convictions religieuses, comme les membres d'un corps jusqu'à leurs dernières extrémités reçoivent leur forme du principe vital qui l'anime.

Ceci dit, que faut-il penser de la promiscuité où se trouveront

¹ Marc Sangnier, *Discours de Rouen*, 1907.

² Marc Sangnier, *Paris, Mai*, 1910.

engagés les jeunes catholiques avec des hétérodoxes et des incroyants de toute sorte dans une œuvre de cette nature ? N'est-elle pas mille fois plus dangereuse pour eux qu'une association neutre ? Que faut-il penser de cet appel à tous les hétérodoxes et à tous les incroyants à prouver l'excellence de leurs convictions sur le terrain social, dans une espèce de concours apologétique, comme si ce concours ne durait pas depuis dix-neuf siècles, dans des conditions moins dangereuses pour la foi des fidèles et tout en l'honneur de l'Eglise Catholique ? Que faut-il penser de ce respect de toutes les erreurs et de l'invitation étrange, faite par un catholique à tous les dissidents, de fortifier leurs convictions par l'étude et d'en faire des sources toujours plus abondantes de forces nouvelles ? Que faut-il penser d'une association où toutes les religions et même la libre-pensée peuvent se manifester hautement, à leur aise ? car les Sillonistes qui dans les conférences publiques et ailleurs proclament fièrement leur foi individuelle n'entendent certainement pas fermer la bouche aux autres et empêcher le protestant d'affirmer son protestantisme et le sceptique son scepticisme. Que penser enfin d'un catholique qui, en entrant dans son cercle d'études, laisse son catholicisme à la porte, pour ne pas effrayer ses camarades, qui 'rêvant d'une action sociale désintéressée répugnent à la faire servir au triomphe d'intérêts, de coteries ou même de convictions quelles qu'elles soient.' Telle est la profession de foi du nouveau comité démocratique d'action sociale, qui a hérité de la plus grande tâche de l'ancienne organisation et qui, dit-il, 'brisant l'équivoque entretenue autour du *plus grand Sillon* tant dans les milieux réactionnaires que dans les milieux anticléricaux,' est ouvert à tous les hommes 'respectueux des forces morales et religieuses et convaincus qu'aucune émancipation sociale véritable n'est possible sans le ferment d'un *généreux idéalisme*.'

Oui, hélas ! l'équivoque est brisée ; l'action sociale du *Sillon* n'est plus catholique ; le Silloniste, comme tel, ne travaille pas pour une coterie et 'l'Eglise, il le dit, ne saurait à aucun titre être bénéficiaire des sympathies que son action pourra susciter.' Etrange insinuation vraiment ! On craint que l'Eglise ne profite de l'action sociale du *Sillon* dans un but égoïste et intéressé, comme si tout ce qui profite à l'Eglise ne profitait pas à l'humanité ! Etrange renversement d'idées : c'est l'Eglise qui serait la bénéficiaire de l'action sociale, comme si les plus grands économistes n'avaient pas reconnu et démontré que c'est l'action sociale, qui, pour être sérieuse et féconde, doit bénéficier de

l'Eglise. Mais plus étranges encore, effrayantes et attristantes à la fois sont l'audace et la légèreté d'esprit d'hommes qui se disent catholiques, qui rêvent de refondre la société dans de pareilles conditions et d'établir sur terre, pardessus l'Eglise Catholique, 'le règne de la justice et de l'amour,' avec des ouvriers venus de toute part, de toutes religions ou sans religion, avec ou sans croyances, pourvu qu'ils oublient ce qui les divise : leurs convictions religieuses et philosophiques, et qu'ils mettent en commun ce qui les unit : un *généreux idéalisme* et des forces morales prises 'où ils peuvent.' Quand on songe à tout ce qu'il a fallu de forces, de science, de vertus surnaturelles pour établir la cité chrétienne, et les souffrances de millions de martyrs, et les lumières des Pères et des Docteurs de l'Eglise, et le dévouement de tous les héros de la charité, et une puissante hiérarchie née du Ciel, et des fleuves de grâce divine, et le tout édifié, relié, compénétré par la Vie et l'Esprit de Jésus-Christ, la Sagesse de Dieu, le Verbe fait homme, quand on songe, disons-nous, à tout cela, on est effrayé de voir de nouveaux apôtres s'acharner à faire mieux avec la mise en commun d'un vague idéalisme et de vertus civiques. Que von-ils produire ? qu'est-ce qui va sortir de cette collaboration ? Une construction purement verbale et chimérique, où l'on verra miroiter pêle-mêle et dans une confusion séduisante les mots de liberté, de justice, de fraternité et d'amour, d'égalité et d'exaltation humaine, le tout basé sur une dignité humaine mal comprise. Ce sera une agitation tumultueuse, stérile pour le but proposé et qui profitera aux remueurs de masses moins utopistes. Oui, vraiment, on peut dire que le *Sillon* convoie le socialisme l'oeil fixé sur une chimère.

Nous craignons qu'il n'y ait encore pire. Le résultat de cette promiscuité en travail, le bénéficiaire de cette action sociale cosmopolite, ne peut être qu'une démocratie qui ne sera ni catholique, ni protestante, ni juive ; une religion (car le *Sillonisme*, les chefs l'ont dit, est une religion) plus universelle que l'Eglise catholique, réunissant tous les hommes devenus enfin frères et camarades dans 'le règne de Dieu.' 'On ne travaille pas pour l'Eglise, on travaille pour l'humanité.'

Et maintenant, pénétrés de la plus vive tristesse, nous nous demandons, Vénérables Frères, ce qu'est devenu le catholicisme du *Sillon*. Hélas ! Lui qui donnait autrefois de si belles espérances, ce fleuve limpide et impétueux a été capté dans sa marche par les ennemis modernes de l'Eglise et ne forme plus dorénavant qu'un misérable affluent du grand mouvement d'apostasie,

organisé, dans tous les pays, pour l'établissement d'une Eglise universelle qui n'aura ni dogmes ni hiérarchie, ni règle pour l'esprit ni frein pour les passions, et qui, sous prétexte de liberté et de dignité humaine, ramènerait dans le monde, si elle pouvait triompher, le règne légal de la ruse et de la force, et l'oppression des faibles, de ceux qui souffrent et qui travaillent.

Nous ne connaissons que trop les sombres officines où l'on élabore ces doctrines délétères, qui ne devraient pas séduire des esprits clairvoyants. Les chefs du *Sillon* n'ont pu s'en défendre ; l'exaltation de leurs sentiments, l'aveugle bonté de leur cœur, leur mysticisme philosophique mêlé d'une part d'illuminisme les ont entraînés vers un nouvel évangile, dans lequel ils ont cru voir le véritable Evangile du Sauveur, au point qu'ils osent traiter Notre Seigneur Jésus-Christ avec une familiarité souverainement irrespectueuse et que, leur idéal étant apparenté à celui de la Révolution, ils ne craignent pas de faire entre l'Evangile et la Révolution des rapprochements blasphématoires, qui n'ont pas l'excuse d'avoir échappé à quelque improvisation tumultueuse.

Nous voulons attirer votre attention, Vénérables Frères, sur cette déformation de l'Evangile et du caractère sacré de Notre Seigneur Jésus-Christ, Dieu et Homme, pratiquée dans le *Sillon* et ailleurs. Dès que l'on aborde la question sociale, il est de mode dans certains milieux d'écarter d'abord la Divinité de Jésus-Christ, et puis de ne parler que de sa souveraine mansuétude, de sa compassion pour toutes les misères humaines, de ses pressantes exhortations à l'amour du prochain et à la fraternité. Certes Jésus nous a aimés d'un amour immense, infini, et Il est venu sur terre souffrir et mourir pour que, réunis autour de Lui, dans la justice et l'amour, animés des mêmes sentiments de charité mutuelle, tous les hommes vivent dans la paix et le bonheur. Mais à la réalisation de ce bonheur temporel et éternel Il a mis, avec une souveraine autorité, la condition que l'on fasse partie de son troupeau, que l'on accepte sa doctrine, que l'on pratique la vertu et qu'on se laisse enseigner et guider par Pierre et ses successeurs. Puis si Jésus a été bon pour les égarés et les pécheurs, Il n'a pas respecté leurs convictions erronées, quelque sincères qu'elles parussent ; il les a tous aimés pour les instruire, les convertir et les sauver. S'il a appelé à Lui, pour les soulager, ceux qui peinent et qui souffrent, ce n'a pas été pour leur prêcher la jalousie d'une égalité chimérique. S'il a relevé les humbles, ce n'a pas été pour leur inspirer le sentiment d'une dignité indé-

pendante et rebelle à l'obéissance. Si son Cœur débordait de mansuétude pour les âmes de bonne volonté, Il a su également s'armer d'une sainte indignation contre les profanateurs de la maison de Dieu, contre les misérables qui scandalisent les petits, contre les autorités qui accablent le peuple sous le poids de lourds fardeaux sans y mettre le doigt pour les soulever. Il a été aussi fort que doux ; il a grondé, menacé, châtié, sachant et nous enseignant que souvent la crainte est le commencement de la sagesse et qu'il convient parfois de couper un membre pour sauver le corps. Enfin Il n'a pas annoncé pour la société future le règne d'une félicité idéale, d'où la souffrance serait bannie ; mais par ses leçons et par ses exemples, Il a tracé le chemin du bonheur possible sur terre et du bonheur parfait au Ciel : la voie royale de la Croix. Ce sont là des enseignements qu'on aurait tort d'appliquer seulement à la vie individuelle en vue du salut éternel ; ce sont des enseignements éminemment sociaux, et ils nous montrent en Notre-Seigneur Jésus-Christ autre chose qu'un humanitarisme sans consistance et sans autorité.

[Conclusion in next number.]

**RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMMITTEE OF MANAGERS OF
NATIONAL SCHOOLS.—LETTER TO MR. BIRRELL**

TO THE RIGHT HON. A. BIRRELL, M.P., CHIEF SECRETARY TO
THE LORD LIEUTENANT OF IRELAND.

ST. MARY'S, DROGHEDA,

October 21, 1910.

SIR,—On behalf of the Managers of three-fourths of the National Schools of Ireland, we desire to most respectfully represent to you some facts of very urgent importance in connexion with the schoolhouses of the country.

1st. The material condition of many of these houses is unsatisfactory, and we believe that in most of these cases the Managers are eager to replace the old schools with new ones, or to so improve existing buildings that they may be large enough for the requirements of the National Board and satisfactory in every way for many years to come.

Money, however, is wanted ; and the proportion that the National Board is willing to supply is not forthcoming. Requests have been made by the Board to the Managers to improve and to

build. Encouragement, and even promises, have been held out to many of them, and they have in several cases gone to much trouble and expense to arrange the preliminaries satisfactorily. Of these things we have personal knowledge from the representations of Managers to us ; and the Commissioners of National Education, in their last and previous Reports to the Lord Lieutenant, corroborate fully our statements, and complain that though there is a necessity for making numerous building grants, the Treasury is deaf to their requests. In consequence, there is partial paralysis in the working of the Educational system of the country. The unsatisfactory schools are naturally becoming worse, and the Educational drawback increases. Promises of help from the Treasury are not even kept, and this is all the more deplorable, as Irish Education in its financial aspect is being, for many years past, scandalously treated.

In support of these statements, to which we beg, in the interests of Education, your immediate attention, we content ourselves with quotations from the last Report of the Commissioners of National Education. It says :—

‘ The question of grants for the building and improvement of the National Schoolhouses has occupied our earnest attention for many months past. *Owing to the want of Funds*, we have been obliged once more to suspend the awarding of grants for these purposes, notwithstanding the many urgent applications still undealt with. Since the end of November, 1909, we have made no building grants except in the case of four new schools and some minor works of improvement, etc., and it is impossible to say how much longer *this serious crisis* will continue.’

‘ In our previous Reports to your Excellency, and more especially in our Seventy-second Report (1905-6), we called attention to this question at considerable length. We pointed out that before 1887 there was no limit fixed to the expenditure on this head for each year, but that in consequence of supplemental estimates for this service being required, the Treasury decided to limit the amount for the year 1888-9 and subsequent years to a fixed sum. Accordingly down to and including the year 1903-4 the sum of £40,000 was fixed as an annual amount, except in the years from 1891 to 1896, when the annual grant was £30,000.’¹

‘ In the year 1902 the question of improving the plans for the new schoolhouses, and of revising the estimates in conse-

¹ In the year 1894-5 the sum was £28,000.

quence of the increased cost thereby entailed, was considered by an interdepartmental committee, and, pending the decision of the Irish Government and the Treasury on the report of this committee, grants were in a large measure suspended for a period of over five years. Although the report referred to was presented in November, 1902, no decision which we were able to accept was reached by the Irish Government and the Treasury until early in 1907, and the revised plans and specifications were not ready for issue to Managers until the end of that year.'

'The virtual suspension of grants for such a long period caused a large accumulation of pressing claims, and in order to deal with these cases, as well as with new applications which were received almost daily, we represented to the Treasury that £100,000 per annum would be required for five years. The sum, however, which the Treasury agreed to place at our disposal for each of the three years beginning with 1907-8 was only £40,000, but as we were promised that this sum would be supplemented by £70,000 from the Ireland Development Grant, we felt that with this addition it would meet the actual expenditure during these years, and we accepted the grant as sufficient for that period. At the same time we pointed out that it would be necessary for us to know the amounts at our disposal at least two years in advance, inasmuch as our grants were necessarily considered and sanctioned about two years in advance of the actual expenditure of the money. This information was not, however, supplied to us, and in September last we informed the Treasury that we had sanctioned grants in excess of the sums (amounting to £190,000) already either promised or allocated to us, and we asked that a liberal provision should be made for the following period of three years, commencing 1st April, 1910.'

'In reply to our request we were informed by the Treasury, in January last, that a further grant of £120,000 would be made for the next three years, making a total provision of £240,000 for the six years from 1st April, 1907, to 31st March, 1913. The sum of £70,000, which was to have been provided out of the Development Grant, but which we have not received owing to the depletion of that fund, must be considered as included in the further sum of £120,000 now promised by the Treasury, so that the actual provision for building offered by the Treasury for the current term of three years is in reality only £50,000.'

'To this letter of the Treasury we replied by pointing out that the grants already sanctioned by us since the year 1907

amounted to over £235,000, that the sum promised represented only £50,000 in addition to the sum of £190,000 already promised, and that we had approved of the erection of schoolhouses in some 130 additional cases representing, approximately, a further expenditure of £135,000. In addition to these 130 cases, there are 106 other applications for grants in which the necessary investigations are being made, and there are fully six hundred cases of unsuitable school-buildings where the Managers have not yet applied for grants, apart altogether from between 2,000 and 3,000 cases where much-needed improvements in the form of additional accommodation or the provision of class-rooms are required.'

'That the Treasury grant is wholly inadequate for our immediate needs may be at once seen, when regard is had to the fact that the amount voted during the five years from 1903 to 1908 averaged between £15,000 and £16,000, that before 1903 the Treasury considered £40,000 per annum might be supplied, and that, notwithstanding the large accumulation of cases during the years of partial suspension of grants and the increased desire on the part of school Managers to provide sanitary buildings, no increase is proposed by the Treasury in the annual amount to be granted (£40,000) for the six years from 1907 to 1913. The new buildings, moreover, which provide additional floor space per pupil, a class-room for each teacher, seating accommodation for all the children, and suitable cloak-rooms and lavatory accommodation, are necessarily more costly than those erected prior to 1903. In revising the estimates it was also necessary to consider the increase in the cost of labour and materials.'

'In many of the cases where new houses are still required the existing buildings are mere hovels: some have earthen floors and thatched or broken roofs unceiled within, and others are badly lighted and ventilated, possessing insufficient floor and cubic space for the numbers in attendance, and destitute of any sanitary arrangements. We have referred at length in former Reports to the impossibility of doing really satisfactory work under such unfavourable conditions. We should be unmindful of our manifest duty if we neglected or hesitated to state these facts again for your Excellency's information and consideration.'

We, Sir, deem it unnecessary to make any comment on these extracts, as they speak for themselves.

Amongst the schools which we think should be entitled to first consideration are those to the Managers of which grants

have been promised, and for which the preliminary expenses have been already incurred.

2nd. We desire to direct your attention also to a question of considerable importance on which you have already more than once sympathetically expressed yourself, though, up to the present, nothing practical has been done. We shall let the Report of the Commissioners of National Education speak for us on this matter also.¹ It says :—

‘ We were encouraged last year to hope that our requests for aid towards the cost of the heating and cleaning of National Schools were about to receive favourable consideration, and that an annual grant to the extent of one-half the expense of providing for their requirements would be made available in the current year. The representatives of the School Managers expressed their willingness to meet half of the cost, and at the request of the Irish Government we prepared estimates and proposed a scheme for submission to the Treasury. We regret that up to the present the necessary funds have not been placed at our disposal, but we entertain the hope that the Government and the Treasury may see their way, at no distant date, to allow a modified grant for this purpose.’

We beg to repeat our offer on behalf of all the Catholic School Managers of Ireland, and as Winter is approaching, we hope for an immediate and favourable reply.

We are, Sir,

Most respectfully yours,

MICHAEL MURPHY, D.D., V.G., P.P.,
*Chairman of the Standing Committee
of Catholic Clerical Managers.*

JOHN CURRY, P.P.,
*Hon. Sec. to the Standing Committee
of Catholic Clerical Managers.*

The Committee also considered a new Rule affecting the teaching of Irish in the National Schools (Schedule I., page 9-1, and page 60-4, Rules and Regulations, 1910-11), and resolved :—

‘ We consider the New Clause added to 4, Schedule I., regarding the payment for teaching Irish, unfair in itself, and detrimental to the interests of the Irish Language.’

¹ Seventy-sixth Report, p. 10.

It was also resolved :—

‘ That with reference to the appeal made to the Managers at the All-Ireland Industrial Conference in Cork, we recommend the encouragement of industrial teaching, and the use of Irish-made goods in the National Schools.’

With regard to the request of the Commissioners that they ‘ be allowed to appoint Junior Assistant Mistresses in Schools with an average attendance of at least 85 pupils, but not large enough to warrant the services of two certificated Assistants,’ the Catholic Clerical Managers hope that it be not acceded to, particularly for Boys’ Schools. In June, 1909, we stated that :—

‘ We regret to find that where there should be upwards of 2,000 trained Assistant Teachers, a corresponding number of untrained Junior Assistant Mistresses are now employed in the National Schools of Ireland, to the detriment of the teaching profession of Ireland, of its Training Colleges, and of National Education generally.’

The request of the Commissioners made in 1909, and again in 1910, will, if granted, intensify the evils mentioned by the Managers, and we, therefore, hope that it will not be acceded to.

The Hon. Secretary was directed to send the foregoing to the Dublin daily newspapers, to Mr. John Redmond, M.P., and to all the Irish Members of Parliament, requesting their favourable and immediate consideration.

NOTICES OF BOOKS

DE INCARNATIONE. Auctore Daniel Coghlan, S.T.D., Eccl. Cathedral. Corcagien. Canonico, Sacrae Theologiae in Collegio Maynutiano S. Patritii Professore. Dublini: apud Browne et Nolan; Londini, Edinburg et Glasgoviae: apud Sands et Co. 1910.

ONLY a few months ago we reviewed two able theological treatises by Dr. Coghlan, *De Deo Uno et Trino* and *De Deo Creatore*. We have now before us the third volume of his dogmatic course, *De Incarnatione*. We may say at once that it well maintains the reputation established by the two previous volumes, and in many respects surpasses them in interest and utility.

Like the volumes *De Deo Uno et Trino* and *De Deo Creatore* the present volume deals with a most profound and important subject—the mystery of the Incarnation. It was written primarily for the author's class; and it is decidedly a great convenience for professor and students to have the professor's lectures in the hands of the students.

The author follows throughout the *Summa* of St. Thomas, giving the teaching of the Angelic Doctor and applying it to modern thought. A new treatise on the Incarnation is not superfluous. No doubt the question has been thrashed out from the beginning. Every phase of it has been discussed—the divinity of Christ with the Arians, the unity of persons with the Nestorians, the distinction and integrity of natures with the Monophysites, the duality of wills and operations with the Monothelites, the sonship with the Adoptionists, the atonement with the Socinians. Against all these errors the doctrine of the Church has been defined, and here there is no room for novelty of doctrine. But the line of attack has changed, and among non-Catholic defenders the nature of the Incarnation is somewhat corrupted; and hence it is necessary to consider the Incarnation from the modern point of view.

The last half of the nineteenth century was remarkable for the propagation of the theory of evolution and for agnostic

philosophy. The divinity of Christ had been already impugned by the Rationalists. But in the modern attack the evolution and Kantian theories are pressed into service by the assailants. Everything, they say, has originated by natural selection, religion as well as organisms. Why, then, should there be contention, when all creeds are the fruits of evolution, having proved their value in the struggle for existence? Away, then, with dogmatic controversy, for all creeds are relatively true! The good and useful is the true. Hence the Modernist position, widely approved by non-Catholics, and from them borrowed by some Catholics, that dogmatic truths need not be intellectually true and need not be believed by the mind: that it is sufficient to employ them as norms of action.

This theory is considered in the volume under consideration. The divinity of Christ is treated very exhaustively. The Virgin Birth, the Atonement, and the Resurrection, are proved to be realities, and not fanciful creations of the brain of the inspired writers.

The Kenotic conception of the Incarnation, now widely advocated by Protestants, is examined and rejected. The adoration of Christ and the devotion to His Sacred Heart is clearly explained. It contains a full treatment of the Incarnation, and will be found most useful for the refutation of error, or instructions on the Incarnation.

Indeed some of the most interesting questions disputed in modern times are treated by Dr. Coghlan in this volume. Modernists and unbelievers have pointed repeatedly to the words of the Gospel which tell us that Jesus made progress 'in wisdom and age and grace with God and men,' and ask triumphantly if Jesus was God, or if He was conscious of His divinity, how could He advance? Dr. Coghlan gives the sound theological answer which has always been given to this by no means new objection, and he presents it in a very telling and convincing manner. Indeed, one of the chief characteristics of the work is the directness, the clearness, and the ability with which the objections are met.

We congratulate Dr. Coghlan on this great work, which now establishes him as one of the leading Irish theologians of modern times.

J. F. H.

CALENDAR FOR THE SESSION 1910-1911 UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN. Dublin: Browne and Nolan, Ltd. 1910.

WE congratulate Dr. Coffey and the other authorities of University College, Dublin, on the first production of their Calendar. It now takes a permanent place amongst the University Calendars of the world. Whatever may be thought of the University itself and its general character from a religious standpoint, there is no doubt that its Dublin College has turned out an excellent calendar. The fullest information is given about College fees in the different faculties and for the different courses. The scholarships offered by the College are clearly set forth. The names of the professors and lecturers in the different faculties are given. The courses of study for the various examinations in the different branches are registered. Here one feels unfortunately that the secularist has left his mark upon the institution. Religion finds no place in that vast curriculum. And indeed even in those branches of study where the authorities have a free hand the great Christian authors of the past get but poor recognition in comparison with their modern free-thinking competitors. Far be it from us to exclude from a University any manifestation of human thought; but farther still the exclusion of the thought that has made universities, and this University in particular, possible.

The examination papers of last year are published in full.

At the end of the volume we find very conveniently and very suitably published 'The Irish Universities Act,' and the Charter and Statutes of Dublin College.

Both editors and publishers deserve to be congratulated on the appearance of the volume.

J. F. H.

A READERS' GUIDE TO IRISH FICTION. By Stephen J. Brown, S.J. Dublin: Browne and Nolan, Ltd. 1910.

WE have been frequently asked for a list of good books for parochial and urban libraries, and we have not always been able to find time to draw it up and send it. This work will go a long way not only to save us from the trouble, but to prevent the request from being made. For that reason alone we feel deeply indebted to Mr. Brown; but our obligation will be greatly

increased when he has finished the work he has cut out for himself.

For the present he has confined himself to fiction ; but later on he hopes to furnish ' notes on books of all kinds relating to Ireland.' His plan is clear and well conceived, and it has been admirably executed. Every work of fiction that bears either directly or indirectly on Ireland is briefly analysed and its worth is indicated in a few words. One can easily enough judge from the account given whether the work is fit for a family or a local library. Mr. Brown has accomplished a very good work, the forerunner, we hope, of many others.

J. F. H.

THE INDUCTIVE SCIENCES. An Inquiry into some of their Methods and Postulates. By Rev. P. Coffey, Professor of Philosophy, Maynooth College. Dublin : Browne and Nolan, Ltd. 1910.

PHILOSOPHY AND SECTARIANISM IN BELFAST UNIVERSITY. By Rev. P. Coffey, Professor of Philosophy, Maynooth College. Dublin : M. H. Gill & Son. 1910.

DR. COFFEY has now published in separate pamphlets the interesting papers contributed to our own pages on the ' Inductive Sciences,' and the paper on ' Philosophy in Belfast University,' which appeared in the *Irish Theological Quarterly*. As their merits are already known to our readers we need do no more than call attention to the fact that they are now available in pamphlet form.

J. F. H.

THE LIFE OF CARDINAL VAUGHAN. By J. G. Snead-Cox. London : Burns and Oates. Two vols. 8vo. 1910.

THROUGH some misadventure the *Life of Cardinal Vaughan* reached us only a few weeks ago, and it is only now we are able to express our opinion of it. The delay is not our fault ; but neither is it the fault of the eminent publishers, who were under the impression that we were amongst the first five or six to whom the work was sent. We have the advantage, at all events, of having read many other criticisms of the work, including the vulgar and offensive criticism of Mr. W. T. Stead. Of the latter we need only say that it is by far the least gentlemanly criticism we have seen. Cardinal Vaughan evidently knew his Stead.

Cardinal Vaughan, whatever may have been his opinions in political matters, was always very popular in Ireland, with the clergy as well as with the laity. He was a big man, with a big, capacious heart, and a hustling sort of honesty that made him a favourite with straightforward and honest people everywhere. Then he had a fine figure and a noble presence, things that are never lost on a race with an eye for beauty. Above all, he was a great and disinterested Churchman. All things considered, he was a man incapable of anything small or petty, and for that reason he had many admirers and friends in every part of the world.

But this biography reveals the late Cardinal in his private and interior life in a light that makes him a far greater and nobler figure than the one with which we had hitherto been acquainted. It is, indeed, one of the most edifying lives of a great ecclesiastic that we have ever come across; and it is only fair to say that it is admirably written, and produced in a form worthy of the subject.

There are many striking and beautiful things in these two volumes; but if we were to choose and pick out what seems to us the most beautiful and striking, it would be the letters written in his early days, during his college life and soon after his ordination, to his father and friends. These letters reveal a great spirit, great in the full Christian sense; great in modesty, great in zeal, great in detachment from the things of this world, great in the desire to sanctify his soul and save the souls of others.

‘What it cost him,’ writes his biographer towards the end of his work, ‘to give up his hopes of distinction in a secular career no one will ever know. That battle had been fought in the long ago, in the Herefordshire hillsides, when he resolved to consecrate himself and his energies and the whole purpose of his life to the service of the Church and the salvation of souls in the Catholic priesthood. The renouncement was complete, and whatever it cost there was never any looking back. If he had ambitious hopes or yearning for the common joys of men such aspirations were resolutely and finally shut away. They were locked up in a cupboard into which he never looked, and stood for a chapter in his life which was closed for ever.’

The systematic determination with which the young man proceeded to regulate himself, to master his natural propensities to curb his pride, to bring his sentiments into subjection, to moderate his desires, is a great lesson. And what a strong,

exuberant, and wilful nature he had to reduce? He had, in the words of his biographer, to 'harness the cataract.' He became humble by grace. He became pious and detached by prayer. He put aside the things of the world, and turned his heart, his mind, and all his energies to the things of heaven.

Herbert Vaughan had thus laid the best foundation on which a Churchman can build. It was always a favourite thought with him that the great things of the Church are done in the power-house, which is the house of prayer, the house of humility, of recollection, of obedience and self-denial. To that thought he clung to the last. It carried him far and carried him successfully through life. He has left it as a precious legacy to those who come after him.

A good deal of the first volume is occupied with the early days of Dr. Vaughan's episcopate at Salford. The part he took in settling the disputed questions between the seculars and regulars, and his relations with Cardinal Manning, are dealt with at considerable length.

The second volume is mainly concerned with Dr. Vaughan as Archbishop and Cardinal. There are still, however, some interesting incidents of his life as Bishop of Salford. Amongst others, the controversy that arose between him and Cardinal Moran as to the burial of his brother's remains in Sydney Cathedral is recalled, and the correspondence that passed between the two prelates is given in full. At least we take it for granted that nothing has been held back. It makes a painful impression.

In the innumerable transactions in which a man in so prominent a position is mixed up it is impossible for us to follow him. We can only note a few of the things that struck us as we moved on. The first of these is the Cardinal's kind, generous, and intelligent attitude towards Lord Acton; the second, his no less kind, but at the same time determined, attitude towards St. George Mivart. For church-builders the chapter on the new Cathedral will have special attractions. A letter from Mr. Longueville, of Llanforda Hall, contains the following:—

'At one time or another many priests have honoured me with visits, but never have I known any priest to spend so much time in the chapel before the Blessed Sacrament as did Cardinal Vaughan. As long as he had that he wanted nothing else. In my humble and uncomfortable little iron chapel, and, like other iron chapels, very hot in summer and very cold in winter, he used literally to spend hours.'

We have neither time nor space to quote the extracts in which Dr. Vaughan's attitude towards Home Rule, towards Irish priests, towards the Irish people, is made plain. There is nothing in it which is not perfectly natural in the best of Englishmen. We need not share it or accept it in all respects, but there is no reason whatever why we should become excited over anything in it. There is one thing certain, that whatever it was it was dictated by a sense of duty and controlled by a kindly, manly, Christian heart. Indeed the author gives several specific instances of the Cardinal's kindness to Irish priests and of his desire to retain their services in the diocese of Westminster.

J. F. H.

THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPÆDIA. Vol. VIII. New York: Robert Appleton; London: Caxton Publishing Co. 1910.

THIS latest volume of *The Catholic Encyclopædia* brings us from 'Infamy' to 'Lapparent.' The editors have now reached mid-ocean, and are steaming ahead unmindful of the breezes and confident of reaching port in safety. We wish them success; and if we have endeavoured to unlock the caverns of Æolus now and again, whilst their ship is on the main, it is not that we want to see them wrecked, but because we wish to see them secure against the storms they may have yet to encounter.

Very important questions are dealt with in this volume—scriptural, liturgical, historical, literary, scientific. A good share of attention is devoted to Italy and Ireland. We notice in the article of Mr. Edmund G. Gardner a sort of liberalism not uncommon amongst Catholics of a certain school; and from what we know of his other works we are not much surprised at his high encomium of Fogazzaro so soon after the condemnation of *Il Santo*.

But we are more concerned with Ireland than we are with Italy. No Catholic Irishman was good enough for the editors to write for them on the subject of 'Irish Literature.' They must get a Protestant to do this work for them. The article is illustrated by about a dozen portraits, and ten of these are Protestants. Amongst them we find the old renegade, Carleton, who lampooned the peasantry from which he sprung, and the clergy and practices of the Church he abandoned. We also find Charles Lever, who, in *Harry Lorrequer*, *Jack Hinton*, and else-

where represented the Catholic clergy as dishonest, immoral, and drunken sots. Dr. Douglas Hyde, the writer of the article, is undoubtedly a liberal-minded man, and has written an interesting work on 'Irish Literature'; but a Catholic Encyclopædia is not supposed to be a nondescript vehicle of thought, to bring Protestant literature to the front and throw Catholic literature in the background. Here we find not a word about Viscount Taaffe, Dr. Curry, Charles O'Connor, Thomas Wyse, or many distinctively Catholic writers of the penal days. In the account of the Gaelic League, not a word, generous or otherwise, of Eugene O'Growney, the Dobrowski of the Gaelic movement. All sorts of nonentities are mentioned; but the genial and kindly priest, who made it, while he lived, a genial and kindly movement, is left in the shade. It was thus that Eugene O'Curry, without whose labours there would be no language movement to-day, was treated in his own time. On the other hand, we get enthusiastic accounts of the 'Abbey Theatre' and its founders and promoters—W. B. Yeats, Lady Gregory, George Russell, Mr. Synge, and George Bernard Shaw. The Catholics who have helped the Abbey Theatre get the treatment they deserve.

Now, we do not, we hope, belong to Swift's category of

'Dull divines, who look with anxious eyes
On every genius that attempts to rise,
And pausing o'er a pipe with doubtful nod,
Give hints that poets ne'er believe in God.'

There are plenty of poets who believe in God, and very many, too, who, although they do not belong to the Catholic Church, have said and written beautiful things of it: but amongst them I do not think there is a single one of the prominent persons mentioned in connexion with the Abbey Theatre. On the contrary, they seem to bear it a continuous grudge, and it looks as if they longed to accomplish by roundabout turning movements what their kindly predecessors failed to accomplish by their frontal charges. They accordingly proceed to rationalize Protestantism, and present it with a new label. It matters not whether the Irish people accept orthodox Protestantism or not, provided they abandon Catholicism or become Catholics on the model of Continental Freemasons.

Mr. W. B. Yeats, the most belauded of the school, has written various poems and dramas, the principal of which are 'The

Countess Kathleen,' 'The Wanderings of Oisín,' and 'The Land of Heart's Desire.' Of the literary form of these works much good may be said. Not so much, however, of their drift and substance.

The 'Countess Kathleen' barter her soul to the 'merchants of hell' in order to obtain money to relieve the famine-stricken peasants. She is none the worse for her love of humanity; for when she dies she passes from 'the gates of pearl to the floors of peace.' Kathleen personifies Erin. Erin would, therefore, do well to barter her faith and her soul for the temporal welfare of her people, and she would be none the worse for the traffic:—

'The Light of Lights

Looks always on the motive not the deed,

The Shadow of Shadows on the deed alone.'

The motive of saving the perishing race is regarded as the highest that can be conceived, far higher and more praiseworthy than any supernatural motive, however pure and sincere.

In 'The Wanderings of Oisín' the pagan hero discusses religion with St. Patrick, and gets the best of the encounter. Here the poet seems imbued with the spirit of Hartmann, who celebrated what he regarded as the courage of the old Danish King Gorm, and commended him for abandoning Christianity:—

'To thy bosom, from this prow
Take me, gently let me die,
What though I a Christian now,
Like a heathen I would die.
Roaring roll the billows black.
Wash away the cross I spurn,
That into the heathen's grave
Unabashed I may return,
Worthy of my comrades brave.
Denmark's ruler, Old King Gorm.'

So, likewise, Oisín says to the 'man of croziers':—

'Put the staff in my hand, for I go to the Fenians, O cleric, to chaunt
The war-songs that roused them of old; they will rise, making clouds with their breath,
Innumerable, singing, exultant; the clay underneath them shall pant,
And demons be broken in pieces, and trampled beneath them in death.

We will tear out the flaming stones, and batter the gateway of
brass,
And enter ; and none sayeth " No " when there enters the
strongly-armed guest.
Make clean as a broom cleans, and march on as oxen move over
young grass.
Then feast, making converse of Eire, of wars, and of old wounds
and rest.'

St. Patrick makes a final effort, only to be finally and definitely
repulsed :—

' On the flaming stones without refuge the limbs of the Fenians
are tost :
None war on the masters of Hell who could break up the world
in their rage ;
But kneel and wear out the flags and pray for your soul that
is lost
Through the demon love of its youth and its godless and
passionate age.'

To which Oisín replies :—

' Ah, me ! to be shaken with coughing and broken with old age
and pain,
Without laughter, a show unto children, alone with remembrance
and fear.
All emptied of purple hours, as a beggar's cloak in the rain,
As a grass seed crushed by a pebble, as a wolf sucked under a
weir.
It were sad to gaze on the blessed and no man loved of old there ;
I throw down the chain of small stones ! when life in my body
has ceased,
I will go to Caolte and Conan, and Bran, Sgeolan, Lomair,
And dwell in the house of the Fenians, be they in flame or in
feast.'

In ' The Land of Heart's Desire ' the contest for a soul is
between Father Hart and the ' faery child,' and here, too, the
' faery child ' is triumphant. The faery child on seeing the
Cross asks Father Hart to ' hide it away,' to ' hide the tortured
thing away ' and ' cover it out of sight and out of mind.' He
yields to the command to the extent of removing it to the next

room. He then proceeds to tell the dying newly-married bride to have courage and hope :—

‘ Be not afraid, the Father is with us,
And all the nine angelic hierarchies,
The Holy Martyrs and the Innocents,
The adoring Magi in their coats of mail,
And He who died and rose on the third day,
And Mary with her seven-times wounded heart.
Cry, daughter, to the Angels and the Saints.’

But the ‘ faery child ’ has a more attractive prospect in store for her :—

‘ You shall go with me, newly-married bride,
And gaze upon a merrier multitude ;
White-armed Nuala, and Ængus of the birds,
And Feacra of the hurtling foam, and him
Who is the ruler of the western host,
Finvarra, and their ‘ Land of Heart’s Desire.’
Where beauty has no ebb, decay no flood,
But joy is wisdom, time an endless song,
I kiss you and the world begins to fade.’

The ‘ faery child ’ carries the day, and then the poet breaks out into a lyrical threnody worthy of a better theme :—

‘ The wind blows out of the gates of the day,
The wind blows over the lonely of heart,
And the lonely of heart is withered away,
While the faeries dance in a place apart,
Shaking their milk-white feet in a ring,
Tossing their milk-white arms in the air,
For they hear the wind laugh and murmur and sing
Of a land where even the old are fair,
And even the wise are merry of tongue.
But I heard a reed of Coolaney say,
“ When the wind has laughed and murmured and sung,
The lonely of heart is withered away.” ’

The ‘ lonely of heart ’ that is ‘ withered away ’ is the Christian and the Catholic.

Such is the pagan spirit of the chief of the school of poets lauded in the *Catholic Encyclopædia*. We may be told that in virtue of our modern liberties Mr. Yeats is entitled to his opinions. But then, in virtue of the same liberties, have we not a right to tell Mephistopheles what we think of him when we meet him ?

Lady Gregory, who is a friend of Mr. Yeats and of Dr. Hyde, has popularized the pagan legends of Erin, a thing quite harmless and even useful in itself ; but when taken in connexion with the work of the Abbey Theatre it looks as if it were part and parcel of a pagan *renaissance*. We are strengthened in this opinion by the words of Mr. Yeats, who has written a preface for Lady Gregory's *Cuchulain of Muirthemne* : 'We Irish,' he writes, 'should keep these personages much in our hearts ; for they lived in the places where we ride and go marketing, and sometimes they have met one another on the hills that cast their shadows on our doors at evening. If we but tell these stories to our children the Land will begin again to be a Holy Land, as it was before men gave their hearts to Greece and Rome and Judea.'

Of Mr. Synge, the author of 'The Riders of the Sea,' and 'The Playboy of the Western World,' we need say nothing more than that he was the originator of a class of plays, which, when transferred from the Abbey Theatre in Dublin to the Court Theatre in London, were described by a critic in the *Pall Mall Gazette* (June 21, 1910) as not remarkable for any wit or humour or genius, but rather as distorted pictures of human nature. As such they were repulsive and disgusting. In many cases they seemed to be nothing more than 'photographs of bestial stupidity and depravity.' The coarseness of the insult they offered to the Catholic peasantry of Ireland was the least of their drawbacks. They were as inartistic as they were offensive.

As for the old Voltairean scoffer, George Bernard Shaw, we are still more shocked at seeing him served up to us in a *Catholic Encyclopædia*. We imagine that there is not before the British and Irish public at the present time a man less suited to the company of Catholics than this clever trifler, with his catch-penny realism and his hopeless grimace.

In his drama on 'John Bull's Other Island' he promises the Irish Catholic clergy a hot time of it when we get Home Rule. Meanwhile he attributes to them in his play the most idiotic superstition, the grossest selfishness and most high-handed tyranny. In 'Man and Superman,' 'Captain Brassbound,' and other plays he combats the fundamental principles of Christian morality, on marriage, on charity, on property, etc., and yet he calls himself an Irish Protestant—a capacious title indeed, and one that, as far as we are concerned, he is quite welcome to.

But then, again, why should a *Catholic Encyclopædia* contribute to his fame and hold him up to the admiration of its readers?

Now we have found fault enough. These people have really no hold on Ireland. They have dazzled some uneducated people at home, and apparently some ignorant persons abroad. That is all. It is owing to them that some few of our Catholic people are calling their children by the pagan names of Fin, Deirdre, and Ferdiad, just as the French atheists call theirs Dumnorix and Vercingetorix—a poor title, we should say, to the commendation of a *Catholic Encyclopædia*.

The article of Mr. D. Moncrieff O'Connor on the 'Irish in Great Britain' is also very defective for a different reason. It is inaccurate and confused.

J. F. H.

DISPUTATIONES THEOLOGICAE, SEU COMMENTARII IN SUMMAM THEOLOGICAM D. THOMAE. Auctore Aliosio-Adulpho Paquet, Sacrae Theologiae Doctore et Professore in Universitate Lavallensi. Rome, Ratisbon, New York, Cincinnati: Frederick Pustet. In parts: 1905, 1906, 1907, 1909.

THE late Pope's deep appreciation of the doctrine and methods of St. Thomas, and the practical encouragement he gave the study of the Saint's writings, have had their effects in various directions. Catholic professors of Philosophy have taken the philosophic system of St. Thomas as the basis of their teaching; the theological courses in many Catholic colleges and universities have been modelled as far as possible on his *Summa*; and many publications have appeared in which Catholic doctrine is defended, and anti-Catholic positions assailed, on principles familiar to every student of the Thomistic school. To the number of the latter the works of Dr. Paquet form, if not the most recent, at least one of the most extensive contributions.

That the principle is correct few will venture to deny. In the bewildering confusion of modern theories, it is well to bring before the public the unchanging principles of Catholic Theology as they have been formulated and defended by one of the greatest of our teachers. They are the touchstone of truth, not merely for the earlier centuries but for our own. Arius and Pelagius and Gothschalk are dead, but it is on the principles which enabled

the Church of the past to repel their attacks that we must rely to combat the errors of the present. But while all that is true, we are sure it never was the Holy Father's intention that commentators should confine themselves to a mere exposition of St. Thomas's teaching or to the refutation of the dead heresies of centuries ago. It was surely his wish that they should adapt the Saint's teaching to the needs and requirements of our own time and apply his principles to the current errors of the day ; in a word, that they should do for their own time what St. Thomas did so well for the Catholic world of his. Principles are not enough : what the ordinary man wants is their scientific practical application. There is little consolation in refuting a Gnostic who is dead and gone, if we are puzzled when confronted with a High Churchman very much alive and full of controversy. We are ready to refute the Gnostic, but we never meet him ; we meet the 'Catholic' Anglican, but are not quite so ready to refute him. And this is, unfortunately, what commentators on the writings of St. Thomas sometimes seem to forget. We rise from a study of their works with an accurate knowledge of every heretic that disturbed the peace of the Church in the early centuries, and of every fallacy that underlay his teaching. But we learn very little of the characteristic teachings of Wesleyans, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, or the other main developments of modern Protestantism.

Then, again, the Catholic world has moved a long way since St. Thomas wrote. Catholic theologians—and it would be sad indeed if things were otherwise—have been very active and have discovered many a truth to which even St. Thomas was a stranger. Within recent times especially a new theological field has been opened up, with the approval of the Holy See, by the Catholic historians of dogma, and Catholic teachers have had their attention called to many points that had perhaps not been sufficiently emphasized by their predecessors. Now all these developments should, we think, be taken into account by anyone who undertakes to give the world a scientific treatment of the doctrine of St. Thomas. The fact that he calls himself merely a commentator will not excuse him from the task. Nor will his disapproval of modern theories justify his silence. Whether accepted by an author or not, these theories are living forces of the present, and have got to be reckoned with. What would be thought of a commentator on Horace who would pass over the various interpretations of a text or the theories based on

the poet's teaching merely on the plea that he thought them incorrect?

In the works of Dr. Paquet we are glad to notice a distinct improvement from this point of view. He applies his principles to modern theories, and is not afraid to criticize a system merely because it dawned on the world within the last century or two. But there is ample room for improvement still. The views of Catholic theologians of early times—not to speak of a number of more or less useless speculations of the Middle Ages—are put before us very clearly, but we are left considerably in doubt as to the attitude we should assume towards many Catholic theories of the present day. Speaking of the Sacraments, for instance, he might, in addition to giving us on the last page a list of condemned modernist propositions, have put before us the conclusions of the historical school, and told us what the principles of St. Thomas had led him to think about them. We find much information on the Macedonians, Sabellians, Marcionites, Ceretians, Manicheans, Priscillianists, and a whole host of early sects—to which we do not object; but very little on the anti-Catholic movements of the day—which is not as it should be. To take an instance. No one who knows anything of modern conditions will be inclined to underrate the importance of Freemasonry. It is regarded by many, and with good reason, as the most formidable enemy the Church has to encounter. It would be reasonable, therefore, to expect that in work written for men who have to take their part in practical life a full explanation should be given of the origin, methods, and aims of the society, and that at least as much emphasis should be laid on its doctrines as on the whimsical fancies of mediæval heretics. Dr. Paquet, unfortunately, merely tells us that its object is to deprive the world of the benefits of Christianity, that it is a secret society, and its doctrine naturalism (*De Repar* p. 337). He quotes the words of the late Pope, but offers no proof of the facts on which the Encyclical was based: and, after devoting twenty lines to the Masons, remarks, 'Haec praelibasseufficiat.' We can only regret it.

Looking, however, at what has been done as distinct from what has been left undone, we must say that, from the scholastic point of view, the work leaves little to be desired. The doctrine all through is based on the *Summa*, and embraces, in the five volumes with which we have been favoured, the Catholic doctrine on the Unity of God, the Trinity, the Creation, the Incarnation,

the Redemption, and the Sacraments (first part). The author exhibits a strong grasp of the subject, and writes in a clear, precise and dignified style. The books, so far as they go, are excellent text-books both for professors to use and students to follow. And if, while not neglecting the theological systems of the past, they did a little more justice to the developments of the present, they would deserve to rank among the most notable contributions to the theological literature of our time.

M. J. O'D.

THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE : Absolutism, Pragmatism, and Realism. By Leslie J. Walker, S.J., M.A. (Stonyhurst Philosophical Series.) London : Longmans, Green & Co. 1910. Pp. xxxix + 696.

THE appearance of this volume may be described as an important event in the history of contemporary philosophy. To the literature of present-day Scholastic Philosophy especially it is a very valuable contribution. Though it appears as a supplementary volume to the 'Stonyhurst Series,' it is quite the reverse of an elementary hand-book. What English-speaking countries want from Scholastic Philosophy is rather a number of critical studies, from the special standpoint of Moderate Realism, on the problems that are being discussed and the solutions that are being offered by existing schools of philosophy other than the scholastic. And the significance of the present volume lies in the fact that it is one of the first studies of this kind offered to English readers—in fact, the very first on the special problem with which it deals. Its value too is enhanced by the fact that the problem it discusses is really *the* great problem of modern philosophy: that of the possibility and limits and value and nature of human knowledge and certitude—the epistemological problem, as it is called.

It is a subject of vast dimensions ; and let us say at once that it is carefully and convincingly treated by the author within the limits he set himself. These limits are sufficiently wide, as a glance at the contents of the book will show. He analyses and compares the three principal theories of knowledge propounded at the present day : Absolutism, Pragmatism, and Realism, the broad outlines of each of which are sketched in the Introduction. He examines the problem of knowledge from the three standpoints of Psychology (200 pp.), Meta-

physics (200 pp.), and Epistemology (260 pp.) successively, in the three parts into which the volume is divided. In each case he aims at expounding the three theories, comparing them with one another, and criticizing Absolutism and Pragmatism from the point of view of Realism. This method inevitably involves the necessity of giving the theories piecemeal, of reiterating the same lines of thought, of writing diffusely, and thereby sacrificing the superior force and cogency of a more concentrated exposition and criticism of either theory. But it is not easy to suggest a better method ; and no one can reasonably quarrel with the diffuseness of the book, for in the Analytical Table of Contents the reader is provided with an excellently clear and full compendium of the teaching developed in every chapter and paragraph.

Naturally it is not a light or easy book to read—with the exception of an occasional chapter—even for students of philosophy. The reader must be prepared to think hard on some of the most abstruse questions that the inquisitive mind of man can raise about itself and its limitations. But he is really helped to think by the author ; and this is no small merit. We have here none of that misty glamour of strange words and that constant straining after novelty of thought by which writers like James and Bradley have brought their systems to a passing vogue. The search here is for truth only, not for originality. The aim is to sift the theorizings of the leading exponents of the Absolutist and Pragmatist theories of knowledge, to translate them into plain language, and to appraise them at their real worth. And in every chapter of the twenty-four we have abundant evidences that the author has completed a most painstaking and extensive study of all the most authoritative literature on his subject ; that he has mastered its contents and provided us with a reliable exposition of its teachings—an intelligible exposition too ; possibly, indeed, more intelligible in some cases than their first author's ambiguous language had made them. Indeed it is not to the original literature, in the first instance, but to the pages of the present volume, we would send the inquiring student for a knowledge of the main lines of thought advocated by the writers here catalogued under the somewhat comprehensive headings of Absolutism and Pragmatism. The former of these two currents is traced from Kant through Hegel, Green, Caird, Bardley, and Bosanquet ; the latter, a reaction against the former, is also traced from Kant's

second *Critique*, through writers of such diverse tendencies as Dewey, Peirce, Schiller, James, Strong, Mach, Avenarius, Simmel, Le Roy, Blondel, Rey. The works of all these are laid under contribution and their leading positions carefully, exhaustively, and judiciously criticized. So, too, are the theories of Poincaré and Duhem—part pragmatist and part realist. The fact that such an extensive output of the most authoritative philosophical literature of recent times is thus passed under review will convey some idea of the importance and utility of the book. The author endeavours, and we think successfully, to put the views of all impartially and to sift what is sound and durable from what is valueless in the theories criticized. The general aim of the concluding chapter is to show that Realism mediates between Absolutism and Pragmatism, embodying the truth that is in them while avoiding their excesses.

Are these modern theories of truth and knowledge worth all the trouble here expended upon them? When one thinks of their extravagances one is tempted to doubt it. But, then, they have undeniably broken new ground, advanced the work of analysing cognition and incidentally brought to light many valuable truths—truths, too, upon which scholastics, defenders of modern Realism, might be slow enough otherwise to stumble. There other theories are in vogue and Realism has got to face them as facts, to take cognizance of them, to fight them—or to utilize them for its own better defence and development. Hence we extend a cordial welcome to the present volume and wish it a wide circulation.

Space forbids us to mention many points of interest on which we should like a little more enlightenment from the author; but they are minor points: to none of his main positions do we take any exception; and we have noted many of his arguments and expositions ably and even admirably elaborated. We will content ourselves, therefore, with the following points as they occurred to us in reading through the volume. Pages 28, 31, 49 leave us doubtful about the meaning of 'sensation.' Page 53: do universal ideas *function*? or sensation (p. 177)? The author seems to hold (pp. 53, 59) that we can think without images. He uses the term 'perception' as apparently including judgment and possible inference (pp. 52, 53, 182, 245); and we do not quite understand his use of the term 'sensation' (cf. p. 178). Pages 76 sqq. contain some good criticism of the anti-psychologist Kantism. Some misprints: p. 77, Vailinger; p. 247, *by* for *to*

in first sentence ; p. 311, 'The oscillations . . . is' (?) ; p. 391 *passivus* (intellectus) ; p. 328, last sentence somewhat obscure, and, with p. 345, leaves us in doubt about Dr. Schiller's position in reference to Kant. An important question is the distinction of subject and object GIVEN (not merely *implied*) in all sentient experience (?) treated at pp. 109, 110, 118, 121, 174 ff., 178 (cf. p. 343) ; the latter pages contain an excellent appreciation and criticism of Professor Strong's writings on Realism. Page 144, first sentence obscure ; Professor Dewey's whole *Experimental Theory of Knowledge*, ably criticized in these pages, is a gem in its way (cf. p. 140). In a remarkable passage on Professor Mackenzie's Idealism (pp. 344, 345) the author implies that if all things are spiritual, interaction is more mysterious than if some things are material : how so ? Pages 349, 350, dependence of the universe on God implies real distinction of universe from God : does Absolutism admit such distinction ?—we could wish for more light on the nature of this latter ; p. 353, 'Quantity is the most imperfect of all accidents' : why ? The chapters (XIII-XV) on 'the metaphysics of scholastic Realism' appear to us to cover too much ground in too synoptical a fashion. Pages 351, 373, the description of substance as a 'unity of ground amid structural differences'—what would that be in the language of the scholastics ? The author's handling of the scholastic 'correspondence' or 'copy' view of truth (cf. pp. 378, 388, 393, 622, 623), though on the right lines, is perhaps lacking in fullness. On p. 623 he rightly rejects as absurd the comparison (of copy with type) that would involve a sort of 'miraculous second-sight' ; but on page 378 he seems to claim a little of this latter—a 'very little'—when he says of objective qualities that we do 'know very little about them' : do we know anything about them in the sense of the context referred to ? Page 379, the *species impressa* (in sense perception) is identified with 'the nervous processes that are the immediate antecedents or physiological conditions of sensation and perception.' But the scholastics distinguished the *species sensibilis impressa* as a psychical process from the *immutatio corporalis* of the sense organ as a physiological antecedent. Page 387 contains observations we fail to understand on a possible fourth dimension of space. Pages 400-418, excellent pages on ultimate intellectual notions. Page 433, third last sentence obscure. Chapters XVII and XVIII, on Physical Science as treated by Pragmatism and by Realism, are of very special interest and importance. They are good,

too ; but their domain is as yet practically unexplored by scholastics.

The book is very clearly printed, and is in every way a creditable contribution to the literature of modern Scholastic Philosophy.

P. C.

HISTORY OF IRELAND FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY. By the Rev. E. A. D'Alton, LL.D., M.R.I.A. Three vols. in six. London: Gresham Publishing Co. 1910.

Two out of these three volumes have been already noticed in our pages, and have been highly recommended for their clear and unusually attractive style. The third volume, to which we shall now confine our attention, brings Dr. D'Alton's work down to date, and finishes what must be regarded as a work of great research and persevering industry. The labour alone of reading so many works of reference, even though they were only scanned in cursory fashion, must have been immense, and Dr. D'Alton is to be congratulated on having finished so laborious a task.

On reading in recent years works like Mr. Davitt's *Fall of Feudalism in Ireland*, O'Leary's *Recollections*, Gavan Duffy's *Autobiography*, Sheehy Skeffington's *Life of Davitt*, Barry O'Brien's *Life of Parnell*, T. P. O'Connor's *Parnellite Movement*, Herbert Paul's *History of Modern England*, William O'Brien's *Recollections*, we often felt that it was high time for the clergy to wake up, that their history was being written in many cases by people who are not their friends, and that if they refrained much longer from presenting their version of affairs the verdict would go against them. It was with satisfaction, therefore, that we heard that Dr. D'Alton was bringing his *History* down to date. We are glad he has done so ; for even though his work is unequal, and in many respects imperfect, it will be easy for himself or others to improve upon it later on.

Of the third volume as of the preceding ones it may be said that the style is clear and attractive, and that the work has involved a great deal of conscientious reading. We fear, however, that we cannot allow it to pass unscathed. There is a tone of journalism running through the last volume which we dislike very much in a history. Persons and events are

appreciated according to certain models which have never much commended themselves to our admiration. It looks as if the historian were making a bid for the approval and laudation of certain men and certain organs. It may not be so, of course, and our impression may not be justified ; but it is there, and we cannot get rid of it.

One might expect from a historian, who is at the same time an ecclesiastic, a little more consideration for those who were the heads of his own Church in Ireland in their day. Cardinal Cullen fares badly at his hands. He seems to find it impossible that an honourable and straightforward man who is not the tool of somebody should adopt any policy except that which is cut out for him by the popular politicians of his day. He is even still more severe on Dr. M'Evilly. Writing of the late Archbishop's intervention with the Government on behalf of Myles Joyce, who was sentenced to death, he says :—

' Dr. M'Evilly, who then demanded an inquiry, had special claims on the Government. The son of a farmer, he had no popular sympathies, and had opposed the Land League and National League, and disliked priests who were members of either organization. With less culture than Dr. Troy, he was an equally strong supporter of the Government, and had got offices for some of his friends ' (vol. iii., p. 309).

Even if the statements in this paragraph were true there were evident reasons why they should not be formulated so harshly by the author ; but we believe that they are profoundly untrue in substance and absolutely unjustifiable. To say that Dr. M'Evilly had no popular sympathies is to say what those who knew him best believe to be false. Criticism of this kind might in any case be left to persons whom it befits. We can only regret that it finds a place in the work of Dr. D'Alton.

Dr. D'Alton's review of recent Irish literature is not very critical nor very original. He is too fond of following the lead of superficial persons. Of Maynooth and its professors he writes :—

' Within the walls of Maynooth there has always been plenty of talent, and yet the number of Maynooth men who have become authors is but small. Busily engaged at class work, the professors have little leisure for literary work, and when they have written it is on purely professional subjects. The

Irish bishops have often more leisure ; but few of them have had literary tastes.'

We may be thankful that we got off better than the bishops.

In spite of these defects we must, in justice, say, however, that Dr. D'Alton has given us the framework of an excellent history ; and that the defective parts of his picture may still be retouched and improved without injury or disturbance to the work as a whole.


J. F. H.

CHIESA E STATO. By Sac. Prof. Felice M. Capello, Dott. in Teologia, Filosofia, Diritto Canonico e Civile. Rome : Ferrari. 1910.

THIS is a clear and reliable exposition of the principles and application of Public Ecclesiastical Law. The author, who has already proved himself to be a writer of merit on juridical and theological topics, displays in the present work a wider acquaintance with the literature of his subject than most writers who have gone before him, not only as far as the works of ecclesiastical writers are concerned, but also as regards the writings of eminent lawyers inside and outside the Church, of every shade of thought and of almost every nationality. His knowledge of the jurists of his own country in particular is very thorough, and is put to the best account in propounding the rights of the Holy See and in explaining the actual relations between Church and State in Italy. Also his treatment of the present situation in France is very satisfactory. Other countries, though referred to, receive less attention, which we think is a pity, even though, as is evidently the case, the author writes only for Italians. The work is divided into three parts: the first dealing with the nature and constitution of the Church according to the Divine Law and the *Jus Gentium*; the second, with the State and its rights and obligations according to the natural law; while the third part considers the mutual relations of Church and State. The question of the separation of Church and State is treated in an exhaustive and masterly manner—the work is well worth having for the treatment of this question alone. The author's principles are always sound and orthodox, but in their application he seems to have Italy mostly in view; also in his review of hostile theories it is almost exclusively Italian lawyers and statesmen he singles out for refutation. This, however, does not prevent the work

from being a valuable addition to the literature of Public Law. From no other manual of the same compass with which we are acquainted can such clear and satisfactory notions be obtained on a subject of vital importance in itself and of peculiarly engrossing interest in our day. The author combines the stringent logic of Tarquini with the learned diffuseness of Cavagnis, being perhaps more detailed and more concrete than either in his application of principles to modern social developments—particularly in Italy.

M. G. C.



IS THE 'ETHER' AN HYPOTHESIS?

ANYONE who follows the progress of modern scientific thought must be impressed by the fact that the advances made in the more practical applications of physics and chemistry have in no way lessened the interest shown in the metaphysical aspect of these subjects. Hardly a volume of 'proceedings' is published but has frequent references to the philosophic attitude of mind with which these studies should be pursued. The typical example is the question of the 'ether,' that ubiquitous substance so intangible and yet so real. At the same time, now and then one reads a sentence which suggests the advisability of giving up all thought of it as a real substance. The difficulties encountered are so great, and the apparent contradictions to be reconciled so many and so serious, that, in a kind of despair, some are tempted to become scientific heretics, and deny its existence altogether. The object of this sketch is to consider a few of the reasons which make it necessary to admit the reality of the ether, and to state the proof which seems most satisfactory on philosophic grounds.

In the purely mathematical way of looking at natural phenomena it does not matter whether the ideas involved present apparent contradictions or not. So long as the numerical relationships between the various phenomena of nature can be expressed in equations the mathematician is content. He would say that there is no need to seek for a

material representation of the physical realities which are at the basis of all material interactions ; we can never hope to represent to ourselves the physical nature of these operations, since there is no evidence that the laws of what we may call 'elementary' interactions are at all similar to those we are acquainted with in ordinary life. This way of looking at things may be best seen in such writings as those of Professor H. Poincaré of the University of Paris, who thus states his view :—

Peu nous importe que l'éther existe réellement, c'est l'affaire des métaphysiciens ; l'essentiel pour nous c'est que tout se passe comme s'il existait et que cette hypothèse est commode pour l'explication des phénomènes.¹

On the other hand, the 'physical' attitude of mind would seek as far as possible to represent to itself, as in a model, the actual workings of primal matter. The pure physicist—including in this title mathematicians who deal largely in experimental science—would not evidently expect to arrive at a complete mechanical interpretation of the hidden forces of nature. He would, however, resist any attempt to set a limit to the extent to which he might push back his researches. He would declare that though the horizon of physical discovery would always remain unattainable, yet it is only by striving to reach the unknown that it is possible to make progress in the knowledge of nature. He would not be content with any 'explanation' which would involve a contradiction according to our ordinary way of looking at things, and would look on any mathematical expression as incomplete which was not based on the ordinary laws of logic and reason. It is evident that for such the real existence of the ether is not a matter of indifference. In the first place we shall consider some of the extrinsic evidence of this belief in the existence of the ether, not as an hypothesis, but as a reality.

The following passage states very clearly the issue

¹ *La Science et l'Hypothèse*, 1908, p. 245.

involved, and will serve to indicate the point of view adopted here :—

There is at present no theory of Optics in the sense that the elastic solid theory was accepted fifty years ago. We have abandoned that theory, and learned that the undulations of light are electromagnetic waves differing only in linear dimensions from the disturbances which are generated by oscillating electric currents or moving magnets. But so long as the character of the displacements which constitute the waves remains undefined we cannot pretend to have established a theory of light. This limitation of our knowledge, in one sense a retrogression from the philosophic standpoint of the founders of the undulatory theory, is not always sufficiently recognized and is sometimes deliberately ignored. Those who believe in the possibility of a mechanical conception of the universe and are not willing to abandon the methods which from the time of Galileo and Newton have uniformly and exclusively led to success, must look with the gravest concern on a growing school of scientific thought which rests content with equations correctly representing numerical relationships between different phenomena, even though no precise meaning can be attached to the symbols used. The fact that this evasive school of philosophy has received some countenance from the writings of Heinrich Hertz renders it all the more necessary that it should be treated seriously and resisted strenuously. . . . The study of Physics must be based on a knowledge of Mechanics, and the problem of light will only be solved when we can discover the mechanical properties of the aether.¹

In his Address to the British Association at the Cambridge meeting of 1904, Mr. A. J. Balfour made a statement in which he practically asserted his belief in the reality of 'action at a distance,' which of course dispenses with any medium such as the ether. Newton had written to Bentley the passage so often quoted afterwards :—

It is inconceivable that inanimate matter should, without the aid of something else, which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact. . . . That gravity

¹ A. Schuster, F.R.S., *Introduction to the Theory of Optics*. 1904. Preface.

should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body can act on another, at a distance, through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity, that I believe no one, who in philosophical matters has a competent faculty of thinking, can ever fall into it.

Of this passage Mill wrote :—

This passage should be hung up in the cabinet of every cultivator of science who is ever tempted to pronounce a fact impossible because it seems to him inconceivable. . . . No one now feels any difficulty in conceiving gravity to be, as much as any other property is, inherent and essential to matter, nor finds the comprehension of it facilitated in the slightest degree by the supposition of an ether, nor thinks it at all incredible that the celestial bodies can and do act where they in actual bodily presence are not.

Whether the assertion of Mill on such questions is of more value than that of Newton is, of course, a matter of opinion.

It was with reference to the passage just cited that Mr. Balfour made the following remarks :—

John Mill, if I remember rightly, was contemptuous of those who saw any difficulty in accepting the doctrine of ‘action at a distance.’ So far as observation and experiment can tell us, bodies *do* actually influence each other at a distance. And why should they not? Why seek to go behind experience in obedience to some *a priori* sentiment for which no argument can be adduced. So reasoned Mill, and to that reason I have no reply.

The speaker admitted, however, that this view was not shared by scientists: ‘. . . physicists, however baffled in the quest for an explanation of gravity, refuse altogether to content themselves with the belief, so satisfying to Mill, that it is a simple and inexplicable property of masses acting on each other across space.’ We shall see that the distinguished philosopher was hardly accurate in supposing that the grounds on which physicists—and metaphysicians—assert the reality of the ether are purely *a priori*.

Modern physicists generally insist on the necessity of an ether, even though they do not profess to be able to describe it. Lord Kelvin, in his *Baltimore Lectures*, said: 'A real matter between us and the remotest stars I believe there is, and that light consists of real motions of that matter, motions just such as are described by Fresnel and Young, motions in the way of transverse vibrations.' Perhaps the most recent assertion of the objective existence of an ether is to be found in the Inaugural Address by Sir J. J. Thomson at the Winnipeg meeting of the British Association in 1909, where we read:—

The aether is not a fantastic creation of the speculative philosopher; it is as essential to us as the air we breathe. For we must remember that we on this earth are not living on our resources; we are dependent from minute to minute upon what we are getting from the sun, and the gifts of the sun are conveyed to us by the aether. It is to the sun that we owe, not merely night and day, springtime and harvest, but it is the energy of the sun, stored up in coal, in waterfalls, in food, that practically does all the work of the world. . . . The study of this all-pervading substance is perhaps the most fascinating and important duty of the physicist.

The opening paragraph of Sir Oliver Lodge's *Modern Views of Electricity* (1907) is:—

The most interesting and important portion of physics at the present day is that constantly growing portion which is concerned with the properties and function of the universal connecting medium, the 'ether.' All phenomena of light, of electricity, and of magnetism, as well as what is spoken of as radiant heat, are intimately connected with, and indeed wholly dependent on, that medium; it is through these agencies that we have gradually become aware of its existence, and able in some degree to investigate it. Probably gravitation, cohesion, and chemical affinity are no less closely associated with the ether; and it is becoming doubtful whether matter itself could exist without it.

Other writers are even stronger in their demand for an ether. In the most modern views matter is nothing else than modified ether. Others, again, would say that *certainly*

gravity is 'propagated' by and through the ether. Even those writers who are satisfied with the mathematical conception would admit the advantage of treating it as a real substance :—

At the same time all that is known, or, perhaps, need be known, of the ether itself may be formulated as a scheme of differential equations defining the properties of a continuum in space, which it would be gratuitous to further explain by any complication of structure, though we can with great advantage employ our stock of ordinary dynamical concepts in describing the succession of different states thereby defined.¹

The view, however, which we insist on here is that the ether is a very real material substance, and perhaps there has been enough to show that such is the opinion, or rather persuasion, of physicists at the present day.

The doctrine of 'action at a distance' is the logical result of the exclusion of a medium. There are only three ways in which we can conceive the action of one body on another with which it is not in contact ; and here it may be convenient to look on all physical actions as being ultimately reducible to a 'push.' Sometimes when a boy's ball falls into the water, and has been carried out some distance before its loss is noticed, the efforts of the on-lookers to recover it are various, and serve to illustrate the point under consideration. Some from the opposite side, of the canal or river, let us suppose, throw stones at it, and a good shot has the satisfaction of seeing that at each hit he sends it nearer the bank. Others instead of endeavouring to hit it content themselves with dropping in stones, just outside, so that the waves thus formed may help it in. Again, when it gets near the owner pulls it towards him with a stick or umbrella. These methods are examples of the only ways we can conceive an influence being exerted by an agent on a body situated at a distance. In all these cases the action is transmitted across the intervening distance by means of a medium. The old corpuscular theory of light supposed light to consist of particles shot out

¹ Larmor, *Aether and Matter*, p. 78.

from the luminous source, some of which struck the body illuminated. The wave theories of light and sound are exemplified by the second example, while the most modern theory of light may be compared to both examples combined. It is clear that there is no question of action at a distance in these cases, for that system is defined thus: 'Action at a distance takes place when one body acts on another which is locally distant from it, when the action of the former is transferred to the latter without the intervention of any substance by means of and through which the energy is conveyed.'

Thus defined the question is perfectly determined. 'Action at a distance' implies that the energy disappears from one body and appears in the other without having been located in any third body in the meantime. In the case of projectiles the energy is evidently in the moving particles. In the case of a medium such as air, water, or the ether the energy is in the medium in the space between the two bodies. To quote Professor Thomson's words from the Address already cited:—

This energy, in the interval [of time] between its departure from the sun and its arrival at the earth, must be in the space between them. Thus this space must contain something which, like ordinary matter, can store up energy, which can carry at an enormous pace the energy associated with light and heat, and can, in addition, exert the enormous stresses necessary to keep the earth circling round the sun, and the moon round the earth.

This statement may be taken as the general reason for admitting the presence of a medium. It is founded on our ordinary conceptions of action and reaction, but it is not the only proof of the existence of a medium, nor the strongest one. This view requires at least that there should be some time interval between the departure of the energy from one body and its reappearance in the other. This has never been *proved* in the case of gravitation, and thus a proof based on the above consideration would not be convincing. It is well to bear in mind that the reasons usually given, on

astronomical grounds, for declaring that the 'velocity' of gravitation must be far greater than that of light are not now looked on as above suspicion. For a stringent proof we must go to our conceptions of an agent, and of the idea expressed by the word 'distance.'

The question is not exactly whether 'action at a distance' is impossible or not, but rather whether we have in nature any known case of such action. At the same time, as will appear, the reasonable deduction from the argument here used is that such action is impossible. We may take as our example the force of gravitation, which is often given as an example of this very 'action at a distance.' In the case of all such actions as that of light and sound, magnetism and electricity, it is always found that the intensity of the action is inversely proportional to the square of the distance between the bodies. In the case of light, for example, if the illuminated body be three feet from the source of light, the intensity of the illumination at each point of the surface will be one-ninth of what it would be if only one foot distant. The same rule holds good also in the case of the force of gravity. In general, therefore, in all known cases of the influence exerted by an agent on a second body, this law is found to be observed: 'The intensity of the action varies according as the distance between the two bodies changes.' It is on this fact that the negation of 'action at a distance' is based.

If the action were directly transferred from say A to B, this law could not be observed. In such circumstances the mere magnitude of the distance between the two bodies could produce no change in its intensity. *Distance* is simply a relationship founded on two positions, and does no more than refer the location, or 'whereabouts,' of one body with respect to another. If either of the two bodies were to cease to exist the other would suffer no change in its properties. So, too, the mere linear distance between them can have no effect on the capability of being acted on or of exerting activity. The same amount of action would be received by a body acted on whether it were an inch or a mile from the origin of the action. Therefore in

the case of 'action at a distance' the intensity of one body's influence on another would be constant, and would not change with the distance. Neither could any change in the distance between the bodies modify in any way the intensity of the force exerted by the agent. Such agents are 'necessary agents,' and will therefore always act with their full activity no matter where the body effected by their action may be situated. Therefore, since neither the amount of influence exerted *by* the agent, or the amount of action exerted *on* the second body, can be modified by mere distance, it follows that in the case of 'action at a distance' the intensity of the action would not vary with the distance. But in the case of gravitation the action does vary with the distance. Therefore in the case of gravity the action is not at a distance.

This proof seems stringent. It would not be a serious objection to urge that perhaps the very nature of action is to vary with the distance. We can conceive no such property of matter. Unless one body were to have some means of communicating with the other to indicate its position it is not easy to form any idea of how the positions of the two bodies could have any influence on the intensity of the action exerted between them. Indeed any such mode of action would seem to imply an intelligent being actually engaged in modifying the intensity of the action as the distance varied! But that introduces an element which the ordinary operation of natural laws does not demand—except, indeed, in a deeper and wider sense than need be considered here.

If, then, there is no direct action exerted by one body on another by means of 'action at a distance,' it remains to examine how the agent can transmit its action to the body affected by that activity. In the first place it is not true to say that the only other alternative is to admit a permanent connexion between the two bodies. In the ordinary way of considering the propagation of sound-waves through a gas we look on the latter as made up of a multitude of small atoms or molecules, not always in contact, but constantly colliding, and thus handing on

motion—and momentum—from one to another. In the same way we might suppose gravity to be due to wave motion in some such medium. As a matter of fact, the generally-received theory does not admit any discontinuity—except, perhaps, of local motion—in the ether, but that does not concern us here. In an article published elsewhere¹ the writer has described a theory of gravitation in which the effects of attraction are attributed to a wave pressure, pressing the bodies towards each other. In fact it is the theory of Le Sage, in which the bombarding particles are replaced by ether waves of a special type. This view is founded on the conclusions and experiments of Clerk Maxwell and other authorities. It is clear that in these or on other medium theories the energy transmitted from the agent is in the medium while on its way from one to the other. This means that the ‘action,’ instead of passing at once to the body influenced by it, is distributed through space, so that in each unit volume the amount of energy present decreases as its distance from the source increases. According to the experimental results for light, gravity, and all such actions, the law of distribution is that the intensity of the action is inversely proportional to the square of the distance. Such a law satisfies all the requirements of transmission through a medium.

Such are the grounds for the two conclusions here arrived at. In the first place there is no action at a distance in the case of natural phenomena, and in the second place the only way of accounting for the results of actual observation is by supposing the energy passing from one body to another to be distributed through the space surrounding both bodies according to a definite law. This demands a something in which this energy resides and through which it is propagated. That substance is the *ether*.

It may be said that we have no experimental knowledge of what goes on in inter-atomic reactions. But the same kind of argumentation may be applied to this case. After all, if the principles just stated are sound they must apply

¹ *New Ireland Review*, August, 1907

to atomic and molecular distances as well as to greater distances. If there were 'action at a distance' in the case of inter-atomic reactions it is not clear why it should be necessary to bring chemical elements into closer juxtaposition before they will act on each other. A piece of sodium would not need to be placed *on* the surface of water in order that it might produce a flame. In fact there would be chemical action between them always! This is perhaps a crude way of stating the fact, but it would seem to be correct.

In this paper we have regarded bodies as necessary agents, and have confined our consideration to merely natural material reactions; the other questions in which it is necessary to consider the possibility of action 'at a distance' involve other considerations, though an argument against the *possibility* of such kind of action has been deduced from the proof of its actual non-existence in the case of all the phenomena with which we are acquainted.

Granting that we have proved that the action between a falling body and the earth is *not* 'at a distance,' we may fairly ask why this is so. As far as our intellect can tell us this absence of action is not due to any change brought about in the earth or the stone by their mere positions. Neither does there seem to be anything special in the kind of activities here considered which of itself would make the absence of such action specially suitable for them. In fact we can assign no reason why there should not be 'action at a distance' in their case. According to the laws of 'least action' and the 'path of least resistance,' we should certainly expect the action in these cases to be 'at a distance,' if that were possible. Since, therefore, we can find nothing in these special kinds of activity which affords a reason why the action is not 'action at a distance,' we are justified in concluding that the reason is because that kind of action between bodies is contrary to the nature of action in itself. But if so, 'action at a distance' can never occur: it is impossible.

We do not purpose to deal with any difficulties which might be urged against this conclusion. Enough has been said to prove that those who are so explicit in their demand

for an ether have good grounds for doing so. The ether is not an hypothesis : it is a necessary substance. The descriptions given by scientists are of course but hypothetical and tentative ; but the inability to describe the nature of any existing entity does not involve any inability to state definitely that *some entity* exists possessing the requisite qualities. Any other attitude of mind would, if applied to other matters, involve consequences of far greater moment than those connected with the ether or any other material substance.

Such, in very imperfect outline, are some of the grounds which science affords for the assertion of the existence of a medium which conveys action from one body to another. Nor would it seem that Mr. Balfour was perfectly accurate when he stated that ‘“ action at a distance ”’ was denied in obedience to some *a priori* sentiment for which no argument can be adduced.’

H. V. GILL.

ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE—I

THE title of this paper may seem at first sight to suggest a claim to a certain prophetic insight to which in reality it makes no pretensions. It is a familiar truth that, while the problems of philosophy remain in bold outline unchanged, the focus of human interest is ever inconstantly shifting, that problems once central cease to interest, and that old-time questions are re-shaped in the light of new principles and new methods. To accurately estimate the course of speculation, to strike out the tendency of thought in so complex a subject as Ethics is, therefore, a task that demands a very nice discretion. Ethical problems are so varied and multiform, the emphasis of passing interest depends upon so many delicately changing factors, social and traditional as well as logical, and finally the outlook of the individual thinker is so apt to be influenced by his own particular theories, that it is no easy matter to arrive at a just conclusion even about contemporary speculation. Moreover, ethical thought is not fixed and static; it is something constantly yet almost imperceptibly changing, subject occasionally to sudden revolution, and always to a steady growth most difficult to fix just because we participate in it. These difficulties are intensified if we rashly endeavour to lift the veil of the future and determine the problems that await us.

Happily, however, the problems of the future are not altogether *future* problems: they have their roots in the present; we may trace them in the stress and strain of present theories, still better in the gradual evolution of ethical thought over a lengthened period. It must be admitted that often they seem to spring up capriciously; and undoubtedly no calculus can be flexible enough to measure and anticipate the path of individual genius. But it is equally true that all speculation, whether true or false,

tends to follow a certain logical course of development, and in so far can be foreseen and calculated upon.

Nor can it be denied that our standpoint gives us peculiar advantages in thus estimating the course of speculation, for the Scholastic is not so intimately involved in the passing stream of thought ; he is to some extent outside the course of this ethical evolution, not in the sense that he is uninfluenced by it, but that it leaves him in fundamental matters unchanged.

That the problem here suggested is one of rare interest need scarcely be urged. Moral philosophy touches life at so many points, its problems have such a deep meaning and significance, and its conclusions are fraught with such mighty issues, that it is a matter of no little moment to notice the gradual but inevitable tendency of thought towards a view which denies the validity of all fundamental ethical notions and the sanctity of the moral law itself. Nor can we doubt that for the logical mind the best way to avoid intellectual error is to be intimately acquainted with its details, and to judge them in the light of the truth. The present paper, then, proposes to trace certain tendencies in recent ethical theories. It is confined, not, I hope, arbitrarily, to two problems, which seem to be attaining prominence and pressing for solution, and which are destined, as I think, to become still more urgent in the future.

It will be necessary for my purpose to follow out in some detail the course of English ethical speculation in the last century, since, whatever may be thought of its intrinsic value, its actual historical influence has been very considerable ; it has become inseparably interwoven in the literature with which we are most familiar ; it meets us on every side not merely in recognized ethical studies, but in political tracts and pamphlets, in the writings of the social reformer, in manuals of popular science, and even in magazines and novels. We live in an atmosphere permeated with these ethical theories ; through long custom they have gained an aspect of familiarity, so that it becomes a task of some difficulty to justly estimate the subtle changes they introduce into the meaning and scope of ethical notions.

Their most essential element of logical danger arises from the fact that they seem harmless. That theories whose purpose it is to furnish a basis for morality should tend at the same time to undermine it seems a far-fetched notion. And yet if we carefully trace the history of the utilitarian and evolutionary ethics of the last century we shall find a gradual change, whose importance cannot be over-estimated, not merely in the fundamental ethical conceptions such as 'duty,' 'obligation,' and the rest, but also in their view of the moral code that seems justified upon their ethical criteria.

It is true that at first no such change of meaning is consciously faced ; it remains embedded in the logical structure of the systems, visible, if at all, only to the eye of criticism. The gradual emergence of these logical implications in the light of a keener analysis is the slow work of time. This furnishes the problem of the present paper. Its purpose is two-fold : in the first place, it aims at showing how these ethical theories introduce such a fundamental change into the meaning of our ethical notions as would seem to imply the negation of ethics altogether, or to reduce it to a moral psychology. The growing, yet ever hesitating, consciousness of this change is admirably illustrated in the history of English ethics during the last century. In the second place, it will endeavour to trace the important influence which the logical application of hedonistic and evolutionistic criteria inevitably has upon our conception of the moral law—an influence far more subtle and, for obvious reasons, more difficult to define.

The central defect of English ethical systems from the logical point of view has generally been their tendency towards a certain limited, undefined orthodoxy. This may appear at first sight paradoxical. Orthodoxy is in itself admirable, symptomatic as it is, when conscious, of that strength of mind and steadiness of intellectual outlook that is not 'blown about by every little wind of doctrine.' But this undefined orthodoxy is apt at times to be merely a survival, a tradition, loosely intertwined with so-called advanced speculations with which it is in reality incompatible.

It is to something of this sort that Leslie Stephen refers when, in speaking of John Stuart Mill's posthumous work on Theism, he tells us, with refreshing naïveté for a philosopher, of Mill's pathetic tendency for finding some germ of truth in outworn creeds and dogmas! ¹ Orthodoxy of this particular type requires careful definition. It is not orthodoxy as generally understood; rather it is an effort to incorporate into new modes of thinking and new theories of reality and of life some of the old-time conceptions that have gathered in the course of ages a certain prestige and dignity—an attempt to retain the driving force, the compelling power, that these conceptions for one reason or another have over the human mind. Such notions as 'duty,' or 'obligation,' or 'sanction,' or 'the moral law,' come to us weighted with a wealth of traditional association, not, so to speak, as ordinary candidates for admission upon their merits into a logical schema of the universe, but as categories involved in the very fibres of our intellectual being and seemingly indispensable to our thinking. It is not easy for a philosopher, however radical his tendency, to shake himself free from the influence of these notions, and although there is a certain delightful intoxication of mind in discarding all that men have held valuable hitherto (a psychological symptom clearly traceable, for example, in Nietzsche), it is an intoxication of mind with grave compensating disadvantages.

This intermingling of orthodoxy, then, in English ethical theories I take to be their fundamental logical defect, and this I shall proceed to illustrate. On the one hand (as I have already hinted) it displays itself in their treatment of the central ethical conceptions, and on the other in their view of the moral law. It is scarcely necessary to point out that moral theories as a rule accept the recognized moral law simply as a fact. The determination of the content of morality or the precise path of duty is not the central point of their problem: rather they endeavour 'to slip in a foundation' under the moral code, to formulate a theory

¹ Leslie Stephen, *English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. i. p. 311.

which will explain and justify it. There is more than mere paradox in the remark of Nietzsche: 'That which philosophers called "giving a basis to morality," and endeavoured to realize, has, when seen in a right light, been merely a learned form of good faith in prevailing morality, a new means of its expression.'¹ Even when the proposed 'basis' has seemed subversive of the 'prevailing morality' and of the essential meaning of duty, we find little trace that this antagonism has been keenly realized, little effort to show by argument that the theory will justify the details of common moral practice. The moral law has been accepted by most English ethical writers, whatever their theory, *in globo*—an example, it might seem, of philosophical heroism, were it not for the *arrière-pensée* (unconscious, let us hope) that theories more easily make their way when they do not depart too violently from traditional views.

I can fancy students intimate with the *Deontology or the Science of Morality* of Jeremy Bentham (their number, such are the chances of time, is scarcely legion) referring to that work to demonstrate that the founder of the 'greatest happiness theory,' in so far as this work can be said to represent him, was sufficiently radical in his view of duty and obligation to satisfy the most exacting taste. He would sweep away the chief concepts of morality as meaningless terms and empty verbiage. 'It is, in fact,' he tells us, 'very idle to talk about duties; the word itself has in it something disagreeable and repulsive, and talk about it as we may, the word will not become a rule of conduct.'²

This, indeed, seems strong enough, but worse is to follow; for those who have been wont to reverence the *Summum Bonum* will be horrified when they hear, on the authority of Bentham, the nature of the idol they have worshipped: 'The *Summum Bonum*, in what does it consist? What does the term signify? Nonsense and nothing more.'³ And if conscience seems to us 'a light to guide' and virtue

¹ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 186.

² *Deontology*, etc., p. 10.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

an ideal, we are informed that 'conscience is a thing of fictitious existence, supposed to occupy a seat in the mind,'¹ and 'virtue is a fictitious entity growing out of the imperfection of language.'² Such expressions are common in the *Deontology*, but Bentham's general position might easily be misconceived by one who would insist too much upon such occasional utterances. The claim, indeed, of the *Deontology*, which is in the main the work of Bowring on the basis, as he tells us, of Bentham's notes, to rank as an authoritative exposition of ethical Benthamism was denied altogether by the Mill. And, in addition, Bentham was apt to express his views in a rather exaggerated form, so that one almost inevitably thinks of him as answering to his own description of the traditional moral philosopher: 'A man, a moralist, [who] gets into an elbow-chair, and pours forth pompous dogmatisms about duty.'³

His lack of humour (a trait which he shares with Spencer) and his intense narrowmindedness are at times not a little entertaining. He tells us, for example, that 'Prose is when all the lines except the last go on to the margin. Poetry is when some of them fall short of it'⁴—an expression of opinion which may perhaps be pardoned him in view of the fact that even nowadays, when in literary matters everyone 'assumes a virtue' if he 'knows it not,' similar sentiments may occasionally be met with. But what is to be thought of the following:—

A man thinks not so highly of Plato as he deserves. What is the consequence? Nothing. A man thinks more highly of Plato than he deserves. What is the consequence? He goes and reads him. He tortures his brain to find meaning where there is none. He moves heaven and earth to understand a writer who did not understand himself, and he crawls out of that mass of crudities with a spirit broken by disappointment and humiliations. He has learned that falsehood is truth, and nonsense is sublimity.⁵

¹ *Deontology*, etc., p. 137.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 138, 139.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁴ *Works*, x., p. 442.

⁵ *Deontology*, etc., p. 281.

After this one is not surprised to find that the Benthamite Utopia is something after the manner of a 'Panopticon': 'A whole kingdom, the great globe itself, will become a gymnasium, in which every man exercises himself before the eyes of every other man.'¹ Surely a 'consummation devoutly to be wished'!

Historical Benthamism, however, is something quite different from what these quotations might lead us to expect. Ultimately it is rather a reinterpretation of ethical concepts than their complete rejection. It is to the old-time intuitive view Bentham raises objection, but to the pursuit of the 'general happiness' he would have urged a manifest obligation. His ethical theory never shaped itself into systematic form; his excursions into this field were upon the whole spasmodic, and only in connexion with legal and social studies. As Leslie Stephen tells us:—

The circumstances of his time and country, and possibly his own temperament generally, turned his thoughts to problems of legislation and politics; that is to say, of direct practical interest.²

The writings in which Bentham deals explicitly with the general principles of Ethics would hardly entitle him to a higher position than that of a disciple of Hume without Hume's subtlety or of Paley without Paley's singular gift of exposition.³

Bentham, in fact, is (in the sphere of morals) peculiarly a man of one idea. He shows a strange lack of appreciation of the subtlety and intricacy of the problems he raises. This, indeed, is a characteristic of the English school of ethical writers generally. To the scholastic mind they are distinguished not, as is sometimes erroneously thought, by their hard-headedness or their tendency to sceptical unbelief, but rather by their easy credence and their readiness to accept sweeping principles, such as 'the general happiness' or 'the association of ideas,' as universal explanations. They seem to have no trace of the keen medieval

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

² *The English Utilitarians*, vol. i. p. 233.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. i. p. 236.

sense of the mystery of things, of their delicate lines of distinction, of the infinite variety and, one might say, ingenuity of nature: 'Ad ea quae sunt notissima rerum noster intellectus se habet ut oculus noctuae ad solem.'¹ The amusing naïveté with which Herbert Spencer, to take only one example, develops in minute detail fantastic explanations of human emotions makes delightful reading. An abundant lack of humour seems, in fact, at once the mainspring of some of these theories and a necessary mental prerequisite to their acceptance.

In estimating Bentham's influence in the history of English ethics of the last century, one must turn not so much to his own ethical works as to those of the school of writers who followed him and ascribed to him its main principle. And it is in John Stuart Mill's *Utilitarianism* that we find the highest achievement of the Benthamite school in the sphere of moral philosophy. Not that in any true sense Mill can be ranked merely as a member of a school, or as a follower of Bentham, or, as he himself points out, as 'a utilitarian at all, unless in quite another sense from what perhaps anyone except myself understands by that word.' 'I have never,' he says, writing to Carlyle, 'at least since I had any convictions of my own, belonged to the benevolentiary, soup-kitchen school.'² It is largely through Mill's writings, and through his 'sincere, earnest, and truth-loving' character, that the principle of utility became an effective force in English thought, and produced such a marked influence upon his entire generation. Nor in estimating this influence can we neglect to give due weight to the moral elevation and, one might almost say, Christian spirit that breathes through his ethical writings, and his insistence that the ethics of utility justifies and even demands the highest nobility of character and the readiness to sacrifice even life at the call of duty:—

And if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt

¹ St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, i., xi.

² *The Letters of John Stuart Mill*, edited by Hugh S. R. Eliot, vol. i. p. 91.

that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character, even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others.¹

Thus the 'general happiness' theory leads to a moral ideal of rare elevation: 'In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as you would be done by, and to love your neighbour as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.'²

Mill's ethical system is, indeed, a curious blending of many diverse lines of speculation. He inherited from Bentham the 'greatest happiness principle,' the theory that the ethical end is the maximum pleasure of the greatest number, that the purpose of all ethical striving is ultimately social pleasure; but with this principle he interwove many views peculiarly his own, and, moreover, he was keenly aware of difficulties in the application of the theory to moral problems that had not appealed to the mind of Bentham. If he appears less logical than his father and Bentham, it is because he was not so narrow. His confidence in the rigid application of the principle was not so deep as theirs. His broadly tolerant mind could appreciate the value of principles differing widely from his own. He even refers to this intellectual sympathy with foreign theories as a fault in his character, inasmuch as it tended, at one period, to weaken his affirmation of his own views: 'I saw, or seemed to see, so much of good and of truth in the positive part of the most opposite opinions and practices, could they but be divested of their exclusive pretensions, that I scarcely felt myself called upon to *deny* anything but denial itself.'³

It is this admirable openness of mind, this readiness to accept and welcome truth from whatever source it comes, that accounts for the peculiar blending of views in Mill's

¹ *Utilitarianism*, p. 16.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 25.

³ *Letters*, vol. i. p. 88.

ethical system. The central ethical principle, identifying the moral end with social pleasure, comes from Bentham. With this he combines a theory of psychological hedonism. For not only does it appear that we *ought* to seek the general happiness (in the sense of pleasure), but in addition, it seems indisputable that we actually *do* in all our acts desire our own pleasure, that everyone does, by a psychological necessity, desire pleasure and can desire nothing else. Thus pleasure is at once the end and motive of our every action. 'Desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable; or rather two parts of the same phenomenon; in strictness of language two different modes of naming the same psychological fact.'¹ This seems to Mill quite an obvious psychological theory. He asks with easy confidence whether we ever find ourselves desiring an object and not anticipating pleasure in its attainment—a question to which, indeed, only one answer can be given, but which seems to serve his purpose only through the confusion of a *pleasant desire or anticipation* with the *desire of a pleasure*.

The way, now, in which Mill combines his ethical and psychological hedonism is one of the marked peculiarities of his system. Since each man in all his actions desires his own pleasure, it of course follows that each man's pleasure is the end of each, and the common pleasure necessarily the end of society, or 'the aggregate.' No apology is needed for reproducing the celebrated passage at the beginning of the fourth chapter, which contains the so-called 'proof' of the system:—

The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not in theory and in practice acknowledged to be an end, nothing would ever convince any person that it was so. No reason can be given why the general happiness is

¹ *Utilitarianism*, p. 57.

desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good : that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.¹

Stereotyped criticisms of this passage are to be met with in almost every handbook on ethics. While containing many valuable hints (they all, indeed, have a close family resemblance), they seldom quite satisfy one that Mill's position could be so crudely illogical as they suppose. They seem scarcely to appreciate the true scope and purpose of this very complicated line of proof. It is pointed out that the terms 'visible' and 'audible,' meaning what *can* be seen and what *can* be heard, are utterly different from the term 'desirable,' which signifies not what *can* be but what *ought* to be desired. This is quite true. But then Mill's purpose is to identify what ought to be desired with what *is de facto* desired, or what alone *can* be desired, namely, pleasure. And it should be remembered also that Mill gave a peculiar meaning to the term 'ought,' and by no means regarded it as irreducible. Then there is the attempted union, in the second portion of the 'proof,' of the egoistic and altruistic elements of the system—the passage from the pleasure of *each* to that of *all*—which seems to involve the fallacy of composition. And so, indeed, viewed from the formal standpoint, it does. But there is in this part of the proof also an element not subject to this logical objection. If it be once admitted that each man does *de facto* desire his own pleasure and nothing else, then, since from the standpoint of the universe it would be absurd for him to assume that his particular pleasure is the universal end, he seems logically forced into the position that this universal ethical end can only be the general pleasure. Of course it is always open to the individual to say: 'What care I about your

¹ *Utilitarianism*, pp. 51, 52.

universe? My own particular pleasure is what is of importance to me.' And this raises a new question. Clearly if each man can only *desire* his own pleasure, he cannot also *desire* the common pleasure, but he may very well understand and intellectually realize that the universal pleasure is the true ethical end, which end is best attained by each man desiring his own.

Finally, it is not at all clear that Mill intended this so-called 'proof' to be taken as a demonstration in the strict logical sense. In fact he tells us at the beginning of this same chapter: 'It has already been remarked that questions of ultimate ends do not admit of proof, in the ordinary acceptation of the term. To be incapable of proof by reasoning is common to all first principles, to the first premises of our knowledge, as well as to those of our conduct.'¹

The fact is that Mill must be criticized, not so much with regard to these logical difficulties, as rather on his general view of pleasure and its relation to human desires and human striving. To the man who holds pleasure to be really the one thing worth striving for, especially if he be one to whom ethical nobility appeals as deeply and as keenly as it did to Mill, it will appear inevitable that the common pleasure of humanity is the only end really worthy of the efforts of a man. Mill was strangely unaware of the harassing fact that between one's own individual pleasure and the pleasure of mankind on the whole there is not unfrequently 'a great gulf fixed.'

We may now consider the ethical theory of Mill in the light of the two-fold problem in which we are at present interested. That Mill had a very robust faith in the principles of the moral law, and strongly urged that the utilitarian ethics tended to strengthen and support them, is abundantly evident. Not that we are to conclude that Mill was unconscious of the necessity of a certain moral progress, or that he regarded the ordinary moral standard about him as satisfactory. He writes: 'I look upon the

¹ *Utilitarianism*, p. 51.

general moral state of the educated classes of Great Britain, taken in the mass, as essentially low and mean—a mean standard, and a contemptible falling short even of their own standard.¹ But in Mill's writings there is no trace of dissatisfaction with the Christian standard taken at its best, no hint that the ethics of utility would be likely to replace or modify it. Even that apparently most irrational of actions from the hedonic standpoint,—the complete abandonment of self,—seems at certain times and in certain circumstances justified :—

There are times [he writes; and here, as elsewhere, the inner nobility of the man rises superior to his theories] when the grandest results for the human race depend on the public assertion of one's convictions at the risk of death by torture. When this is the case martyrdom may be a duty; and in cases where it does not become the duty of all, it may be an admirable act of virtue in whoever does it, and a duty to those who as leaders or teachers are bound to set an example of virtue to others, and to do more for the common faith or cause than a simple believer.²

Strange that he should have maintained at the same time that in every act a man desires and must desire *his own* pleasure and nothing else!

On the second problem, namely, the meaning assigned to the fundamental ethical notions of duty and obligation, we can already trace in Mill the beginnings of a vital change of import, the far-reaching consequences of which are seldom adequately realized. To him the idea of duty is essentially a psychological growth. It has developed by a kind of mental chemistry out of simpler elements, such as fear of punishment, disapprobation of others, and so forth. It carries with it no intrinsic, irreducible worth. We can trace its history and sum up its constituent factors. And, as so often happens when genealogies are traced, the result is (though this result Mill does not face) that our respect for moral conceptions is weakened, and their supposed sanctity

¹ *Letters*, vol. ii. p. 91.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii. pp. 96, 97.

is shown to be a dream. On this most vital point of morals, a knowledge of the truth (if Mill's account be taken to be the truth) would issue in the complete abandonment of morality as ordinarily conceived. Concerning the nature of the normal moral feeling, he writes to Dr. Ward :—

I conceive that feeling to be a natural outgrowth from the social nature of man ; a state of society is so eminently natural to human beings that anything which is an obviously indispensable condition of social life easily comes to act upon their minds almost like a physical necessity. Now, it is an indispensable condition of all society, except between master and slave, that each shall pay regard to the other's happiness. On this basis, combined with a human creature's capacity of fellow-feeling, the feelings of morality properly so-called seem to me to be grounded, and their main constituent to be the idea of punishment. I feel conscious that, if I violate certain laws, other people must necessarily and naturally desire that I should be punished for the violation. I also feel that I should desire them to be punished if they violated the same laws towards me. From these feelings and from my sociality of nature I place myself in their situation, and sympathise in their desire that I should be punished ; and (even apart from benevolence) the painfulness of not being in union with them makes me shrink from pursuing a line of conduct which would make my ends, wishes, and purposes habitually conflict with theirs. . . All these feelings are immensely increased in strength by a reflected influence from other persons who feel the same.¹

A clever piece of special pleading, which could only, however, be valid if association were creative instead of being merely reproductive, and if the ethical insight of obligation could be generated out of something that did not contain it even potentially. And then there is the strange result that the knowledge of this supposed origin of our idea of duty annihilates the idea of duty itself. If men once came to know the truth, that duty had no such intrinsic value and meaning as they had supposed, but was

¹ *Letters*, vol. i. pp. 230, 231.

merely a development out of non-moral factors, then nothing but want of logical insight would enable them to respect or reverence such a conception. A respect for morality, on Mill's theory, seems possible only to one who does not realize what morality truly means.

Here we touch upon the ultimate limit of ethical speculation, where the problem of the nature of reality confronts us. At its highest point ethics depends upon metaphysics; the question, 'What ought I to do?' can only be finally answered when we know what is the nature of reality. If reality be not such as to justify the moral order, then morality is an illusion, and ethics—not merely the ethics of perfection or self-realization, but the ethics of pleasure—seems fundamentally irrational. If we are to hold fast by moral distinctions, if we are to rationally construe our moral life, it can only be upon the basis of some view of the universe, that makes morality an essential element of the real, and the moral end something capable of attainment. At this point also we touch upon what may be called the fundamental egoism (not to be confused with selfishness) of morality. It seems to be inevitably borne in upon us that unless the end for which each of us is striving is attainable by each, then the effort itself is useless, or at least to the logical mind there seems no sufficient reason for making it. To work for a future state of society, or for the attainment of some such ideal as 'the Superman' (poor fellow!), has, as an ethical theory, not merely the fatal defect of furnishing no sufficient motive for common human effort, but, in addition, involves the curious and illogical attempt of endeavouring to secure for others what, regarded as a complete moral ideal, we would scarcely consider worth aiming at for ourselves. For what ultimate value can we attach to such ideals (even if there were any moderately strong reasons for believing them attainable) while they suffer from the fatal defect of impermanence, and hold out to us no hope of 'thoughts that wander through eternity'? Nor can we find satisfaction in vague pantheistic notions that offer us no prospect of *personal* immortality. One will remember the more than despair that breathes

through the hope in Matthew Arnold's lines on ' Rugby Chapel ' :—

Somewhere, surely, afar,
In the sounding labour-house vast
Of being, is practised that strength
Zealous, beneficent, firm.

What a world of doubt vibrates in that ' surely ' !

This is at once the first and the last question both for metaphysics and for ethics ; the question in which everyone is so poignantly interested, that every philosophical theory must either furnish it with a positive answer, or attempt, as they so often do, to ease the ' beating brain ' of man with some ' dull opiate ' of forgetfulness to deaden the restless longing, the *naturale desiderium vivendi semper*. We cannot enter in detail into Mill's curiously balanced view upon this question, especially as, owing to his easy optimism, the problem did not assume for him the same ethical importance as we find it taking later on in the theory of Sidgwick. When we remember the narrow discipline to which Mill was, from his earliest years, subjected, there is not a little pathos in the following extract from a letter to Carlyle in the year 1834, which sums up his state of mind upon these (as he fully realizes) most momentous issues :—

The first and principal of these differences is that I have only what appears to you much the same thing as, or even worse than, no God at all, namely, a merely probable God. By *probable* I do not mean as you sometimes do, in the sense of the Jesuits, that which has weighty authorities in its favour. I mean that the existence of a Creator is not to me a matter of faith or of intuition ; and as a proposition to be proved by evidence, it is but a hypothesis the proofs of which as you I know agree with me, do not amount to absolute certainty. As this is my condition in spite of the strongest wish to believe, I fear it is hopeless ; the unspeakable good it would be to me to have a *faith* like yours, I mean as firm as yours, on that, to you, fundamental point, I am as strongly conscious of when life is a happiness to me, as when it is, what it has been for long periods now passed by, a burthen. But I know that neither you nor anyone

else can be of any use to me in this, and I content myself with doing no ill by never propagating my uncertainties.¹

Later on he briefly outlines his position on the question of immortality: 'With respect to the immortality of the soul, I see no reason to believe that it perishes, nor sufficient ground for complete assurance that it survives; but if it does there is every reason to think that it continues in another state such as it has made itself here.'²

Holding such beliefs as these, we cannot be surprised that Mill failed in his effort to give an ethical basis to human life. But it is of vital importance to realize that he has failed, and that no attempt upon the same principles can be successful. The very moderation of his statements, the fact that, at least in his *Utilitarianism*, no definite break with common morality seems visible, that he is, in a word, so *doucement révolutionnaire*, easily blinds one to the logical issues of his theory: 'Au lieu d'attaquer de front les croyances communes, les penseurs anglais les minent par la base, lentement, sans beaucoup de bruit. On nous dira que c'est le plus sûr moyen pour qu'elles s'écroulent toutes à la fois.'³

D. O'KEEFFE.

To be continued.]

¹ *Letters*, vol. i. p. 90.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i. pp. 90, 91.

³ M. Guyau, *La Morale Anglaise Contemporaine*, p. viii.

DARWINISM AND HISTORY: A DIALOGUE—II

PADRAIG.—At our last meeting you promised to explain the application of the 'struggle for life,' which, if I am to believe you, is a very complex problem. Let us see.

CATHAL.—The first form of the struggle is between races ; for the racial element is the fundamental factor which settles the line of development of any given civilization.¹ It has been defined by Brunetière as the 'irreducible element which separates humanity into distinct families, the last term of analysis, whether literary, philological, linguistic, or psychological, beyond which there is only uncertainty and mystery.'² Race is an inborn, a hereditary quality, independent of moral, political, and intellectual movements. It is a constant. As a factor of history it conditions rather than determines the progress of man.³ King Canute said to the waves : 'Hitherto shalt thou come and no further, and here shalt thou break thy swelling waves.' In like manner race says to the various groups of men : 'So far shalt thou advance and no further.' Just as nature has set limits to every man, beyond which he cannot perfect his inherited faculties, so race has drawn lines across the future over which the nations cannot step. If you recall now the original title of Darwin's famous work, you will see at once the part which race plays in the struggle for life. It is, *On the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of the Favoured Races in the Struggle for*

¹ 'C'est dans la disparité originelle et indélébile du caractère distinctif des races, qu'il faut chercher le principe fondamental de la diversité des civilisations.'—(M. Souffret, *Disparité physique et mentale des races humaines*, p. 306.),

² *Evolution des genres dans la littérature*, p. 242.

³ 'On peut donc admettre que la race ou le mélange des races conditionne le développement social d'un peuple, c'est-à-dire lui assigne un certain champ plus ou moins étendu avec des limites plus ou moins étroites mais il est faux que la race détermine ce développement.'—(A. Fouillée, *Esquisse psychologique des peuples européens*, p. xv.)

Life. You see from the sub-title that Darwin demands certain racial differences before the struggle begins, and it is these intrinsic differences which will finally determine the issue of the fight. The *Origin of Species*, of course, deals solely with the animal kingdoms ; but the application of its principles to the evolution of nations, *mutatis mutandis*, is obvious.

PADRAIG.—Do you really believe that race explains anything ? It is my firm conviction that much dust has been thrown in our eyes by this new-fangled theory. Where amongst Western nations is there a pure race ? They are all composite. France alone has at least three racial elements—Celtic, Roman, Germanic ; England, according to some, has even more—Celtic, Germanic, Scandinavian, Norman. Race is certainly a very convenient factor, an 'Open Sesame' to many a problem of history. It has been used with great effect by Taine, Renan, and others. 'C'est la première et la plus riche source de ces forces maîtresses d'où dérivent les événements historiques,' says Taine in the best manner of our dogmatic Positivists. If you wish to know why the Jews were monotheists and Greeks polytheists, you get the enlightening answer that it was all a question of race.¹ The striking differences between the white and yellow races or between North and South America were explained jauntily in the same *a priori* manner. Unfortunately we have witnessed in recent years many remarkable changes, which have sadly disturbed the calculations of our social astronomers. Japan has suddenly shot like a meteor into the firmament of Western civilization, and Argentina is moving forward with alarming rapidity. The rise of these two nations is explained in a more efficacious and more rational manner by the laws of imitation as formulated in the various works of M. Tarde,

¹ 'Le génie sémitique, par exemple, était réputé absolument réfractaire au polythéisme, au système analytique des langues modernes, au gouvernement parlementaire ; le génie grec, au monothéisme, le génie chinois et le génie japonais à toutes nos institutions et à toutes nos conceptions européennes.'—(G. Tarde, *Les Lois sociales*, p. 43 ; Paris, 1898.)

and especially in his masterly essay, *Lois de l'imitation*. If the Young Turks succeed in lifting their moribund nation out of the Slough of Despond, it will be by the force of imitation rather than by any mysterious potency of race. You really must acknowledge that there are now few believers in that *génie d'une race* which, since the days of Taine, has presided as a kind of grand manitou over the destinies of nations. Its existence as a factor in history is denied by such men as Seignobos,¹ Mougeolle,² Lacombe,³ Robertson,⁴ Reich,⁵ and others.

CATHAL.—Excuse me. There are still great and good men who believe in race. Mr. A. J. Balfour does not support a theory without good reason. Allow me to quote a few words from his suggestive lecture on 'Decadence': 'If there are whole groups of nations capable on their own initiative of a certain measure of civilization, but capable apparently of no more, and if below them again there are (as I suppose) other races who seem incapable of either creating a civilization of their own, or of preserving unaided a civilization impressed upon them from without, by what right do we assume that no impassable limits bar the path of Western progress? Those limits may not be in sight. Surely they are not. But does not a survey of history suggest that somewhere in the dim future they await our approach?'⁶ You appeal to imitation rather than to race as a cause of progress. I do not deny the force of imitation, nor its unique power to mould the nations after a definite pattern. But imitation presupposes the capacity to imitate, and it is not every nation which has this capacity. The Chinese have the same opportunities of imitation as the Japanese. Why, then, are they frozen in eternal immobility? Again, the Negroes of North America have been for centuries in contract with white men, and yet have never profited of that intercourse by imitation. Finally,

¹ *Introduction to the Study of History*, p. 240.

² *Problèmes de l'histoire* (cf. Xénopol, *Théorie de l'histoire*, p. 170).

³ *Histoire considérée comme science*, ch. xviii.

⁴ *The Saxon and the Celt*.

⁵ *General History of Western Nations*, Introduction.

⁶ Pp. 38-39.

your principle is hopelessly inadequate to explain the Jew, who has been transformed from a peaceful agriculturist in the plains of Palestine to a hard money-lender in the markets of Europe ; for he had nobody to imitate. Neither does it explain the permanency of the Jewish type amid the wear of centuries and the vicissitudes of change.

PADRAIG.—It is quite true that imitation presupposes a capacity to imitate ; but I deny your supposition that the cause of Chinese stagnation is to be sought in racial incapacity. The real cause is far more complex. It embraces richness of soil, jejuneness of education, dearth of great men, and the resultant of these three, a history remarkable for its barren monotony. The soil of China is so rich that you have only to scratch its surface and it smiles into a golden harvest. It supplies the necessities of life without much labour and above all without much science. In a word, the physical environment of China is in perfect harmony with the wants of the inhabitants, and consequently there is not that struggle with the forces of nature which gives fire to the imagination, energy to the body, and strength to the will.¹ The necessary result of all this is a general tendency amongst Chinamen to move in the same groove as generations have done before. To break this tendency you must prove the desirability of a change, and a desirability of change can only be proved by education in one form or another. Satisfied with the present and hopeful of the future, the Chinese masses have no sense of unrealized desires. But if a series of great men should arise amongst them, point out the glaring defects of their civilization, lift them to higher ideals, sketch a definite line of march, and then lead the way, I think we should have one more proof against the ethnologists that the yellow races are not doomed to everlasting sterility. It is the great man who creates the electric atmosphere of thought from which the thunders of revolution break. He is the alpha and omega, the beginning and end of change ; for he is the creator of ideas,

¹ ' Bref, c'est surtout la fécondité du sol en productions spontanées, en végétaux et en animaux, qui a été le plus grand obstacle à la civilisation.'—(G. Richard, *L'Idée d'évolution dans la nature et l'histoire*, p. 269.)

and ideas are the motive forces of action. It is ideas which make 'the great world spin for ever down the ringing grooves of change.' Now a few great men might arise at any moment amongst the Chinese, and it is this possibility which has created what the defenders of the race-theory are pleased to call the chimera of the Yellow Peril.

CATHAL.—Darwinian historians, of course, cannot admit the extraordinary power of the great man as sketched by you; but I think we had better omit for the present this delicate problem. You also touched on the question of environment, and I was glad to see that you believe it to have a certain influence. It is an important factor to which I shall return in a moment; but I must first make a few concluding and perhaps conciliatory remarks on race as a factor. Darwinism as applied to history is not necessarily based on that rigorous distinction of races which the ethnologists give us. It only demands certain 'accidental variations' amongst nations, and these you cannot very well deny unless you deny national character. The inhabitants of one country differ both physiologically and psychologically from those of another. They differ in ideals, sentiments, and aspirations; in energy, will-power, and endurance; in physical, intellectual, and moral gifts. Was it not Renan who divided nations into two great classes—intellectual and volitional? If the French are superior in intellect, the English are certainly superior in will-power, in that force of character which brings forth great and enduring actions. The foundation of these national differences, whether ethnical or otherwise, is a matter of minor importance for the Darwinian historian; indeed this problem is outside his sphere. It is sufficient for him to know what they are and how they act in the great struggle for life. If the Darwinian zoologist sees a species of giraffe *naturally selected* by 'accidental variations' in the length of the neck, the Darwinian historian sees certain peoples *naturally selected* by 'accidental variations' of national character.

PADRAIG.—You have made one more remarkable concession, which will not please many. I suppose you know that M. Xénopol criticises at much length M. Gustave Le

Bon for confounding race and national character in his *Lois psychologiques de l'évolution des nations*. Race is a distinct factor for M. Xénopol. It is a constant, whereas national character is variable.¹ But I have heard quite enough on this question of race. I should now like to know your views on environment as a factor in history.

CATHAL.—Physical environment embraces two elements—the character of the climate and the character of the country. That climate affects the development of man is evident, and has been admitted by every thinker since the days of Aristotle. The only nations which have evolved along the lines of modern civilization are those situated within the temperate zones. High-strung activity is absolutely essential to material progress, and high-strung activity cannot exist in regions of great cold or great heat. At least the aboriginal inhabitants of such regions have never been known to resist the paralysing influence of the climatic conditions. The second element of physical environment, the character of the country, embraces many things—quality of the soil, mineral wealth, configuration of the coast,² direction of mountain ranges, course of rivers. These external factors—over which man has practically no control—will direct his activities in certain definite lines. A maritime situation will force a nation to navigation and commerce, no matter what has been the vicissitudes of its history. Hence the story of Tyre, Carthage, Venice, England. In modern times a good outlet on the sea is of supreme importance; and consequently the possession of such an

¹ Il (M. Le Bon) confond le caractère, à proprement parler le fond de la race, constitué par les particularités anatomiques, physiologiques et psychologiques des individus qui composent les différents groupes humains, avec le caractère historique des peuples, issu de la réaction exercée par les événements sur le fond organique primitif. Pendant que le premier—le fond de la race—est en effet irréductible, qu'il ne change jamais, que sous l'influence de causes bien profondes—le caractère historique se forme dans le cours des temps, et notamment dans des intervalles qui n'ont nullement besoin d'atteindre l'immensité des âges géologiques.—(*Théorie de l'histoire*, p. 172.)

² 'Un pays inégalement rongé par la mer et possédant ainsi une magnifique dentelle de côtes, est dans la situation la plus favorable pour se civiliser au contact des autres pays et développer ce génie des affaires et des entreprises, qui met en branle une si grande variété d'aptitudes et de talents.'—(A. Castelien, S. J., *La Méthode des sciences sociales*, p. 40)

outlet has become the ruling policy of more than one European state. But if the geographical position of a country determines its line of development, it also determines the nature of its national defences, the strength of its armies and its navies, as is only too plain to the student of history. This, however, is not all. Modern civilization is becoming more and more dependent on the products of industry. Every new invention creates a new desire. The conditions of life which satisfied our grandfathers no longer satisfy us. We have tasted the fruits of progress and are haunted with the idea of an indefinite advance in material conveniences. As Disraeli remarked of the nineteenth century, 'we mistake comfort for civilization.' The application of steam and electricity has revolutionized the world in more than one sense; it has given birth to as many wants as it has filled; for the supply creates the demand no less than the demand creates the supply. The invention of new comforts has become the chief object of science. If the civilization of Greece was intellectual and its science speculative, the civilization of the modern world is material and its science utilitarian, or, as some prefer to call it, pragmatic. Accordingly, the nation which possesses in abundance the raw stuff for these material improvements has the best chance of success in the modern wars of commerce; it is one of the 'favoured races.' In a word, the peoples who win in the great Darwinian struggle for life are those favoured intrinsically by ethnical qualities and extrinsically by physical environment.

PADRAIG.—I have a few objections against all this. Darwin had an explicit wish to eliminate environment as a factor of development. He criticised Lamarck for unduly insisting on the influence of external nature, and made it clearly known that the characteristic feature of his theory was the preservation of races favoured by accidental differences in their constitution. The great struggle for life, which eliminates the weak and preserves the strong, is a struggle between individuals and groups, not a struggle with nature. Hence the opening sentence of M. Novicow's

La Critique du darwinisme social contains this definition of social Darwinism: 'La doctrine qui considère l'homicide collectif comme la cause des progrès du genre humain.' The distinguished sociologist then proceeds to establish the accuracy of his definition by quoting from English, American, German, and French authors. And in chapter iv. he has this sentence: 'Chose étrange, en effet les darwiniens, qui sont hypnotisés par le fait de la lutte, qui en font le pivot même de l'évolution vitale, les darwiniens, dis-je, négligent de voir la plus importante de toutes les luttes: celle qui se livre contre le milieu extérieur.' Now you seem to be one of those charged in this indictment; for physical environment, as expounded by you, is purely passive in its action. It can originate nothing. If favourable, it preserves the race by supplying the essentials of life and progress; if unfavourable, it destroys by denying these same essentials. It has no active influence on the structure and character of the race. In a word, its favour is purely extrinsic, as you have very well expressed it. If such is the case, the better the physical environment, the greater the progress; but unfortunately for you the chequered story of man with its long record of triumphs over nature does not confirm this view. Nay, it proves the contrary; for the nations which have stood in the forefront of civilization in all ages were precisely those not specially favoured by physical environment. For thousands of years the highest forms of human civilization were conceived, brought forth, and nurtured round the Mediterranean, in lands which, to quote Sir William Ramsay, 'are not like the great plains of the Canadian North-west, productive almost spontaneously, gifted by nature with a great depth of rich soil. They are to a large extent hilly or even mountainous; a considerable portion of them is bare and rocky; where there is soil it is in great part so dry as to be absolutely useless without artificial irrigation; the rich valleys are rarely extensive, and large part of those valleys were originally marsh. Almost everywhere a vast amount of labour and a high degree of skill, forethought, and knowledge had to be applied before the soil became useful to man and able to support a

large population.’¹ Note the last words of the distinguished scholar—labour, skill, forethought, and knowledge had to be applied. It was this exercise of body and mind which contributed in no small way to the progress of the nations situated by the shores of the Mediterranean. The struggle with nature brought out and sharpened the faculties, moulded and strengthened the national character. Difficulties brace and fortify, whilst easily won riches weaken and destroy. The decadence of Rome set in at a moment when it could lay the whole world under toll to supply its wants, when it had within its grasp every advantage of physical environment. Why? Because conquest had led to riches, riches had led to indulgence of every form, and indulgence sapped the national character. So much for the influence of external nature on the physical and moral life of a nation; but it has power also to mould the intellectual and imaginative life, though not to the exaggerated extent laid down by Buckle and Taine. The moods of nature are reflected in the art and literature of the country.²

CATHAL.—I do not know why M. Novicow states so dogmatically in the passage quoted by you that Darwinian sociology takes no account of the struggle with nature. It is true that the ideas of Darwin fluctuated between natural selection and the direct action of environment; but he finally confessed that the latter could not be eliminated altogether and for that reason introduced it as a minor fact of evolution. In his *Origin of Species* we find these words: ‘There must be in every case a struggle for existence, either one individual with another of the same species, or

¹ *The Cities of St. Paul*, p. 17.

² ‘Pour rendre compte des différences de goût, de caractère, de mœurs, de tour d’esprit et de force de volonté, que nous remarquons, chez les différents peuples, l’historien ne doit donc pas négliger ce facteur, qui nous explique pourquoi, par exemple, la Grèce avec ses horizons lumineux, ses riants paysages, son doux climat, a donné à ses enfants un tempérament, un caractère, des goûts, un tour d’imagination qu’on ne trouve pas chez les habitants des sombres rivages, des terres froides, humides et marécageuses des pays du Nord, et pourquoi dans la chaude et lourde atmosphère des tropiques, dans la vie facile et abondante des plaines fertiles, les populations ne puiseront pas l’énergie de corps et d’âme qui donne l’air sec et vif, la vie sobre et active des montagnes.’—(L. Boutié, S.J., *Études*, January 20, 1897.)

with individuals of distinct species, or *with the physical conditions of life*.¹ The same doctrine is held by his disciples. For instance, Mr. Benjamin Kidd, the great exponent of social evolution in England, writes: 'Man, originally a creature of a warm climate and multiplying most easily and rapidly there, has not attained his highest development where the conditions of existence have been easiest. Throughout history the centre of power has moved gradually but surely to the north, into those stern regions where men have been trained for the rivalry of life in the strenuous conflict with nature in which they have acquired energy, courage, integrity, and those characteristic qualities which contribute to raise them to a high state of social efficiency.'² Though I admit, therefore, with Darwin and his followers the influence of external nature as a factor of evolution, I consider it of minor importance beside the transforming force of social environment. Race, climate, and physical surroundings are too constant to be the main causes of those great changes and new-born movements from which the web of history is woven. The real solution of any historical problem must finally be sought in the psychology of the masses, in the collective consciousness.

PADRAIG.—Indeed. So you are a believer in the theory of Lamprecht. If you are going to serve it up to me, you must remove the husks of transcendentalism.

CATHAL.—There is nothing very new nor very obscure in the general theory, though its exposition bears unmistakable marks of having been 'made in Germany.' Most thinkers nowadays are agreed that the real explanation of social development must be got from psychology; but as no one has built so imposing a system or exercised so great an influence as Lamprecht, I think it well to say a few words on his method. For him history is the record of an evolution 'towards progressive differentiation and integration of the human soul.' It treats of the human past

¹ P. 50. (The italics are not in the original.)

² *Social Evolution*, p. 57.

as a development of ideas or series of psychic phases in which the 'collective soul of the nation' reveals itself. The real forces and phenomena of society are psychological. You must remember, however, that as civilization advances and becomes more complex the dominating factors of change are no longer individuals or great men, but the collective soul which results from the 'co-existence of absolutely differentiated persons.' Just as the sounds of single notes are quite different from one another and from the harmony which they produce in combination, so the psychic characters of the individuals are quite different from one another and from the collective psychic life which is born of their union in a given society. 'To this spiritual life of the whole the psychic activity of the individual is in such a manner subordinate as to be dominated by it for the best and highest ends.' Consequently for Lamprecht history is a socio-psychological science; it 'concerns itself with the investigation of the dominating socio-psychic character of the times in question, and with its changing forms during the various ages of culture,' as appears plainly from the following formulæ in which he has summed up the psychic phases of German civilization: Symbolism, Typism, Conventionalism, Individualism, Subjectivism.

PADRAIG.—The theory of Lamprecht is only one more attempt to eliminate the great man with whom evolutionists will have nothing to do; for his introduction spells freedom and uncertainty. No one can tell when he will appear, nor where, nor why he appears at one time and is wanting at another. And when he comes upon the stage, no one can foresee what he will do; for he is a free agent, making laws rather than obeying them. Consequently the great man is a most disturbing element in any system of evolution and must be removed at all costs. He must be proved to be a product of his age, a child of circumstances, a resultant of general causes, or a subject of the collective soul. It is interesting to watch how these *soi-disant* Positivists force the facts to fit the theory. They will, however, spend a little more time and spill a little more ink before they persuade the general public that Carlyle was wrong when he

wrote: 'Universal history, the history of what man has accomplished in this world, is at bottom the history of the great men who have worked here.'¹

CATHAL.—It is quite true that Lamprecht and all Darwinian historians try to eliminate the great man or at least to minimise his influence; but it is not quite true that they force the facts to fit their theories. History is the record of various races working out their destinies in space and time. The facts of natural science are formulated in laws independent of space and time; the facts of history on the contrary are linked to space and individualised by time. Hence the three primal factors in the story of man's development are race, physical environment, and the moment or dominant character of the period under consideration. This last, which is really the most important factor and which will finally settle the place of great men in history, has various expressions with various writers—general tendency, social environment, acquired momentum, aggregate of antecedent conditions, dominant psychic character, *Zeitgeist* or time-spirit. The importance of historical moments was first scientifically shown, I think, by H. Taine in the Introduction to his *History of English Literature*, where he gave an elaborate exposition of race, environment, and moment as factors of change. His distinguished disciple, Brunetière, carried forward the work, but with certain radical changes; for he lessened enormously the action of race and physical environment, and trebled that of moment. 'Through the influence of moment,' he says, 'and through that influence alone, I promise to explain all that is really explicable in a literary work.'² And in the Introduction to his *Manual of the History of French Literature* we read: 'Of all the influences which make themselves felt in the history of a literature, the principal is that of works on works.' The same views in one form or another are expressed by many English writers. 'It is the age that forms the man,' says Macaulay, 'not the man that forms the age.'³ For Herbert

¹ *The Hero as Divinity*, p. 1.

² *Évolution de la critique*, p. 262.

³ *Essay on Dryden*, p. 2.

Spencer the great personality is a natural product of antecedents, a resultant of that 'aggregate of conditions' from which he and all other social changes have arisen. Hence he asks : ' Given a Shakespeare, what dramas could he have written without the multitudinous conditions of civilised life around him—without the various traditions which, descending to him from the past, gave wealth to his thought, and without the language which a hundred generations had developed and enriched by use?'¹ You will find the same views defended in Mr. Kidd's *Social Evolution*, and in Mr. Bellamy's *Looking Backward*.

PADRAIG.—Of course man owes much to the past. He can accomplish nothing without instruments and materials. No man, not even the greatest, is a creator in the strict sense of the word. He must have matter to work on, and the more perfect the matter, the more perfect the work. Even for ideas he is dependent on the external world ; for, to quote an Aristotelian maxim, *nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*. But does it follow that, because Shakespeare required the instrumentality of tradition, language, pen and ink, these were the chief causes of his masterpieces ? Certainly not. Otherwise there would have been hundreds of Shakespeares ; for hundreds lived in the same ' aggregate of conditions.' Genius alone can breathe an immortal soul into the dead matter of tradition, or evoke undying music from even the most perfect language. Again, the characteristic note of all good art is originality, the expression of individuality. Consequently it is incumbent on every great artist not to be a slave to tradition or general tendencies.

CATHAL.—The example given by H. Spencer, and indeed all examples drawn from the fine arts, are not the best to show the small part played by the great man ; and that for the reasons you have set forth. But, though the great man is largely emancipated from tradition in the world of art and letters, the same cannot be said of him in the world of politics and economics. Here the masses, general tendencies

¹ *The Study of Sociology*, p. 35.

and traditions are of paramount importance. It is not art or literature, but economic conditions, which 'are the 'ultimate causes of all social and political revolutions,' as pointed out by Karl Marx. *Primum vivere, deinde philosophari*, sums up the philosophy of life for the majority of men; for, to quote the words of Engels, 'above all else men stand in need of meat and drink, of shelter and clothing, before they can engage in politics, science, art, religion.' Economic wants create economic desires, economic desires create general tendencies, and against general tendencies there is no resistance. They move forward steadily to their appointed goal, sweeping the individual before them like an avalanche, and then settle down to traditions, which are equally immovable. Men move in grooves of acquired habits and general tendencies. They are tenacious of the old and chary of the new. By nature or force of circumstances they are conservative; for they have reaped much benefit from the existing conditions. There may be many defects, and a change may be desirable; but the future is dark and uncertain. 'Better the devil you know than the devil you don't know.' Hence the struggle which is now going forward in England between the Free Traders and the Tariff Reformers. The time was not ripe for the change, and so the genius of Chamberlain failed. It was easy to paint for 'the man in the street' the glory and the advantages which came from Free Trade, and he knew that the picture was founded on fact. But the glory and advantages of Protection were in the shadowy region of the possibles, and if ever fulfilled, would be fulfilled when he had passed away. 'Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof,' he stoically but unpatriotically remarked. You cannot, therefore, undermine the force of tradition unless you prove the desirability of a change. But what genius on earth can even initiate such a work unless economic wants have already created economic desires in the collective consciousness of the nation? These are the real factors of change.

PADRAIG.—Excuse me. It is the great man who proves to the masses the desirability of a change, and not the

economic conditions. Certain wants may exist in a vague subconscious manner in the minds of the people; dim aspirations and ambitious dreams may simmer on the surface of Lamprecht's 'collective soul'; but it is the commanding personality, who gathers into a synthesis these vague longings, gives them a definite form, and outlines a policy in which they will receive their fulfilment. It is he who invents the idea of a new movement, educates a few chosen spirits to believe in his idea, sets the laws of imitation in motion, and thus inaugurates a new tendency. In a word, invention explains the birth, and imitation the growth of a general tendency. If man is naturally conservative and thereby clings to the old, he is no less naturally imitative, and thereby adopts the new. The child learns by imitation, and the majority of us are little more than children. We try to be original and succeed at most in making a happy synthesis of borrowed ideas. 'There is nothing new under the sun,' said Solomon, only a clever adaptation of other men's thoughts. What is the tyranny of fashion, with which we are all so familiar, but the tyranny of imitation. What is personal enthusiasm, the most powerful of all motive forces, but the impulse to imitate some masterful character. What is love in all the manifestations of its complex nature, but a union in which the lover becomes assimilated to the beloved. Man, however, cannot imitate unless he has something to imitate. An image or ideal of some kind is required. That is the *primum mobile* of action, whose motive power is in direct proportion to the sympathy it arouses or the want it satisfies. In other words, every movement in the world of action is necessarily preceded by a corresponding movement in the world of ideas; for a great movement is the realization of a great idea. But as the majority of men reflect little and do not originate new ideas, we must, I fear, acknowledge that the beginning and end of all social changes is the great man, who invents the great idea. I might confirm all this by the very example which you brought forward to buttress your views on tradition and general tendencies; for who launched on the world of English politics as living forces

the ideas of Free Trade and Tariff Reform? Was it not two leaders of men, Cobden and Chamberlain, rather than any complexus of economic conditions? Again, you brushed aside as of minor importance art and literature, and yet you have dealt with complacency on Lamprecht's theory which is characterized by special insistence on the epochs of culture and their psychic character. Finally, you seem to make economic conditions the be-all and end-all of social evolution; but surely not on bread alone doth man live. He has other and higher wants. Nay, moral and religious concepts have been more fruitful facts in his history than economic conditions.

CATHAL.—If I have made too much of tradition, you have certainly made too much of invention. You belong to the old school of thinkers, who neglect the antecedents of a great idea, and do not see that a great idea is the flower which crowns the labours of past generations, rather than the supreme effort of any single genius. 'For it must be remembered that even the ablest men amongst us whose names go down to history connected with great discoveries and inventions, have each in reality advanced the sum of knowledge by a comparatively small addition. In the fullness of time, and when the ground had been slowly and laboriously prepared for it by a vast army of workers, the great idea fructifies and the discovery is made. It is, in fact, not the work of one, but of a great number of persons whose previous work has led up to it. How true it is that all the great ideas have been the product of the time rather than of individuals, may be the more readily realized when it is remembered that as regards a large number of them, there have been rival claims for the honour of authorship put forward by persons who, working quite independently, have arrived at like results almost simultaneously.'¹ Just as one little spark of electricity may fire a great mine, so one little spark of genius applied at the right moment may throw a nation into revolution. But no stretch of imagination can erect either spark into an adequate, or even

¹ B. Kidd, *Social Evolution*, p. 266.

principal, cause of the colossal changes which follow their application. The real explanation of these must be sought in the prepared material. If a great man intervenes before the existing tendency has run its course, he will fail hopelessly, or at most disturb for a brief space the general equilibrium, as Charlemagne did with Feudalism and Napoleon with the principles of the French Revolution. The balance will swing back again when he has gone, giving an example of atavism amongst nations as amongst men. To use the Darwinian formula, the great man must be selected by the social environment, if he is to accomplish anything; and even then he is at most a 'proximate imitator,' as Spencer allows, or an anticipator of what would otherwise inevitably happen, as Bourdeau puts it.¹

† PADRAIG.—The quotation from Mr. Kidd and the attack on great men which you have hung upon it differ very little from the words of H. Sepncer and your deduction from the same. I refer you back, therefore, to my previous answer. Neither I nor the defenders of great men deny the influence of 'social inheritance and environment.' No genius, however great, works independently of the past. He is the 'heir of all the ages,' and builds upon that capital. But still no manipulation of antecedents or 'aggregate of conditions' can explain away the part played by great men in the evolution of nations. Thousands breathe the same psychic atmosphere, thousands enjoy that 'equality of opportunity' about which Mr. Kidd speaks so much, and yet only a few master-minds revolutionize the world of action by some new invention, only a few leaders of men deflect into another channel the deep waters of a general tendency. You know Aristotle's theory of matter and form. These are the ultimate elements into which his philosophy reduces

¹ 'L'humanité pourrait parfaitement marcher sans ces individualités marquantes. Elles ne font que hâter quelque peu le développement qui se réaliserait de lui-même, sans leur concours. Comme le coq matinal, les grands précurseurs d'idées ont pu signaler l'aube prochaine. Ce ne sont pas eux qui ont fait lever le soleil. Quand les choses sont parvenues au point où la réussite est prochaine, il importe peu qu'elle s'opère quelques instants plus tôt, par les anticipations du génie, ou quelques instants plus tard, par les opportunités du bon sens. La gloire n'est qu'une question de célérité.'—(L. Bourdeau, *L'histoire et les historiens*, p. 102.)

every object of the organic or inorganic world. The matter is passive, recipient, indetermined ; the form acts, shapes, determines. But before you can deduce a given form from a given matter, that matter must undergo a certain preparation. If you apply this theory to social evolution, you have more or less my views. In human society the community is the matter, the great man the form. The community may evolve in many ways ; the great man determines the direction. The community is pre-ordained to no definite form of civilization ; the great man makes the mould in which the masses shape themselves by imitation. In a word, human progress is the result of a combined action, the child of a union, in which the great man is the dominant partner.

CATHAL.—All this is mere abstract reasoning. I should like to see your views illustrated from history.

PADRAIG.—Very good, I shall try. You must admit that the most remarkable fact of Western civilization after the growth of the Catholic Church is the growth of liberty. Indeed, the evolution of this latter during nineteen hundred years is the evolution of European history, as Lord Acton clearly saw when he chose it as the theme of the great work he projected but never executed. Now, if we examine the dominant moments of liberty we shall see that some commanding personality presided at the birth of each one of them. But first let me state once for all that in tracing this evolution I do not contend that every new form of freedom invented by the great man and incorporated into the life of the community was good and true. All I contend is that the various stages of the evolution were inaugurated by a single personality rather than by any other factor. Now to the point. In the ancient world few had a true idea of liberty, and fewer still enjoyed it. The State, whether a monarchy, a republic, or an oligarchy, was everything, the individual nothing. Women were kept in seclusion and ignorance ; children might be exposed or put to death for trifling reasons ; slaves were an inferior class born to serve and obey ; citizens were for the State, not the State for the citizens—'theirs but to do and die.' Such democratic

principles as liberty, equality, fraternity, were unknown. Antiquity did not even suspect that most characteristic note of modern times, individualism. The will of the State absorbed the will of the individual. It settled internal relations by the principle of blind obedience and foreign relations by the principle of might is right. Then came Jesus Christ with a new message. He proclaimed all men to be equal, children of a common Father, possessed of a common nature, destined for a common end. With one stroke He destroyed the barrier walls between Jew and Gentile, Greek and Barbarian, ruler and subject, master and slave, rich and poor. The only aristocracy that has letters patent of nobility in His kingdom is an aristocracy of virtue. He came as a prince of peace and a prophet of altruism to a world given up to war and ruled by egoism. His social principles were destined to elevate woman, sanctify marriage, emancipate the slave, curb the despot, dignify labour, and relieve poverty. During fifteen hundred years they were an active ferment in human society, until the Humanists restored, once again, the pagan ideals and prepared men for a new conception of liberty. This came in the sixteenth century when Luther sounded the 'tocsin of revolt on the banks of the Rhine,' and proclaimed the supremacy of reason in the domain of religion. Papal authority was overthrown, private judgment set up in its place, and the reign of rationalism inaugurated. But if reason is the supreme arbiter in spiritual matters, men naturally asked why it should not also be the guide in other departments of knowledge. Accordingly, they examined in its light the credentials of governments, found them wanting, and out of the 'volcanic heart and moonstruck brain' of Rousseau burst the French revolution. Democracy, with its principles of liberty, equality, fraternity, was born, and democracy, if rightly understood, might be a very Christian institution. But reason, drunk with victory, carried the principle of equality to its last conclusion, with the result that Socialism, organized and aggressive, stepped from the brain of Karl Marx.

CATHAL.—And then? A new page was opened in the

history of the world, which shall not be closed until there is burned into it the story of the most stupendous battle which man has yet recorded, the battle between Capitalism and Labour. It is the Darwinian struggle of man against man, or the Marxian struggle of class against class, or the Lamprechtian struggle of ideas against ideas in which those of the collective soul will succeed. 'And the individual withers, and the world is more and more.'

PADRAIG.—What the issue of this tremendous contest will be neither I nor anyone else can say ; for we are in the presence of titanic forces of which history affords no example. But this I do know, that the final success of either movement will mainly depend upon its leaders—*le monde est à ceux qui portent une idée.*

EPILOGUE

If it is a general law of history that no man has ever created a great movement without the aid of favourable circumstances, there is at least one exception. Jesus Christ was helped neither by race, environment, nor the psychic character of the period in which He appeared. He was not helped by race ; for He came of a people who had no history according to the established canons of the day, and who were despised by the civilized world. He was not helped by social environment ; for He was born of peasant parents in a stable of Bethlehem, and passed His youth as a carpenter's son in the sequestered village of Nazareth. 'Is not this the carpenter's son?' 'Can any good come from Nazareth?' were the taunts of His countrymen. He was not helped by the psychic character of Jewish history ; for He came as a humble teacher of spiritual truths to a people who expected that a great King would arise amongst them to lead them forth to the conquest and occupation of the earth. Neither was He helped by the psychic character of the civilized world ; for His kingdom was not of this world, and its principles were of a general character antagonistic to every tendency of the time. But that is not all. Christ chose to establish a universal religion and a new conception of society by means which any man endowed

with the merest rudiments of political wisdom must have judged foolishly inadequate ; for He took as founders, not the great leaders of armies nor the masters of ancient thought, but twelve Galilean peasants, weak of heart and slow of understanding ; and at last, when he had drawn the plans of the New Jerusalem and had selected the builders, He died a malefactor's death on the cross. Judged by the laws of earthly change and human instability, it must have seemed to the witnesses of that awful tragedy that Christ as a living force was no more, and that the darkness which overshadowed Mount Calvary was but a forerunner and a symbol of the deeper night which sooner or later overtakes every human enterprise. But the darkest hour precedes the dawn, and the name Jesus has arisen as a new sun to illumine a new world. It has gone forth rejoicing, as a giant, to run its course. It has subdued the intellect of Greece, the arms of Rome, and the untutored savage of the North. It has triumphed over the world, and maintains that triumph ; though the high priests of modern science have arisen in their might against it, and have used every weapon in their armoury to strike it out of the hearts of men and the pages of history. On November 8, 1906, M. Viviani, Socialist Minister of Labour, boasting in the French Chamber of Deputies of the work accomplished by himself and his colleagues, said : ' Together and with a majestic gesture we have put out in the heavens the lights that shall never be lit again.' He was only repeating the thirteenth psalm of King David : ' The fool hath said in his heart : There is no God,' and verifying the eternal axiom : ' The wish is father to the thought.' If the omnipotent arms of Rome could not crush Christianity in its infancy, it is not likely that the visionary dreams of Socialists will extinguish a religion which has withstood the shock of centuries and counts its adherents by the hundred million. The works of man are like the ephemerae—they are born and die in a day ; but the work of Christ, like the everlasting mountains, is above every vicissitude of time and every law of change.

P. J. CONNOLLY, S.J.

LYING

ANY person who observes cannot but be struck by the great variety of notions generally prevalent concerning lies. They are a difficult subject to handle, and we could wish that some persons more mature and more competent than ourselves had undertaken its treatment. We are desirous they may yet do so. In the meantime, as Irishmen away from home hear the now not unfrequent taunt that the Irish people have not a little to charge themselves with in this respect, and as this taunt is at times put forth for the purpose of injuring us, we are in hopes that our present endeavour may help to clear away false notions and also do something to dislodge a slander, which at times is levelled against our race and fatherland.

It is quite evident that whatever does not square with facts is false. Yet not every falsehood is a lie, nor is every lie a falsehood—except from a subjective standpoint. A mistake differs from a lie in this, that a mistake is usually a non-deliberate, a non-intended act, whereas a lie is always deliberate and intended to a greater or lesser extent. A mistake might be called not unfrequently a material lie, because it is used or may be used in the manufacture of a lie.

Lies, as commonly understood, are found in the expressing or setting forth of our ideas to others. The province of lying, therefore, will always be either speech, written or spoken or its equivalent. St. Thomas¹ defines a lie as a *locutio contra mentem*, 'a speaking contrary to one's present knowledge,' 'a speech against one's mind.'² Under

¹ *Summa*, ii., ii., q. cx., art. i.

² *Aquinas Ethicus*, (Father Joseph Rickaby, S.J.), vol. ii. p. 215. We quote practically all our references and translations from this excellent book.

the term *locutio*, St. Thomas wishes us to embrace all intelligible external expressions of human thought.

Speech holds the foremost place among signs. And therefore when it is said that a lie is a false intimation given by speech, under the name speech is understood every sign. Hence he would not be guiltless of lying who by nods and becks should endeavour to give any false intimation.¹

Further, a *locutio* is not addressed merely to oneself, but to others. 'It takes two to make a speech,' as Father Joseph Rickaby, S. J., observes, for 'a man does not properly speak to himself.'² We may, therefore, conclude that, strictly speaking, no man lies to himself.

If we are to get a clear notion of a 'lie' we must pass under strict review the precise content of the three terms, *locutio*, *contra*, and *mentem*. This we now proceed to do.

Having already defined *locutio* as an intelligible external expression of human thought, we must seek whence a *locutio* derives its power of signification. We are all well aware of the old division of 'natural signs' and 'arbitrary signs,' that is to say, certain signs derive their signification from their own very nature or from their natural association; others from the 'agreement or free will' of men. We may be allowed for the sake of clearness to modify this division somewhat, without pretending either to introduce any new fundamental basis of division, or any definite psychological reason for doing so. Thus we shall consider *locutio* as it is, 'natural,' 'arbitrary,' and 'figurative.'

A *locutio* may be termed natural when the very sound of the words gives its signification or when under certain circumstances, such as danger, fear, sorrow, etc. Of themselves the *locutiones* convey but one definite meaning to any human being, no matter what may be his language or nationality. It ought to be clear that such language suggests its meaning as naturally as smoke suggests fire. Thus, in danger of his life, the cries uttered by an individual will clearly convey to any human being the idea 'help

¹ *Aquinas Ethicus*, vol. ii. p. 216.

² *Moral Phil.*, p. 226.

required,' 'intense fear,' etc. It ought also to be clear that those natural signs may at times be used as a *locutio contra mentem*, e.g., where a person utters such a *locutio* to express to others ideas, states, or feelings that are none of his; and he may do so for many reasons. This dislodges the theory we sometimes hear propounded that the arbitrary meaning men give to words will always determine what is and what is not their meaning, and so what is and what is not a lie.

Arbitrary.—This generally means that the words of any given language have, by common consent, a settled and definite signification. In a living language this settled meaning is not always the same. Time, particular provinces, districts, and professions may much modify the meaning of any given word or expression. Time and its accompanying circumstances not unfrequently change the meaning of a word. And to insist on giving certain expressions of Shakespeare a present-day meaning were ridiculous, except perchance in places where Shakespeare's meaning still prevails. This is doubtless the case in some parts of Ireland. Indeed, a comic song may change the meaning of a given expression in a few years. We once heard of a young preacher who, in a delightfully poetic May sermon, used an expression then current in the theatre. It highly amused some of the audience. In certain provinces and districts many expressions and phrases have a modified or peculiar meaning. This meaning the people of the district both understand and attach to these *locutiones*. To 'get a gate' in Lancashire means 'to begin.' The fact that a stranger, a workman, actually got a gate when his master used the expression, does not prove that his master told a lie, or had any wish to mislead. Thus, too, 'I'm not at home,' 'I cannot sing, play,' etc., 'I don't know,' simply mean 'It is inconvenient for me to see you, to sing, play, or to tell you.' To these we may add certain expressions of society: 'I'm very sorry,' 'I'm very glad,' 'You play admirably,' etc., which in ordinary signification are mere polite expressions of mere sympathy, encourage-

ment, etc. We do not wish to convey that people never mean those expressions ; but we do say that society attaches its own meaning to them, and that it by no means gives them the meaning they bear in ordinary language. In many cases too with business people, the expressions used about certain articles : ' Very good,' ' Will suit admirably,' etc., have in general a modified, or, if we may so express it, a 'business meaning,' and, usually speaking, no person interprets those expressions in the precise meaning language in general gives to such words. It may be objected that this or that district, this or that portion of society or of business, ought not to use ordinary expression with a peculiar or modified meaning. The fact, however, is that such use really exists and it is use not logic that rules a language. ' Use,' writes Roscommon, ' is the judge, the law and the rule of speech.' Finally, that different professions and sciences give a modified or peculiar meaning to certain words and expressions is so well known that we need not insist much upon the fact. ' Appendix,' for instance, has one meaning for the physician, another for the lawyer or *littérateur*. What has here been said about 'arbitrary locutio' will show that in many cases a 'lie,' is 'taken' not 'given,' and that people are misunderstood and dubbed 'liars' simply because of the ignorance of their audience, be it one or more persons, who know but little about the meaning of the 'local expressions' of everyday life, of society, or of business.

Figuratively.—A *locutio* is used figuratively when the circumstances show that it is employed to express a meaning that it has not either in its natural or in its arbitrary (whether local, professional, etc.) signification. Thus when scorn or contempt prompts the expressions 'Oh, he's a good man'; 'He has a sweet temper,' etc., we know quite well that just the contrary is the fact. Or when a man standing in the broad sunshine suddenly exclaims: 'Oh, how wet it is now,' we know our speaker merely wishes to express an incongruity, or to point a joke owing to some previous blunder of one of the company. In polite literature figures are used which in ordinary language are undoubted

exaggerations or the reverse. So, too, in great or poetic occasions, when many exaggerations are used, by a kind of 'polite licence' we may allow that they are but brilliant and more expressive settings forth of some clear truth. We may say the same about certain expressions concerning the faults of others, where the language expresses less than the real facts of the case, and where both the speaker and the audience quite understand the drift of the remarks. We do not wish those suggestions or interpretations of what is the ordinary usage (what we know daily takes place) to be pushed too far. We say only that a reasonable allowance ought to be made, and that it would be ridiculous to interpret a book without any reference to the context. So, too, is it ridiculous either to use or to interpret a *locutio* without reference both to the text and context, if we may so express the matter. When, therefore, the context shows that no meaning is attached to a *locutio*—as where a man speaks an evident and utter absurdity—we must not attach a meaning thereto, nor think the speaker meant us to attach a meaning thereto. In such a case we cannot accuse the speaker of a 'lie'; for where there is no *locutio* there can be no lie. It is well to remember, too, that at times the language of our fellowmen, if we will understand them aright, requires quite as judicious an exercise of our brain-power as the reading of a book or a newspaper.

Contra.—This means that in the circumstances (a) the *locutio* employed cannot rationally express our 'mind'; (b) it expresses something else which nevertheless our audience *must* rationally think, under the circumstances, our present mind concerning the subject in hand. We have said 'must,' for it may indeed happen that the *locutio* under the circumstances is quite ambiguous—it bears two or more reasonable meanings; the exact one, with reference to the speaker's mind, the audience are unable to determine.

Is such ambiguous *locutio* '*contra mentem*'? Clearly, as far as the audience is concerned, it cannot be strictly called a *locutio* '*contra*' *mentem*, for objectively it does truly express the speaker's mind. But is the speaker himself in the case guilty of a lie? To our mind, it all depends on

his intention. The speaker may wish by the 'ambiguous *locutio*' (a) really to express his mind; (b) in the circumstances to express nothing further than his weariness and desire to get rid of an unwelcome questioner on a matter wherein he wishes to keep his mind to himself; (c) really and positively to express something else than his mind, intending his audience to understand that something else as his own very mind concerning the subject in hand. In (a) and (b) we have no hesitation in saying there is no *locutio contra mentem*, and therefore no lie. In (c) there is a decided *locutio contra mentem* on the speaker's part, and therefore undoubtedly a 'lie.' Here we quite agree with Cardinal Newman that equivocation (c) differs not from a 'lie'—if we interpret the great Cardinal correctly; but we quite disagree with him if he wishes to embrace under a 'lie' equivocation (a) and (b). It seems to us, moreover, that in his *Apologia* the teaching of St. Alfonso Liguori is misrepresented. The Cardinal's words are somewhat ambiguous, so we shall quote the passage: 'St. Alfonso Liguori, then, it cannot be denied, lays down that an equivocation (that is, a play upon words, in which ONE sense is taken by the speaker and ANOTHER sense intended by him for the hearer) is allowable.'¹ Now, to our mind St. Alfonso clearly teaches that in an equivocation the speaker really expresses his mind and really intends to express his mind even for his hearer, though he allows that his hearer 'ex sua incuria vel inadvertentia decipiatur.'² Again,³ St. Alfonso writes: 'Simulatio formalis nempe cum quis intendit per factum externum aliud significare quam in animo habet, haec nunquam est licita, quia est verum mendacium facti ut docet D. Th.' Thus St. Alfonso's view seems identical with equivocation (a) above, and it is quite evident such equivocation—at least it seems to us—and 'ex justa causa' is always allowable. Whereas equivocation (c) is a 'verum mendacium facti' and 'haec (simulatio) est nunquam licita.'

¹ *Apologia*, p. 169.

² *Moral Theol.*, lib. iii., tract. ii., De Secundo Praec. Decal. dubium iy.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 334.

Mentem means the speaker's present personal notion, conviction, knowledge of the subject in question, or, to put it literally, 'the speaker's own present mind concerning what he is speaking of, questioned about, etc. We may now dispose of the puerile objection. A person who lies both knows the meaning of the *locutio* he uses and also wishes to express that meaning: this is, his 'mind' and intention. There is, then, no *locutio contra mentem*, and therefore no lie. The objection shows that in every wilful lie there is an element of truth. Yet the equivocation on the word 'mind' is obvious. Either the meaning of the words used, under the circumstances, expresses the speaker's ideas or personal convictions on the subject in hand (and is intended to express these same), or it does not. If it does there is no lie. If it does not then there is a *locutio contra mentem*, and undoubtedly a 'lie.'

This leads us to our final discussion: what intention is required on the part of the speaker before he is guilty of a lie? Is the intention to utter a *locutio contra mentem* sufficient? or is there further required the intention to deceive? Many think the further intention to deceive is required. Paley somewhere says: 'It is wilful deceit that makes a lie'; and St. Augustine¹ writes: 'To utter a falsehood with the will to deceive is undoubtedly a lie.' To us indeed the 'intention to deceive' does not seem essential. People often tell lies with no further intention than to conceal their thoughts, or to hide something they do not wish to be known. A general who constructs a false battery to deceive the enemy is not considered guilty of a 'lie.' Deception is merely the result, and by no means the necessary result, of lying, as the observation of the life-events of every day will amply prove. The reasoning of St. Thomas hereon is to us comprehensive and conclusive:—

If, then [he writes], these three elements all combine; that the assertion made is false, that there is the will to make a false assertion, and lastly the intention to deceive: then there is falsehood materially, because what is said is false; and falsehood

¹ *Ethics*, c. iii., sec. ii., n. 7.

formally on account of the will to utter what is false ; and falsehood effectively on account of the will to create a false impression. Nevertheless, the essential character of lying is derived from formal falsehood or from the fact of having the will to assert what is false.¹

Thus, following St. Thomas, we think to be guilty of a lie the speaker requires no further intention than the intention really to utter a *locutio contra mentem*.

We may conclude this endeavour with the following remarks. Equivocation undoubtedly is lawful for a just cause ; and this just cause varies from a slight inconvenience to a very serious or grave one, according to the importance of the matter in hand. It is lawful also to keep one's thoughts to oneself (except in extraordinary circumstances, i.e., a witness before the court). Thus knowing the natural desire many Irish people have to conceal their thoughts on certain matters—especially to prying strangers—knowing also the versatility of Irish wit, which can express the truth in an original and obscure fashion, and yet with perfect correctness, may it not be said—and we know in many cases it may be said with sincere truth—that the diplomacy of Irish simplicity is often mistaken for lying. Many phrases and expressions used in Ireland bear a modified or local meaning. Irish people, too, more perhaps than the peoples of the neighbouring islands, always think that their audience ought to interpret words and phrases according to reasonable circumstances.

These facts, and many more that might be added, will show to any fair-minded person that no matter how good their intentions, casual visitors to Ireland, whether their stay be for a month or two in different parts of the country, are no competent judges of the veracity of the Irish people, and that their ignorance both of the English-Irish language and dialects, and of the character of the Irish nation, apart from their own peculiar notions on the subject of lying, is liable to betray them into manifold unjust errors concerning the children of Erin.

¹ *Aquinas Ethicus*, vol. ii. p. 215.

At times we have no doubt but this has actually happened. Now we do not deny that many lies are told in Ireland—even as many lies as are told in other nations—yet we believe that on a just examination of a competent judge or critic the Irish people will stand well to the forefront in the question of truth ; that they will be seen, as a nation, fully acting up to ‘ the true,’ the ideal of their Faith and national literature, and that their practical motto might be expressed in those words of ‘ Herbert ’ :—

Dare to be true.
Nothing can need a lie
A fault that needs it most
Grows two thereby.¹

Lying is base and wicked. It should be cried down by all upright and spirited people. It is as injurious to nations as to individuals.

JOSEPH BROSNAM, M.A.

¹ *Church Porch.*

CARDINAL VAUGHAN: A STUDY

FOR Irishmen to consider the personality of Herbert Vaughan is not easy. He was an Englishman, and he was strongly opposed to the political objects for which nine Irishmen out of ten would give their lives. But only an international Church can permit nationalism among her clergy. It is the sects that are ever ranged on the sides of classes and not of nations. Herbert Vaughan was a stout English nationalist, and we can forgive him when we reflect that England can only be restored to the Church under the guidance of men of her own breed and thought. In the past we find every nation supplying the Church with ecclesiasts and master-ecclesiasts after its manner—men who wrought and struggled in the service of heaven upon earth until they passed into the still records of history or hagiology. In its turn each nation came to wonder and rejoice as it beheld its national qualities enlightened and transfigured in the higher service. England could be no exception. The workings of the Church could not be excluded by the policy of ‘proud isolation.’ A succession of great prelates like Wolsey and Beaufort took a strong and vigorous place in the current of national life, and others there were, like St. Thomas of Canterbury, who mingled more of the heavenly politics in their great earthly career. But one and all they found themselves coming to variance with public opinion, and even if they won due recognition and admiration in the end it was not till they had ceased to trouble the ambitions or consciences of their fellow-countrymen. In recent years England has astonished the world as much as herself by a unique succession of men whose Cardinalatial dignities did not conceal the clay whence they were digged and the rock whence they had been hewn.

The biography of Cardinal Vaughan is the record of the last of that line—a line whose like the Church will

hardly see again. It is no secret to say that Mr. Snead-Cox has written more than an account of a stirring life: he has revealed a personality. Cardinal Vaughan's noble presence was familiar to the public, but few seemed to have realized what lay behind. Strange to relate, he was considerably misunderstood by many of his own clergy, and dislike met him from within as well as from without the fold. He had succeeded by right to that fitful but distinguishing unpopularity by which the English public had already attracted universal attention to the qualities of a Wiseman and a Manning. Wiseman had long held the field as the bugbear of 'papal aggression,' and after him Manning had received all the hate that is due to a 'pervert's machinations,' but it was in Vaughan that the keen-sighted discovered the filled cup of 'sacerdotal haughtiness and pretence.'

Since then the biographer has come upon the scene, and without the prejudice of a zealot or of an *advocatus diaboli* has set down the stark truth that friend and foe may judge how far their estimates were correct. He has distinguished between the prelate who put a bold face on the outward world and the man who stooped to wrestle with his soul, between the ecclesiastical busybody and the concentrated spirit, between the 'Vaughan manner' and the man of Christ. For in this case it was not the manner that made the man.

Though it has been remarked that the English people have generally little use for saints, they seem to have been at some trouble to understand this most perplexing of the mediæval figures who have recently stepped amid their modern life. It is curious also to note that the only two Englishmen of this generation who have been spoken of by their intimates as saintly, and saintly in the supra-conversational sense, should have met with such singular treatment at the hands of their fellow-countrymen, for a well-intentioned effort was made to clap the first of them, the High Church Bishop of Lincoln, into prison, while the other, the eminent subject of our study, was pilloried as a charlatan, and a dangerous one at that. To put it shortly, the former was

dismissed with a *caution*, while the latter was held up as *one*. One can only hope that some of his critics may come to read his life with that increase of wisdom and sadness which second thoughts are wont to beget.

The different chapters of Cardinal Vaughan's life unfold themselves like a torn but triumphant banner above the rising fane of English Catholicism. Their message is clear and well-woven. They should give little trouble to the Bollandists and to his contemporaries still less.

From the days of his childhood spent at the old family house at Courtfield, on through his Roman years, past his headlong missionary exploit in America, past the tumultuous Salford episcopate, and his final struggles as a Prince of the Blood Royal of the Church, the life of Herbert Vaughan reads like the pages of a stirring spiritual romance. He started with many assets, but not too many talents, towards a great ecclesiastical career. There was in his favour a long Catholic tradition, the emulation of his brethren, the friendship of Manning, and, above all, the brooding prayers of his mother. If we may judge from a memory of those days the value of religious atmosphere was well appreciated in the Vaughan household. It was the custom for the children to dress up on the Feast of the Holy Innocents in the habits of different Orders, and 'to preach each other down until a pandemonium was reached amid clouds of incense and a blaze of candles round the schoolroom statue'—an entertainment corresponding to the Biblical charades we sometimes meet in the livelier of Protestant homes.

Later we have a glimpse of the eldest of these play-fellows at Rome through the eyes of Aubrey de Vere. He speaks of a 'handsome young aristocrat sitting up half the night to read St. Thomas Aquinas, and then dreaming that people had been burning him alive and that it gave him no pain'—the dreams of martyrdom that come to the chosen as dreams of success come to other men. Then follow in quick succession the menace of death, an ordination fore-dated by eighteen months that he might be a priest and die, the vice-presidency of St. Edmund's, and a rush through

the two Americas on behalf of a missionary college still unborn; but it was in this, the first scheme of many, that he rang a needed note. He realized as none of his generation that the religious life of a country is always in proportion to the number of priests it sends out to fulfil the last Commandment that was left with the Apostles, and as far as one man was able he set out to wipe a certain stigma from English Catholicism. When he returned he founded Mill Hill College with the same impetuosity that marked all the public actions of his life. To men of the world his dealings always appeared unaccountable, for if he was practical one moment he baffled them with his childishness the next. The house and grounds were secured by the 'spiritual dodge' of leaving St. Joseph wrapped up in brown paper in a cupboard. He was always acting as though the spiritual world was really a fact, which is a disconcerting attitude even for a priest. It was in the same spirit in after years that when he was engaged in his famous dispute with the Jesuits he said Mass over the body of St. Ignatius, praying the saint to whip his sons, which he did.

The new institution was devoted to a one and only purpose with all a visionary's love. Everything was turned to account. Even the gold-fish pond was used to inculcate the shivering novices with some notions of fording African rivers in later life, while such fish as they scooped out in buckets were sold for the needs of the community. It is interesting to note that the founder attributed the success of the College more to the humiliations and crosses he had endured on his begging journeys than to any dollars he was able to collect.

The work of his life commenced with his call to the Bishopric of Salford. He undertook the work with mingled enthusiasms and misgivings. He placed the Brief from Rome on the altar to receive it thence from Our Lord and then from the hands of the Immaculate, and finally at St. Joseph's feet. It sounds very like the child's play of the Middle Ages, very charming in a child but rather strained as the act of a grown man—unless he, too, happens to be 'of such is the Kingdom'

Shortly, but sublimely, he outlined what he conceived to be the correspondences between the Christ of Judæa and a bishop of to-day : (1) He was derided by the multitude ; (2) men, women and children pressed round Him the whole way ; (3) the whole way was marked with His Blood ; (4) the people were marked with His Blood. And again, throughout the private papers which reveal the inner man and make the biography one of flesh and blood, we find amid the most practical memoranda the note of a dreamer : 'Have three places prepared at dinner for guests in honour of the Blessed Trinity, or two in honour of the two disciples going to Emmaeus.'

His life as a Bishop was tremendous. During its twenty years he never ceased to hurry and beg and pray, and yet he never appeared to have a second or a penny or a prayer over. It was said that even the most zealous blessed the fact that the Bishop of Salford never had ten minutes to spare or he would have initiated another scheme. The first warning the diocese had of their new Bishop was in the heading of a local paper, 'The Bishop of Salford buys the Manchester Aquarium.' It was true. At 4 p.m. on the day of purchase he had entered into possession, and by 5.30 he was delivering a lucid explanation of his notions to an audience gathered on the spur of the moment. He wished to frustrate the music-hall gentry and save the neighbourhood of his new College from contamination. It was a bold stroke, and it was followed up by an advertisement in all the Catholic shops, wherein the educational value of fish was clearly set forth. To the wonder of friend and foe the Bishop had started to run a show where showmen had tried and failed. A Monsignore was sent to the docks to purchase an alligator—followed closely by a conger-eel. Then by another happy thought the silences attached to the 'voiceless children of the brine' were broken by a cheerful cargo of cockatoos. As to the subsequent escape of the alligator and the transformation of the whole building into a part of the College—are they not written in the book of the chronicles of Salford ?

Whatever Mgr. Vaughan set his hand to do he did it

with his whole heart, and thereby accomplished much that was large and chivalrous and sometimes magnificent, and even though his natural impulse led him at times to perform the ludicrous, his action never partook of meanness or vulgarity. He was not afraid to act as openly as he spoke. He initiated a great mission in Manchester by carrying a cross barefoot round his cathedral. He was right, for the eyes of men have never tired of Sacred Drama: but not every ecclesiast could do the same. Before long he was campaigning on behalf of the unfortunate children who are yearly lost to the Faith through the twin forces of proselytism and neglect. Once more he struck the right note when he set aside his income for three years for the purpose. Indifference to money is almost the only trait of the supernatural which Englishmen can recognize. Nothing is more striking than the flat contradiction of a national vice.

When he was translated to Westminster he carried on the same fight for the children until a stiff skirmish led to victory. One who had saved little blackamoors as an unknown priest by sheer power of word and act was not likely to throw up the struggle when he found himself dealing with the waifs and strays of his own Archdiocese. He insisted that every Catholic child should be taken in, funds permitting or not. The nightmare of financial debt he was always ready to meet with a *sangfroid* acquired from facing even more haunting phantoms. He would have no half measures, because he believed with all the belief of a Vaughan that he had been sent to combat for that very purpose as emphatically as he believed later it was his mission to plant a 'live' cathedral at Westminster and that he had been inspired to learn German for the sole purpose of once shriving an old dying woman he came across in Royston. Money counted low down in the list of difficulties. 'Do you make this pay?' he once asked an officer of the Salvation Army, and the answer that it was always on that principle they worked, confirmed him in his dislike of that body. He had not taken over the Manchester Aquarium to make it pay, and no Mill Hill dividends had dazzled his subscribers in the markets of finance.

His later years were marked by disappointments that succeeded each other like milestones, but they tended to bring out his deep-set power to translate every cross into its spiritual value, while the assurance that every humiliation or ill-success was for his own good led him into many a reckless exploit. It is still fresh history how he contrived the restoration of St. Edmund's relics from France to Rome and thence to England only to be met with sure historical disproof in the correspondence columns of the *Times*. He accepted the entire blame and mockery that fell upon the affair and consoling himself only that 'God is not mocked,' he passed on to his next scheme. Neither in the day of advancement or the night of regression did his humility fail him. The old English hymn seemed to be his :—

For whoso suff'reth here despite
And meekly abideth in that battail,
It will turn them to great profit
And endless joy for their travail.

When he was appointed Metropolitan he wrote at length to the Pope mentioning the formidable list of his deficiencies. After discounting himself as preacher, author, theologian and philosopher, he expressed a fear lest a certain tenacity in his character might lead him to compromise the interests of religion by errors of judgment. It was truly and bravely spoken. He did not mention that he was one of those 'who walked and talked where others reposed and whispered.' But Rome had taken stock of him long before he wrote.

When his strenuous mind was not struggling in the lists of man it turned round upon his inner soul with all the alacrity of a public prosecutor. Every question of conscience meant a struggle, every problem a fight without mercy, and every great decision a battle royal, but whatever the verdict was it was accepted humbly and without repining. He was always at great pain to keep the mean between his individual unworthiness and the dignity of his office, between the mortification necessary to an ascetic and the needful nutrition of a human being. All these questions remain argued out for us in his diaries. When

Father Rickaby had insisted on his eating what he relished he notes : ' Still some little mortification might surely come in every day as salt to the food '—so the soul had the last say after all.

Even his daily behaviour came before this unforgiving tribunal, and the *proces verbal* of some survives : ' To be polite is to give pleasure ; it is charitable to give pleasure. I must overcome this silence and moroseness in the morning ' ; while the question of the use or uselessness of dining out in society passed from a skirmish to a thirty years' war. On the one hand he set down the reasons for : the example of our Lord, the desirability of becoming acquainted with the powers that be ; while the reasons against included the example of the Vicar of Christ, of St. Charles Borromeo, the advice of Cardinal Franzoni, and the effect on the mind of the clergy. In the end a Concordat was stipulated between the opposing influences which permitted him to judge each case upon its merits, but even then clause 3 was marked : ' Will need watching.' Needless to say there is a note regarding the silences during a dinner, which were to be filled up with aspirations of Divine Love. It was the same spiritual economy which set him turning the odd moments and occupations of his life to eternal worth. He prayed for hours before the Blessed Sacrament as part of his daily work, but he prayed when he was being driven to and fro through London. As long as beautiful scenery or gaudy luxury remained the haunt of unsaved souls, the hills of Wales and the salons of the town fell within his missionary effort. To him a walk through Hyde Park might be made an approach to the ' place of many mansions,' while a breakdown on a suburban line was as good as a spiritual retreat. A railway seat became a *prie-dieu*, and an enclosed cab served as a temporary cell.

He was not afraid to take the spirit of medievalism, and to set it up as his standard of life in London. As a receipt of neuralgia he suggested a ' good *Deo gratias* in response to each twinge ' ; and he said oddly enough that he fed on them himself. He spoke his thought outright, and no more glossed his meaning or sugared his words than St. Hugh of

Lincoln was wont to, though it led to misunderstandings on the part of many. It is generally the case in our complex age that when straight, four-square men blurt out truths or mention a spade in terms of a spade that they are taken for simpletons or else very acute diplomatists. Cardinal Vaughan was neither : he just spoke his thought. When he was asked to sympathize over a child that had died in innocency he could only remark, 'Best thing that could have happened'; and so it was, if Catholic doctrine is true—and it was on the understanding of its truth that he lived and thought and prayed. It prepared him for many trials and disappointments, for conflicts among his flock, the tragedy of Fort Augustus, the comedy of St. Edmund's relics. When the apostasy of the O'Hagans was announced his answer was sublime : 'I do not think they can have been saying their prayers of late.' He never mentioned it again.

That he was equal to an occasion demanding his tact and magnanimity is shown by the famous letter he wrote to congratulate Lord Acton on his appointment to the Professorship of History at Cambridge.

I know and understand something of the awful trials you must have gone through in years past, and I cannot but thank God that you are what I believe you to be, faithful and loyal to God and to His Church, though perhaps, by your great learning and knowledge of the human in this same Church, tried beyond other men,

is but one sentence from that masterpiece of conciliation. It is by a spirit of generosity such as this that the allegiance of great intellects can be preserved to the Church. Yet the same pen often touched the strange realism of the medieval :—

Deal with each wound [he wrote] wound of the Feet torn and bleeding, work of my sins towards Feet that have followed me in order to possess me. You are helpless before me, Feet nailed so that you cannot escape, Hands nailed so that you cannot wave me off or strike me for my sins.

One is reminded of the musings of the old English mystics, now, alas, passed over in books of devotion :—

The nails through Feet and Hands also
Help they me out of sin and woe,
That I have here in my life done
With hands handled or on feet gone.

When a liberal share of illness struck him down he was perfectly satisfied : ' I am always pleased with the idea that our Lord takes His servants in the midst of their activities and quietly lays them on the flat of their backs and otherwise renders them helpless.' When there was no sickness to torment him we find some such memorandum : ' To cultivate the discipline every Wednesday and Friday, even though I have not the courage to inflict severe punishment.' He left no loophole.

It must not be supposed that his spiritual life was one clear vision of the unseen. Several moments of ' theological anguish ' are recorded during his life. When asking for the prayers of a religious he once compared himself to one who was on deck, and added that it was very cold and rough, and sometimes very dark. It was this spiritual darkness that fell upon him shortly before he was ordained, and his death-bed many years after was curtained by the same torment of dereliction. As the long and harshly schooled body fell into the stage of final weakness it began to drag down the spirit that had so long domineered its works. The shadow of the pit crept up against his soul. The pangs of hell got hold upon him. It seemed that the weary, jaded corpse was to overpower its bright rider after all. The ghastly riddle of materialism assailed him in some form, and a loneliness and bewilderment, which in younger days he might have thrown aside with a smile, were suffered to make trial of that uncowering heart. For a while during his last illness he lay struggling amid the shadows, and the most awful of shadows, the perishing wraith of all he had most truly believed in during his life. But these are the mysteries of Gethsemane which no man may interpret. He lived long enough to reach the calm which lies behind the appalling

twilight of doubt, and with that calm came the certain mercies of death.

The life of Cardinal Vaughan must be reckoned among the lives of great Englishmen, but it remains almost *suo genere* as an example of a man who, amid the welter of circumstance and fact, shaped a great and lonely career according to the standards of the supernatural—a career marked by that greatness and that loneliness which must inevitably come about a spiritual man who moves through an age of crowds and materialism.

In conclusion, if we may use a term which has been upon the tip of our pen while writing this essay, we would say that, with the exception of Bishop Challoner's life, no portrait of an English Bishop since the Reformation has come down to us in terms so human and yet so sanctified, so unhappy and yet so glorified, so stricken of disappointment and yet so laden of triumphs, in which a reader might conceive that he had been reading a *prima-facie* proposition towards the process of canonization.

SHANE LESLIE.

Notes and Queries

THEOLOGY

THE MORAL PRINCIPLES OF AN ANONYMOUS WRITER IN THE 'TABLET'

THE following letter appeared in the *Tablet*, November 19, 1910 :—

SIR,—I think I detected a tone of mild surprise in your note last week on the solution given in the current number of the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* of a case of conscience about the transfer of railway tickets. I think your surprise is not without foundation. Dr. Harty condemns the Superioress of a convent to make restitution to the railway company because two Sisters of her convent who had return tickets transferred them to two other Sisters to be used by them for their return journey. Restitution is an irksome duty whenever injustice has been done, but its very irksomeness should make us hesitate to impose it unless the obligation is quite certain. Is the obligation certain in this case? I think not. The Sisters had bought the right to make the return journey on the railway. They transferred that right to two of their Sisters. What prevents them from doing this? Their contract, says Dr. Harty; the tickets are not transferable. But the Sisters never entered into a contract not to transfer the tickets.

On the contrary, they intended to transfer them when they bought them. The fact that the railway company prints *not transferable* on its tickets does not make that one of the terms of the contract; it does not make the right which the traveller buys inalienable. The railway companies for their own profit strive to make all sorts of conditions essential terms of the contract, but neither the law of the land nor the common sense of the travelling public dreams of accepting all their terms. So that I fail to see why the Superioress should be compelled to make restitution to the railway company.

NOLI ESSE JUSTUS MULTUM (Eccles. vii. 17).

The writer of this letter superabundantly shows his

right to his *nom de guerre*. Both his logic and his theology are hopelessly at fault.

‘The railway companies for their own profit strive to make all sorts of conditions essential terms of the contract, but neither the law of the land nor the common sense of the travelling public dreams of accepting all their terms. So I fail to see why the Superioress should be compelled to make restitution to the railway company.’ The law of the land and the travelling public do not accept *all* the terms of the railway company; therefore they do not accept *this* particular condition! Where did ‘*Noli esse justus multum*’ learn logic?

‘But the Sisters never entered into a contract not to transfer the tickets. On the contrary, they intended to transfer them when they bought them.’ Students of theology know only too well what a deluge of injustice this principle would bring on the theological world. Its immorality is patent to one who considers the theology of fictitious consent. If the goods bought have been accepted and used, the fair price must be paid even though the purchaser did not intend to bind himself when the contract was formed. What is true about the price is true also of all reasonable conditions of the contract which the seller imposed when he entered into the contract. Any ordinary manual of Moral Theology makes this teaching clear.

That the condition imposed in this particular case is reasonable sensible men as well as the law of the land will admit. Is it reasonable on the part of a railway company to charge less for a double journey than for two single journeys? Till ‘*Noli esse justus multum*’ faces this question he is only beating the air. Men of business will answer the question in the affirmative, and it follows at once that the ‘non-transferable’ condition is eminently fair.

For the law of the land I quote the following conclusive passage from Disney’s *Carriage by Railway* :—

In *Langdon v. Howells*, a man took a tourist return ticket from Ludlow to Milford. He broke the journey at Hereford, and subsequently went to Milford by a different route, retaining

his ticket. The respondent bought the outward half of the ticket from him and used it to travel to Milford. He gave a false account as to how he had come by it, and the ticket was marked 'not transferable.' The company accordingly took proceedings against him for travelling without having previously paid his fare, and with intent to avoid payment thereof. The magistrates refused to convict, but the High Court held that the respondent should have been convicted. Cockburn C.J., said: '*It is not a case of a single ticket taken by A, but which A, being unable to use it, hands over to B, a case which possibly might admit of different considerations. The ticket was a return ticket which the company issues at a cheaper rate, because they find it advantageous to issue tickets to persons intending to return, at a cheaper rate. If it is given by the original taker to a person who seeks to use it for a single journey, and so to travel at the cheaper rate for such journey, it seems to me clear that such person does travel without having previously paid his fare with intent to avoid payment thereof.*'¹

I also refer my readers to the law reports of the *Times*, November 12, 1910, and of the *Freeman's Journal*, November 14, 1910. Four men, of whom two were old offenders, put into practice the principles of 'Noli esse justus multum.' They sold the return halves of excursion tickets which had been bought from the South Eastern and Chatham Railway Company, and which were marked 'not transferable.' They were charged at the Sussex Assizes with conspiracy to defraud the railway company. Mr. Justice Grantham sentenced them respectively to 12 months' imprisonment with hard labour, 9 months' imprisonment with hard labour, 2 months' imprisonment, and 1 month's imprisonment. A copy of the letter in the *Tablet* would cheer them in their lonely cells.

In view of Mr. Justice Grantham's decision, I admire the prudence with which the *Tablet's* correspondent concealed his identity.²

J. M. HARTY.

¹ Disney, *Carriage by Railway*. Second Edition, 1909, p. 211.

² In the *Tablet*, 26th November, 1910, three letters appeared on this subject. Two of them were strongly condemnatory of the principles of 'Noli esse justus multum,' and the third simply called attention to a decision of Mr. Justice Grantham.

CANON LAW

THE FORCE OF EXCOMMUNICATION. ARE EXCOMMUNICATES CATHOLICS?

REV. DEAR SIR,—May I ask you if excommunicated persons (excluding heretics, etc.) may still be regarded as Catholics? A certain author says that a Freemason ceases to be a Catholic, and I am told that the same should be said of any excommunicated person—therefore of a ‘notorius clerici percussor.’ It seems to me that, in the case of a Catholic who does not fail in faith or in acknowledging the authority of the Church, the force of excommunication is not that of ‘ejectio’ but that of ‘privatio,’ namely, that} such a person is not cast out of the Church, but only deprived (until absolved) of the benefits of membership. In ordinary parlance, does he not still remain a Catholic, but one under excommunication?

MISSIONARIUS.

As regards expulsion from the Church, there is one sense, at least, in which the thing is impossible. Baptism, which makes us members of the Catholic Church, once given can never be recalled. As a priest is a priest for ever, so is anyone born by Baptism into the Church, no matter what his subsequent career has been, in a true sense a Catholic for ever. We may find analogies in other societies. A nation can never completely expel anyone born into it. A Frenchman, for instance, born in France of French parents may be condemned and outlawed by the nation; he may be driven out and deprived of all the privileges and rights conferred on him by birth; he may assume the beliefs and manners of another State and espouse its interests against his native country; but he will remain, and be regarded by all men as, in a true sense, a Frenchman to the end.

Nor is this aspect of the case merely theoretical, as far, at least, as the Church is concerned. Her laws may follow him wherever he goes: they may bind him whether he merely separates from her or attaches himself to an heretical or pagan sect. He is a Catholic, then, in the sense

that he was born into the Church by Baptism : a Catholic also since he may be bound by Catholic laws.

And the connexion, at all events in the case of persons baptized in the Catholic Church, is so close that even the Head of the Church may speak of them as Catholics. The following is from the recent Decree *Ne temere* :—

XI. § 1. Statutis superius legibus tenentur omnes in catholica Ecclesia baptizati . . . (licet . . . illi ab eadem postea defecerint) quotiens inter se sponsalia vel matrimonium ineant.

§ 2. Vigent quoque pro iisdem de quibus supra catholicis, si cum acatholicis . . . sponsalia vel matrimonium contrahunt.

In a sense even the apostate, therefore, is a Catholic : ‘ de quibus supra *catholicis*.’

We need not dwell on this use of the term. It is purely technical. ‘ Ordinary parlance ’ does not admit it ; nor do the theologians, when they treat the general question of Church membership. It would justify ‘ Missionarius ’ in holding much more lenient views than he does, but, if admitted unreservedly, would extend the boundaries of Catholicism beyond anything the most liberal theologian ever dreamt of.

Abstracting, then, from this sense, there can be no doubt that the Church, like every other external society, has the power to expel, if she pleases, from her body members whose conduct brings serious discredit on her name or tends to frustrate the end she has in view. And that, too, irrespective of the faith they hold. Without such right no society could accomplish its purpose. Whether a person is so expelled will depend, therefore, entirely on the intention of the Church when she issues her decrees against him.

Now, it can hardly be doubted that sometimes the Church does really intend to exercise this power. St. Paul ordered the Corinthians to ‘ put away the evil one from among them,’ and ‘ deliver him to Satan for the destruction of the flesh.’¹ St. Cyprian says that certain excommunicates, if they continue in their sin, ‘ can never be admitted by us into the Church ’ ; ‘ the proud and contumacious are

¹ 1 Cor. v. 13, 5.

killed with the spiritual sword when they are expelled from the Church, for they cannot live outside, seeing that no one can be saved except in the Church.¹ Origen declares that 'sinners are separated for their crimes from the body of Christ,' and 'are driven from the Church by the priests.'² St. Jerome says that 'the fornicator, adulterer and homicide are driven out of the Church.'³ Nor were the Popes and Councils less emphatic when the occasion demanded it. The Council of Orange expelled 'the violators of churches from the bosom of Holy Mother Church, and from the fellowship of all Christendom.'⁴ Innocent III. says that a certain count 'expelled from the Church wanders outside her.'⁵ And Gregory VII. 'with the sword of anathema cut off and cast away [the adherents of a deposed Bishop at Ravenna] from the body of Christ—the Catholic Church.'⁶ and many other statements might be quoted to the same effect.

For us, however, the important question is not what the Church intended in earlier times, nor what she intends, or may intend, now in very special cases, but what effect she attaches, as a general rule, to her ordinary excommunication. And we believe with our correspondent that the intention is not to 'expel' but to 'deprive.' The very derivation of the word suggests it: 'a placing outside the communion' of the faithful; in other words, 'a medicinal spiritual penalty that deprives the guilty Christian of all participation in the common blessings of ecclesiastical society.'⁷ The bond, as we shall see, is not completely broken. The excommunicate is still in the Church, though he has lost the place and privileges he once enjoyed. He may be compared to a paralysed limb in the human body: the limb is practically dead; for the time being it has almost ceased to have any vital connexion with the body at all; but

¹ Ep. 62 ad Pomp.: 'nunquam admitti in Ecclesiam posse'; 'de Ecclesia ejiciuntur'; 'neque vivere foris possunt.'

² In 1 Tim., hom. 5, n. 2.

³ In Ep. at Tit., 2.

⁴ Baluz. capit., t. ii., 670: 'a gremio . . . eliminamus.'

⁵ Op. Inn. (Migne), t. 2, p. 1032: 'expulsus . . . extra eam vagari.'

⁶ Harduin, Conc. VI. i. 1371.

⁷ *The Cath. Encyc.*, v., 678.

it remains part of the body all the same. Or to a prisoner deprived of his civil rights and completely shut off from intercourse with his fellow-men: his nationality is of little practical advantage to him for the moment, but he remains one of the nation notwithstanding. And, therefore, when it is said that the excommunicate is 'cut off as a rotten member from the Church,'¹ and that excommunication is 'the expulsion from the external and internal membership of the Church, the complete withdrawal of all the graces and privileges acquired by Baptism, the separation from the living body of Christ and a thrusting back into the helpless state of unredeemed man,'² we should, we believe, understand the words in a qualified sense as expressing more than is really implied.

In determining who is a Catholic and who is not, Bellarmine's definition, adopted by most theologians, will give us some help. 'The Church,' he says, 'is the congregation of men on earth bound together by the profession of one and the same Christian faith and by the communion of the same sacraments, under the rule of legitimate pastors and particularly of the Roman Pontiff.'³ To be a perfect Catholic a man must reach the standard given. But there are degrees in Catholicity as in everything else. Not all Catholics are members of the Church in the same way and to the same extent. St. Thomas explains that there are different degrees of perfection in our union with Christ as Head of the Church;⁴ and Bellarmine, in the same chapter from which we have quoted, declares that 'some belong to the Church most perfectly,' while others, whose state he describes, are in it 'like the hair or the nails or the evil humours in the human body.' The full perfection of a thing may be wanting, and yet enough remain to justify us in maintaining that the thing is really such and nothing else. And so the question resolves itself into this: How far a Catholic may fall short of the full perfection of the definition

¹ Barg., *Jus. Can.*, ii., 518.

² Kober, *Excom.*, p. 32; Smith, *Elements*, iii., 277.

³ *De Ecc. Mil.*, c. 2.

⁴ ii., 8, 3.

without, in the common estimation of men, forfeiting his title to the name 'Catholic.' The Church has never decided the question: there are almost as many shades of opinion as there are theologians; about the facts of the case, the actual effects of excommunication for instance, there is no serious dispute whatever: the whole controversy regard the interpretation.¹

We believe, with Suarez, that the really decisive factor is faith. If a man professes his belief in all the Church teaches, and is, in consequence, submissive to legitimate ecclesiastical authority, the question of 'actual communion in the sacraments'—of which excommunication deprives him—will seldom give trouble. The Church cannot deprive a man of his faith: neither can she take away his submission to authority. Needless to say, she has no wish to do either. She may completely reject him from community of worship and so expel him from the fold. But her excommunication does not, we believe, except in very special cases such as those referred to in the quotations given above, produce that effect.

True, excommunicates are often public heretics, and therefore outside the pale. But it is fairly clear that excommunication as such does not make a man a non-Catholic. If it did, then all excommunications would have that effect. But they have not.

To take an instance or two. The public penitents of the early Church were subjected to a kind of minor excommunication,² inasmuch as they were excluded from the Church's sacraments. 'In the Church long ago,' says Suarez, 'there were other methods of punishment [besides the minor excommunication of which he has been speaking]: separation of the fallen Christian either from the reception of the Eucharist alone or from entry into the Church and

¹ As indicating the varying views taken even by the Roman Congregations, it is interesting to compare the rules laid down by the Holy Office on April 6, 1859 (in regard to marriage), with the decree *Ne temere*. Several classes regarded as 'heretics' in the former are called 'Catholics' in the latter. See Vermeersch on the late Decree, p. 51; or Lehmkühl, *Th. Mor.*, ii., 894 and 905 (note).

² Morinus, *De Poen.*, l. 6, c. 25.

participation in the divine services or from common prayers, and these all may be called minor excommunications.¹ But surely no one ever maintained that the penitents, who incurred all these, were ever anything but Catholics.

Or, take the minor excommunication of later times mentioned in all our manuals of Canon Law. It is no longer in force, but that does not affect the principle. Those subject to it were deprived of the passive use of the sacraments and of the right of being elected to ecclesiastical dignities. Could anyone possibly hold that they ceased to be members of the Church, or that they could be described as anything but Catholics? They were in much the same position as Catholics at the present day under sentence of personal interdict. No one denies the latter the title of Catholic; why should we the former?

Now the difference between various excommunications must be, after all, a difference of degree, not of kind. The effect of the minor excommunication is certainly deprivation not expulsion. Unless there is clear evidence to the contrary, we might expect, and are justified in maintaining, that the effect of the major excommunication is also deprivation—the withdrawal of further spiritual blessings—but not expulsion.

In fact, as regards the 'tolerati' the majority of theologians have little difficulty in admitting that they are Catholics.² And with reason. For could anyone really maintain, with any respect for the ordinary use of language, that a student, for instance, who in violation of the prohibition takes a book from our college library ceases on that account to be a Catholic? Or that a parish priest guilty of confidential simony is no longer a Catholic, though he holds his benefice and retains his jurisdiction and reads his Office daily as in duty bound?

Even as regards the 'vitandi,' there is a strong theological opinion in their favour. Their strongest advocate is Suarez. After showing by a variety of arguments that

¹ D. 14, s. 1, n. 3, 6.

² Zallinger, *Jus. Pub.*, n. 384; Antoine, c. 3, a. 1, § 5; Murray, *De Ecc.*, i., 207; Mazella, *De Ecc.*, p. 474, etc.

schismatics may, in a great number of cases, continue to be members of the Church, he says :—

And all this may be applied with still greater force to the case of excommunicated persons who are not schismatics. For in their case not only does faith remain but also union with the head. They are deprived of communion with the other members, but not of membership itself. It is as if one could exclude the hand or foot from the support or influence of the other members : the part would not on that account cease to be a member of the body. Besides, if that were not true, we might, as a consequence, maintain the absurd position that an excommunicated Bishop is no longer Bishop at all, since he has ceased to be a member of the Church.

He shows that the statements of the Fathers regarding schismatics are susceptible of a milder interpretation than some theologians were inclined to give them, and continues :—

The objections brought forward have still less application to the excommunicates, for the Fathers never say that an excommunicated person is thereby placed outside the Church : he is merely separated, they say, from the Church's communion. . . . Or if it is stated anywhere that an excommunicated person or a schismatic is outside the Church, that is to be understood in a qualified sense and merely as indicating a comparison with the other members : for, absolutely speaking, he is still substantially united with the Church.¹

That, we are sure, is the opinion of the ordinary faithful also. In deciding whether a man is a Catholic or not they are guided almost exclusively by the faith he professes and the ecclesiastical authority he recognizes. He ceases, in their judgment, to be a Catholic when he has 'lost the faith.' And in matters of this kind the opinion of the ordinary Catholic, based on broad general principles, is often more valuable than that of the expert whose eyes are blinded by the multitudinous details of technical science.

To come to the instances given by our correspondent. The 'percussor clerici' will, in a great number of cases, escape the brand of the 'vitandus.' He is 'tolerated,'

¹ Suarez, *De Fide*, a. 9, s. 1, n. 14.

unless, in the words of Pope Martin V., he has 'so notoriously incurred the penalty that the fact cannot be concealed by any subterfuge or excused by any principle of law,' or, as the theologians explain, 'unless there is not merely certainty about the fact but some 'notoriety of law' also; unless, that is, the culprit has been convicted of his crime in the courts or has confessed it there, or has openly boasted of it and shown contempt for the ecclesiastical penalty.'¹ And even though all this is verified and he becomes a 'vitandus,' he will still, in the opinion of Suarez, remain a Catholic. And the common sense of the Catholic community will, as we have said, endorse Suarez' decision.

And then as to the Freemason. Unless his crimes are very notorious he will not be personally excommunicated and denounced by the Pope. Being therefore a 'tolerated' excommunicate he will, according to the general verdict of theologians, still be a Catholic. Even though the personal denunciation does come, there is still a probable opinion in his favour and we are justified in giving them the title. Of course, his joining the sect may lead to the adoption of heresy. If he keeps his heretical opinions to himself or expresses them only to a few, he probably remains within the Church;² for, like every other external society, the Church in reference to matters of this kind is guided by his public profession not by his secret thoughts or his private life. If he has publicly expressed his heretical views or joined an heretical sect, he ceases to be a member of the Catholic Church—but not by reason of the excommunication.

This view is confirmed by a Roman decision. In 1883 the Holy Office was consulted as to the proper treatment of penitents who found it extremely inconvenient to remove their names at once from the roll of condemned societies. On the 7th March it replied that 'taking into account what had been stated, the Catholics about whom there was question should be admitted to the Sacraments, after

¹ Lehmkuhl, *Th. Mor.*, ii., 1128.

² Bellar., *op. cit.*, iii., 10; à Lapidè in Ephes. 4, 16; Perrone, *De Rel.*, ii., 196, etc.

absolution from censures, provided,' etc.¹—which shows that, in the opinion of these high authorities, the members of these societies should still be spoken of as Catholics, notwithstanding the excommunication they had incurred.

To sum up: Apart from very special excommunications, a Catholic, we believe, retains a right to the name until he has joined an heretical or pagan sect, or otherwise publicly professed his disbelief in the dogmas of the Church. Excommunication as such leaves the title intact. This acceptation of the word, supported as we have seen by some of the leading authorities in the Church, seems to harmonize best with the convictions of the ordinary faithful and with the principles that govern every other human society.

M. J. O'DONNELL.

LITURGY

MEDAL-SCAPULARS

IN the June issue of the I. E. RECORD a question was asked about the authenticity of the concession which certain priests claimed to have obtained from the Holy See entitling them to bless and endow medals with the privileges and indulgences hitherto associated with scapulars. Since this power seemed to introduce a radical change into existing regulations, and since, moreover, the official *Bulletin* of the Holy See was silent on the innovation, it was deemed prudent to await further evidence before deciding the matter definitely and finally. There can be no doubt any longer that, while as a *general rule* the old legislation about scapulars is to prevail as formerly, the Holy See has granted special Indults empowering those, to whom they are given, to bless medals that for all practical purposes dispense with the customary scapulars. The concession of these faculties is by way of exception—that is to say, it does not abolish

¹ 'Catholicos de quibus agitur admitti ad sacramenta praevia absolutione a censuris,' etc.—*Collec. S. C. de Prop. Fid.*, n. 1864.

the ordinary regulations, but simply privileges certain priests to derogate from them in particular circumstances. It is because these Indults do not introduce a new law, but merely establish exceptions in the old legislation which do not require authentic promulgation, that the change finds no mention in the official organ of the Holy See—the *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*.¹ The Indults, therefore, are more or less of a private character, but they are none the less authentic.

That the Holy See is competent to make the modification dispensing with the use of the scapulars cannot of course be questioned; for, all the indulgences being of ecclesiastical origin, the Church can fix the conditions for gaining them.

There is just one point concerning the Scapular of Our Lady of Mount Carmel which seems to require explanation. Among the privileges attached to wearing the scapular there are two which are piously believed to have their source in revelations made to individuals and to be conditioned on observances that were dictated from a supernatural source. Our Lady, for instance, in giving the brown scapular to Simon Stock promised him that those wearing it at the hour of death would escape eternal torments; and to this privilege she subsequently added another, which is known as the *Sabbatine* indulgence. Both these privileges, therefore, with the conditions for gaining them, are of divine or quasi-divine right. How, then, is it possible to modify the conditions without possible detriment to the privileges which are based upon them? The answer to this difficulty may be found in an explanation analogous to that which declares how the Church is competent to modify, in certain details and *secundum voluntatem Christi*, the matter and form of the sacraments. In permitting the substitution of the medal for the scapular the Holy See evidently meant to accord to the former all the privileges belonging to the latter. At the same time, owing to the doubt just raised in connexion with the special favours believed to belong to the scapular in virtue of divine promises, it would be safer to

¹ Cf. *Novv. Revue Theol.*, 1910, pp. 385, etc.

continue to wear the scapular until the matter is placed beyond the region of doubt by some authentic pronouncement.

The documents issued so far in regard to the medal-scapulars have been published in the *Nouvelle Revue Theologique* for July. Their substance will be given in the following paragraphs :—

(a) At first only the Pope himself and one of his prelates blessed these medals.

(b) An Indult, dated December 7, 1909, gave power to the Superior-General of the Foreign Missions in Belgium to bless the medals and subdelegate like faculties to the Superiors of Missions in other countries.

(c) Another Indult empowers the Congregation of Rites to grant the power to Bishops, Superiors-General, and priests. Bishops can subdelegate the faculties only to their Vicars-General, Vicars-Forane, Dignitaries and Canons ; so that simple priests must apply for the power to the Congregation of Rites. The following form may be used :—

Beatissime Pater. N.N. . . . ad pedes S. V. humillime provolutus implorat facultatem benedicendi Sacra Numismata, quae Beatae M. Virginis Imaginem praeseferant, substituenda uni vel pluribus e quinque Scapularibus, nempe Sanctissimae Trinitatis, Passionis N. D. I. C. et Beatae M. Virginis sub respectivo titulo Immaculatae Conceptionis, Septem Dolorum et Montis Carmeli, ac gestanda a fidelibus, qui maluerint, rite pridem ascriptis.

In order that the substitution of the medal for the scapular may not render the indulgences invalid or doubtful, the following directions are to be carefully attended to :—

1°. Since it is only in regard to the *carrying* or *wearing* that the medals take the place of scapulars, it follows that the latter must still be employed for purposes of investment or enrolment. They must, therefore, be blessed and ‘imposed’ as usual. Moreover, where there is question of a Confraternity for reception into which the inscription of names is essential, this formality must be complied with. So, too, must all the prayers and other good works enjoined be performed as hitherto.

2°. In virtue of some Indults the blessed medal substitutes for all the scapulars without exception; so that if a person had received all the scapulars he was able to receive the medal would dispense him from wearing all or any of these. Other Indults are restricted to the five ordinary scapulars, namely, those of the Blessed Trinity, the Passion, the Immaculate Conception, the Seven Dolours and Mount Carmel. These Indults do not cover the case of the Grand Scapular proper to the Third Order.

3°. As to the precise kind of medal required, this will be defined by the Indults. Sometimes a medal of the Blessed Virgin is specified and sometimes one of our Saviour. A medal with an image of the Redeemer on the obverse, and an image of the Blessed Virgin on the reverse, side would seem to answer all cases. Nothing is prescribed regarding the character of the representation. The Miraculous Medal, that of the Rosary, or Our Lady of Lourdes, would do for the Blessed Virgin; while the picture of the Sacred Heart, or of Jesus crucified, will suffice for the Redeemer. The material should be something decent and durable. Nothing is prescribed, and hence the old rule forbidding lead, pewter and such substances, and recommending the precious metals, nickel, brass, steel and ivory, ought to be followed. Substantial deterioration or effacement of the image would probably deprive the medal of its privilege.

4°. The Indults of the Congregation of Rites empower the recipients to bless the medals with the sign of the cross without any other form. Those who get the faculties from other sources should see if any special form is prescribed.

5°. Those who get Indults should examine very carefully the extent of the concession, its duration, restrictions, etc. Faculties granted by the Congregation of Rites only last for five years. At the end of this period they must be renewed.

6°. Like all indulgenced objects, the medal can only avail the person to whom it is finally given for his or her personal use. This does not prevent a priest from blessing a number at a time and then distributing them, either

personally or through intermediaries, to others for their own benefit.

7°. The medal must be *habitually* worn or carried about the person. It need not, therefore, be carried day and night. Neither is it necessary to wear it around the neck. It may be kept in the pocket or attached to an article of dress that is generally worn. Whether the words *habitualiter apud se habere* would be verified if one were to keep the medal in a desk or drawer is doubtful. They seem to imply more than this.

8°. Finally, there is no cause or reason required for laying aside the scapulars and adopting the medals in their stead. The latter indeed have their own conveniences, but apart from all question of advantage or benefit, they may be freely employed. All indulgenced objects, need it be said, have no inherent efficacy. The virtue that goes out from them comes from the blessing of the Church, and the special value of each is derived from its appositeness to express and symbolize the divine power of the keys.

STATUES OR PICTURES ON ALTARS

REV. DEAR SIR,—In decorating the sanctuary of a church dedicated to an archangel, would it be permissible to have a painting of the archangel placed on the wall over the High Altar, and to have paintings, say, of the Crucifixion and the Nativity on the same wall over the Altars of the Sacred Heart and Our Lady? An early answer will oblige.—Yours sincerely,

A SUBSCRIBER.

It is not only permissible but it is prescribed by the Rubrics that every altar, whether fixed or portable, should be dedicated in honour of some saint or mystery, whose statue or picture should occupy a prominent place in the vicinity. In the case of a fixed altar the representation may not be removed without the authority of the Holy See, but for its removal from a portable altar the sanction of the Ordinary is sufficient. As to character, the painting

should be in harmony with the approved type; and, as regards the material, a statue should consist of something solid and durable.¹

BLESSING OF NEWLY-ORDAINED PRIESTS

REV. DEAR SIR,—I should be thankful for an answer to the following questions:—

When a newly-ordained priest gives his blessing to women is it allowed for him to permit them to kiss the palm of his hand where the oils were placed? And also, in giving his blessing to a woman, is it permissible for him to lay his hand on her head?

Does the fact that the woman in question is a religious make any difference? Has custom anything to do with the practice?

CONSTANT READER.

In reply to a similar query in the June issue of the I. E. RECORD it was stated that a newly-ordained priest when giving his blessing to females should hold his hands over their heads. This direction, however, it need hardly be said, does not impose any kind of obligation, except such as might be suggested by motives of becomingness and propriety. This blessing is not found among those of the Ritual. Neither, so far as can be ascertained, has it any indulgence, especially if it is given outside the young priest's first Mass. Being, then, a purely extra-liturgical ceremony, the method of carrying it out will be governed a good deal by usage. Now, it is customary in many places for those who receive the blessing to kiss the hand of the priest—not generally, indeed, on the palm, but rather the back. Wherever the former practice obtains it may be continued so long as it does not excite any admiration, but care should be taken that no encouragement is given to anything like superstitious ideas in this connexion. In the direction already referred to for giving the blessing to females, it is assumed that these persons wear head-dresses upon which hands may not be easily laid. Hence it is sufficient to hold

¹ Cf. I. E. RECORD, September, 1910, p. 256.

the hands over their heads. But if it happens that these people wear head-gears on which hands may be placed without injury, and if, moreover, there is no impropriety or unbecomingness in the action, then the thing might be done. Religious females who wear a 'plain,' unadorned head-dress would appear to have these conditions present.

The imposition of hands is associated with the giving of blessings since the days of the Patriarchs. The Church borrowed it from Judaism, and made it one of the commonest of her ceremonies. It figures largely among the rites employed in ordinations, administration of the sacraments and benedictions. Actual physical contact is rarely required for the validity of any of these acts. Hence, in the case of actions where it has only a symbolical significance, the physical touch may be dispensed with wherever it is in the least inconvenient.

PATRICK MORRISROE.

DOCUMENTS

LETTER OF HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS X. TO THE FRENCH
BISHOPS—(concluded)

Pour vous, Vénérables Frères, continuez activement l'œuvre du Sauveur des hommes par l'imitation de sa douceur et de sa force. Inclinez-vous vers toutes les misères, qu'aucune douleur n'échappe à votre sollicitude pastorale, qu'aucune plainte ne vous trouve indifférents. Mais aussi, prêchez hardiment leurs devoirs aux grands et aux petits ; il vous appartient de former la conscience du peuple et des pouvoirs publics. La question sociale sera bien près d'être résolue, lorsque les uns et les autres, moins exigeants sur leurs droits mutuels, rempliront plus exactement leurs devoirs.

De plus, comme dans le conflit des intérêts, et surtout dans la lutte avec des forces malhonnêtes, la vertu d'un homme, sa sainteté même ne suffit pas toujours à lui assurer le pain quotidien, et que les rouages sociaux devraient être organisés de telle façon que par leur jeu naturel ils paralysent les efforts des méchants et rendent abordable à toute bonne volonté sa part légitime de félicité temporelle, nous désirons vivement que vous preniez une part active à l'organisation de la société dans ce but. Et à cette fin, pendant, que vos prêtres se livreront avec ardeur au travail de la sanctification des âmes, de la défense de l'Eglise, et aux œuvres de charité proprement dites, vous en choisirez quelques uns, actifs et d'esprit pondéré, munis des grades de docteurs en philosophie et en théologie, et possédant parfaitement l'histoire de la civilisation antique et moderne, et vous les appliquerez aux études moins élevées et plus pratiques de la science sociale, pour les mettre, en temps opportun à la tête de vos œuvres d'action catholique. Toutefois que ces prêtres ne se laissent pas égarer, dans le dédale des opinions contemporaines, par le mirage d'une fausse démocratie ; qu'ils n'empruntent pas à la rhétorique des pires ennemis de l'Eglise et du peuple un langage emphatique plein de promesses aussi sonores qu'irréalisables. Qu'ils soient persuadés que la question sociale et la science sociale ne sont pas nées d'hier ; que, de tous temps, l'Eglise et l'Etat, heureusement concertés, ont suscité dans ce but des organisations fécondes ; que l'Eglise, qui n'a jamais

trahi le bonheur du peuple par des alliances compromettantes, n'a pas à se dégager du passé et qu'il lui suffit de reprendre, avec le concours des vrais ouvriers de la restauration sociale, les organismes brisés par la Révolution et de les adapter, dans le même esprit chrétien qui les a inspirés, au nouveau milieu créé par l'évolution matérielle de la société contemporaine : car les vrais amis du peuple ne sont ni révolutionnaires, ni novateurs, mais traditionnalistes.

Cette œuvre éminemment digne de votre zèle pastoral, nous désirons que, loin d'y faire obstacle, la jeunesse du *Sillon*, dégagée de ses erreurs, y apporte dans l'ordre et la soumission convenables un concours loyal et efficace.

Nous tournant donc vers les chefs du *Sillon*, avec la confiance d'un Père qui parle à ses enfants, nous leur demandons pour leur bien, pour le bien de l'Eglise et de la France, de vous céder leur place. Nous mesurons, certes, l'étendue du sacrifice que nous sollicitons d'eux, mais nous les savons assez généreux pour l'accomplir, et, d'avance, au nom de Notre-Seigneur Jésus-Christ, dont nous sommes l'indigne représentant, nous les en bénissons. Quant aux membres du *Sillon*, nous voulons qu'ils se rangent par diocèses pour travailler sous la direction de leurs évêques respectifs à la régénération chrétienne et catholique du peuple, en même temps qu'à l'amélioration de son sort. Ces groupes diocésains seront, pour le moment, indépendants les uns des autres; et afin de bien marquer qu'ils ont brisé avec les erreurs du passé, ils prendront le nom de *Sillons catholiques* et chacun de leurs membres ajoutera à son titre de *Silloniste* le même qualificatif *de catholique*. Il va sans dire que tout *Silloniste catholique* restera libre de garder par ailleurs ses préférences politiques, épurées de tout ce qui ne serait pas entièrement conforme, en cette matière, à la doctrine de l'Eglise. Que si, Vénérables Frères, des groupes refusaient de se soumettre à ces conditions, vous devriez les considérer comme refusant par le fait de se soumettre à votre direction ; et, alors, il y aurait à examiner s'ils se confinent dans la politique ou l'économie pure, ou s'ils persévèrent dans leurs anciens errements. Dans le premier cas, il est clair que vous n'auriez pas plus à vous en occuper que du commun des fidèles ; dans le second, vous devriez agir en conséquence, avec prudence mais avec fermeté. Les prêtres auront à se tenir totalement en dehors des groupes dissidents et se contenteront de prêter le secours du saint ministère

individuellement à leurs membres, en leur appliquant au tribunal de la Pénitence les règles communes de la morale relativement à la doctrine et à la conduite. Quant aux groupes catholiques, les prêtres et les séminaristes, tout en les favorisant et en les secondant, s'abstiendront de s'y agréger comme membres ; car il convient que la milice sacerdotale reste audessus des associations laïques, mêmes les plus utiles et animées du meilleur esprit.

Telles sont les mesures pratiques par lesquelles nous avons cru nécessaire de sanctionner cette lettre sur le *Sillon* et les Sillonistes. Que le Seigneur veuille bien, nous l'en prions du fond de l'âme, faire comprendre à ces hommes et à ces jeunes gens les graves raisons qui l'ont dictée, qu'Il leur donne la docilité du cœur, avec le courage de prouver, en face de l'Eglise, la sincérité de leur ferveur catholique ; et à vous, Vénérables Frères, qu'Il vous inspire pour eux, puisqu'ils sont désormais vôtres, les sentiments d'une affection toute paternelle.

C'est dans cet espoir, et pour obtenir ces résultats si désirables, que Nous vous accordons de tout cœur, ainsi qu'à votre clergé et à votre peuple, la Bénédiction Apostolique.

Donné à Rome, près de St. Pierre, le 25 Août 1910, la huitième année de Notre Pontificat.

PIVS PP. X.

**DECREE, ON NOT ADMITTING CERTAIN POSTULANTS TO
RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES EXTENDED TO WOMEN**

DECRETUM D. D. 7 SEPT., 1909, 'DE QUIBUSDAM POSTULANTIBUS
IN RELIGIOSAS FAMILIAS NON ADMITTENDIS,' AD MULIERUM
QUOQUE RELIGIOSAS FAMILIAS EXTENDITUR.¹

Sanctissimus Dominus Noster Pius Papa X., in audientia die 4 Ianuarii, 1910, infrascripto Cardinali Praefecto benigne concessa, decernere dignatus est, ut dispositiones Decreti Sacrae Congregationis de Religiosis, d. d. 7 Septembris, 1909, *De quibusdam postulantis in Religiosis Familias non admittendis*, ad mulierum quoque Religiosas Familias in posterum extendantur. Ideoque, absque speciali venia Sedis Apostolicae et sub poena

¹ The Decree referred to above was published in the I. E. RECORD of December, 1909, p. 650.

nullitatis professionis, non excipiantur sive ad Novitiatum, sive ad emissionem votorum, postulantes :

1° quae, propria culpa, e collegiis etiam laicis, gravi de causa, expulsae fuerint ;

2° quae a scholis domesticis, in quibus puellae speciali cura in spem amplectendae vitae religiosae educantur, quacumque ratione dimissae fuerint ;

3° quae, sive ut professae, sive ut novitiae, ab alio Ordine vel Congregatione religiosa dimissae fuerint ; vel, si professae, dispensationem votorum obtinuerint ;

4° quae iam admissae, sive ut professae, sive ut novitiae in unam provinciam alicuius Ordinis vel Congregationis et ab ea dimissae, in eadmdem vel in aliam eiusdem Ordinis vel Congregationis provinciam recipi nitantur.

Contrariis quibuscumque non obstantibus.

Romae, 4 Ianuarii 1910.

FR J. C. CARD. VIVES, *Praefectus*.

L. ✠ S.

D. L. JANSSENS, O.S.B., *Secretarius*.

**ADDRESS TO HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS X. BY THE IRISH
ARCHBISHOPS AND BISHOPS ON THE OCCASION OF THE
INSULT OF SIGNOR NATHAN, MAYOR OF ROME, AND
REPLY OF HIS HOLINESS**

Beatissime Pater,

Hiberniae Antistites in annuo Conventu congregati ad eorum dioeceses redire nequeunt, quin summi eorum moeroris et indignationis sensus Sanctitati Vestrae manifestent, ratione alloqui ad Populum Romanum a capite Municipii recenter habiti.

Sane nefarium prorsus est et intolerabile quod vir sui Municipii primus ita suo officio abuti permittatur, ut non solum in jura temporalia Sanctae Sedis insolenter invehat, sed ut contra spirituale Summi Pontificis magisterium, et liberum ipsum exercitium supremae jurisdictionis docendi et gubernandi universum Christi gregem audacter et impune insurgere possit.

Conscii supremi doloris quo scimus cor Vestrum benevolum necessario ob flagitiosam illam agendi rationem opprimi, Nos, una cum Clero nostro et populo universo Tecum Beatissime Pater ex toto corde condolemus, et desideramus nunc denuo renovare omnes illos profundissimae reverentiae et obedientiae sensus, quibus majores nostri a saeculis Apostolicam Sedem et

B. Petri successores prosequi consueverunt. Apostolicam Benedictionem humiliter efflagitantes, subscripsimus.

✠ THOMAS, *Archiep. Cassiliensis et Imlaci Administrator, Praeses Conventus.*

✠ ROBERTUS, *Episc. Cluanensis, Secretarius.*

Datum Maynutiae die Oct. 20, 1910.

REPLY OF HIS HOLINESS

VENERABILIBUS FRATRIBUS

THOMAE CASELIENSII ARCHIEPISCOPO,

EMELIENSII ADMINISTRATORI,

CETERISQUE HIBERNIAE EPISCOPIS

PIUS PP. X.

Venerabiles Fratres, salutem et Apostolicam Benedictionem.

Omni sane laude cumulando pietatis certamine et ipsi vos, Venerabiles Fratres, quos ingens a Nobis terrae marisque sejungit spatium, Clerique populi vestri choro concinuistis omnium in universum christifidelium, immissa nuper, heic Romae, in Nos inque catholicum nomen convicia gravissima uno animo atque una voce expostulantium, vicemque dolentium Nostram. Recruduisse porro videntur eorum odia qui Ecclesiae perniciem jam diu moliuntur; jamque acriores belli impetus praecipimus adventantes. At vero Deo freti, cujus gerimus causam, nihil inde metuimus Ecclesiae, quam divina virtus tutam facit ab inferorum potestate. Id quidem nos excruciat vehementer, tot animas, Christi praetium sanguinis, ab Ecclesiae matris amplexu misere avelli, atque in interitum ruere sempiternum. Quo inde gravius affligimur, eo instantius, Venerabiles Fratres, hortamur vos et obsecramus ut evigilando, docendo, monendo, in id toti sitis ut Catholicam fidem ac disciplinam integram in gregibus vestris et cum Sedis Apostolicae obsequio arcte conjunctam, perpetuo tueamini, atque adeo in latiore provehatis ubertatem. Adjumento vobis sint divinae gratiae opes, quas, delati memores officii, vobis, Venerabiles Fratres, iisque omnibus in quos vestrae evigilant curae, Apostolica, quam ex animo impertimus, Benedictione, suppliciter a Deo contendimus.

Datum Romae, apud S. Petrum die 1 Novembris MCMX, Pontificatus Nostri, anno octavo.

PIUS PP. X.

INTERPRETATION OF THE DECREE 'MAXIMA CURA'

S. CONGREGATIO CONSISTORIALIS

DUBIA CIRCA DECRETUM 'MAXIMA CURA'

Cum nonnulli Ordinarii quaedam dubia circa vim et interpretationem decreti '*Maxima cura*' proposuerint, Sacra Congregatio Consistorialis, mandante SS^{mo} Domino Nostro Pio PP. X., eisdem dubiis die 3 Octobris, 1910, respondit prout infra:

1. Utrum examinatores eligendi iuxta praescriptum *can. 4* adhiberi possint in examinibus pro collatione beneficiorum atque sint unum et idem ac examinatores de quibus statuit Trid. Synod. *cap. 18, sess. 24 de reform.*; an potius sint distincti et adhibendi dumtaxat pro amotione decernenda.

R. Affirmative ad I^{am} partem, negative ad II^{am}.

2. An examinatores sive synodales sive prosynodales nunc existentes, per idem decretum a munere cessent.

R. Servetur dispositio finalis decreti.

3. Utrum Ordinarii, quando Synodus non celebratur, adhuc indigeant indulto S. Sedis pro eligendis examinatribus.

R. Negative.

4. Utrum Ordinarii possint eligere aliquem sacerdotem regularem in examinatore vel consultorem.

R. Affirmative, dummodo sacerdos regularis parochus sit, si in consultorem eligatur.

5. Utrum eligere possint extradioecesanum.

R. Affirmative in parvis dioecesibus, aut quoties iusta aliqua causa intercedat.

6. Utrum Ordinarius inter examinatores accensere possit Vicarium suum generalem.

R. Non expedire.

7. Utrum inter examinatores aliquot parochi accenseri possint

R. Affirmative.

8. Utrum una eademque persona esse possit simul examinatore et consultor.

R. Affirmative, sed non in eadem causa. Generatim tamen expedit ne plura officia in una eademque persona cumulentur.

9. Utrum consultores dioecesani de quibus in § 2, *can. 4* quorum consensus (quoties deficiat capitulum cathedrale) requiritur in electione examinerum et parochorum consultorum, iidem sint ac collegium praefatum parochorum consultorum.

R. Negative; sed consultores dioecesani stant loco capituli in

aliquibus dioecesibus ubi cathedrale capitulum erigi adhuc non potuit.

10. Utrum in computanda antiquitate electionis ratio habenda sit electionum praecedentium ; an dumtaxat electionis praesentis, ita nempe ut qui bis vel ter electus iam fuerit, antiquior non habeatur illo qui prima vice electus sit, dummodo pari die electio evenierit.

R. Negative ad I^{am} partem, affirmative ad II^{am}.

11. Utrum error in computanda antiquitate et admissio alicuius examinitoris seu consultoris, hac de causa illegitima, inducat nullitatem actorum.

R. Negative.

12. Utrum iusiurandum in *can. 7* praescriptum debeat singulis vicibus in singulis causis renovari, an sufficiat illud semel emitte post electionem aut in primo conventu.

R. Sufficit semel emissum, durante munere, dummodo pro omnibus causis fuerit emissum. Potest tamen Ordinarius exigere ab examinitoribus et consultoribus ut illud renovent in casibus particularibus, si id expediens iudicaverit.

C. CARD. DE LAI, *Secretarius*.

SCIPIO TECCHI, *Adessor*.

L. ✠ S.

**LETTER OF CARDINAL DE LAI TO CARDINAL VASZARY,
PRIMATE OF HUNGARY, ON NEWSPAPERS AND
PERIODICALS IN SEMINARIES**

AD EMINENTISSIMUM VIRUM CLAUDIUM S. R. E. PRESBYTERUM
CARDINALEM VASZARY, ARCHIEPISCOPUM STRIGONIENSEM
(ESZTERGOM) ET PRIMATEM HUNGARIAE

Eme. ac Rme. Domine mi Obsme.,

Eminentiae Vestrae litterae, nomine etiam omnium Hungariae Antistitum datae sub die 27 transacti Septembris, ad SS^mum Dominum Nostrum pervenerunt. Quas quidem Ipse assueta benignitate excepit, nec dissimili cura, prout rei gravitas postulabat, expendit ; mihiq^{ue} haec Eminentiae Vestrae coeterisque Antistitibus communicanda mandavit.

Porro SS^mi Domini Nostri mens est ut firma sit lex qua prohibetur ut diaria et commentaria, etiam optima, quae tamen de politicis rebus agunt quae in dies eveniunt, aut de socialibus et scientificis quaestionibus quae pariter in dies exagitantur quin adhuc de iis certa sententia habeatur, haec, inquam, in manibus

alumnorum seminarii libere non relinquantur. Nil tamen vetat quominus superiores seminarii aut magistri, si agatur de quaestionibus scientificis, legant alumnis aut legendos articulos in sua praesentia tradant eorundem diariorum et commentariorum, quos ad alumnorum instructionem utiles vel opportunos censent.

Commentaria vero in quibus nil contentionis continetur, sed notitias religiosas, S. Sedis dispositiones et decreta, Episcoporum acta et ordinationes referunt, vel alia quae quamvis periodica non aliud sunt quam lectiones ad fidem et pietatem fovendam utiles, haec, inquam, possunt, probantibus seminarii moderatoribus, prae manibus alumnorum relinqui tempore a studio et ab aliis praescriptis officiis libero.

Haec dum Tibi pro meo munere significo, manus Tuas humilime deosculor meque impenso animi obsequio profiteor.

Eminentiae Vestrae,

Romae, die 20 Octobris 1910.

addictissimum famulum

CAIETANUM CARD. DE LAI,

S. Congr. Consistorialis Secretarium.

THE DECLARATIONS IN THE OATH PRESCRIBED IN THE MOTU PROPRIO 'SACRORUM ANTISTITUM'

DECLARATIONES

CIRCA IUSIURANDUM A MOTU PROPRIO 'SACRORUM ANTISTITUM' PRAESCRIPTUM

Ad hanc sacram Congregationem proposita sunt quae sequuntur dubia circa Motum Proprium *Sacrorum Antistitum*, die 1 Septembris proxime lapsi editum, nimirum

I. Utrum qui, in praesenti, plura obtinent officia vel beneficia, unum dumtaxat iusiurandum praestare possint, an tot iuramenta emittere teneantur quot possident officia vel beneficia ;

II. Coram quo Moderatores generales Ordinum aut congregationum religiosarum praestare debeant eiusmodi iusiurandum ;

III. An Vicarius generalis delegari possit ab Episcopo, generali modo, ad iusiurandum excipiendum ;

IV. Utrum iuramenti formula, pluribus simul convenientibus, ab omnibus singillatim legenda sit, an vero sufficiat ut ab aliquo ex eis recitetur ;

V. An quotannis teneantur renovare iusiurandum vicarii parochiales, confessarii et sacris concionatores, quibus facultas singulis annis prorogatur ;

VI. Utrum parochi, in locis a residentia Episcopi dissitis, teneantur emitte iuramentum coram Vicariis foraneis, an sufficiat ut ad Episcopum remittant iurisiurandi formulam ab ipsis subsignatam ;

VII. An novi beneficiarii debeant subscribere formulam tum professionis fidei tum iurisiurandi.

SS^{us} Dominus Noster Pius PP. X., in audientia die 21 Octobris 1910 E^{mo} Cardinali Secretario sacrae Congregationis Consistorialis concessa, mandavit ut respondeatur :

Ad I. Sufficere unum iusiurandum, sed de eodem prius praestito fides exhibenda est ei, qui ius habet aliud exigendi iuramentum ;

Ad II. Moderatores generales, qui actu Ordini vel Congregationi vel Instituto praesunt, coram Patribus sui Definitorii, sive Assistantibus sive Consiliariis generalibus ; Moderatores autem generales, qui in posterum eligentur, coram Praeside capuli generalis ;

Ad III. Affirmative, postquam ipse in manibus Episcopi, iusiurandum praestiterit ;

Ad IV. Sufficere ut, formulâ iuramenti ab uno recitata, a ceteris singulis, iureiurando emisso, formula ipsa subscribatur ;

Ad V. Negative ;

Ad VI. Pro hac prima vice sufficere ut memorati parochi subsignent iuramenti formulam iuxta indultum diei 25 Septembris elapsi ; in posterum vero parochos teneri ad iuramentum praestandum coram eo a quo beneficii possessionem obtinebunt ;

Ad VII. Quoad professionem fidei, nihil innovandum ; quoad iuramentum, servandam dispositionem Motus Proprii *Sacrorum Antistitum*.

Datum Romae, ex aedibus sacrae Congregationis Consistorialis, die 25 Octobris, 1910.

C. CARD. DE LAI, *Secretarius*.

SCIPIO TECCHI, *Adsector*.

L. ✠ S.

**PRIESTS' EUCHARISTIC LEAGUE—LETTER FROM THE LATE
ADOLPHUS CARDINAL PERRAUD TO THE VERY REV.
E. POIRIER, S.S.S., DIRECTOR-GENERAL**

Bishops, on account of their being judges and guardians of the Faith, are often asked to be vouchers for the worth of a book, by writing to the author a letter that will entitle him to the confidence of the public.

This is a measure of prudence easily understood when there is question of some works not as yet thoroughly accredited among Catholics. They become so by being placed under such patronage as will make them acceptable to the faithful.

You begged of me, Rev. Father, to do something of the kind in favour of the pious Association of which you are the zealous Director, and which is grafted upon the religious family to which you belong.

I might have answered you with perfect right that it is superfluous to recommend an undertaking which has on its face the best titles of recommendation and the excellence of which cannot be questioned by anyone.

Is not this the case with the Confraternity of the Priests' Eucharistic League? And is it not enough to point out its existence to the clergy to be certain of a very extensive membership in its ranks?

Yet I cannot object to making known some of the motives on the strength of which I have been delighted to promote it among the priests of the diocese of Autun during our ecclesiastical retreat last September.

The priests who gave their names to this Association pledge themselves to spend every week, on the day that may suit them best, *an hour without interruption* in adoration before the Blessed Sacrament.

At first sight this practice seems to be trifling, and one might doubt whether it is worth being made the object of a special association. But, with a little reflection, we soon understand that this weekly visit of an hour without interruption may easily become, in the life of a good priest, the mustard seed growing steadily and speedily stretching on all sides its branches with their fruit.

In the first place, will not this hour of adoration, faithfully kept, be the means of securing exactness to visit the Blessed Sacrament every day, at least within the limits of time consecrated by the pious practice of our seminaries?

I am even persuaded that not a few among the Associates, after having experienced the joys and advantages of a continued hour of adoration, will find very short the visits of the other days in the week, lasting only a quarter of an hour. If they cannot always, on account of the occupations of the holy ministry, lengthen the duration of those visits, they will improve every occasion of multiplying them ; they will be urged on by a sort of necessity, by a contracted habit to go again and appear, should it be for some minutes only, before the God who dwells in the tabernacle, to salute Him and call a special blessing more particularly needed for such a good work, such a measure to be taken, such an object of personal solicitude. Is it not related of St. Thomas Aquinas that when his genius, powerful as it was, felt at a loss how to solve some theological difficulties, he had recourse to our Lord present in the Blessed Sacrament, and humbly called for the missing light ? Again, was not St. Vincent de Paul in the habit of repairing to the church to treat directly with Jesus Christ, hidden under the eucharistic veil, about the multitudinous details of his works of charity ?

Is there any need of showing, in itself, the practice of an hour of adoration is *one of the best preventives against negligence in fulfilling the duty of mental prayer*, an exercise so essential that without it there can be neither true piety nor solid virtue ? For it cannot be that after spending a full hour before the Blessed Sacrament on such or such a day of the week a priest could omit the six other days, a practice that should have its place in the rules of a true priestly life. *By itself alone, the hour of adoration is a compendium of ecclesiastical discipline and regularity*, and one may apply to it what is said of wisdom : *Venerunt autem mihi omnia bona pariter cum illa* (Sap. vii. 11).

Could not the hour of adoration be likened to a short weekly retreat renewing and preserving the fruits of the monthly retreat, and, consequently, of that preparation for death which ought to be the constant business of every true Christian, and still more of every priest worthy of his sublime vocation ?

But so far I have, it seems, considered this exercise only in its relation to the other practices of sacerdotal piety. It is time to study it in itself and for what it is intrinsically worth. I shall endeavour to do so by setting forth some reflections suggested to me from this text of the Book of Ecclesiastes : *Depth, the depth of depth, who shall find it out ? Alla profunditas quis inveniet eam ?* (Eccles. vii. 25).

Is it not true that too often, after reading some book on spirituality or hearing a sermon, we are compelled to acknowledge that the subject has not been fathomed to its depth? Here is the reason why many writings, sermons or instructions leave in the soul nothing but superficial and short-lived impressions. They may have, according to their nature, dazzled the mind or moved the heart for a moment. But to-morrow they will have partly vanished and the next day fallen for ever into oblivion. The impression did not proceed from the marrow itself of the soul that can be reached and moved by deep meditation alone.

With regard to this, and I am now touching the very core of my subject, *there is a world of difference between spending before the Blessed Sacrament four quarters of an hour separated from each other by studies, business solitudes, legitimate as they may be, and uniting them without interruption to make of them one unbroken hour*, during which thoughts, affections, desires and resolutions submitted to the action of Christ's immediate presence may centre upon one point in particular and reach the innermost depth of the soul. Could not this meaning be taken among others from the words of St. Paul : *Quae Dei sunt, nemo cognovit, nisi Spiritus Dei . . . ? Spiritus omnia scrutatur etiam profunda Dei* (1 Cor. ii. 10, 11).

I would be much surprised if a priest who, on the day marked by a full hour spent before the Blessed Sacrament, and is called to preach the word of God, to hear confessions, to visit the sick and dying, did not betray, as if in spite of himself, the secret result of a more intimate union with Jesus Christ, by something more persuasive in his words, more expansive in his charity, more decisive and lasting in his action upon souls.

This being the case, is there a priest desirous of imparting fecundity and usefulness to his ministry for the conversion and sanctification of his fellow-men who would be unwilling to try a means so easy in itself and within the reach of all?

But is there not many a priestly life whose every instant is implicated into a multiplicity of the most unavoidable occupations? In the course of those days spent without hardly any interruption in the service of his neighbour, how can there be found a full hour during which no extra call will occur and full liberty will be left, without neglecting any professional duty, to relish the boon of this long period of recollection, silence, prayers, and to fathom at pleasure the depth of the Eucharistic Mystery?

Yet is it not proved by experience that the more a man is obliged to spend himself in the service of others, the greater is for him the necessity of entering into himself, and, to use the language of our Lord, of refitting himself and being refitted, *Ego reficiam vos* (Matt. xi. 28), to be enabled to face unscathed the perils of the apostolic labours? Otherwise, even with the best intentions, inspired by a zeal truly supernatural, he runs the risk of emptying himself according to the expressive figure, or rather the inexpressible realism, employed by the Holy Ghost Himself, *in vita sua projecit intima sua* (Ecclus. x. 10).

The more a priest is engaged in the service of the Church and of souls the more he needs the graces of an interior and recollected life afforded by that hour of adoration.

You show me the details of your daily occupations and you easily persuade me that from the moments spent in thanksgiving after Holy Mass, even to bedtime, you can scrape off for your own personal use only a few unconnected bits of time, and at most can you, after properly reading your Office, spare in the afternoon a short quarter of an hour to spend before the Blessed Sacrament ?

I believe you ; no need of discussion. But I tell you without hesitation : select one day in the week, when you will get up an hour earlier than usual. You shall go and spend that hour before the Blessed Sacrament, and most appropriately will it serve you as your morning meditation. Now, in truth I say to you, your work during the rest of the day, I might even say during the rest of the week, will feel the influence of that blessed hour. *In consequence of it you will do more and better work.*

I write these pages in the evening of the great day of Christmas. I wish to finish them in giving with all simplicity an account of an impression which I myself received this morning, during an hour spent before the Blessed Sacrament previously to the Pontifical Offices in the Cathedral. I was thinking of the shepherds spoken of by St. Luke and of their visit to the Divine Baby of Bethlehem. *Let us go to Bethlehem*, they said to one another. *Pastores loquebantur ad invicem : Transcamus usque Bethlehem* (Luke ii. 15). Bethlehem is the house of bread. Our Bethlehem, for us pastors of souls, is above all the Eucharistic Tabernacle.

Warned by angels' songs, the shepherds of Judea repair with hurried steps to the Infant God. *Et venerunt festinantes.*

St. Luke does not tell us how long they remained. But we may well suppose that a full hour spent with the Blessed Virgin and St. Joseph, contemplating in His poor little crib the Redeemer of the World, honouring, adoring Him, offering themselves to Him, did not appear too long. Yet they had to withdraw to go back to their flocks to take up the ordinary round of their duties and occupations. But their souls were so full of what they had seen and heard that they were never tired of praising God, and so they were the first apostles of the good tidings. *Et reversi sunt pastores, glorificantes et laudantes Deum in omnibus quae audierant et viderant* (Luke ii. 20).

I wish to all my brethren in the priesthood, I wish to myself, that plenitude of faith, conviction, charity, zeal, which is to be the blessed fruit of *the full hour spent before Jesus in the Blessed Sacrament*: a plenitude that will overflow into the souls entrusted to our pastoral care and impart fecundity to all our good works.

With you, Rev. Father, and with your religious family, with all the members of your pious Association, the priests of the Eucharistic League, canonically erected by Pope Leo XIII., and enriched by His Holiness with precious indulgences, I say with all my soul: *Blessed be and adored for ever Jesus Christ in the Most Holy Sacrament of the Altar.*

✠ ADOLPHUS LOUIS, CARD.,

Bishop of Autun, Chalon and Macon.

Priests wishing to be enrolled may apply to

REV. DIRECTOR,
Priests' Eucharistic League,
Blackrock, Co. Dublin,
Ireland.

REV. DIRECTOR,
Priests' Eucharistic League,
St. Peter's College,
Bearsden,
Scotland.

REV. DIRECTOR,
Priests' Eucharistic League,
Catholic Church,
Streatham, London, S.W.,
England.

NOTICES OF BOOKS

MODERN BIOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. By Erich Wasmann, S.J. Translated from the Third German Edition by A. M. Buchanan, M.A. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. With 54 illustrations in the text, and 8 full-page plates at the end. Pp. xxxii and 540.

WHAT evidence has the science of Biology accumulated up to the present for or against the theory that existing forms of life, including man himself, have been gradually evolved by the transformation of fewer and simpler forms, themselves similarly derived from one primitive type, and this perhaps in turn evolved from non-living matter? What the sincere, believing Christian wants is *an impartial statement* of the evidence so far forthcoming for the solution of the many momentous questions involved in the modern study of the origin and descent of living things. This is what he will find in the present volume by the eminent German biologist. Father Wasmann's original work in the domains of insect and ant-life place him in the front rank of living scientific experts. These researches of his, no less than his polemic with Haeckel and the monists, and his Innsbruck lectures, have won for him a European reputation.

The reader will not find in the present book much that is directly controversial. He has before him a purely scientific work, written of course in language as little technical as possible, and quite intelligible to the ordinary educated reader, for whom it is intended, and who is here provided with reliable data for arriving at his own conclusions. But of course the absorbing interest of those biological studies which shed light on the problem of evolution or descent, lies precisely in their direct and immediate bearing upon man's whole outlook on life, upon his philosophy and religion, both theoretical and practical. And hence the reader will not be surprised to find that the author uses his vast and varied knowledge of his subject to prove the soundness of his own—which is the Christian—world-view, and to refute the competing theory of materialistic monism. These two views were contrasted in three public lectures delivered by

Father Wasmann in 1909 to the students of Innsbruck University. They are added as an appendix to the present volume 'to supply university students with a short sketch of the scientific doctrine of evolution and its bearing upon monism and Christianity respectively' (p. 485). 'The only true monism,' he tells us (*ibid.*), 'is that of Christianity, viz., there is but *one* eternal God and *one* eternal truth!'

Turning from the end of the volume to the commencement, we find the brief prefaces to the second and third editions succeeded by twelve very instructive pages, which the author entitles 'A few Words to my Critics.' These words are addressed mainly to the class of critics 'who seek to maintain their own monistic theory in opposition to the author, and to prove his position as a Christian untenable' (p. xiii)—a class to which 'unfortunately most of the zoologists of the present day belong' (*ibid.*), and of which they 'form a considerable majority' (p. xi).

'Why,' he asks, 'have the monists thought it necessary to pay so much attention to my work? The only psychological explanation of their action is that they see in it a certain amount of danger to the supremacy of their anti-Christian views. For this reason they do their best to draw as sharp a distinction as possible between the author as scientist and as theologian. They cannot help recognizing the merits of the book, and the only objections they can raise refer to minor points, or are based on misunderstandings and misrepresentations, but naturally they refuse to acknowledge that the author has succeeded in reconciling biology in its recent developments with the principles of Christianity, for such an acknowledgment would at once deprive modern unbelief of one of its chief weapons in the conflict with Christianity' (p. xiii).

Those modern unbelieving scientists take themselves and their new monistic dogmas very seriously, with the consequence, perhaps, that their theorizings are often taken too seriously by believers. Anyhow their methods are instructive—and would even be amusing in their naïveté, if it were not so sad to see science so prostituted to the dissemination of error and irreligion. They *assume* in quite a superior way, as something recognized by all educated people, that the dogmas of Christianity are so many purely *a priori* theories about man and the universe, untenable in the face of discovered facts. They profess to abhor all *a priori* axioms and unproven postulates masquerading as unquestioned and unquestionable principles. Very well.

Some scientist proceeds to infer from discovered facts a conclusion to which the weight of evidence points. 'Oh, but that conclusion cannot be admitted,' they protest. Why so? Because, they answer, it contradicts 'the most important postulates of the monistic doctrine of evolution'! (p. xiv). But—the scientist may venture to suggest—these postulates of your monistic philosophy seem to be 'neither based on science nor philosophically correct.' At all events it ill becomes the monist to accuse the Christian of slavery to *a priori* dogmas, while he himself assents to unproven postulates and seeks to impose them on the general public. But he *will* make the charge; he *will* set down the inconvenient scientist as prejudiced. And why? Because the latter refuses to swallow the *ipse dixit* of the monist that monism is the only rational philosophy of the universe! And he will appeal, as Haeckel did, 'to those lower classes which are especially interested in the overthrow of Christianity' (p. xi), and ask such questions as 'Where does science end, and the Jesuit begin?' (p. xv); but he will evade the question 'Where does science end and the Monist begin?' in his own case. He will calmly label as 'modern biology' not merely the 'scientific results [of biological research] but also the monistic postulates which the opponents of Christianity have insisted on attaching to these results' (p. xix). It is not surprising that when a scientist of the front rank, like Father Wasmann, rejects the dogmas of monistic scientists the latter should feel somewhat disconcerted. But their methods of meeting his position reflects small credit upon them, merely destroying their claims to impartiality in the minds of all honest men. It is not for the good of science that in some of the leading scientific reviews on the Continent personal abuse, ill-concealed irritation, ill-mannered sneers at conscientious beliefs and insulting imputations of insincerity should so often take the place of candid and straightforward criticism when there is question of the work of a scientist who happens to be a Christian instead of a free-thinker. Yet it is such criticism the author has to meet in the opening pages of his book. It was called forth in abundance by the previous editions of the work. One does not regret to see it wither up under the calm and dignified analysis of the author, but one does regret that it ever could have been produced, or that when produced it could find readers or call for serious notice.

The Catholic who is a scientist must, however, perform this

additional task of defending science against all attempts on the part of any false philosophy to identify 'science' with its own assumptions and theorizings. And this is so simply because every scientist has some sort of a philosophy of life, some sort of a *credo*, be it positive or negative, and will naturally endeavour to seek in science a confirmation of his particular world-view, whatever this latter may be. We congratulate the author on the splendid success with which he has shown that there is nothing in the science of biology to countenance monism or to conflict with Christianity.

Father Wasmann candidly acknowledges that in approaching his subject he 'had a bias' 'with regard to the doctrine of creation, the hypothesis of spontaneous generation and the application to the theory of descent' (p. xxii). But he justifies this bias :—

'I had the intention of proving that a reasonable theory of evolution necessitates our assuming the existence of a personal Creator, and I wished further to show that "spontaneous generation" was scientifically untenable and therefore, could not be a postulate of science. Finally, I desired to prove that to regard man from the purely zoological point of view is a one-sided and mistaken proceeding. I was, however, forced to adopt this three-fold bias by the monists, who were exerting themselves with a much greater bias to establish false philosophical postulates in the name of biology, and to force them as "monistic dogmas" upon all interested in science. I considered it my duty as a Christian and as a scientific man to protest vigorously against these attempts at a fresh subjugation of the human intellect' (p. xxii).

Indicating the scope of the book he reveals incidentally in a few plain sentences his own attitude towards evolution :—

'I wish to emphasize the fact that it is not my intention that this work should serve as a complete text-book of the theory of descent. The chapters on this subject are intended only, on the one hand, *to help the reader to form a clear conception of the theory of evolution, the philosophical and scientific principles underlying it, and its limits and causes*; and on the other hand to lay before him *fresh evidence, derived from my own special department of biology, which tends to prove that the theory of evolution is really better supported than that of permanence*. The theory of evolution, which I regard as a well-founded hypothesis, must be *polyphyletic* and not *monophyletic*, if it is to

correspond with known facts. With regard to the application of the theory of descent to man, I abide by my previous opinion, and maintain that the *mental* evolution of man from brutes is *impossible*, and that his *bodily* descent from brute ancestors *presents, from the scientific standpoint, difficulties that have not hitherto been solved* (pp. vii, viii).

The phrases I have italicized in this extract will show two things: firstly, the profound importance of the book for all Christians who are pursuing higher studies in any department of biology, in physiology, or in medicine—and these form a large and influential class in all our universities, a class, too, who are in constant contact with a scientific literature that is permeated with the dangerous virus of an anti-Christian and materialistic monism. They will show, secondly, that the author accepts, and furnishes evidence for, the theory of an evolution of existing species, not, however, for one type of parent stem, but from a plurality of original and independently created types: an evolution which, further, he refuses, on scientific grounds, to extend to the body of the highest living type, the *homo sapiens*. The value of the scientific evidence adduced for such a qualified theory of evolution, as against the permanence theory, the reader of the book is at liberty to judge for himself.

The titles of the various chapters will convey a sufficiently full idea, to the intending reader, on the subject-matter dealt with and the line of treatment followed: I. Meaning and First Development of Biology; II. Development of Modern Morphology and its Branches involving Microscopical Research; III. Modern Development of Cytology; IV. Cellular Life; V. The Laws of Cell-Division; VI. Cell-Division in its Relation to Fertilization and Heredity; VII. The Cell and Spontaneous Generation; VIII. The Problem of Life; IX. Thoughts on Evolution; X. Theory of Permanence or Theory of Descent? XI. The Theory of Descent in its Application to Man; XII. Conclusion; Appendix (Innsbruck Lectures); Supplementary Notes; Plates; Index.

The translation appears to be excellent throughout. The original is rendered into clear, forcible, idiomatic English—which is more than can be said for perhaps most of our translations from the German. The printers and publishers, too, have done their work admirably. But it is a pity that such a book should not be placed within reach of a wider public. It has met with a gratifying welcome already from 'men of culture and

intelligence' (p. xi)—all of them, that is, who have been able to introduce it into their homes and libraries. May we hope to see it one day as accessible to the general public as, say, books like Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe*? The general public would be sure to welcome it and to profit by it.

P. C.

GESCHICHTE DER KATHOLIKENVERFOLGUNG IN ENGLAND (1535-1681). Joseph Spillmann, S.J. Third edition, improved and enlarged. Otto Pfülf, S.J. 5 vols. Breisgau : Herder. 1910.

FATHER SPILLMANN'S work on the English Martyrs is the only one in his own language. On account of its wealth of information, the *Geschichte* is a favourite of many historical students. The Germans like facts. They must have the results of critical and exhaustive research, for they are never satisfied till they are sure they know everything that has been written on a subject from the beginning of the investigation down to the most recent discovery.

All that had been published regarding those who died for the faith in England by Father Bridgett, Father Stephenson, Father Morris, and Dom Gasquet was presented in a condensed form by the late Father Spillmann. The present editor has been able to avail himself of Dom Bede Camm's *Lives of the English Martyrs declared Blessed by Pope Leo XIII. in 1886 and 1895*. The *Geschichte*, as it now stands, is a model. Its admirable order and the clearness of its style will secure for it a still wider circle of readers. Even non-Germans who are satisfied with knowing the characteristic events in each martyr's career, and do not care for the additional details of genealogy, etc., will read the book with profit and pleasure.

It consists, as we said, of five parts. The first contains the history of the martyrs in the reign of Henry VIII. When the cause was taken up, the Postulator showed that prior to the Decree of Urban VIII. fifty-four had been in possession of *cults*. So regarding these there was no further question. They (Cardinal Fisher, Sir Thomas More, the Carthusians, Franciscans, and others) were beatified on December 29, 1886. Besides these, nine others, including the Earl of Northumberland, were for the same reason beatified on May 13, 1895. Thus out of the total number presented to the Congregation of Rites (two hundred

and sixty-one), sixty-three have been raised to the altars. Of these Blessed the first volume treats. It should be mentioned in passing that this volume contains an introductory chapter on the history of the period (e.g., the marriage with Anne Boleyn, etc.).

The second volume which also has an introduction, is devoted to the martyrs under Elizabeth till the year 1583 (e.g., Ven. John Fenton, Francis Tregian, and Edmund Campion). The third volume continues the series down to the time of Elizabeth's death (1603). Here we find Ven. Robert Southwell, S.J., Philip Howard, Earl of Arundel, Robert Nutter, O.P., and many others. Besides the biographies this volume has chapters respectively on Mary Stuart, the Armada, 'the year of blood' (1591), and other subjects connected with the reign of Elizabeth. In the fourth volume we get first some excellently written chapters on the treatment of Catholics by James I., the Gunpowder Plot, etc. The fifth, and by no means the least interesting volume, presents us with an account of the martyrs of the Titus Oates period. First we get a sketch of the times and then of the arch-villain himself—then the history of the Ven. Father Whitebread and our other Jesuits, Fathers Richard Langhorne, Charles Mahony, O.S.F., Oliver Plunket, and others.

In conclusion we may state that the work is enriched by excellent portraits of Fischer, Mary Stuart, and Oliver Plunket. Also that each volume is provided with a copious index. As a handy and reliable book of reference it may safely be recommended to all who are interested in one of the most eventful and glorious periods of the history of the Church in England.

R. W.

LIMEN. A First Latin Book. By W. C. F. Walters, M.A., and R. S. Conway, Litt.D. Parts I. and II. London: Murray.

THE authors of this excellent work state in their Preface that the object of their enterprise was threefold: '(1) to bring the pupil as soon as possible to the stage of reading Latin authors; (2) to teach him as much as possible of the use of the forms of the language in and during the time in which he is learning them; (3) to use as far as possible the fruits of recent inquiry in historical and comparative grammar, so as to simplify and enliven the harder rules of accidence and syntax by indicating briefly and clearly how the rules themselves grew up.' The

authors observe very naturally that all this may have been said before, but they add, with probable justice, that their book represents a fuller attainment of what others had proposed. The names of the authors, Dr. Conway and Mr. Walters, supply the best guarantee that the book contains all the well-established results of recent investigation, while the perusal of the book itself leaves no doubt on the teacher's mind that the authors understood the limitations of youthful intelligence and youthful application, and that they bent all their energies to producing a book stamped broad with clearness of exposition and attractiveness of matter. Here is a specimen from Exercise 27—Davus tells a story to the children, Sextus and Tullia :—

‘D.—Nōn longa est fābula. Horātii pater villam habitābat ad Venusiam, oppidum inter Lūcāniam et Āpuliam ; in tabulā (*on the map*) id quaerite. Quid, Sexte ? Nōn reperīre potes ? Quaere et tū, Tullia. Bene est ; nunc igitur pergēmus. Vidētis inter Appenninōrum clivōs oppidum iacēre ; multa ibi arbusta erant, multum silvae. Silvam habitābant multae ferae, lupi, ursi, vīperae ; in oppidum non veniēbant, sed per inculta nōn procul errābant. Extrā oppidum casam habēbat Pollia serva, fēmina iam annōsa, cūrārū plēna ; ad casam eius nōn nunquam veniēbat puerulus Horātius. Dum extrā līmen (*Acc. Neut., threshold*) Polliae ōlim lūdit, sentit eam āversam esse nec iam suum lūdum cūrāre. Currit subito per clivum, per arbusta ; ad silvam venit ; paulum stat incertus, spectat nunc ad casam, nunc procul ad oppidum, nunc ad silvam ; tum in mediam silvam pergit impavidus.’

‘S.—Quid ibi reperit, Dāve ? ’

‘D.—Crās audiētis ; hodiē nimis fessī estis. Bonum est bonam fābulam exspectāre.’

The reading-exercises and dialogues touch upon some of the most interesting passages of Grecian and Roman History and are written in a free but accurate style. A separate appendix has been prepared for the use of teachers showing how to apply the oral method to the subject-matter of the book. There are 292 pages of exercises, containing 171 exercises in all, with their aids and explanations, 14 pages giving a useful summary of accidence, and 65 pages of vocabulary and index. A three years' course would take the student of average ability over the entire book, and would give him all the Latin that would be required of him at any of the Matriculation examinations held in these countries.

We may briefly sum up under three heads our impressions of the book. (1) It gives valuable notes on the origin of various forms and constructions, a matter of great interest to the intelligent teacher. (2) It marks all long vowels. Thus, we find 'pōns' with the 'o' marked long, but 'pontifex' with the 'o' unmarked, and therefore short. Quantities such as the 'o' in 'pons,' which cannot be determined from verse-scansion, are called by English writers 'hidden quantities.' The authors of the book under review assume that teachers understand what is meant thereby, and it may reasonably be contended that the expression, if not self-explanatory, becomes sufficiently clear when a few instances of the use and omission of the long sign, as in the words mentioned above, are studied. (3) The exercises deal with themes attractive to the young and many of them unfold themselves in the flowing ease of the conversational style which must make the pupil realize that he is in touch with a language, once spoken by boys like himself, and not the mere mental equivalent of a faded parchment, the feeble echo of a vanished world.

M. S.

ENGLISH AS WE SPEAK IT IN IRELAND By P. W. Joyce, LL.D., M.R.I.A. Dublin: Gill & Son; London: Longmans.

DR. JOYCE in this volume, which is characterised by the painstaking research, accuracy, and fullness that are found in everything he does, has laid the educational world under a new obligation. The study of the Anglo-Irish dialect has hitherto been very scrappily treated; Dr. Joyce gives us the collected experience of all who have already written on the subject, and in addition the results of his own ripe scholarship, wide acquaintance, long, acute, and steady observation. For more than twenty years he has been compiling examples of the Anglo-Irish idiom, and it is doubtful if one peculiarity of our people's speech has escaped his note-book. Peculiarities of pronunciation, local and general, idioms, strange turns of expression, some universally employed through the country, others limited to provinces or counties, all are set down here, labelled, their sources indicated, their meaning explained. The three sources of our dialect are set forth and examined in detail—the Irish language; Old English and Scotch; the independent dialectic

variations that have arisen amongst our people in the development of English with them ; and Dr. Joyce traces each peculiarity to one or other of them.

The book is full of learning ; but it is learning made light and quaint and readable by the genial gossip with which it abounds. The Vocabulary in the thirteenth chapter is a most valuable collection of idiomatic and dialectic words.

CHRIST, THE CHURCH, AND MAN. An Essay on New Methods in Ecclesiastical Study and Worship. By His Eminence Cardinal Capecepatro, Archbishop of Capua. London : Burns and Oates.

THE argument of this little volume as His Eminence states, is 'to point out to the clergy the new path they should follow in their studies and in the exercise of Divine worship to promote the religious and moral renewing of Christianity' in the new era that has begun. The book is divided into brief pregnant chapters full of wise and learned counsel and fatherly advice. As examples of the contents we might refer to the chapters on Theological Studies, The Need of a Newer Method in Theology, Biblical Studies, Liturgical Music, Religion, and Literature, and to the 'New Apologia for Christianity in relation to the Social Question.'

THEOLOGIA MORALIS. Auctore Augustino Lehmkuhl, S.J. Editio Undecima. Revisa, Refecta, Adaucta. Friburgi Brisgoviae : Sumptibus Herder. 1910.

THIS is the eleventh edition of Lehmkuhl's great work on Moral Theology. Of the value of the work itself nothing need be said. It has been proved by twenty-five years' experience, which is not a bad test ; and now at the end of a quarter of a century it is renovated, recast, and renewed, so as to be brought thoroughly up to date, and to reflect most accurately the teaching of Pope Pius X. on marriage and espousals, frequent Communion, application and stipends of Masses, etc. Several pages have been added, and considerable changes have been made in certain parts that are not quite new. The marginal numbers are entirely changed, but a key to the numbers of former editions is thoughtfully supplied. We recommend Lehmkuhl's *Moral Theology* as sincerely now as ever, and wish it continued prosperity and success.

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